

**From Crime to Illness**  
**Shifts in the Iranian Press Discourse on Drugs**  
**(1995-2000)**

Thesis  
presented to the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences  
of the University of Zurich  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by  
David Arn

Accepted in the fall semester 2010  
on the recommendation of

Prof. Dr. Andreas Kaplony and Prof. Dr. Katajun Amirpur

Zurich, 2019

## Table of Contents

I	Introduction	2
II	A Short History of Opium in Iran	8
III	A Short History of the Press in the Islamic Republic	91
IV.	Aims, Sources and Methodologies of the Analysis	132
1	Aim And Scope of the Analysis of the Iranian Press Discourse on Drugs	132
2	Selection, Quantity, and Quality of the Drug Related Newspaper Articles	134
3	The Methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis	148
V.	Analysis of the Iranian Press Discourse on Drugs	163
1	Discourse Events: the Basic Structure	163
2	A Chronology of Topics and Arguments	171
3	The Imagery: the Language as collective symbols	230
VI.	Synthesis and Interpretation of the Iranian Press Discourse on Drugs	250
1	Homogenizing Powers	253
2	Heterogenizing Powers	274
3	Summary: Professional Journalism	289
VII	Conclusion and Outlook	294
VIII	Appendix: Drug Related Newspaper Articles in the Iranian Daily Press	299
XI	Bibliography	326

## **I. Introduction**

When the author of this study travelled for the first time to Iran, in 1999, he was surprised to be confronted with so many drug dealers and drug addicts, more or less openly selling and consuming drugs in the street. It was not long after he learnt that the Islamic Republic has one of the world's highest addiction rates to drugs, particularly opiates. Not long ago, Switzerland had introduced a major drug policy change by introducing the controlled distribution of heroin to long-time intravenous drug users. This provoked a heated discussion in the Swiss media and society at large, eventually leading to a broad-based acceptance of such harm reduction measures in the country. As a result, the author of this study started to develop a keen interest in similar discussions about local drug addiction and the best ways to confront it in Iran. This promised to be an interesting entry point to this research as drugs are not only prohibited by law, but also proscribed by religion, which is deeply ingrained in the Islamic Republic.

When the author visited Iran in 1999, the country had experienced acute internal tensions since the revolution of 1979. While the author was travelling through the country, huge student demonstrations took place in Tehrān against the conservative ruling elite. This was a manifestation of a broader conflict between a new generation of reformist politicians and the conservative elite that is in control of almost all centers of powers in Iran. This factional line of division runs through the whole political landscape, and arguably society as a whole. Spearheading the reformists at the time was Moḥammad Ḥātāmī, who had just been elected president of the country in May 1997. The reformists were, thus, in control of the executive, whose power is in many ways limited in Iran. The real power in Iran lies with the Supreme Leader 'Alī Ḥāmeneḥ'ī and the conservatives allied with him. This conflict between a conservative and a reformist faction actually dates back to the beginning of the Islamic Republic; but it increasingly escalated from the mid 1990s.

### ***Political & cultural background***

The struggle between the two factions was, arguably, first and foremost about power and influence. But it became manifest in a fundamental ideological difference, namely concerning the conception of political and religious authority and the approach towards governance. Such a basic tension is already contained in the constitution of the Islamic Republic and even in its name, as it contains both, elements of a “theocratic” or clerical political order, and of a republican or democratic order. This contradiction was the result of a

political compromise in the beginning of the Islamic Republic but it continued to characterize Iran ever since. Tensions between the representatives of the two ideological strands appeared in the forefront in the matters of everyday politics.

Since the end of the long war against Iraq, political, social and economic challenges of the country were plenty. The early decision-makers of the Islamic Republic had come forward with the ideological claim to thoroughly reform the Iranian society, eliminating all previous problems. This resulted in much success, especially in the fields of education and health care. Due to the war, many previous problems, however, persisted. At the beginning of the 1990s, the political elite increasingly admitted that it had failed to solve poverty, unemployment, rural development, urbanization, and last but not least drug addiction. They, consequently, started to address these problems seriously, but it remained divided along the old ideological fracture line. As a result, in the field of drug policy, however, the government gradually made a volte-face from the previously repressive drug policy to an increasingly liberal drug policy, including some of the most progressive harm reduction measures in the region.

Such economic and social reforms had already started during the administration of the moderate and pragmatic president Akbar Rafsanjānī. But it only took a truly progressive turn under the reformist administration of Ḥātāmī, in many political, social and cultural fields. The reformists adopted an entirely new political program, propagating concepts like rule of law, democracy, civil society, and particularly press freedom. Thus, they decidedly departed from the almost two decades of political, economic, social and cultural authoritarianism and rigidity. With their explicit encouragement, new political groups formed; cultural production grew exponentially; non-governmental organizations developed; student organizations demonstrated; and women, long being considered second-class citizens, became increasingly active and vocal in the public sphere. Arguably the most crucial change in this regard, took place in the media landscape, particularly in the press. From 1998, a large number of outspoken and critical reformist newspapers appeared that were crucial for the promotion of the reformist agenda.

However, it must be noted that the conservatives vehemently opposed this new political development. They saw their hold on power threatened by such new, participatory concepts, and strongly disagreed with the new cultural freedoms, ostensibly fearing a dilution of the Islamic character of the Republic. As a result, they started to attack the reformists, and

with them large sections of the civil society, which was taking profit from the new opportunities by actively participating in the political, social and cultural life. This power struggle, arguably, was primarily taking place within and over the press. In the absence of legal political parties in Iran at the time, the newspapers became surrogates or at least mouthpieces for the political factions, in particular for the reformists. The conservatives, who were in control of all influential centers of power in Iran, had other means to fight back against the reformists and their newspapers; especially through the security forces and the courts. By 2000, they largely succeeded in banning almost all critical reformist newspapers. The reformists would continue to control the administration until 2005, and the factional conflict persists to this day.

### ***Aim and scope of the study***

While concomitantly serving as organs for the political factions, Iranian newspapers have a more general function when reporting on general political, economic, social and cultural issues. They were naturally expected to report about drug-related issues. Since such “social problems” are often still a taboo in Iran, the author initially was not certain if the press covers this topic at all. A first research stay in Iran in the year 2006, however, soon proved that the Iranian press reports in detail about the local situation of drug consumption, drug addiction, drug trafficking and drug policy, including ever more progressive addiction therapy and harm reduction measures, as well as drug prevention.

The present study, therefore, aims at analyzing Iranian press discourse on drugs. The press was chosen as a research subject because it is arguably the freest public forum in Iran, much more than the strictly controlled television and radio. It also reflects the broadest range of publicly expressed opinions in Iran. Given its crucial role as a venue for factional disputes, the press could be expected to mirror sharp factional differences on the important sociopolitical topic of drugs. The present study is interested in how the Iranian press writes about drugs, drug addiction and drug policy in Iran: which drugs they report to be prevalent; how they judge drug addiction; which drug policy measures they discuss; and how they conceive their own role in informing about such topics. The study will analyze the range of the main topics and arguments, diverging opinions, changes and developments, and further peculiarities concerning the format, style, sources and language of this discourse. Since content analyses of Iranian newspapers are generally scant, such an analysis proves to be of critical importance. The study further aims at analyzing the interplay of different factors that influence the Iranian

press discourse on drugs. Naturally such factors are the official drug policy and the press policy; but also international drug policy discourse, religious discourse and scientific discourse.

In order to fully grasp the importance of the shifts taking place in Iranian drug policy, and consequently in the press discourse on drugs, the analysis examines the drug related press coverage during a sample period comprising the years before and after the election of Ḥātāmī. This period encompasses six years (1995-2000), but the analysis will only consider every alternate year, specifically the years 1374 (1995-96), 1376 (1997-98) and 1378 (1999-2000).

### ***Methodological basis***

Methodologically and theoretically, the analysis is based primarily on Foucault's *discourse analysis*, but complemented with Fairclough's and Jäger's *critical discourse analysis* and the *grounded theory*. While maintaining that discourses are characterized by a large homogeneity, *discourse analyses* is nevertheless also interested in the power play between differing individual positions that try to influence and thus change the overall discourse. *Discourse analysis* is both interested in such homogeneous and heterogeneous factors, since both exert power on and thus influence the discourse. The analysis will thus concentrate both on regular, homogeneous and irregular, heterogeneous patterns within Iranian press discourse on drugs. Since the analysis encompasses the diachronic development of Iranian press discourse over the course of three consecutive years, it pays special attention to the establishment of homogenous discourse orders, as portrayed in Foucault's "*Archaeology of Knowledge*". Against this background, *discourse analysis* is, thus, considered a particularly apt methodology for the present analysis. In a final interpretative observation, the study aims at reflecting more generally on the role of the press in Iran.

### ***The structure of the study***

The present study is organized into five main chapters. The first two introductory chapters cover the history of drugs and drug policy in Iran (chapter II), as well as the history of the press and press policy during the Islamic Republic (chapter III). This is followed by a methodological chapter comprising of a description of the aim and scope, the sources (newspapers), and the methodology of the analysis (chapter IV). A descriptive analysis of the Iranian press discourse on drugs is next undertaken, which includes the structuring of *discourse events*; the chronological order and development of the main topics and arguments;

and the typical linguistic imagery (chapter V). The last chapter, finally, consists of a synthesis and interpretation of the previous chapter, which particularly examines the various factors that influence and alter the Iranian press discourse on drugs.

The first chapter [**chapter II**] provides a summary of the long history of drug consumption in Iran, concentrating on shifting social and political patterns in regards to drug addiction and related problems. It concomitantly gives a survey on the most important literature in European languages and in Farsi. The chapter follows the sequence of consecutive political time periods, by paying particular attention to changes in drug consumption and drug policy patterns. This history presents itself as a prime example of a trial-and-error approach towards drug policy, in which liberal and repressive drug policies alternate. Of particular interest is the observation that emerges as to how the Islamic Republic has repeated many mistakes of previous governments.

The second chapter [**chapter III**] gives a survey on the development of the press during the Islamic Republic. The history of the press in Iran is, arguably, even more strongly characterized by successive periods of press freedom and periods of strict press control. While the first period of press freedom during the *Constitutional Revolution* of 1905-1911 had a lasting impact on the development of the Iranian press, two further such periods have taken place since 1979 alone. This chapter concentrates on the last “press spring” in Iran between 1997 and 2001, and its interrelation with the concomitant political reform process and the factional power struggle; as well as on the legal framework.

The third chapter [**chapter IV**] lays out the aim and scope of the analysis. It continues to describe the newspapers represented in the discourse, including their political affiliation, and gives a first overview on the quantitative distribution of drug related articles over the course of the sample period. It finally lays out the contours of the combined methodologies of (*critical*) *discourse analysis* and *grounded theory*, which form the basis of the present analysis.

The fourth chapter [**chapter V**] first provides an analysis of so-called *discourse events*. These events are triggered by the publication of newspaper articles, which, as a result, often appear in clusters around specific dates and events. They consequently provide Iranian press discourse with a first structure. The chapter proceeds to give a chronological account of the development of the most important topics and arguments of the Iranian press discourse on drugs. It thus reproduces the impression, an average reader of Iranian newspapers might have experienced in Iran. Eventually, it analyzes typical features of the language and linguistic

imagery of the discourse. This often contradicts the explicit arguments that are made, therefore revealing the persistence of the more unconscious perceptions of the Iranian society.

The fifth chapter [**chapter VI**] synthetizes and interprets the analytical description of the previous chapter. It pays particular attention to the various extrinsic and intrinsic influences that shape and influence Iranian press discourse. It will show that these forces have various homogenizing and heterogenizing effects on the discourse, which as a result is constantly being renegotiated. Such power is especially exerted by the official Iranian drug policy and to a lesser degree by Iranian press policy but also by further factors such as the international or the medical drug *discourse levels*. The chapter argues that Iranian press develops its own, intrinsic dynamic, which produces its own homogeneities and, as will be argued, especially heterogeneities. The chapter concludes with some general considerations on the changing role and function of the press during the sample period. It argues, that despite being organs for the competing political factions, Iranian newspapers increasingly adopted professional journalistic ethics and have slowly developed into an entity independent from the state, a fourth estate so to speak.



## II. A Short History of Opium in Iran

Archaeological findings at different sites in Central Europe demonstrate that humanity had become conscious of the nutritious and healing power of the opium poppy (*papaver somniferum*) already in the 4<sup>th</sup> millennium BC.<sup>1</sup> Sumerian and Assyrian clay tablets from the 3<sup>rd</sup> millennium BC provide the first written evidence for the cultivation of this important plant. Opium is referred to as “the red brown drug” or more figuratively the “joy plant” (*hul gil*).<sup>2</sup> The familiarity with the amenities of the poppy plant spread to the ancient world around the Mediterranean. Egyptian papyri from the 2<sup>nd</sup> millennium BC list a variety of ailments against which opium-containing drugs were prescribed, even if the raw material might have been imported from Crete<sup>3</sup>, where a statue of the so-called “poppy goddess” suggests a cultic use of opium around the 13<sup>th</sup> century BC.<sup>4</sup> Not long after, the Greek world becomes the most important centre for opium production in antiquity.<sup>5</sup>

### Opium in the Hellenic World

Already Homer (9<sup>th</sup> – 8<sup>th</sup> cent. BC) in his *Iliad* mentions poppy (*mekon*) and the “pain reliever” (*nepenthes*) from Egypt.<sup>6</sup> Opium appears increasingly in a medical context. Hippocrates (5<sup>th</sup> cent. BC) for instance describes it as a cathartic, astringent and narcotic drug;<sup>7</sup> Theophrastus (371/70-287/86) lists different poppy categories in his *historia plantarum*;<sup>8</sup> and Pedanios Dioscorides (1<sup>st</sup> century BC) differentiates between *opion*, the proper opium “juice”<sup>9</sup> and *mekones*, the sap of the entire crushed plant.<sup>10</sup> The poppy was also an attribute of several Greek gods, among them namely Demeter, the goddess of agriculture; as such opium seems to have been as well part of the *Eleusinian Mysteries*. Demeter is said to have consumed poppy juice to forget about the loss of her daughter Persephone in the city of Sicyon,

<sup>1</sup> E.g. in today’s France (Provence), Italy (Milano) and Switzerland (Robenhausen): **Seefelder** (1996), 9f.; **Booth** (1996), 15.

<sup>2</sup> **Neligan** (1927), 1f.; **Kritikos & Papadaki I** (1976); **Brownstein** (1993), 5391; **Scarborough** (1995), 17;

<sup>2</sup> **Neligan** (1927), 1f.; **Kritikos & Papadaki I** (1976); **Brownstein** (1993), 5391; **Scarborough** (1995), 17; the exact meaning of *hul gil* is contested among assyriologists: **Seefelder** (1996), 12, 25f.; opium was already collected by the incision of poppy pods: **Booth** (1996), 15f.

<sup>3</sup> **Neligan**, **Kritikos & Papadaki** and **Seefelder** question the cultivation of poppy in Egypt before Hellenistic time: **Neligan** (1927), 2; **Kritikos & Papadaki I** (1976); **Scarborough** (1995), 4.; **Seefelder** (1996), 12f., 16, 19, 26ff.; **MATTHEE** assumes that “*real opium*” was found in a Pharaonic tomb (1500 BC): **Matthee** (2005), 97.

<sup>4</sup> Researchers disagree whether the depictions are to be interpreted as opium pods or pomegranates: **Kritikos & Papadaki II** (1976); **Askitopoulou & al.** (2002).

<sup>5</sup> The earliest coins depicting poppy pods were found in the 7<sup>th</sup> cent. BC in Lydia: **Seefelder** (1996), 15, 31.

<sup>6</sup> *Nepentes* most probably refers to opium: **Brownstein** (1993), 5391; **Scarborough** (1995), 4; **Seefelder** (1996), 17, 19, 28f.; **Booth** (1996), 18f.; **Matthee** (2005), 97.

<sup>7</sup> According to **Neligan** Hippocrates called it “poppy juice” (*opos mekonos*): **Neligan** (1927), 3; **Seefelder** (1996), 29; **Booth** (1996), 18.

<sup>8</sup> **Kritikos & Papadaki I** (1976); **Scarborough** (1995), 5; **Seefelder** (1996), 30; **Booth** (1996), 16;

<sup>9</sup> *Opion* is a diminutive of *opos* „(vegetable) juice“: **Neligan** (1927), 3; **Dubler** (*Afyūn – EI*); **Seefelder** (1996), 9; **Booth** (1996), xi; **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn – EI*).

<sup>10</sup> **Neligan** (1927), 4; **Kritikos & Papadaki I** (1976).

which was also known as Mekone, the “city of poppies”.<sup>11</sup> Consequently, the depiction of poppy pods on statues or vessels came to symbolize fertility and wealth, healing and therapy, sleep and death or ecstasy and euphoria.<sup>12</sup>

Closely related to death – or the fear of death respectively – are the popular *theriaka*. Recipes for these antidotes are handed down from Nicander of Colophon (3<sup>rd</sup> – 2<sup>nd</sup> cent. BC).<sup>13</sup> In Roman times, the *theriaka* of Galen (129-216 AD) were famous as it contained opium as a main active agent and were prescribed as miracle cure.<sup>14</sup> Galen, however, only had developed earlier recipes of alexipharmic, which were variedly known as *mithridatum*<sup>15</sup>, *philonium*<sup>16</sup> or *galene*<sup>17</sup>. The Romans seem to have consumed these cure-alls in great quantity and not exclusively for medical purposes. The Roman physicians Galen and Pedanios Dioscorides (1<sup>st</sup> cent. AD)<sup>18</sup>, notably still of Greek origin, were accordingly already aware of opium’s addictive capacity and the notion of tolerance.<sup>19</sup>

The influence of Greek and Roman medical use of opium on locally and timely neighbouring cultures is particularly visible in the terminology of poppy and opium. Greek *mekon* turned into *mak* in different Slavic languages or *Mohn* in German,<sup>20</sup> while *opion*<sup>21</sup> became *opium* in various European languages, but also *afyūn* (or rarely *apyūn*) in Arabic and Persian,<sup>22</sup> *ahiphena* or *aphuka* in Sanskrit and

<sup>11</sup> Demeter – as well as Hypnos and his twin brother Thanatos – are often depicted with bundles of poppy – as are their Roman equivalents: **Seefelder** (1996), 14f., 18, 35, 40; **Booth** (1996), 17, 20; Askitopoulou & al. (2002), 28f.; for the use of opium in initiation rites of the *Eleusinian Mysteries*: **Kritikos & Papadaki I** (1976) & **Kritikos & Papadaki II** (1976).

<sup>12</sup> **Kritikos & Papadaki I** (1976).

<sup>13</sup> The early theriacs did, however, not contain opium yet: **Scarborough** (1995), 5, 11; SEEFELDER refutes the etymology of *theriak* as a derivation of “viper” (*therion*): **Seefelder** (1996), 31; ĀDARAHŠ assumes a derivation from the the city of Tyros: ĀDARAHŠ (1955/56), 345.

<sup>14</sup> Galen advised opium containing drugs as a panacea against vertigo, epilepsy, poor sight, asthma, bronchitis, leprosy, coughs, colics, fever or melancholy: **Neligan** (1927), 4; **Scarborough** (1995), 17f.; **Seefelder** (1996), 41f.; **Booth** (1996), 19.

<sup>15</sup> Named after Mithridates VI of Pontus (120/63 BC), who reportedly took so much of this antidote that he eventually became immune to poison: **Neligan** (1927), 3; **Scarborough** (1995), 17; **Seefelder** (1996), 32f., 37; **Booth** (1996), 19.

<sup>16</sup> Named after the pharmacologist Philo of Tarsus (1<sup>st</sup> cent. AD): **Seefelder** (1987), 31f.

<sup>17</sup> A term, which was adapted to the antidote by Andromachos the Elder (1<sup>st</sup> cent. AD), Nero’s personal physician, from an expression meaning “calmness of the sea” or “stillness”: **Neligan** (1927), 3; **Scarborough** (1995), 17; **Seefelder** (1996), 40ff.; **Ambühl** (*Galene* – New Pauly); **Eder** (*Tranquilitas* – New Pauly).

<sup>18</sup> Dioscorides wrote extensively on the different applications of opium, e.g. as lozenges, powder, decoctions or syrups, which were prescribed against almost all ailments: **Neligan** (1927), 4; **Scarborough** (1995), 5ff., 15ff.; **Seefelder** (1996), 37f.; **Booth** (1996), 17.

<sup>19</sup> Scarborough and Seefelder both accentuate, that the modern differentiation between a medical and a recreational drug use, doesn’t make sense for these early times: **Scarborough**, (1995), 10f., 18; **Seefelder** (1996), 40; **Booth** (1996), 19.

<sup>20</sup> A southern German variant was *magen* (still visible in Magenbrot, a type of cookie): **Seefelder** (1996), 18; assuming a reverse etymology from Germanic *mago*: **Kritikos & Papadaki I** (1976) & **Kritikos & Papadaki II** (1976).

<sup>21</sup> **Neligan** (1927), 3; **Dubler** (*Afyūn* – EI); **Seefelder** (1996), 9; **Booth** (1996), xi; **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EI).

<sup>22</sup> **Neligan** (1927), 5f.; **Kritikos & Papadaki I** (1976); tracing it back to the city Afyon, which at the time was however known as Akroinon and only later obtained the name Afyon: **Seefelder** (1996), 18f.; **Matthee** (2005), 97; **Dubler** (*Afyūn* – EI); **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EI).

(y)apian or *afurong* in Chinese.<sup>23</sup> In Ottoman Turkey and in Persia, opium containing *theriak* had become *tiryāq* or *taryāk*, a term that soon was used for opium itself.<sup>24</sup> In modern times, many of the fifty alkaloids of opium obtained their name in allusion to the Greek-Roman culture, namely *morphine*, *codeine* or *papaverine*.<sup>25</sup>

The exact date of an Iranian acquaintance with opium is unknown. The only pre-Islamic evidence for the use of opium in Persia dates from the Sassanid period, when the Zoroastrian book of Ardā Vīrāz (*ardā-vīrāz-nāmāg*) refers to opium as *afyūn* or *apyūn*. This term clearly indicates a Greek influence.<sup>26</sup> Yet, in view of the scarcity of ancient Iranian literature and given the use of opium in ancient Mesopotamia, an Elamite acquaintance with the drug cannot be excluded altogether.<sup>27</sup> In Achaemenid time, Darius the Great could have come across opium during his campaigns to Egypt or Asia Minor.<sup>28</sup> Early Iranians were aware of the remedial properties of herbal drugs as revealed by the cultic use of *haoma* and other drugs in the Avesta.<sup>29</sup> During Alexander the Great's conquest, or the subsequent Seleucid rule at the latest, medical applications of opium can be expected to have been introduced to Iranian territory as well.<sup>30</sup>

More crucial for the proliferation of medical knowledge on opium was perhaps the Sassanid era. Greek physicians might have performed for a long time in the Persian Empire. After the Christianization of the Roman Empire, many pagan physicians and scholars were forced to flee the new austerity, certainly carrying with them Galen's and Dioscorides' opium recipes. Many found a safe haven in Nisibis or Gondēšāpūr, contributing to the reputation of

<sup>23</sup> For the Sanskrit terms found in Ayurvedic medical texts: **Neligan** (1927), 5; **Dwarakanath** (1965); for the Chinese terms: **Neligan** (1927), 6; **Dikötter** (2004), 78.

<sup>24</sup> To this day opium continues to be called *teryāk* in Iran: **Neligan** (1927), 3f.; **Matthee** (2005), 97f.; **Dubler** (*Afyūn* – EIr); **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EIr).

<sup>25</sup> *Morphine* from Morpheus, god of sleep; *codeine* from *kodeia*, the “poppy pod”; *thebaine* from the Egyptian Thebes (*thebai*), a region famous for its opium; and *papaverin* from Latin *papaver*, to which the English *poppy* or the French *pavot* can be traced: **Seefeldter** (1996), 19f., 32; **Booth** (1996), 16.

<sup>26</sup> Erroneously ascribed to the Parthian epoch: **Neligan** (1927), 7; the Ardā Vīrāz (6<sup>th</sup> cent. AD) specifically mentions “opium oil” (*mishgā-i apīyūn*), which is mentioned together with poison: **Haug & West** (1872), 117; **Parvin & Sommer** (1987), 247; **Kūhī-Kermānī** (1945/46), 136; **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 42; **Matthee** (2005), 97; **Gignoux** (*Ardā-Vīrāz* – EIr).

<sup>27</sup> **Neligan** (1927), 2; Malek-Moḥammadī considers the Elamites mainly because they were non-Aryan: **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 39.

<sup>28</sup> **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 41.

<sup>29</sup> The identification of *haoma* (Sanskrit *soma*) is disputed; often it is assumed to be the stimulant plant *ephedra*: **Falk** (1989); **Taillieu** (*Haoma I* – EIr); **Boyce** (*Haoma II* – EIr); **Seefeldter** (1996), 51; many denotations of drugs from the middle ages can be traced back to a Persian origin: **Sajjādī** (*Drugs* – EIr).

<sup>30</sup> **Neligan** (1927), 7; **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EIr); related to the introduction of opium into India during Alexander the Great's reign: **Kritikos & Papadaki II** (1976); **Scarsborough** (1995), 4, **Matthee** (2005), 97; Seefeldter disagrees: **Seefeldter** (1996), 19, 51.

famous medical colleges there.<sup>31</sup> Others continued to teach at the medical school of Alexandria, which the Sassanids controlled for a short time before the Arab conquest.<sup>32</sup> Not long after, Islamic sources depict the Persian shahs as always keeping the popular theriacs with them.<sup>33</sup> In all likelihood, opium thus was introduced to Iran before the Arab conquest in the 7<sup>th</sup> century AD.

## II. 1. Opium in Islamic Persia

The Arab conquests, and especially their scientific developments, were crucial for the proliferation of the knowledge about opium and its use in the Islamic world. Whether the Arabs were already trading opium in the Indian Ocean before Islamic times remains speculative.<sup>34</sup> Later, they certainly traded opium with countries as far as India and China including Iran.<sup>35</sup>

The medical prescription of opium had already been present in the regions, which after 632 AD (10 HQ) successively came under Arab dominance. This is especially true for Egypt, but in all likelihood as well for Iran.<sup>36</sup> The physicians of the Umayyad caliphs, most of them of Syriac or Greek origin, certainly knew the works of the old Greek masters and might have prescribed opium-containing medicine in their own communities and at the court.<sup>37</sup>

Not long after the Abbasid takeover, an intense period of translations from the Greek medical canon took place, often through the intermediary of Syriac works. Information on various illnesses and their cures, among them especially the *theriaka*, thus became accessible in Arabic as well. The two outstanding early physicians and translators Yuhannā Ibn Māsawaih (d. 857 AD) and Hunain ibn Ishāq (808-873) both mention the poppy plant and the

<sup>31</sup> Seefelder (1996), 49f.; Sajjādī (*Drugs* – EIr); Russell (*Greece: Greek Medicine in Persia* – EIr); the Greek name *apyūn/afyūn* in the *Ardā-Vīrāz* might date from Sassanid or even from Seleucid time: Neligan (1927), 7; other authors consider Gondēšāpūr in the 6<sup>th</sup> century AD generally an “outpost of Hellenism”: Savage-Smith & al. (*Tibb* – EI);

<sup>32</sup> Russell (*Greece: Greek Medicine in Persia* – EIr)

<sup>33</sup> Ccorroborated by the Arab physician ‘Alī al-Ṭabarī: Seefelder (1996), 50f.

<sup>34</sup> A pre-Islamic Arab opium trade to India is assumed by: Neligan (1927), 5; Kūhī-Kermānī (1945/46), 103, 136f.; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 42.

<sup>35</sup> Kūhī-Kermānī (1945/46), 136f.; Brownstein (1993), 5391; Seefelder (1996), 23; Booth (1996), 21f.; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 42f.

<sup>36</sup> The medical knowledge about opium certainly was still prevalent in Alexandria and arguably in Gondēšāpūr; poppies might still have been grown in Upper Egypt, later again an important region for opium production: Seefelder (1996), 50, 52f.; Dubler (*Afyūn* – EI); Sajjādī (*Drugs* – EIr).

<sup>37</sup> Few information are available on the situation of medicine under the Umayyads: Savage-Smith & al. (*Tibb* – EI); Sajjādī (*Drugs* – EIr).

medical uses of opium and theriacs,<sup>38</sup> as does the equally renowned ‘Alī al-Ṭabarī (d. 864), who was of Persian origin.<sup>39</sup>

Of the later Muslim physicians and polymaths, who all built their works on these early translations, two scholars of Persian descent are worth mentioning: al-Rāzī (Rhazes) and Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna). In his pharmacological encyclopaedia the influential physician Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Rāzī (854-924 or 935) mentions wild and cultivated forms of opium poppy and describes various prescriptions of theriacs against a plethora of ailments.<sup>40</sup> Arguably, the only person to overshadow his reputation is Ibn Sīnā (980-1037), considered to be the most famous Muslim polymath. He wrote in detail about the beneficial effects of the “great theriac” (*al-tiryāq al-fārūqī*) as he calls the opium-containing antidotes and reported a widespread opium use in Ḥorāsān and Transoxania. Taken along with al-Rāzī’s comment on poppy cultivation, a local opium production in Iran can therefore not be excluded. Both physicians also warn of an excessive use of opium because of its addictive and lethal potential. This did not prevent Ibn Sīnā of dying from an opium overdose himself according to Arab sources.<sup>41</sup> At the same time, the equally versed polymath al-Bīrūnī (973-1048) mentions *kūknār*, a proper Persian name for “poppy”, and reports that opium was widely consumed in the hot climate of Mecca.<sup>42</sup> These outstanding scholars were all working at the courts of the new semi-independent Iranian principalities of the Sāmānids, Būyīds or Ġaznavīds.<sup>43</sup>

#### Opium in Persian poetry

“The poison of separation has killed you, ‘Aṭṭār  
it is time to talk about [taking] taryāk”<sup>44</sup>

From the outset, Persian epic and lyric literature, which was crucial for the development of a distinctive Persian collective identity, refers to opium and *theriaka* in their manifold applications. The general increase in opium consumption in the 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> century is increasingly reflected by corresponding references in the Persian literature.

<sup>38</sup> Seefelder (1996), 50f.; Sajjādī (*Drugs* – EIr); both of them apparently were close to Iranian circles at the court; Ibn Ishāq even wrote a treatise on antidotes (*al-tiryāq*): Vadet (*Ibn Māsawaih, Abū Zakariyyā’ Yuḥannā* – EI); Strohmaier (*Hunain b. Ishāq al-‘Ibādī* – EI).

<sup>39</sup> Seefelder (1996), 51; Sajjādī (*Drugs* – EIr).

<sup>40</sup> Neligan (1927), 7f.; Kūhī-Kermānī (1945/46), 104; Ādaraḥš (1955/56), 343; Seefelder (1996), 52; Booth (1996), 21; Sajjādī (*Drugs* – EIr); Goodman (*al-Rāzī, Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Zakariyyā’* – EI).

<sup>41</sup> Neligan (1927), 7f.; Kūhī-Kermānī (1945/46), 104; Ādaraḥš (1955/56), 343; Sajjādī (*Drugs* – EIr); Seefelder (1996), 52ff.; Booth (1996), 21; Mathee (2005), 98.

<sup>42</sup> al-Bīrūnī calls the white poppy *mīqūna* (*mekon*) and the black poppy “cough pomegranate” (*rummān al-su‘āl*): Seefelder (1996), 54; Boilot (*al-Bīrūnī {Bērūnī}, Abu ‘l-Raiḥān Muḥammad b. Aḥmad* – EI).

<sup>43</sup> Further authors, who wrote about opium, were e.g. ‘Alī b. al-‘Abbās al-Maḡūsī (10<sup>th</sup> cent. AD) and Muwaffaq Harawī (10<sup>th</sup>-11<sup>th</sup> cent. AD): Seefelder (1996), 52; Elgood (‘*Alī b. al-‘Abbās al-Maḡūsī* – EI); Karamarti & Rezaee (*Abū Manṣūr Muwaffaq Harawī* – EI).

<sup>44</sup> (*košt zahr-e haḡr tō ‘aṭṭār-rā – vaqt agar āmad dam az taryāq zan*): Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 124.

All famous Persian poets essentially refer to *taryāq* / *taryāk*, especially in its capacity as a cure-all against the pains and sorrows of love, both earthly and mystically. Relevant verses have been written by Ferdousī (10<sup>th</sup> cent.), Nāṣer-e Ḥosrou (11<sup>th</sup> cent.), Sanā'ī (11<sup>th</sup> cent.), 'Omar-e Ḥayyām (11<sup>th</sup>-12<sup>th</sup> cent.), 'Aṭṭār (12<sup>th</sup>-13<sup>th</sup> cent.), Rūmī (13<sup>th</sup> cent.), Sa'dī (13<sup>th</sup> cent.) and Ḥāfeẓ (14<sup>th</sup> cent.).<sup>45</sup>

The recurring allusions to the addictive and fatal nature of opium in these medical and pharmaceutical works suggest that opium was not exclusively taken as a medicine. The same source that reports the overdose of Ibn Sīnā speaks of another victim of opium: Mas'ūd I Ġaznavī (r. 1030-40 AD), son of the famous Maḥmūd Ġaznavī (r. 998-1030) who was reported to have consumed “a little opium” (*andak-e taryākī*) and as a result overslept and lost a crucial battle against the Salġūqs.<sup>46</sup> The distinction between a medical and a recreational drug use is, nevertheless a modern one. However, at that time, differentiation might have been between a moderate and an excessive use. Against the background of the classical medical theory of the four temperaments, al-Bīrūnī's description of opium consumption in Mecca as a means to endure the torrid heat might thus rather be judged as medical use. As shown by the increasing varieties of opium preparations, opium nevertheless started to become a fashionable drug again no later than the 10<sup>th</sup> century AD, like during the Roman times. Opium was prescribed in a variety of recipes, either pure (*ḥāleṣ*) or mixed (*maḥlūt*), as “powder” (*masūd*), “potion” (*ma'ġūn*), dissolved in wine or probably in the form of a „tablet“ (*qorṣ*) or „pill“ (*ḥabb*).<sup>47</sup>

From the 10<sup>th</sup> century, presumably, opium started to be produced in Iran. To what extent such a local production might have covered the domestic needs, remains a matter of scholarly debates.<sup>48</sup> Even during Mongol times in the 14<sup>th</sup> century, poppy cultivation still seems to have been limited. Still, the Īlhānīd ruler Abū Sa'īd (r. 1316-1335 AD) apparently

<sup>45</sup> Anwari-Alhosseyni (1981), 484f.; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 119-138.

<sup>46</sup> Reported by the historian Abo-l-Faẓl Beyhaqī (995-1077): Āḍarāḥš (1955/56), 344f.; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 48ff.;

<sup>47</sup> Neligan (1927), 9; Āḍarāḥš (1955/56), 433; Malek-Moḥammadī ascribes the praxis of mixing opium with wine to the Mongols, but quotes a corresponding distich of the earlier 'Aṭṭār: Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 47, 51f., 135f.; the mixing of opium (*ma'ġūn*) with wine later was to become the preferred way of consumption in Moghul India: Honchell (2010), 19.

<sup>48</sup> Neligan and Shahnavaẓ assume a local cultivation from the 10<sup>th</sup> cent. AD at latest: Neligan (1927), 9; Shahnavaẓ (*Afyūn* – Elr); Petrushevsky assumes that poppy cultivation only started to gain track from the 11<sup>th</sup> or 12<sup>th</sup> cent. AD: Petrushevsky (1968), 502; Rāzī's allusion to opium cultivation, however, suggests an even earlier date: Parvin & Sommer (1987), 247.

paid a large amount of opium as a tribute to China.<sup>49</sup> The Mongols are said to have been “instrumental in spreading the use of opium to China”.<sup>50</sup> The Īlhānīd rulers and soldiers in any case are reported to have been often addicted to opium, especially opiate wine, either out of fear of being poisoned or for simple recreational purposes.<sup>51</sup> But, it remains disputed whether – especially the recreational – use of opium has increased in general in Iran during Mongol times.<sup>52</sup>

#### Iranian Discourse I

##### *Arabs and Mongols as scapegoats*

Iranian authors, who in the 20th century wrote about the history of opium in Iran, often put forward rather conspiratorial views on the introduction and dissemination of opium use in Iran. Usually, they blame foreigners for having introduced the habit of opium smoking in Iran, or domestic fringe groups. In doing so, their positions follow the prevailing ideological discourses of their times.

Authors who wrote before the revolution of 1979 thus attribute the introduction of opium to the Arabs; while authors sympathetic to the Islamic Republic deny them such a crucial role.<sup>53</sup> Both agree, however, that the Iranians themselves, at least initially hardly had any role in this<sup>54</sup> and that the Mongols are to be blamed for the increasing turn of Iranian society towards the recreational use of opium.<sup>55</sup>

## II. 2. Opium in Šafavīd Iran

The establishment of the Šafavīd realm in the early 16<sup>th</sup> century heralded a distinctive new era for Iran. Although the Šafavīds were of non-Iranian descent and for a long time did not differ much from their predecessors regarding the sphere of control or the use of Persian in administration and culture, they are commonly acknowledged for the reunification and

<sup>49</sup> Matthee agrees with Petrushevsky that opium production still was small, given the rare references to it in the tax records; the Mongols were, nevertheless „instrumental in spreading the use of opium to China“: **Petrushevsky** (1968), 502; **Matthee** (2005), 98.

<sup>50</sup> **Matthee** (2005), 98.

<sup>51</sup> For the fear of poisoning: **Matthee** (2005), 98; for recreational purposes: **Āḍarāḥš** (1955/56), 345f.; **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 50ff.

<sup>52</sup> Not assuming an increase in opium consumption are: **Parvin & Sommer** (1987), 247.

<sup>53</sup> According to KŪHĪ-KERMĀNĪ, Arabs allegedly took opium to chase away “tiredness” (*hastegī*) and “different pains” (*dard-hā-ye moḥtalef*); he explicitly refers to a certain “French Dr. Martin” – likely Ernest Martin’s work *L’opium, ses abus, mangeurs et fumeurs d’opium, morphinomanes* (Paris, 1893): **KŪHĪ-KERMĀNĪ** (1945/46), 103, 136f.; **Āḍarāḥš** attributes this to the fact that the Europeans became acquainted with opium through the works of al-Rāzī and Ibn Sīnā: **Āḍarāḥš** (1955/56), 343f.; **MALEK-MOḤAMMADĪ** denies that the early inhabitants of Central Arabia were acquainted with opium, else it would have been mentioned in the Qur’ān: **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 42f.

<sup>54</sup> According to then finance minister MAḤMŪD BADR: **KŪHĪ-KERMĀNĪ** (1945/46), 103; **Āḍarāḥš** (1955/56), 343; (*ma’dūdī az pezeškān-e īrānī [...] yā pezeškān-e melal-e dīgar*): **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 42.

<sup>55</sup> **Āḍarāḥš** maintains that no opium consumption for the purpose of „enjoyment and recreation“ (*barāye kaif va tafrīḥ*) took place before the Mongols: **Āḍarāḥš** (1955/56), 345ff.; **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 50ff.

reawakening of an Iranian entity and identity. This interpretation might have emerged only in later times.<sup>56</sup> However, it is in so far appropriate as the Şafavīds chose the Twelver Shī‘ī faith as their official denomination, resulting in Iran becoming a Shi’a majority country.<sup>57</sup> They also started to develop increasing diplomatic and commercial links with European countries, in the wake of which many European diplomats and traders travelled to Iran.<sup>58</sup>

During the Şafavīd reign, the situation of opium consumption, too, changed dramatically. Opium became a fashionable everyday recreational drug, simultaneously with the consumption of tobacco, coffee and other luxury goods.<sup>59</sup> European travellers left behind vivid descriptions of this new fashion, their curious accounts becoming important sources for the history of opium during this time. Eşfahān, Şīrāz and Yazd emerged as famous poppy growing centres to satisfy the ever-increasing local demand for opium. The Şafavīd shahs repeatedly tried to prohibit – or at least to restrict – opium consumption, especially among soldiers. This was to no avail as Iranians remained avid consumers of an increasing variety of opium preparations.

### *Opium consumption*

Like wine, opium – or a mixture of the two – initially seems to have been consumed for recreational purposes at the royal court, and was considered a luxury good.<sup>60</sup> The chamberlains of the shahs and other courtiers were said to always have carried golden caskets containing opium with them.<sup>61</sup> It is difficult to assess, when exactly this fashion of non-medical opium consumption found its way to ordinary people. Crucial for the proliferation of opium as a drug of “joy” (*naşāʔ*)<sup>62</sup> might have been soldiers, who were avid consumers of

<sup>56</sup> Newman doesn’t take the Şafavīd rule as an absolute rupture with earlier times: **Newman** (2006), esp. 11-12.

<sup>57</sup> For the declaration of the Twelver Shī‘ism as the official faith under Esmā‘īl I (r. 1499-1542 AD): **Matthee** (2005), 19f.; **Calmard** (2009), 139-190.

<sup>58</sup> On the diplomatic and commercial relations between Europe and Iran: **Floor** (2000), esp. 125-245.

<sup>59</sup> In the 17<sup>th</sup> cent., tobacco spread even quicker than opium: **Tavernier** (1679), 714; **Matthee** (2005), 117ff.; for a history of coffee during Şafavīd time: **Matthee** (2005), 144-174; tea was only introduced later: **Matthee** (2005), 237-266.

<sup>60</sup> This was also the opinion in Iran at the time: **Teixeira** (1902), 200f.; **Chardin** (1801) IV, 73; **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2006), 53; for wine consumption before and during Şafavīd time: **Matthee** (2005), 37-68.

<sup>61</sup> **Kaempfer** (1940), 82; for further examples of the widespread opium consumption at the Şafavīd court: **Matthee** (2005), 101-105; **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 53.

<sup>62</sup> **Matthee** (2005), 101; **Tavernier** and **Chardin** both accentuate the recreational use: “*pour se rendre allegres & se divertir*”: **Tavernier** (1679), 715; “*qu’elle produit [...] des visions agréables et une manière d’enchantement*”: **Chardin** (1811) IV, 74.



wine and opium;<sup>63</sup> and arguably Šūfis, whom Iranian authors, admittedly, often blame for all sorts of vices.<sup>64</sup>

Opium consumption certainly was already common in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, as was observed by the prominent Šafavīd physician ‘Emād al-Dīn Šīrāzī (16<sup>th</sup> century) and the Portuguese traveller Pedro (de) Teixeira (d. 1614).<sup>65</sup> Later European travellers to Iran at times contradict each other in details. Yet, most agree that opium consumption was widespread among Iranians from all classes.<sup>66</sup> Probably the most famous Europeans, who visited Persia in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, were the merchant Jean-Baptiste Tavernier (1605-1689) and the jeweller Jean Chardin (1743-1713), who both travelled as well on diplomatic missions. Both report in detail about the extent of opium consumption. According to Tavernier “*il est mal-aisé de trouver en Perse un home qui ne soit adonné à quelqu’un de ces bruvages, sans quoy il semble qu’ils ne pourroient pas vivre avec plaisir*” and according to Chardin, this was “*une inclination si general, que de dix personnes, à peine on trouvera-t-on une exempte de cette méchante habitude*”.<sup>67</sup> Even if this estimation seems to be exaggerated, the multitude of preparations alone shows how popular opium had become.

#### Opium Preparations

Opium powder (*masūd*), opium concoction (*ma‘ḡūn*, generally all theriacs), opiate-wine and probably opium pills (sg. *ḥabb*) or tablets (sg. *qorṣ*) were already familiar to Iran long before Šafavīd time. These preparations certainly continued to be prescribed for medicinal application; but together with new preparations, they were now also used for purely recreational purposes<sup>68</sup>. At the beginning of the Šafavīd epoch opium (*afyūn* / *taryāk*)<sup>69</sup> seems to have been an expensive commodity, which only the rich could afford.<sup>70</sup> The poorer Iranians were drinking a decoction made of the poppy “husks” (*pūst*) instead and accordingly were called *pūstī*<sup>71</sup>. Like its equivalent *afyūnī* or *taryākī* for regular opium-eaters this was a pejorative, insulting term indicating addictive behaviour.<sup>72</sup> The “opium pill” (*ḥabbeh-ye taryāk*) or

<sup>63</sup> The British traveller and historian THOMAS HERBERT describes the soldiers as “*the Foot-posts by continuall chawing it, runne fleeping day and night*”: **Herbert** (1638), 241.: **Matthee** (2005), 106.

<sup>64</sup> According to the Carmelite missionary Ange de Saint-Joseph (1636-1697), opium consumption was widespread among Šūfis; poets, too, were said to have been sympathetic to opium: **Matthee** (2005), 105.

<sup>65</sup> Šīrāzī (16<sup>th</sup> cent.) locates problematic opium use in particular among ordinary people: **Matthee** (2005), 100; Teixeira (ca 1593-97 in Iran) also describes opium consumption among common people: **Teixeira** (1902), 200f.; for an increased general consumption since ‘Abbās I: **Parvin & Sommer** (1987), 248.

<sup>66</sup> Chardin often copied from Tavernier: **Tavernier** (1679), 715f.; **Chardin** (1811) IV, 73ff.

<sup>67</sup> **Tavernier** (1679), 715; **Chardin** (1811), IV: 77; similarly also the Capuchin monk Raphaël du Mans (1613-1696): **Matthee** (2005), 106.

<sup>68</sup> The popularity of opium probably was due to its medicinal status: **Matthee** (2005), 99.

<sup>69</sup> *Taryāk* was already synonymous to *afyūn* in the 16<sup>th</sup> cent. AD: **Teixeira** (1902), 200.

<sup>70</sup> **Matthee** maintains that opium soon became cheap: **Matthee** (2005), 106; **Parvin & Sommer** are of the opinion that opium pills were only consumed by the privileged: **Parvin & Sommer** (1987), 248.

<sup>71</sup> **Teixeira** (1902), 200; Chardin describes the *pūst* as being especially strong: **Chardin** (1811), IV: 79; according to Šīrāzī the husks were consumed in ground form (*kūfteh*) or boiled in water: **Matthee** (2005), 106.

<sup>72</sup> **Teixeira** (1902), 200; **Tavernier** (1679), 715.

“enjoyment pill” (*ḥabbeh-ye nešāt*), the most famous of which was called *hāšem begī*, increased in popularity.<sup>73</sup> The same is true for the *ma‘ḡūn*, which was prepared as a sweet confection, and for the all-cure *felūnīyā*<sup>74</sup>. From the 17<sup>th</sup> century, another decoction, which was prepared by boiling the entire crushed poppy pods, was called *kūknār*. *Kūknār* seems to have been the preferred recreational drug among the common people as suggests the many references to the “*kūknār* houses” (sg. *kūknār-ḥāneh*). Like the “coffeehouses” (sg. *qahveh-ḥāne*), where not only coffee but also opium was served, they were public, though rather shabby places where people would gather to consume this particular drug.<sup>75</sup>

Even when taken for pleasurable purposes – not at least as an aphrodisiac<sup>76</sup> - and despite the sensational European accounts, most Iranians still seem to have consumed opium moderately.<sup>77</sup> Excesses were particularly reported for the consumption of *kūknār*, while Šīrāzī generally identified the problematic consumption among the ordinary people<sup>78</sup>. The words *taryākī* and *afyūnī*, however, also point to problematic consumption of proper opium. European travellers and the Persian annalists repeatedly mention cases of addiction.<sup>79</sup> de Teixeira maintained “*I have seen men die in various places for want of opium, and others from taking more than they were used to*”.<sup>80</sup> Tavernier for his part describes addicts to *kūknār* as follows: “*Dans leurs jeunesse on voit ces Theriakis ou preneurs d’Opium [...] avec des visages pâles mornes & abatus, & qui on comme perdu la parole*” and observes “*quand ils approchent de quarante ans ils se trouvent fort incommodez de douleurs*”.<sup>81</sup> Fatal overdoses continued to be reported by both European and Iranian authors.<sup>82</sup> Arguably, the most prominent victim was Šāh Esmā‘ī II (1576-77), who is said to have died of an overdose of

<sup>73</sup> According to Ange de Saint-Joseph, whom Chardin met in Persia, *Hāšem Begī* was the name of its inventor: **Chardin** (1811), IV: 74ff.; attributed to the German author and diplomat Adam Olearius (1599-1671): **Matthee** (2005), 99ff.; Tavernier and Chardin both refer to the recreational use of opium pills: **Tavernier** (1679), 715; **Chardin** (1811) IV, 73f.; **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 55.

<sup>74</sup> **Matthee** (2005), 111; according to Malek-Moḥammadī *felūnīyā* was a mixture of opium (*taryāk*), cannabis (*bang*), and hashish (*ḥašīš*) with spices: **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 54.

<sup>75</sup> For *kūknār*, which Tavernier calls *kokemaar* and Chardin *cocquenar*: **Tavernier** (1679), 716; **Chardin** (1811) IV, 78; **Kaempfer** (1940), 28; generally on the use of *kūknār* in the *kūknār-ḥāneh*: **Matthee** (2005), 107ff.; **Parvin & Sommer** (1987), 248.

<sup>76</sup> For a specific example: **Kaempfer** (1940), 28; opium of course only worked as an aphrodisiac when taken in moderate amounts: **Matthee** (2005), 103; a rather questionable “Oriental” nexus between inebriation, sexuality and mystic experience is put forward by: **Gelpke** (1995), 33ff.; 199ff.

<sup>77</sup> **Matthee** (2005), 99f.

<sup>78</sup> **Matthee** (2005), 100.

<sup>79</sup> **Āḍarabāš** (1955/56), 352; **Matthee** (2005), 101f., 105f.

<sup>80</sup> **Teixeira** (1902), 201; the German physician and traveller Engelbert Kaempfer gives another vivid description of drug addicts and their desperation: **Neligan** (1927), 9f.

<sup>81</sup> **Tavernier** (1679), 715f.; Chardin provides a similar description of addiction to opium pills: **Chardin** (1811), IV: 76f.

<sup>82</sup> **Matthee** (2005), 104.

*felūnīyā*.<sup>83</sup> Opium did, however, not only accidentally lead to death; men and women alike specifically consumed it in order to commit suicide.<sup>84</sup>

### **Poppy cultivation**

It is unclear, how much opium was produced locally before Šafavīd time. For the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the Europeans report extensive poppy cultivation around Langān near Ešfahān, and around Kāzerūn near Šīrāz, both of which soon counted among the best poppy growing regions in Iran.<sup>85</sup> Yazd soon seems to have been an important poppy-growing centre as well.<sup>86</sup> Chardin emphasized that the poppies “*ne rendent nulle part autant de suc comme en Perse, ni si fort*” and that the Iranians “*y font toujours douze incision, en mémoire des douze imams*”.<sup>87</sup> More importantly, opium was already subject to taxes, as shows a prebend, which ‘Abbās I gave to one of his weapon-bearers.<sup>88</sup> Opium was, however, not yet a regular export commodity.<sup>89</sup> The local poppy cultivation might not even have covered the local needs, as opium was additionally imported from other countries.<sup>90</sup>

### **Addiction treatment & royal bans**

Physicians and pharmacologists had always been aware of the Janus-faced properties of opium. When in Šafavīd times, addictive patterns became more prevalent, physicians not only prescribed opium as a medicine but saw themselves increasingly confronted with a need to cure opium addiction. The common ‘cure’ against opium dependency consisted of simply substituting opium with wine, and opium in turn was often advised as a cure against

<sup>83</sup> According to the Iranian historian Eskandar Baig Torkamān Monšī (1560-1633?): **Ādaraḥš** (1956), 350f.; **Matthee** (2005), 104; before, he had already consumed “pure opium” (*taryāk-e ḥāleš*) and an “opium-containing composition” (*tarkīb-e afyūn-dār*): **Malek-Moḥammadi** (2006), 62;

<sup>84</sup> According to Tavernier: „*si quelqu'un par desespoir se veut faire mourir, il en avale un gros monceau [sic], puis prend du vinaigre par dessus, de peur qu'on ne le secoure par du contrepoison*”: **Tavernier** (1679), 716; **Chardin** (1811) IV, 78; for specific examples: **Matthee** (2005), 104f.

<sup>85</sup> Parvin & Sommer assume that a “regular opium industry” existed since the 17<sup>th</sup> cent.: **Parvin & Sommer** (1987), 248.

<sup>86</sup> The quoted references are, however, all from later times: **Matthee** (2005), 213; also from a later time: „*from time immemorial opium has been grown in Persian in the neighbourhood of Yazd*”: **Wills** (1886), 234.

<sup>87</sup> **Chardin** (1811), III: 300f; the same observation is made by the French traveller Mēlchisedec de Thévenot (1620-1692); “opium from Kāzerūn” (*taryāk-e kāzerūnī*) is also mentioned in a royal edict (*farmān*): **Matthee** (2005), 99.

<sup>88</sup> According to the Šafavīd viceregent Ḥūzānī Ešfahānī: **Matthee** (2005), 114; according to Kaempfer, farmers cultivating royal lands had to pay 45% of their crop to the shah: **Kaempfer** (1940), 90; also: **Neligan** (1927), 9f.

<sup>89</sup> Some Iranian opium was exported via Hormoz to India: **Matthee** (2005), 99.

<sup>90</sup> Teixeira reports that there were two sorts of opium in Iran, one called *malwy* (*malvī*) from Malwa (Northern India) and another one called *mecery* (*makarī*) apparently from Cairo; the local cultivation therefore still must have been limited at the end of the 16th cent.: **Teixeira** (1902), 201; also for imports from Egypt: **Matthee** (2005), 99; for imports from the Ottoman Empire: **Malek-Moḥammadi** (2005/06), 54.

alcoholism.<sup>91</sup> This treatment naturally was rather ineffective, in addition to the fact that wine was looked upon disapprovingly.<sup>92</sup> A prime example for the failure of this method was Šāh Šafī I (r. 1629-1642), whose long lasting opium addiction was treated with wine. It is reported that he finally died as a result of his alcoholism.<sup>93</sup> Hence, a more promising method consisted of mixing an ever-decreasing amount of opium to a drug compound called *barš* until the opium-addicted patient eventually became abstinent.<sup>94</sup>

The Shī'ite clerics, by contrast, never opposed opium consumption during Šafavīd times. This might be explained by the absence of opium in the Qur'ān, even though the religious anathema hit the equally absent but popular "cannabis" (*bang*).<sup>95</sup> A religious denunciation might thus rather be lacking because of the historical position of opium in Iranian society<sup>96</sup>, and especially of its status as a traditional and all-curing medicine.

#### ‘Emād al-Dīn Šīrāzī and opium

The consumption of opium was nevertheless prohibited during daytime in Ramadan. In this regard ‘Emād al-Dīn Maḥmūd Šīrāzī had a particularly savoury medical advise. Šīrāzī hailed from a family of court physicians and worked himself in this function with Šāh ‘Tahmāsp I. He is the author of the famous "treatise on opium" (*resāleh-ye afyūn*), in which he covers various medicinal and recreational uses of opium; and like so many contemporaries, he is reported to have been an opium-eater (*afyūnī*) himself.<sup>97</sup>

In order to comply with the rules for Ramadan, Šīrāzī recommends the regular opium consumer to reduce his daily doses to two pills, which he could take before sunrise and after sunset. However, for someone who could not endure these long hours without opium, he proposes to insert an opium-containing cartridge into the rectum, yet writes of the dangers of leaving it too long, lest the muscle lose its contracting force.<sup>98</sup>

<sup>91</sup> **Chardin** (1811) IV, 77; **Matthee** (2005), 102f.

<sup>92</sup> „Mais comme d'ordinaire cela ne satisfait pas ces gens, parce que le vin n'est pas d'une aussi forte opération“: **Chardin** (1811) IV, 77.

<sup>93</sup> Šāh ‘Abbās I (1587-1629) reportedly made his grandson Šafī dependent on opium to prevent him from becoming a pretender to the throne: **Ādaraḥš** (1956), 356; according to Tavernier: **Matthee** (2005), 102.

<sup>94</sup> *Barš* consisted of bezoar stone (*bād-zahr*), zedary (*ḡadvar*), pepper (*felfel*), saffron (*za'ferān*), gum euphorbium (*farfīyūn*) and dracunculus (*'aqāqīr-hā*): **Matthee** (2005), 102.

<sup>95</sup> **Tavernier** (1679), 716; *bang* is e.g. mentioned in manuals of Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*): **Matthee** (2005), 113.

<sup>96</sup> **Matthee** (2005), 113.

<sup>97</sup> For general information on Šīrāzī: **Savage-Smith** (*'Emād al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Serāj al-Dīn Mas'ūd Šīrāzī – EIr*).

<sup>98</sup> **Matthee** (2005), 112f.

The royal authorities, in contrast, repeatedly tried to prohibit or at least to restrict the consumption of opium and other drugs – at least officially as a proof of their religious zeal.<sup>99</sup> Šāh Ṭahmāsp I (1524-1576) in 1532/33 AD (939 HQ) issued the first royal decree against opium as part of his public repentance, while simultaneously banning wine taverns (sg. *mey-ḥāneh*), beer-house (sg. *būzeh-ḥāneh*), cannabis-taverns (sg. *bang-ḥāne*) and opium-houses (sg. *ma‘ḡūn-ḥāneh*). At the same time, he ordered five hundred *tūmāns* worth of “distinguished opium” (*taryāk-e fārūq*) of the court to be destroyed.<sup>100</sup> Similar to his predecessor, Šāh ‘Abbās I (1587-1629 AD) issued several bans against opium consumption. The first two bans from 1596/97 AD (1005 HQ) and 1608/09 AD (1017 HQ) specifically prohibited the consumption of opium at the court and in the army on pain of expulsion or fines.<sup>101</sup> In 1620/21 (1030 HQ), a further ban targeted the public meeting-places, in particular the *kūknār-ḥāneh*, threatening the violators with the death penalty.<sup>102</sup>

#### The court jester and opium

According to CHARDIN, the court jester of Šāh ‘Abbās I, Kel Anayet (Koll-e ‘Enāyat), opened a booth for the sale of shrouds, after hearing the angry complaints from the many desperate *kūknār* consumers who could not visit the *kūknār-ḥāneh* any more. When ‘Abbās passed by and asked him about the reason for his absence at the court, the jester answered: “*je ne suis plus homme de cour, je suis marchand de toile [...] depuis que vous avez défendue le cocquenar [...] ces pauvres coquenaïres meurent à centaines, la toile à ensevelir est renchérie de moitié*”. Following this, the shah allegedly re-allowed the consumption of *kūknār*.<sup>103</sup>

This anecdote, as well as the fact that such edicts were issued repeatedly, suggests that the royal prohibitions ultimately remained ineffective. The edicts additionally do not prove a total ban on opium consumption. They seem to have mainly targeted the opium consumption at the court and in the army, which directly affected the operability of the Šafavīd Empire; and the opium consumption in public places, which were associated with all kinds of debaucheries and immoralities<sup>104</sup>. The Europeans in any case continued to deliver most

<sup>99</sup> The opium bans were propagated as religious deeds by the Šafavīd historians: **Āḍarāḥš** (1956), 348f.; 353ff.; especially: **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 54ff.; **Matthee** (2005), 112-115.

<sup>100</sup> According to the historians Eskandar Baig Torkamān Monšī and Ḥoršāh Ebn Qobād al-Ḥosainī; the exact date of this ban is not known: **Āḍarāḥš** (1956), 348; **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/2006), 58f.; **Matthee** (2005), 113f.

<sup>101</sup> **Āḍarāḥš** (1956), 354; **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 60f.; **Matthee** (2005), 114f.

<sup>102</sup> **Āḍarāḥš** (1956), 354; **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2006), 62f.; **Matthee** (2005), 114f.

<sup>103</sup> **Chardin** (1811), VIII: 126f.

<sup>104</sup> For a vivid description of the atmosphere of a *kūknār-ḥāneh*: **Tavernier** (1679), 716; Chardin describes the coffee-houses as „*vraies boutiques de sodomie*“: **Chardin** (1811), IV: 69; **Matthee** (2015), 108.

pictographic descriptions of opium consumption in *kūknār-ḥāneh* and *ma'ḡūn-ḥāneh* after these bans.<sup>105</sup>

The Ṣafavīd epoch indubitably marks the definite transition from a predominantly medical to a recreational pattern of opium consumption in Iran. Opium, like coffee or tobacco, became a fashionable consumer good, which was offered in different forms and often in public taverns, specifically in the *kūknār*- and *ma'ḡūn*-houses.<sup>106</sup> Even repeated royal bans did not succeed in halting this development. In parallel, a local opium industry began to develop, which, however, still seems to have been limited, probably not even covering the local demand.

### II. 3. Opium in Qāḡār Iran

From the power contest that took place after the Afghan conquest of Eṣfahān in 1722, the Qāḡārs eventually emerged as the new rulers of Iran. Based in Tehrān, they established a comparatively stable order; yet, at the same time Russia and Great Britain grew increasingly influential in Iran. Territories were lost to the Tsarist Empire, notably today Azerbaijan, and both foreign nations obtained preferential and often exclusive trade agreements with Iran. The intensified contact with these countries brought a growing number of European consuls, traders and governmental advisers to Iran, who provide important information on the situation of opium in Iran. The political and intellectual exchange eventually led to the *Constitutional Revolution* (1905-11), which was as much influenced by liberal ideas from Europe as it was by anti-imperialist and nationalist feelings. This revolution would have a deep impact on Iranian society but also on the development of a proper drug policy.<sup>107</sup>

During this eventful period, the position of opium within the Iranian society also changed dramatically. Opium consumption remained unabated, but it took on truly disastrous forms with the introduction of opium smoking in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century AD. Simultaneously, the opium poppy became the most important cash crop in Iran. Iran was

---

<sup>105</sup> In 1729, Šāh Tahmāsp II issued another ban on poppy cultivation and opium consumption, most probably in order to try to legitimize his – short and powerless – rule: **Parvin & Sommer** (1987), 249; the Austrian physician Jakob Eduard Polak (1818-1891) – referring to the Italian traveller Pietro Della Valle (1586-1652) – mentions only a ban on *cācnār* (*kūknār*): **Polak** (1865) II, 248f.

<sup>106</sup> *Kūknār* allegedly was the most popular opium preparation: **Parvin & Sommer** (1987), 248; *kūknār* and *ma'ḡūn* were considered to be more addictive than the opium pills: **Matthee** (2005), 115.

<sup>107</sup> The Qāḡārs were one of the seven Qezelbāš tribes that had been closely associated with the Ṣafavīds – **Yarshater** (*Iran II(2) – the Qajar Dynasty* – Elr); **Katouzian** (2006).

inspired in this by the British opium industry in India, as both invested in the lucrative production and export of opium for the sake of a trade balance. At the end of the Qajar reign, the new parliament passed a first law against opium, which in reality, however, rather served to institutionalize a state monopoly on the cultivation of poppy and the production of opium.

### ***Opium consumption***

At the beginning of the Qāğār Empire, opium consumption patterns did not differ from the Šafavīd time. Opium continued to be widely enjoyed by lower and upper classes: *kūknār* rather by the poor, and the “joy pills” (sg. *ḥabbeh-ye nešāf*), a mix of opium with different spices, rather by the rich.<sup>108</sup> Together with the *barš* and *bang*, they retained their popularity throughout the Qāğār rule and were consumed in great quantity.<sup>109</sup> Most European accounts from the 19<sup>th</sup> century describe the consumer habits in less dramatic terms than their earlier colleagues. Thus, the French naturalist Guillaume-Antoine Olivier (1756-1814) observed that “*l’opium est d’un usage plus générale en Perse, qu’en Turquie; mais on y voit bien moins des ces hommes qui le prennent avec excès*”, and compared it to the common wine consumption in the countries of Southern Europe.<sup>110</sup> The Austrian physician Jakob Eduard Polak (1818-1891) and the British medical officer Charles James Wills (1842-1912) later shared this opinion.<sup>111</sup> Iranians would in average not take more than two pills of about two *grains* per day<sup>112</sup>, but even the ones who consumed up to thirty *grains* were still described as using it in controlled form.<sup>113</sup> Men and women<sup>114</sup>, especially older people<sup>115</sup>, indulged in opium pills, *kūknār* and various sorts of *ma‘ğūn*.<sup>116</sup> They continued to consume such preparations in order

<sup>108</sup> Typical ingredients were nutmeg, amber, cardamom or cinnamon: **Olivier** (1807) V, 277f.; rich Persians always carried a small silver-box containing silver or gold-plated pills on them: **Polak** (1865), 248, 250f.; **Wills** (1886), 197, 237f.; for *kūknār*: **Olivier** (1807), 278f.; **Bélanger** (1838), 342.

<sup>109</sup> For *barš* and *bang*: **Olivier** (1807) V, 278f.; **Bélanger** (1838), 342f.; **Polak** (1865), 249f.; **Wills** (1886), 96

<sup>110</sup> **Olivier** (1807) V, 278f.

<sup>111</sup> Polak worked in Iran during the 1850s and, like Wills, visited it (again) in the 1880s: **Polak** (1865), 251f.; **Polak** (1883), 124; “*it does not appear that the moderate use of Persian opium in the country itself is deleterious*”: **Wills** (1886), 237.

<sup>112</sup> According to Olivier, especially the wise and learned consumed opium or *kūknār* in moderate amounts: **Olivier** (1807) V, 278f.; **Polak** (1865), 251; at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> cent., the daily ration was already between 1-5 *grains*: **Wills** (1886), 234, 237f.; similarly also the French physician Jean-Baptiste Feuvrier (1842-1926): **Ādaraḥš** (1955/56), 367.

<sup>113</sup> An 111 years old patient of Polak allegedly had been using 4 *grains* per day for the most part of his life: **Polak** (1865), 253f.; the Scottish trader John Malcolm (1769-1833) tells a similar story: **Malcolm** (1845), 50f.

<sup>114</sup> **Wills** (1886), 197.

<sup>115</sup> In order to produce “*eine gewisse Aufgewecktheit und Frische des Geistes und Körpers*”: **Polak** (1865), 249ff.

<sup>116</sup> Polak mentions different varieties of opium and many more opium preparations, among them „*Electuarium Mithridatis*“, „*Electuarium Andromachi (teriak-e fāregh)*“, „*Electuarium Fuluniā (Philonia)*“ or „*Syrupus diacodii (scherbet-e-chāschchāsch)*“: **Polak** (1865), 248f.

to find “*une trêve à leurs ennuis ou à leur misère*”<sup>117</sup> as the French botanist Charles Bélanger (1805-1888) states; or simply as a “*Schlemmerei*” according to Polak<sup>118</sup>. Opium continued, however, also to be prescribed extensively as a medicine, and it was still used as an antidote or as a means for suicide.<sup>119</sup> Even horses and other animals apparently were given opium in order to increase their endurance.<sup>120</sup>

It was not long after that European observers noticed a new fashion of taking opium, which according to Polak was “*unbedingt von schlimmen Folgen*”:<sup>121</sup> opium smoking (*taryāk-kešt*). The Dutch are accredited with having first smoked a tobacco-opium mix in Java in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, from where this new habit quickly spread to China.<sup>122</sup> It is a matter of speculation, when or where exactly opium smoking was introduced to Iran. According to Polak, who is the first European to mention opium smoking in Iran, it initially took place in secrecy.<sup>123</sup> Twenty years later Wills still maintained that “*opium-smoking is almost unknown*” and “*when smoked is, as a rule, smoked by a native doctor’s prescription*”.<sup>124</sup> Hence, it was only from the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century that opium smoking started to gain ground, and soon with an incredible success. A British consul noticed that up to a quarter of the inhabitants in Mašhad were smoking opium.<sup>125</sup> Each witness had the impression that this new habit was most prevalent at the place of his visit, be it in Yazd<sup>126</sup>, Kermān<sup>127</sup>, Balūčestān<sup>128</sup> or at the Caspian Sea<sup>129</sup>. Most prone to start smoking opium were people who already took opium pills in excess,<sup>130</sup> and most probably the consumers of *kūknār*, as these latter gradually disappeared. Opium smoking was equally addictive as drinking *kūknār*, and the “pipe-smokers” (sg. *vāfūrī*) were accordingly described in similar terms with “*eingefallenes Gesicht, stierer Blick*,

<sup>117</sup> **Bélanger** (1838) II, 342.

<sup>118</sup> **Polak** (1865), 251.

<sup>119</sup> “Opium syrup” or “*Scherbat Chasch=chasch*” (sg. *šerbat-e ḥaš-ḥāš*) was e.g. used against colds and to calm toddlers; especially prone to commit suicide were people of African descent (“*Neger und Negerinnen*”): **Polak** (1865), 249f., 254; **Wills** (1886), 234

<sup>120</sup> POLAK even mentions horses being addicted to opium: **Polak** (1865), 250f.

<sup>121</sup> **Polak** (1865), 254; **Polak** (1883), 24.

<sup>122</sup> On the development of opium smoking: **Neligan** (1927), 5, 10; **McLaughlin** (1976), 733; **Saleh** (1956); **Booth** (1996), 103ff.; **McMahon** (2002), 33-44; **Dikötter** (2004), 32-38; **Matthee** (2005).

<sup>123</sup> **Polak** (1865), 254; according to MATTHEE, James Baillie Fraser (1783-1856) is the first European to mention opium smoking in Iran: **Matthee** (2005), 210; the relevant paragraph, however, refers rather to tobacco smoking: **Fraser** (1826), 161.

<sup>124</sup> **Wills** (1886), 237.

<sup>125</sup> According to British consul Ronald Ferguson Thompson (1830-1888): **Matthee** (2005), 220.

<sup>126</sup> According to British consul John Richard Preece (1843-1917): **Matthee** (2005), 220.

<sup>127</sup> According to British consul PERCY SYKES (1867-1945): **Sykes** (1902), 434.

<sup>128</sup> According to Sykes: **Matthee** (2005), 221.

<sup>129</sup> According to British consul Hyacinth Louis Rabino (1877-1950) especially in Lāhīgān: **Malek-Moḥammadi** (2005/06), 70; already POLAK had maintained that around the Caspian Sea, twice as much opium is consumed as in the rest of the country: **Polak** (1865), 251

<sup>130</sup> According to Thomson: **Matthee** (2005), 211.



*strohgelbe Gesichtsfarbe, geistige Erschlaffung, confuses Denken, zuletzt wirklicher Irrsinn*".<sup>131</sup> Until the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, they continued to be "*spoken of with contempt*" even by the opium-eaters,<sup>132</sup> and both continued to be labelled *teriakhi* (*taryākī*).<sup>133</sup> Examples for excessive opium eating are, however, also (still) documented. Opium consumers still had difficulties to abstain from their habit during Ramadan<sup>134</sup> while the Šūfī or Qalandar were considered prime examples as licentious consumers of opium.<sup>135</sup>

Concerning Neligan's question "*as to which country had the doubtful privilege of handing the habit [of opium smoking] on*",<sup>136</sup> Iranian literature particularly points to India and the colonial power Great Britain.<sup>137</sup> An Indian origin is, however, implausible because most Indians were not smoking opium yet at the time.<sup>138</sup> It is more probable that pilgrims who travelled to the shrine of Emām Reżā in Mašhad, or merchants from Central Asia, introduced this new habit to Eastern Iran.<sup>139</sup> This suggestion is corroborated by contemporary European travellers, who observed that opium smoking was most widespread in the Eastern provinces of Iran.<sup>140</sup>

#### Opium smoking<sup>141</sup>

While the Iranians already had developed elaborate and refined consumer habits for opium eating, opium smoking would become even more ritualized. Abo 'l-Qāsem Yazdī, a largely unknown Iranian author, has written a famous treatise on opium smoking in the 19<sup>th</sup> cent., in which he describes opium smoking as an art form comparable to tea ceremonies in Japan or China.

Opium, as a rule, originally was usually smoked in company. Before embarking on an opium session, a room was prepared with the necessary equipment: comfortable mattresses and cushions ensured a relaxed sitting; for the smoking of opium charcoal was burned in a brazier (*manqal*) and further

<sup>131</sup> **Polak** (1865), 254; even children of opium-smoking parents were already born „*with a craving for the drug*“: **Sykes** (1902), 402; on *kāknār*-addicts: **Bélangier** (1838), 343.

<sup>132</sup> According to Thompson: **Matthee** (2005), 211; **Saleh** (1956).

<sup>133</sup> **Olivier** (1807) V, 277; **Polak** (1865), 252; **Polak** (1883), 124.

<sup>134</sup> "*For opium-eaters*" there was even "*some degree of indulgence to be purchased*": **Fraser** (1826), 161.

<sup>135</sup> **Polak** (1865), 252; **Polak** (1883), 124; **Wills** (1886), 96; according to the Austrian civil engineer and special envoy to the Qajar court, Albert Joseph Gasteiger (1823-1890), the first European to be bestowed with the noble title "khan" (*hān*): **Matthee** (2005), 209.

<sup>136</sup> **Neligan** (1927), 10f.

<sup>137</sup> **Adarāhš** (1955/56), 365f., 371; **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 64, 66, 69.

<sup>138</sup> **Neligan** (1927), 11; according to a letter sent to the Swiss botanist Augustin de Candolle (1778-1841): **Parvin & Sommer** (1987), 249.

<sup>139</sup> **Neligan** (1927), 10; **McLaughlin** (1976), 733; **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – Elr); **Matthee** (2005), 212f.

<sup>140</sup> **Sykes** (1902), 402; **Neligan** (1927), 11.

<sup>141</sup> **Anwari-Alhosseyni** (1981), 484f.; **Neligan** (1927), 17, 20; **Parvin & Sommer** (1987), 249; Yazdī's treatise is titled „Book on the opium-pipe and on opium-pipe smokers“ (*ketāb-e vāfūr va vāfūrīyān*) or simply „Treatise on his excellency, the opium pipe“ (*resāleh-e hażrat-e vāfūr*): **Yazdī** (1908); **Gelpke** (1995), 48f., 55f.

paraphernalia such as fire tongs (*anbor*), a needle (*sīḥ*), a knife (*čāqū*), an opium cutter (*taryāk-šekan*) and of course the opium pipe (*vāfūr*) were arranged; and further indispensable were a teapot (*samāvar*) and tea cups as well as sweets (*šīrīnī*).

The opium pipe (*vāfūr*) consisted of a wooden handle (*dasteh*) and a hob (*hoqqeh*) usually made of clay. In the hob, there was a small hole, where for each round a small piece of opium was stuck, which was heated with a piece of charcoal. The ensuing vapor was then smoked through the wooden handle. During smoking, talking was frowned upon; one was instead advised to listen to the hissing sound of smoking, which was compared in his regularity and echo of the name „protector“ (*moğīr*) – one of the names of God – to the Šūfī practice of recitation (*dīkr*).

After having smoked opium through the pipe, the burnt dross (*sūḥteh*) of the opium remained inside the hollow clay hob. This *sūḥteh* was scraped out and gathered, in order to be processed into a preparation that could be smoked again: the so-called opium juice (*šīreh*). With around 16%, both these by-products had a higher morphine content than (raw) opium (12%).

Opium often used to be smoked at private gathering at home and continues to be so up to this day. Until the respective bans in the 20th century, opium was, however, often also smoked in specific opium dens, still called coffee houses (*qahveh-ḥāneh*) or more commonly šīreh dens (*šīreh-ḥāneh*).

### ***Poppy cultivation & opium production***

At the beginning of the Qāğār period, the Scottish traveller James Baillie Fraser (1783-186) stated that opium was not “*much or successfully cultivated, although the poppy [...] grows sufficiently well*”.<sup>142</sup> The most important poppy growing regions were Ešfahān, Šīrāz, and Yazd.<sup>143</sup> Due to bad transportation routes, only very little Iranian opium was exported in these early years, namely to India or Boḥārā and finally to China.<sup>144</sup> However, Colonel Ephraim Stannus (1784-1850) from the *East India Company* already warned of a possible competitor,<sup>145</sup> as opium exports initially remained small.<sup>146</sup>

<sup>142</sup> Fraser at the time, however, visited the Caspian Sea, where poppy only grew badly; he also states „*opium is, I believe, made only for consumption in the country*“: **Fraser** (1826), 86.

<sup>143</sup> The European travellers always described Yazd as a traditional poppy-growing region: **Wills** (1886), 234; **Matthee** (2005), 213; according to the Russian economist and official of German-Baltic descent, Julius von Hagemeister (1806-1878), “*c’est dans la province de Yeẓd qu’on sème le plus de pavot*”: **Hagemeister** (1839), 34; **Groseclose** (1947), 107.

<sup>144</sup> **Hagemeister** (1839), 34; Fraser states „*opium is, I believe, made only for consumption in the country*“: **Fraser** (1826), 359; also according to Stannus: **Seyf** (1984), 240; **Matthee** (2005), 213.

<sup>145</sup> Iran apparently could produce opium for a third of the price of Indian opium: **Seyf** (1984), 240; **Matthee** (2005), 213f.

<sup>146</sup> A British proposal in 1848, to enhance Iranian opium production failed due to unsafe transportation routes: **Matthee** (2005), 214.

It was not until the 1850s that Polak described Šuštar and Dezful in Ĥūzestān, Māhān near Kermān, as well as Kāšān and Qom, as new regions where poppy was grown.<sup>147</sup> At the same time, the famous grand-vizier Amīr Kabīr experimented with poppy growing in Tehrān.<sup>148</sup> Mainly because of private initiatives, Iranian opium production grew threefold between 1859-1861<sup>149</sup> and opium exports started to increase correspondingly. According to George Curzon (1859-1925), the later viceroy of India, opium exports were first recorded in Eṣfahān in 1853,<sup>150</sup> but only really gained ground after the collapse of the silk trade in 1864/65.<sup>151</sup> The decline of Iran's silk industry was caused by the silkworm disease but it coincided with a sharp recession in the cultivation of cotton, when after the civil war the USA (re-)emerged as a powerful competitor for these crops on the market.<sup>152</sup> Suffering from a chronic trade deficit with European countries, Iran was thus forced to increasingly invest in poppy as a vital cash crop.<sup>153</sup> Opium was a manifest choice since the Chinese demand for opium grew exponentially after the second British opium war.<sup>154</sup> To be able to compete more successfully in the profitable market, the Persian opium producer Moḥammad Mahdī Eṣfahānī brought back improved cultivation methods from India.<sup>155</sup>

In the following decades, new areas for the cultivation of poppy were developed, namely in the Eastern provinces of Ĥorāsān, Kermān and Balūčestān,<sup>156</sup> which alongside Yazd, Eṣfahān, Kāzerūn and Šuštar would count among the best poppy growing regions in Iran.<sup>157</sup> The total production of opium accordingly increased from 870 cases of 160 lbs. each in the year 1871/72 to 7,700 cases in the year 1880/81 – a nine-fold increase.<sup>158</sup> Opium

<sup>147</sup> The opium from these regions had different names: **Polak** (1865), 246.

<sup>148</sup> According to Thompson: **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EIr); according to the Dutch physician Johann Louis Schlimmer (1819-1881): **Ādaraḥš** (1956), 362f.; **Matthee** (2005), 217; **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2006), 64f.

<sup>149</sup> **Matthee** (2005), 215.

<sup>150</sup> CURZON was travelling in Iran in the late 1880s: **Curzon** (1966), 499; **Seyf** (1984), 240.

<sup>151</sup> **Curzon** (1966), 499; **Groseclose** (1947), 107; **Seyf** (1984), 240.

<sup>152</sup> **McLaughlin** (1976), 730f.; **Seyf** (1984), 237f.; **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EIr); **Matthee** (2005), 213.

<sup>153</sup> For a detailed analysis of Iran's economy during Qāḡār rule, especially concerning the growing trade deficit: **Seyf** (1984), 233-237; **McLaughlin** (1976), 730; **Parvin & Sommer** (1987), 252f.

<sup>154</sup> After the second opium war (1856-60), Iran allegedly sought a peace treaty with China in order to export its opium directly to China: **Ādaraḥš** (1956), 361ff., 369; **McLaughlin** (1976), 730; **Parvin & Sommer** (1987), 253f.; according to British consul Lucas: **Matthee** (2005), 213; generally on the opium wars: **Booth** (1996), 103-173; **Dikötter & al.** (2004), 42-45.

<sup>155</sup> According to Iranian geographers Arbāb Eṣfahānī (d. 1896) and 'Abd ol-Ġaffār Naḡm al-Molk (d. 1908): **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EIr); **Matthee** (2005), 216f.

<sup>156</sup> According to Belgian orientalist Auguste Bricteux (1873-1937): **Matthee** (2005), 217; according to Thompson: **Seyf** (1984), 244f.

<sup>157</sup> **Wills** (1886), 234f.; according to the British diplomat EDWARD STACK, in the 1880s "*all the fields around the city {of Yazd} [...] were white with poppy*": **Stack** (1882), 262; **WILLS** made a similar observations for Eṣfahān: **Wills** (1891), 173.

<sup>158</sup> According to British consul Baring: **Matthee** (2005), 218; based on different consular reports, **SEYF** shows a climax for 1884-1886, when 403,000 lbs. were produced solely in Eṣfahān: **Seyf** (1984), 242.

exports from the ports of Būšehr and Bandar-e ‘Abbās mainly to China accordingly skyrocketed from 103,000 lbs. in 1865 to 874,710 lbs. in 1880-82.<sup>159</sup> “Opium merchants” (*toğğār-e taryāk*), who performed different tasks as exporters, middlemen (*dallāl-ān*), brokers or commission merchants were responsible for transporting opium from the cultivation areas towards the export harbours.<sup>160</sup>

Iranian opium production, however, did not increase unabatedly.<sup>161</sup> A first recession is assumed for the years following the disastrous famine of 1871/72, which was caused exactly by this concentration on cash crops like cotton, silk and poppy at the expense of cereals.<sup>162</sup> In the mid 1880s, British consuls documented another decrease in Iranian opium exports.<sup>163</sup> This time, the drop might have been caused by a temporarily lower demand in China<sup>164</sup> and systemic problems of Iran’s opium industry seem, however, to have played a more crucial role. From the 1860s, Iranian opium had developed a bad reputation for being extremely altered with ever increasing amounts of sugar, oil, starch, flour, grape juice or simply other parts of the poppy plant.<sup>165</sup> Incessant poppy cultivation additionally had exhausted the soils, which as a result started to yield reduced harvests.<sup>166</sup> The transportation infrastructure continued to remain poor as well.<sup>167</sup>

Despite such temporary setbacks, the quality of the Iranian opium steadily improved, as did the industry as a whole. While opium of bad quality continued to be shipped to China<sup>168</sup>, opium of better quality – with a morphine content of 10-12% – found ready markets in India and Great Britain.<sup>169</sup> Opium production continued to experience many crises at the beginning

<sup>159</sup> Based on data from different authors: **Seyf** (1984), 246; **Matthee** (2005), 219; after different routes had been tested, the shipment to Ceylon proved to be the cheapest: **Seyf** (1984), 245; **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn – EIr*); **Matthee** (2005), 214.

<sup>160</sup> According to the Iranian geographer Ḥasan Fasā’ī (1821-1898): **Matthee** (2005), 217; according to the Iranian geographer Mīrzā Ḥossein Ḥān Taḥwīldār-e Eṣfahānī (19<sup>th</sup> cent.) and Baring: **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn – EIr*).

<sup>161</sup> **Neligan** (1927), 13; **Matthee** (2005), 218.

<sup>162</sup> Neligan and others primarily hold the poppy cultivation responsible for the famine: **Neligan** (1927), 13; **McLaughlin & Quinn** (1974), 482; for some time after the famine, more grain was planted: **Seyf** (1984), 237, 240.

<sup>163</sup> For tables of opium exports: **Seyf** (1984), 246; **Matthee** (2005), 219.

<sup>164</sup> According to Preece, this was due to the bad quality of Iranian opium: **Seyf** (1984), 241.

<sup>165</sup> **Sykes** (1902), 423; **Curzon** (1966), 499f.; **Matthee** (2005), 215; **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn – EIr*); **Ādaraḥš** (1956), 370.

<sup>166</sup> **Seyf** (1984), 239, 241.

<sup>167</sup> In the 1880s, Baring still deplored „the absence of good roads and the utter apathy and helplessness of the Government“: **Seyf** (1984), 238; **Parvin & Sommer** (1987), 255f.

<sup>168</sup> **Polak** (1883), 125; according to the Scottish traveller Napier Malcolm and others: **Matthee** (2005), 215.

<sup>169</sup> **Neligan** (1927), 13; **McLaughlin** (1976), 730; **Seyf** (1984), 241; **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn – EIr*); **Matthee** (2005), 215; **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 67; from London some opium was sent to the USA: **Curzon** (1966), 500f.

of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, but the industry recovered after the most dramatic crisis in World War I.<sup>170</sup> By the early 1920s, opium was grown in at least 18 out of 26 provinces, amounting to approximately 70,000 acres.<sup>171</sup> Despite a Chinese ban on importations of Persian opium, it continued to be predominantly sent to China.<sup>172</sup>

### ***Addiction treatment & clerical bans & state regulation***

The increasing opium production and consumption continued to preoccupy certain circles. Cultivators and producers naturally were more concerned with augmenting their profits, as was now, during Qajar time, also the government. But, physicians and clerics remained comparatively inactive.

The available literature contains little information on medicinal measures against opium addiction. Nāṣer al-Dīn Šāh's personal physician Polak advised a gradual withdrawal from opium as being the best method<sup>173</sup>, as Šīrāzī had done before him. This method, now, might indeed have been applied more generally in Iran.

Breaking their silence from Šafavīd time, Shī'īte clerics started to issue legal opinions (sg. *fatvā*) against the consumption of opium. The Šūfī 'Alī Nūr-'Alī-Šāh Gonābādī (1867-1918), who wrote the first religious treatise on opium prohibition, cites some religious edicts by grand āyatollāhs.<sup>174</sup> Yet, the dispersed clerical hierarchy prevented a concerted approach. In their function as landowners, the clergy additionally had invested financial interests in the opium industry as well.

The Qāğār shahs for their part were less concerned with opium consumption than the Šafavīds. The only royal decree against drugs is handed down from the first Qāğār ruler Āqā Moḥammad, who thus wanted to legitimize his rule by tying up with earlier Šafavīd displays of piety. His ban seems, however, rather to have concerned cannabis (*bang*).<sup>175</sup> Additionally, a

<sup>170</sup> For the development of Iran's opium industry in the volatile period between 1900 and 1920: **Neligan** (1927), 13; **Seyf** (1984), 242, 247; **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EIr).

<sup>171</sup> Only in the torrid provinces at the Persian Gulf and the dump provinces at the Caspian Sea no poppy was cultivated: **MacCormack & al.** (1924), 7, 37; **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EIr).

<sup>172</sup> Now mostly over Hong Kong and the Straits Settlements: **McLaughlin & Quinn** (1974), 484f.

<sup>173</sup> **Polak** (1865), 252.

<sup>174</sup> Cf. his treatise “The piercing {sword} and the prohibition of opium smoking“ (*du 'l-feqār va ḥormat-e kešīdan-e taryāk*): **Gonābādī** (1948/49); further Āyatollāhs who had issued religious bans are cited by: **Ādarahš** (1955/56), 523ff.; **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EIr).

<sup>175</sup> **Parvin & Sommer** (1987), 249; Matthee refers to a quote by Olivier concerning *kūknār*: **Matthee** (2005), 207, 209; Olivier, however, refers to *bang* and explicitly states that “la loi [qui] permet les autres breuvages”: **Olivier** (1807) V, 279.

few provincial governors issued edicts on prohibiting opium consumption or restricting poppy cultivation, a lesson learnt from the famine of 1871/72.<sup>176</sup>

The Qāğārs initially, however, did not encourage poppy cultivation either.<sup>177</sup> Until 1889/90 poppy – like other cash crops – was not subject to special taxes.<sup>178</sup> Only from then onwards did the government actively encourage opium production for export purposes. The levy on opium exports initially only amounted to one or two percent of the total value, but in 1903 it was elevated steeply to twenty percent.<sup>179</sup> Newly designated inspectors were tasked with supervising the poppy cultivation and opium production, in order to guarantee a high quality of the opium and thus secure a profitable and stable export market.<sup>180</sup>

Characteristically, it was only shortly after the Constitutional Revolution that Iran's second parliament, after long discussions on the scale of prohibition, passed Iran's first opium law, the OPIUM LIMITATION LAW of 1911 of 13<sup>th</sup> March 1911 AH (12<sup>th</sup> Rabī' I 1329 HQ).<sup>181</sup>

**The OPIUM LIMITATION LAW (*qānūn-e taḥdīd-e taryāk*)**

In six articles, the law regulates the production and sale of processed opium, in particular by way of taxing. On each *mesqāl* (4.25g) of processed opium, a levy of 6 *šāhīs* was imposed (§1). In order to control the consumption of *šīreh*, governmental officials were tasked with buying the country's stock of *sūlṭeh* for 3 *šāhī* per *mesqāl*, register addicts to *šīreh*, and resell them the processed *šīreh* at twelve *šāhī* per *mesqāl* (§2). After three years, the levies on processed opium and *šīreh* were to be increased; and after seven years, the consumption of *šīreh* was to be totally banned, and the consumption of opium restricted to medical uses (§4). Only opium destined for export was to be exempt from taxes (§5). Tasked with the handling and supervision of these provisions are the ministries for Finance and Interior.<sup>182</sup>

While the law theoretically aimed at reducing opium consumption, the government in praxis merely installed a monopoly on the opium production for the purpose of tax revenues. Apparently, it also assumed ownership of many opium (smoking) dens (sg. *šīreh-keš*-

<sup>176</sup> Zēll al-Solṭān, governor of Eṣfahān, prescribed a minimal acreage for the cultivation of wheat: **Stack** (1882) II, 36; Aṣef al-Dowāl, governor of Ḥorāsān, issued an edict (1881/82) prohibiting the sale of opium and ordering the closure of dens for opium smoking (*marākeẓ-e taryāk-kešī*): **Kūhī-Kermānī** (1945/46), 154; **Matthee** (2005), 221.

<sup>177</sup> **Curzon** (1966), 499; Amīr Kabīr's stimulation of poppy cultivation was rather an experiment – according to Ādamiyyat and Okazaki: **Matthee** (2005), 217; a more active role of the Qājār government is suggested by: **Ādaraḥš** (1955/56), 362f.; **Malek-Moḥammadi** (2005/06), 64f.

<sup>178</sup> **Shahnavaz** (*Afṣūn* – EIr).

<sup>179</sup> **Shahnavaz** (*Afṣūn* – EIr); **Hansen** (2001), 98.

<sup>180</sup> **Curzon** (1966), 499.

<sup>181</sup> **Shahnavaz** (*Afṣūn* – EIr); **Matthee** (2005), 221.

<sup>182</sup> The taxes on stick opium and *šīreh* increased from 6 and 12 *šāhī* in 1910 to 20 and 16 *šāhī* in 1916 respectively: **MacCormack & al.** (1924), 4f., 35f.; **Neligan** (1927), 47; **MacCallum** (1928), 7; **Chahkar** (1936), 39ff., 141f.; **Ādaraḥš** (1955/56), 488f.; **McLaughlin & Quinn** (1974), 483f.; **Shahnavaz** (*Afṣūn* – EIr); **Hansen** (2001), 98f.; **Matthee** (2005), 221.

*ḥāneh*).<sup>183</sup> William Morgan Shuster (1877-1960), the American *Administrator General of Finance* to the Qājār government, suggested to increase governmental revenues by further raising the opium tax. This plan was, however, dismissed by both Russia and Great Britain,<sup>184</sup> not because the existing taxes had already led to local revolts and opium smuggling.<sup>185</sup> While admittedly establishing a certain governmental control on opium production and consumption, the law never really was fully implemented. As a result of British, Russian and Ottoman incursions into Iran during WWI, the country soon descended into chaos.<sup>186</sup>

The OPIUM LIMITATION LAW of 1911 came into existence as a result from the global movement against opium. Persia had already taken part in the *First International Opium Commission* at Shanghai in 1909<sup>187</sup> and participated at the *First International Opium Conference of The Hague* (1911-12). The latter resulted in the FIRST INTERNATIONAL OPIUM CONVENTION, which regulated the production, distribution and export of opiates and cocaine. The Qājār government signed the HAGUE CONVENTION in 1914, but the parliament rejected its ratification as it was concerned about the economic impact on Iran, fearing reduced governmental revenues and the loss of livelihood for many poppy farmers.<sup>188</sup>

## Iranian Discourse II

### *The British Empire as a scapegoat*

While the Iranian authors of the 20<sup>th</sup> century acknowledge the responsibility of Iranian society for greatly expanding the recreational use of opium consumption during Šafavīd times, they proceed to portray rather conspiratorial views for the introduction of the habit of opium smoking during Qājār times.

Both, Ottomans and Europeans, are accused of having deliberately used opium as a colonial strategy to subdue Iranian people.<sup>189</sup> By encouraging poppy cultivation and circulating opium, they would have “suck[ed] the Iranian blood” and done all “to keep Iranians ignorant, backward and stricken by misfortune”.<sup>190</sup>

<sup>183</sup> MacCallum (1928), 7; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 70.

<sup>184</sup> MacCallum (1928), 7; Agahi (1998), 12ff.

<sup>185</sup> The government only paid 1 and later 2 *šāhī* for the *sūḥteh*, while selling the *šīreh* at 12 *šāhī*: MacCormack & al. (1924), 4f., 36; Chahkar (1936), 39; Hansen (2001), 99; Matthee (2005), 221.

<sup>186</sup> MacCormack & al. (1924), 5; Neligan (1927), 47; McLaughlin & Quinn (1974), 485; Shahnavaḥ (Afyūn – Elr); Hansen (2001), 99.

<sup>187</sup> McLaughlin & Quinn (1974), 383.

<sup>188</sup> For the text of *The Hague Convention*: MacCormack (1924), 24-34; Groseclose (1947), 209;

McLaughlin & Quinn (1974), 485.

<sup>189</sup> Ādaraḥš assumes a deliberate colonial opium strategy to exploit the Asian nations: Ādaraḥš (1955/56), 347, 358; Malek-Moḥammadī is equally conspiratorial regarding the Ottomans and the Western colonialists:

Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 53f., 63f.;

<sup>190</sup> Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 63f.

Considerable blame is put on the British Empire, which was in control of India at the time, and towards the end of the 19th century increasingly in Iran. During the construction of the telegraph line, which ran across Iran, the British owned INDO-EUROPEAN TELEGRAPH COMPANY, freely distributed opium to the Indian workers. Later, they sold it for half a penny per gram while buying the *sūḥteh* for 5 pennies per gram.<sup>191</sup> The offering of opium – still the main medicine in the region – might rather have been motivated by health-related considerations, and the purchase offer for *sūḥteh* by concerns to prevent the consumption of this stronger drug. Yet, Iranian authors interpret this as a deliberate British strategy towards the Iranians, who apparently were introduced to opium smoking by the Indian workers.<sup>192</sup> However, they also identify further culprits for the introduction of opium smoking: Nāder Šāh's military campaigns to India<sup>193</sup> as well as Indian and Iranian dervishes and Šūfīs, who are portrayed as „helpers of colonialism“ (*ayādī este 'mār*).<sup>194</sup>

The British finally are accused of having influenced the OPIUM LIMITATION LAW of 1911, which in fact contained similar provisions for the governmental purchase of *sūḥteh* from drug consumers. Together with the Iranian government, they are consequently blamed of having furthered opium smoking in Iran – while the law rather aimed at controlling this more addictive substance.<sup>195</sup>

Thus, during the Qāğār rule, opium became even more intricately intertwined with the Iranian society than ever before. Although European travellers might have exaggerated the extent of opium consumption, it had become more widespread than during Šafavīd times. The new habit of opium smoking had more negative consequences as it created a stronger dependency for opium and thus more opium addicts. The emergence of a vast opium industry might have further increased opium consumption. Instead it made opium a bigger part of everyday life. The OPIUM LIMITATION LAW of 1911 admittedly installed an expanded governmental control, albeit more on tax revenues than on opium consumption.

## II. 4. Opium during the reign of Rezā Šāh Pahlavī

After the outbreak of World War I, Qāğār Iran descended into chaos. Large parts of the country came under British domination or became de facto independent from central control. Matters only took a turn when the British-supported military coup of 1921 installed a

<sup>191</sup> McLaughlin (1976), 733.

<sup>192</sup> Āḍarāḥš (1955/56), 371; according to a special edition of the newspaper *Bāztab* in autumn 1359 (1980): Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 64, 69.

<sup>193</sup> Āḍarāḥš (1956), 365.

<sup>194</sup> Āḍarāḥš (1955/56), 366; Malek-Moḥammadī generally accuses them of being the “helpers of colonialism” (*ayādī-ye este 'mār*): Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 66; POLAK and WILLS admittedly also report that the dervishes and fakirs consume opium immoderately: Polak (1865), 252; Wills (1886), 96.

<sup>195</sup> Hardly convincing, the consumers received more money for selling the *sūḥteh* than they had to pay for the opium according to the newspaper *Bāztab* (autumn 1359 / 1980): Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 69, 93.



new government, which included the powerful chief of army and war minister Reżā Ḥān. Within a few years, this determined officer assumed power for himself and declared himself as the new shah in 1925, and reduced the young parliament to a mere rubber-stamp. Far from being a British lackey, as often portrayed by Iranian sources, Reżā Šāh Pahlavī in fact managed to loosen the tight British embrace. Inspired by Western and especially the Turkish model, he initiated a decisive modernization process by implementing radical legal, educational and infrastructural reforms.<sup>196</sup> Arguably the most crucial aspect of Reżā Šāh's rule was, however, a new centralization of power. He strengthened the previously precarious control over the country, by violently suppressing tribal and peripheral revolts and by asserting state monopolies in all crucial economic fields – including the opium industry.

Since the opium industry remained a vital source of income for the country, the government made every possible effort to control the production and sale of opium. This culminated in the STATE OPIUM MONOPOLY LAW of 1928, for which the international community had intensely lobbied for a long years. Contrary to international expectations, the monopoly, however, did not result in a lasting reduction of opium exports. The methods of poppy cultivation and opium production, meanwhile, remained the same as in Qāğār times. The same applies to the habit of opium smoking, albeit the consumption rate might have increased further.

### ***Opium consumption***

During Reżā Šāh's reign the trend towards opium smoking continued, especially in the provinces, while the consumption of opium pills, remained common.<sup>197</sup> Despite the OPIUM LIMITATION LAW of 1911, the harmful habit of smoking *sūḥteh* or *štreh* respectively was still popular;<sup>198</sup> and the opium dens (sg. *štreh-keš-ḥāneh*) remained frequently visited places.<sup>199</sup> George Everard Dodson, an American missionary stationed in Kermān, was of the opinion that opium smoking was a particular habit of the upper and middle classes.<sup>200</sup> But, opium

<sup>196</sup> On the political development between WWI and WWII, or more specifically on Reżā Šāh's ascent to power: **Ghani** (1998); **Katouzian** (2003), 15-36.

<sup>197</sup> Due to the quick physical effect „*smoking is the method par excellence*“: **Dodson** (1927), 263; for the continuing habit of eating opium pills: **Neligan** (1927), 27ff.

<sup>198</sup> According to Neligan fewer people were smoking *štreh* than opium: **Neligan** (1927), 26; according to Dodson, *štreh* allegedly was destroyed after collection by the government: **Dodson** (1927), 264.

<sup>199</sup> **Kūhī-Kermānī** (1945/46), 124ff., According to the Iranian historian Moḥammad Ebrāhīm Bāstānī-Pārīzī (d. 2014): **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 93.

<sup>200</sup> “*These folk are obviously mainly those who can afford to grow or purchase a commodity which is not only a luxury, but an expensive one withal*”: **Dodson** (1927), 262f.; according to Neligan, the richer classes smoked at home and the poorer classes in “tea-houses”, that is opium dens: **Neligan** (1927), 26; on

consumption was certainly not confined to these ranks. There were considerable imports of lower-grade and thus cheaper opium from Afghanistan and British-India, and a similar semi-legal smuggling in Iranian opium. Thus, in 1923/24 an estimated 22,000 lbs. of opium were imported into Iran.<sup>201</sup> Arthur Chester Millspaugh (1883-1955), an American tax advisor to the Iranian government, estimated in the mid 1920s, that a large part of the Iranian opium production was consumed locally.<sup>202</sup> A commission of the *League of Nations*, which travelled to Iran in 1926 to study possible consequences of an opium prohibition, evaluated a consumption rate of 20%-50% of the population. The Iranian government only admitted a rate of 5-10%.<sup>203</sup> Hossein Kūhī-Kermānī, himself an inspector of the OPIUM MONOPOLY INSTITUTION, estimated that 40% of the population of Māzandarān were smoking opium, among them many judges, gendarmes and policemen. Out of fear for cot death, even newborns were welcomed with a puff of opium.<sup>204</sup>

Smokers of opium and *šīreh* were very often strongly addicted. Dodson astutely observed: “*if the habit has been dropped, every ensuing illness, even a passing cold, is attributed to having stopped it, and the advice is pressed home, to treat it by just smoking a pill of opium*”<sup>205</sup> and the dependent *taryākī*, *vāfūrī* or *šīreh’ī* continued to be frowned upon by the society.<sup>206</sup>

### ***Poppy cultivation & opium exports***

The original plan of eliminating non-medical opium consumption, enshrined in the law of 1911, remained futile as long as the government made all possible efforts to enhance opium production in order to collect tax revenues. Like in Qāğār time, the agricultural fields were “*covered with a bright green crop topped with a white flower*”.<sup>207</sup> In fact, poppy cultivation even increased under Reżā Šāh and amounted to nearly 90,000 acres in 1926,

---

apparently widespread opium consumption among the courtiers, including allegedly Reżā Šāh himself: **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 93, 95<sup>1</sup>, 252-256.

<sup>201</sup> **MacCormack & al.** (1924), 39-42; **Neligan** (1927), 38f.; **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EIr).

<sup>202</sup> **Millspaugh** (1973), 189; **Neligan** (1927), 28; **Hansen** (2001), 100.

<sup>203</sup> **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EIr).

<sup>204</sup> **Kūhī-Kermānī** (1945/46), 124ff.; according to Dodson, “*one in six*” smoked opium in Kermān: **Dodson** (1927), 263, 265; according to Neligan, out of 60,000 inhabitants of Kermān, 25,000 were said to be opium smokers, among them women and children: **Neligan** (1927), 23, 27, 33.

<sup>205</sup> Dodson describes the opium addicts as becoming „*slacker and more and more of a slave to the habit*“: **Dodson** (1927), 263.

<sup>206</sup> **Neligan** (1927), 32.

<sup>207</sup> **Dodson** (1927), 261.

covering 21 out of 26 provinces.<sup>208</sup> This acreage produced over two million lbs. of opium, even though the soils were yielding ever-deteriorating results.<sup>209</sup> Due to international pressure and more importantly due to domestic economic problems, in 1936 poppy cultivation was banned in 35 districts, with the notable exception of Eşfāhān, traditionally an important area for opium production.<sup>210</sup> Poppy nevertheless continued to be a vital cash crop.<sup>211</sup>

The declared aim was tax revenues and the procurement of currency. The Iranian government achieved this by taxing the different steps of production and sale – including the growing opium exports. These exports now also took place overland to Russia and China.<sup>212</sup> Much of this opium was exported illegally that is against the will of the countries of destination – in particular China.<sup>213</sup> In 1925/26, Iran's opium exports exceeded for the first time 1 million lbs.<sup>214</sup> A year later, this amounted to 1.6 million lbs.<sup>215</sup> and continued on the same level until the mid 1930ies. This was due to an ongoing demand in Japanese-occupied Manchuria<sup>216</sup>. Daniel MacCormack, a member of the *American Financial Mission*, estimated the governmental income from the opium taxes to be approximately 20 million *qerāns* in 1923/24, which amounted to 10% of the total state revenues. Characteristically, most income was generated from a so-called *banderole* (*bānderōl*) tax on local consumption.<sup>217</sup> Concurrently with the increase in poppy cultivation and opium exports, this amount even increased to 45 million *qerāns* in the early 1930s.<sup>218</sup>

### ***International framework, & governmental regulation***

The international community continued to pressure Persia for a reduction of opium exports. In 1923, Persia announced its readiness to renounce the reservation towards the 1912 THE HAGUE INTERNATIONAL OPIUM CONVENTION concerning a limitation opium export.<sup>219</sup>

<sup>208</sup> According to MacCormack “it is absolutely impossible to furnish accurate statistics of the Persian opium trade”: **MacCormack** (1924), 9; **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EIr); assuming only 30,000 acres: **Destrée** (1969), 98; detailed figures are also provided by: **Neligan** (1927), 36ff.

<sup>209</sup> The production of 13 lbs. dropped to 5 lbs. per *ġarīb* (a third of an acre): **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EIr); for a table with slightly different figures: **Groseclose** (1947), 213.

<sup>210</sup> During the great economic depression, Iran experienced a shortage in raw materials like sugar beet or cotton and consequently invested more in these crops for a certain time: **Hansen** (2001), 107; according to Iranian-American academic Hamid Mowlana, still 1.35 tons of opium were produced in 1936, and cultivation only decreased later: **Mowlana** (1974), 161f.; then health minister Ġahān Saleh dates the ban in 1938: **Saleh** (1956).

<sup>211</sup> **MacCormack** (1924), 9f.

<sup>212</sup> **MacCormack & al.** (1924), 12f.; **Neligan** (1927), 41f.; **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EIr).

<sup>213</sup> **Neligan** (1927), 41ff.

<sup>214</sup> **Neligan** (1927), 13, 39f.; **Matthee** (2005), 215.

<sup>215</sup> **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EIr).

<sup>216</sup> **Groseclose** (1947), 212; **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EIr).

<sup>217</sup> **MacCormack & al.** (1924), 50; **Groseclose** (1947), 210.

<sup>218</sup> **Hansen** (2001), 103.

<sup>219</sup> **Neligan** (1927), 48f.; **MacCallum** (1928), 19f.; **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EIr).

For this purpose, the Persian government commissioned an investigation into the economic significance of opium in Iran, which it presented to the *Second Opium Conference* of 1924-1925 in Geneva.<sup>220</sup> The following year, the *League of Nations* sent a commission headed by Frederic A. Delano, uncle of later US president Frankling Delano Roosevelt, to Iran in order to analyze the feasibility of alternative crops. The resulting report of the *Commission of Enquiry into the Production of Opium in Persia* suggested extending governmental control over the production and distribution of opium; raising export taxes; and reducing the opium production by annually 10% after an initial transition period of 3 years.<sup>221</sup> Iran, in turn argued that it needs more time to develop alternative crops, and that this proposal would remain ineffective as long as other countries were not implementing the same measures.<sup>222</sup> It nevertheless soon reacted to the international pressure, and ratified the CONVENTION FOR LIMITING THE MANUFACTURE AND REGULATING THE DISTRIBUTION OF NARCOTIC DRUGS of 1931.<sup>223</sup>

The trend towards increased governmental control and a taxation of the opium industry, which had already started with the law of 1911, received a further boost after 1921.<sup>224</sup> Arthur Chester Millspaugh, who served as Iran's *General Administrator of Finances* from 1922-1927, realized that the Iranian government only controlled 20% of the local opium industry. By adapting a successful trial-and-error method, he consequently greatly increased the state monopoly on opium and thus the state revenues.<sup>225</sup> The government accordingly started to build warehouses, to which the farmers had to deliver their opium, and in which the traders had to pay additional taxes for the processing and storageing of opium. This initially caused furious revolts by poppy farmers and opium producers. Further taxes were imposed on transport permits, opiums exports, and on the local sale of opium. This consumption tax was levied on the opium rolls, which were marked with a revenue or banderole stamp according to their weight, hence the designation banderole tax.<sup>226</sup> Two years later, in 1924, Millspaugh

<sup>220</sup> **Neligan** (1927), 49; **Groseclose** (1947), 209f.; **Destrée** (1969), 84; **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EIr); for excerpts of the report: **MacCallum** (1928), 39-f.; for the detailed report: **MacCormack & al.** (1924); Iran did, however, not sign the second INTERNATIONAL OPIUM CONVENTION of Geneva (1925): **MacCallum** (1928), 37.

<sup>221</sup> Discussed alternative crops were silk, cotton, tea, tobacco pr cereals: **MacCormack** (1924), 16f.; for excerpts of the report: **Neligan** (1927), 49, 69-77; **Groseclose** (1947), 210; **Destrée** (1969), 84; **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EIr); **Hansen** (2001), 105; **Malek-Moḥammadi** (2005/06), 94f.

<sup>222</sup> **Groseclose** (1947), 210f.; **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EIr).

<sup>223</sup> **Chahkar** (1936), 107; **Saleh** (1956).

<sup>224</sup> **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EIr).

<sup>225</sup> In detail: **Hansen** (2001), 99-101.

<sup>226</sup> The new policy was first tested in 1923 in Eṣfahān, where revolts were forcefully suppressed: **MacCormack & al.** (1924), 6, 48ff.; **MacCallum** (1928), 11ff.; **Millspaugh** (1973), 188-193; **MacCallum**

assessed that two thirds of the country's opium was now under governmental control, and that the revenues had increased to 2 million *tūmāns*<sup>227</sup>. Yet, in 1926, the governmental income from the opium industry started to diminish again. Millspaugh identified the prohibition of the sale of *šīreh* and *sūh̄teh* as being responsible for it, which apparently had led to an increased local smuggling of these byproducts.<sup>228</sup> In 1928, the governmental monopolization efforts culminated in the STATE OPIUM MONOPOLY LAW.

**STATE OPIUM MONOPOLY LAW (*qānūn-e enḥeṣār-e dawlatī-ye taryāk*)**

The STATE OPIUM MONOPOLY LAW was ratified by the Iranian parliament on 17<sup>th</sup> July 1928 (26<sup>th</sup> Tīr 1307).<sup>229</sup> In 16 articles, the law regulates the exclusive governmental control on the purchase, processing, storage, transport and sale of opium. The Iranian government accordingly declared itself the sole legal purchaser of raw opium (§3); specified the banderole tax (§7); retained the right to auction export licences (§6); prohibited all opium imports (§11); and confirmed its intention to gradually eradicate non-medical consumption of opium or morphine within ten years, as earlier requested by the *League of Nations* (§15). Tasked with the supervision of the implementation of the law was the *State Opium Monopoly Institute* (*mo'assaseh-ye enḥeṣār-e dawlatī-ye taryāk*) (§4).<sup>230</sup>

In 1928, additionally, the PENAL LAW FOR OPIUM TRAFFICKERS (*qānūn-e moḡāzāt-e mortakebīn-e qāčāq-e taryāk*) was passed. It prohibited the hitherto widespread trafficking of opium from neighbouring Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey, albeit with relatively mild punishments. This initially only consisted of monetary fines, except for governmental officials who could be expropriated and imprisoned as well.<sup>231</sup>

In 1929, the government tried to raise more taxes by increasing the banderole tax twofold. It immediately realized this was a mistake, when as a result of increasing local smuggling the total revenues from domestic consumption actually started to fall. Consequently, it reduced the tax again in 1930. To further counter trafficking of foreign

---

(1928), 12ff.; some farmers were allowed to continue processing and transporting opium themselves: **Hansen** (2001), 99-101.

<sup>227</sup> According to the *Commission of Enquiry into the Production of Opium in Persia*; 2 mio. *tūmān* were equal to 20 mio. *qerān*: **Hansen** (2001), 101.

<sup>228</sup> **MacCormack & al.** (1924), 5f., 39; similar: **Neligan** (1927), 28f.; **Hansen** (2001), 102f.

<sup>229</sup> In the preceding parliament debate many deputies clearly stated that this law only would serve as a source of income for the government: **Groseclose** (1947), 211.

<sup>230</sup> **Ādaraḥš** (1955/56), 490f.; **Destrée** (1969), 84f.; **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EIr); **Hansen** (2001), 102f.; civil servants were already expelled from office by an earlier law: **MacCormack & al.** (1924), 6; as were army officers: **Dodson** (1927), 263.

<sup>231</sup> Two amendments to the *Penal Law for Opium Smugglers* (1934 and 1940) later also introduced prison sentences for non-officials: **Ādaraḥš** (1955/56), 491; **Destrée** (1969), 85f.; **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EIr).

opium, it granted excise tax reliefs in the border provinces in 1931.<sup>232</sup> Despite such concessions, the black market for opium remained thriving.<sup>233</sup>

Hence, the government set work on controlling the last two weak links of the chain: the control on poppy cultivation and opium exports. On the one hand, the STATE OPIUM MONOPOLY LAW had not limited the acreage for poppy, nor had it sanctioned fraudulent harvest declarations. On the other hand, the government had abused its monopoly on the legal purchase of raw opium by paying low prices to the poppy cultivators, without, however, supervising the harvest of opium. This amounted to an open invitation to fraud and abuse by the opium producers. In 1932, the government consequently amended the law by punishing wrong harvest declarations. In 1936, the government eventually started to buy the opium directly from the farmers, this time at appropriate market prices. This proved to be a big success for the treasury.<sup>234</sup> Opium exports, which meanwhile had become the most important export commodity,<sup>235</sup> gradually came under governmental control as well. Initially, private companies could sell opium destined for export, albeit with a governmental licence. In 1930, the Amīn brothers were the only ones to receive such a licence. However, since they were not able to sell the amount of opium predetermined by the government, opium exports were deregulated again for a short time. In 1933, eventually, the government enforced its monopoly on opium exports by creating its own *Monopoly Corporation for the Export of Opium* (*bon-gāh-e enḥešār-e šāder-āt-e taryāk*).<sup>236</sup>

In the mid 1930s, Iran had finally achieved its goal of largely controlling the opium industry from the cultivation to the national and international sale. However, even though the establishment of such a governmental monopoly corresponded to the postulation of the international community, the *League of Nations* was not satisfied, as the monopoly had not entailed a reduction of opium exports. It continued to soar since the Iranian government used the monopoly as a source of income than a means to reduce opium production.<sup>237</sup> The overall

---

<sup>232</sup> The tax was raised from 1 *qerān* and 1 *šāhī* to 2 *qerān* and 10 *šāhī* per *mesqāl*; in border provinces sometimes only 10 *šāhīs* were imposed: **Hansen** (2001), 103f.; **Groseclose** (1947), 213; **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn – EIr*);

<sup>233</sup> The numbers of arrested opium smugglers increased from 18,366 in 1929 to a stunning 155,486 in 1933; it was also estimated that in 1929 half of the consumed opium was contraband opium: **Hansen** (2001), 103.

<sup>234</sup> **Destrée** (1969), 85f.; in 1936, 500 t more opium were delivered to the governmental warehouses, which the government proudly reported to the *League of Nations*: **Hansen** (2001), 103f.

<sup>235</sup> **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn – EIr*)

<sup>236</sup> The Amīn brothers, in whose company Reżā Šāh is reported to have had a share, were obliged to export 6,500 cases opium, which even exceeded the global demand: **Groseclose** (1947), 211f; **Hansen** (2001), 105f.

<sup>237</sup> **Neligan** (1927), 30f.

opium production and opium exports only abated after 1936 only due to smaller global demand and domestic economic restraints.<sup>238</sup>

A further explicit postulation of a reduction of the local opium consumption was not achieved from the international community and from the STATE OPIUM MONOPOLY LAW. The relevant passage in the law had not been sincere from the start. The government simultaneously had the monopoly on the local sale of opium and thus had little interest in curbing opium consumption as it received most revenues from the banderole tax.<sup>239</sup> Additionally, a black market for opium continued to thrive, not least because Iran's central authority did not reach to all regions, especially those ruled by the still powerful tribes or those bordering neighbouring countries.<sup>240</sup> Opium consumption, furthermore, continued to be deeply ingrained in society. Opium was still an important medicine,<sup>241</sup> a traditional and still fashionable consumer product and an all-cure against everyday stress and ennui.<sup>242</sup> As a result, the American missionary Dodson stated: "*a public opinion against the abuse of the drug has yet to be created, despite the fact that the havoc which it causes is generally acknowledged*".<sup>243</sup>

### Iranian Discourse III

#### *The Pahlavīs as scapegoat*

Iranian authors of the 20<sup>th</sup> century continue to point out specific culprits for having furthered opium consumption during the time of Reżā Šāh. They accuse Western states of have pushed for the passing of the STATE OPIUM MONOPOLY LAW of 1928 and thus contributed to opium addiction.<sup>244</sup> The LEAGUE OF NATIONS admittedly had requested the establishment of a state monopoly on opium and the law did not curb the domestic opium consumption. But it was rather the Iranian government that had a financial interest in taxing the local opium industry. Reżā Šāh consequently – and more justifiably – is not exempt from harsh criticism.<sup>245</sup> One author even maintained that: "*there are still many veteran opium addicts, to*

<sup>238</sup> Iran even offered to ratify the *The Hague Convention* of 1912 if it was guaranteed the purchase of 4,000 cases of opium: **Hansen** (2001), 106f.; **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – Elr); **Hansen** (2001), 107.

<sup>239</sup> **MacCormack & al.** (1924), 48ff.; detailed in: **Groseclose** (1947), 212f.; **Ādaraḥš** (1955/56), 373;

<sup>240</sup> **MacCormack & al.** (1924), 11f.; **MacCallum** (1928), 16.

<sup>241</sup> DODSON mentions his hospital as being the only one in the province of Kermān: **Dodson** (1927), 261.

**McLaughlin** (1976), 728f.; Neligan specifically mentions opium smoking for medical purposes, especially as an analgesic: **Neligan** (1927), 22f.

<sup>242</sup> Opium also still served as a means to commit suicide: **Neligan** (1927), 23.

<sup>243</sup> **Dodson** (1927), 265; Millspaugh in contrast maintained, "*public sentiment condemned*" the opium industry: **Millspaugh** (1973), 189; and according to NELIGAN, many people in Iran were already concerned about the extent of opium consumption in Iran – not at least because of the bad reputation this created for Iran: **Neligan** (1927), 30f

<sup>244</sup> **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 94.

<sup>245</sup> The Iranian government is described as having run its own opium dens (*šīreh-keš-hāneh-hā*) and advertised opium in shop windows; the shop assistants are said to have worked on commission: **Ādaraḥš** (1955/56),

whom opium was sold by force of the gendarm”.<sup>246</sup> Not long after, Moḥammad-Rezā Šāh’s twin sister Ašraf was accused of having been involved in drug trafficking.<sup>247</sup>

The attitude of local physicians and clerics, accordingly, does not seem to have differed much from earlier times. According to Dodson, physicians continued to treat addicted patients with “*so-called anti-opium remedies*”.<sup>248</sup> The clerics, for their part, continued to largely refrain from condemning opium consumption. As wealthy landowners, they were still profiting from poppy cultivation, and were opposed to the monopolization efforts of the government, as was the equally wealthy class of the *bāzār* merchants, which traditionally has been closely intertwined with the clerics.<sup>249</sup>

## II. 5. Opium during the reign of Moḥammad-Rezā Šāh Pahlavī

During World War II, Rezā Šāh, who was seeking increasing independence from Great Britain, was portrayed as being on friendly terms with Nazi-Germany. Great Britain and the Soviet Union used this a pretext to invade Iran and on the 17<sup>th</sup> September 1941 imposed crown prince Moḥammad-Rezā as his successor. After the end of the war, the allies withdrew their troops. But, Iran continued to be under tight political and economic tutelage of Great Britain until the 1950s. This foreign influence eventually served as a catalyst for the nationalist movement around Moḥammad Moṣaddeq, who became prime minister in 1952. Miscalculating that the USA would support him, he initiated the nationalization of the British-owned *Anglo-Iranian Oil Company* (AIOC) and forced Moḥammad-Rezā Šāh into exile. Due to immense external and internal pressure, however, his independence movement was short-lived. He was ousted on 13<sup>th</sup> August 1953 by a CIA-backed coup d’état, and Moḥammad-Rezā Šāh returned to his throne. In the following two and a half decades, the shah increasingly turned towards authoritarian rule, and showed himself as a reliable ally of the USA, even though he preserved his own agenda. More Americans started to come to Iran as advisers for military assistance and foreign policy and contributed to the modernization and westernization – or Westoxication (*ġarb-zadegī*) in the words of the Iranian intellectual Āl-e

---

373; for a rather far-fetched link between Rezā Šāh’s campaign against the veiling of women, sexual frustrations by men and increased opium consumption: **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 46.

<sup>246</sup> **Ādaraḡš** (1955/56), 373; similar: **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 44.

<sup>247</sup> **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 110f.

<sup>248</sup> For the medical prescription of opium eating and even smoking by Persian physicians – e.g. against malaria or rheumatism: **Neligan** (1927), 23f, 33f.; according to Dodson, himself a physician, there were only “*few efficient doctors of their own*” in Kermān: **Dodson** (1927), 261.

<sup>249</sup> **MacCormack** (1924), 11, 38f.



Aḥmad – of Iran. This eventually would serve as the main catalyst for the revolution of 1979.<sup>250</sup>

The development of Iran's drug policy during these years mirrored the general political development. Initially, political measures to control opium production and consumption were a reflection of the errant domestic politics following World War II. Concurrent with increasing oil revenues, the economic importance of opium steadily decreased, especially after 1953. Iran's opium industry consequently flourished for a last time during Moṣaddeq's government, when oil revenues were running dry due to international sanctions. Arguably, as a service in return for the US supported coup against Moṣaddeq, the shah pushed through the first serious law against opium production and consumption in 1955. Domestic production indeed was suppressed but local demand for opium persisted and immediately started to be supplied by opium – and worse, increasingly by heroin – from neighbouring Turkey and Afghanistan. Seemingly more concerned by capital outflow than local addiction rates, a new law was passed in 1969 that re-allowed limited domestic opium production. This represented a deliberate break with the international drug policy and accordingly provoked the anger of the international community. However, this time, the opium was not destined for export but for an innovative local opium maintenance programme. In combination with repressive measures against opium trafficking and new progressive therapy measures against opium addiction, this new programme started to yield its first successes. Yet, the revolution of 1979 soon put an end to this progressive approach.

### ***Drug addiction***

There is little reliable information on the situation of drug consumption in Iran for the time during and after World War II. Inferring from the substances that were listed in the LAW ON PROHIBITION OF POPPY CULTIVATION AND OPIUM USE of 1955, opium must still have been the drug of choice and it was predominantly smoked. The law also lists cannabis, morphine, heroin, cocaine, and chemical drugs – yet these drugs were rarely consumed in Iran.<sup>251</sup> Even cannabis was less consumed as in other countries,<sup>252</sup> once the popularity of the cannabis products *bang* and *barš* had waned at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The prohibitive measures against the byproducts of opium smoking, *sūḥteh* and *šīreh*, which had been upheld since

---

<sup>250</sup> For a general overview on the political and economic developments under Moḥammad-Rezā Šāh and Moṣaddeq: Afkhami (2009); Gasiorowski & Byrne (2004); Sepehri (1982).

<sup>251</sup> Destrée (1969), 86.

<sup>252</sup> Mowlana (1974), 165.

OPIUM LIMITATION LAW of 1911, might have reduced the consumption of these strong opiates. Nevertheless, since every opium smoker produced his own *sūḥteh*, an overall control could never be achieved.<sup>253</sup>

The total ban on opium consumption by the law of 1955 corresponded to international requirements and consequently was marred with the inherent flaws of the global, repressive drug regime. Iranians continued to consume opiates, which was simply trafficked from neighbouring Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey. Due to strict border controls, however, traffickers increasingly traded heroin, since heroin was less voluminous and thus – at least initially – could be detected less easily by border guards. Afghan heroin initially was typically brown heroin (no. 3), which had lower morphine content than the famous white heroin (no. 4).<sup>254</sup> It accordingly was predominantly smoked from a tinfoil, which is called “chasing the dragon”. Soon enough, purer heroin no. 4 started to be injected intravenously as well.<sup>255</sup> Opium, *sūḥteh*, *šīreh* and heroin continued to be the most popular drugs in Iran until the end of the Pahlavī reign, as show statistics on registered, treated and arrested drug users. Cannabis, hashish oil and chemical drugs such as LSD or barbiturates, might have increased in popularity but they remained negligible in comparison.<sup>256</sup>

Estimations of drug consumption rates in Iran had been traditionally unreliable and varied widely. In 1926, the *Commission of Enquiry into the Production of Opium in Persia* had calculated local addiction rates between 20-50% of the population, while the government only acknowledged rates between 5-10%. Elgin Groseclose, who first was an assistant to Arthur Millspaugh and later became treasurer general in Iran, equally had estimated addiction rates of 25-50% before WWII and even up to 75% afterwards. Reliable numbers are, however, lacking and the real rates might probably have been rather around 10%.<sup>257</sup>

---

<sup>253</sup> MOWLANA claims in the 1970s that „a substantial portion of shireh addicts do exist“: **Mowlana** (1974), 163; according to the health minister Šāleḥ there were apparently still 4,700 opium dens (sg. *šīreh-keš-hāneh*) alone in Tehrān in the 1950s: **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 102f.

<sup>254</sup> **McLaughlin** (1976), 736.

<sup>255</sup> Generally on the spreading of heroin consumption since the 1960s: **Mowlana** (1974), 163ff.; **McLaughlin** (1976), 736; **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 109f.

<sup>256</sup> **Destrée** (1969), 91f.; **Mowlana** (1974), 162ff.; **McLaughlin** (1976), 727, 736f., 761.

<sup>257</sup> According to the medical adviser to the Iranian Health Ministry, Alexander Neuwirth: **Groseclose** (1947), 109; Mowlana and Malek-Moḥammadī assume an increase in opium consumption and opium dens (*šīreh-keš-hāneh*) due to the political chaos during WWII: **Mowlana** (1947), 162; **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 98ff.

Official figures are only available from the year 1955 again. Then health minister Ġahān Šāleḥ assessed a number of 1.5 million drug users out of a population of 19 millions. This amounts to 7.9%, which corresponds to the average of the official estimations in 1926.<sup>258</sup> The real number might, however, have been higher, as Šāleḥ himself earlier had estimated a total of 4 million drug users, which would amount to 21%.<sup>259</sup> He furthermore assumed there were annually 100,000 drug-related deaths, which if compared to his lower estimation of total drug users would be untypically high.<sup>260</sup>

Subsequent figures were announced on the occasion of the drug law of 1969. This time, the number was estimated to be half a million out of a population of now 27 millions – which amounts to 1.86%.<sup>261</sup> A proportional reduction in the addiction rate since 1955 is indeed possible but whether this reduction was indeed so remarkable remains questionable.<sup>262</sup> Subsequent statistical data collected from the opium maintenance programme, therapy clinics and prisons, admittedly confirm a countrywide addiction rate of approximately 2%. The number of registered opium addicts, who according to the law of 1969 were entitled to purchase opium, rose from 50,000 in 1972 to 169,512 in 1975. Jointly, they were consuming 180 tons of opium annually. The number of non-registered opium users was estimated to be between 200,000 and 500,000. Thus, in 1975, approximately 600,000 opium users were calculated out of a population of 32 millions, amounting to 1.88%.<sup>263</sup> Included in this number were an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 heroin consumers.<sup>264</sup> The real number of non-registered heroin and especially opium-users most probably still was higher. However, in total the addiction rate indeed seems to have decreased from the at least 8% in 1955.<sup>265</sup>

The remarkable reduction in the overall number of drug addicts might, however been less a direct result of prohibitive governmental measures. The proportional decrease was

<sup>258</sup> According to the newspaper *Kaiḥān*: **Destrée** (1969), 89; **Saleh** (1956); for a similar, more detailed estimation: **Mowlana** (1947), 162f.

<sup>259</sup> According Malek-Moḥammadī, who cites an interview with Šāleḥ in the weekly *Tehrān Moṣavvar*, these addicts annually consumed 500 tons of opium: **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2995/06), 102f.

<sup>260</sup> **Saleh** (1956); Frédy Bemont in “L’Iran devant le progrès” even maintained that 100,000 were dying due to overdose and another 50,000 due to suicide: **Destrée** (1969), 89.

<sup>261</sup> According to the newspaper *Kaiḥān*: **Destrée** (1969), 89.

<sup>262</sup> Assuming a relative inefficiency of the 1955 law are: **Destrée** (1969), 89; **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 106f.

<sup>263</sup> For the numbers of 1975: **McLaughlin** (1976), 728, 739f.; Mowlana assumes 250,000 non-registered opium users and a total annual consumption of 350 t opium; yet, he also maintains that ¾ of all addicts would buy illegal opium: **Mowlana** (1974), 163, 169; Moharreri reports the number of 185,000 registered addicts in 1975: **Moharreri** (1978), 69; Malek-Moḥammadī assumes an overall increase of opium consumers after the passing of the 1969 law: **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 108f.

<sup>264</sup> Mowlana assumes 10,000 to 50,000 heroin addicts: **Mowlana** (1974), 164f.; **McLaughlin** (1976), 746.

<sup>265</sup> Destrée attributes this to the amendment of 1959 to the law of 1955: **Destrée** (1969), 97f.

mainly due to population growth; while an increased availability of alcohol and a generally changing societal attitude towards opium consumption might have contributed to this development.<sup>266</sup> Undisputed is the fact that the introduction of opium maintenance programme led to a stabilization – maybe even a reduction – of the numbers of heroin addicts.<sup>267</sup>

Despite changing societal attitudes, opium smokers were not socially stigmatized and generally seem to have been able to perform their everyday social and professional duties.<sup>268</sup> Statistical data from the 1970s show that the consumption of opium and *šīreh* was particularly widespread among men between the ages of thirty to fifty.<sup>269</sup> Statistics furthermore suggest that drug addiction was distributed equally among the social classes; including amongst many clerics, and that it was a predominantly male phenomenon.<sup>270</sup> Yet, drug addiction amongst women has always been a hidden phenomenon in the Iranian society. According to an Iranian magazine “*previously many of them [women] [...] were smoking opium and šīreh in their houses; but slowly they had been relinquishing all their being and had been forced to sell themselves in order to procure opium*”.<sup>271</sup> Heroin, in contrast to opium, tended to be fashionable amongst the young, notably among the better-off men – and women – between the ages of twenty to thirty.<sup>272</sup> The same young people, who were often oriented towards a Western lifestyle, were most prone to consume cannabis, LSD, cocaine or barbiturates.<sup>273</sup>

### ***Cultivation, production, and trafficking***

Like the addiction rate, the exact poppy cultivation during and after WWII is difficult to estimate. The overall opium production certainly was lower than the 2,000 tons in 1926. A reduction of poppy cultivation has been postulated for the time during WWI due to an increased demand for vegetables by the foreign troops.<sup>274</sup> In reality, however, no reliable data

<sup>266</sup> On the widespread and free alcohol consumption: **McLaughlin** (1976), 727.

<sup>267</sup> **Siassi & Fozouni** (1980), 128; according to the newspaper *Bāztab*: **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 110; **McLaughlin** (1978), 768.

<sup>268</sup> For an example of a lorry-driver from Sīrḡān: **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 109<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>269</sup> Cf. table 1 in: **Mowlana** (1974), 164; **McLaughlin** assumes that over 50% of the drug consumers were sixty years or older – this, however, rather reflects the official criteria of the maintenance programme: **McLaughlin** (1976), 739f.

<sup>270</sup> According to official figures of 1973, most addicts were employed and nine percent of all drug users were women: **Mowlana** (1974), 165f.; on detailed statistics of drug addicts considering age, gender, education, profession or civil status: **Moharreri** (1978), 69, 71-80; **Siassi & Fozouni** (1980), 133.

<sup>271</sup> According to the magazine *Tehrān Moṣavvar*: (*besyārī az ān-hā keh qablān [...] dar ḥāneh-hā-ye ḥ'od taryāk vā šīreh mī-kešīdand; valī kam-kam kollīyeh-ye hastī-ye ḥ'īš-rā az dast dādeh va barāye beh dast āvordan-e taryāk nā-čār beh ḥ'od-forūšī šodeh būdand*): **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 105.

<sup>272</sup> In Western countries, heroin addiction was rather prevalent among the poorer classes in the 1970s: **Mowlana** (1974), 164; **McLaughlin** (1976), 736.

<sup>273</sup> **McLaughlin** (1976), 727, 736f.

<sup>274</sup> **Destrée** (1969), 86.

is available and the annual production figures vary considerably. Governmental statistics show for instance a production of 752,250 kg of opium in 1940 and of 192,000 kg in 1944.<sup>275</sup> Yet, this reduction might rather point to a declining governmental control.<sup>276</sup> The US government accordingly still assumed an annual production of 600 tons in 1944.<sup>277</sup> In 1947, poppy was apparently grown in 18 of a total of 26 provinces. Conflicting governmental decrees against or in favour of a continuous opium production further suggest an unabated poppy cultivation and constantly high exports<sup>278</sup>. Most opium thus now seems to have been produced illegally and sold on the black market.<sup>279</sup> Opium revenues consequently fell to 2.5% of the overall governmental income, however, mainly because of increasing revenues from the oil industry.<sup>280</sup>

The share of opium taxes in the state revenues increased for a last time to 20% between the years 1951 and 1953.<sup>281</sup> This was due to Moṣaddeq's ill-fated project of the nationalization of Iran's petroleum industry because of which Great Britain imposed a naval blockade on Iranian oil exports from the Persian Gulf and the subsequent withdrawal of petroleum engineers by the *Anglo-Iranian Oil Company* (AIOC). Hence, the income of opium rose relatively to the total state revenues. The annual opium production, by contrast, only seems to have increased slightly to a minimum of 700 tons.<sup>282</sup> Soon after, the overthrow of Moṣaddeq, the relative share of opium incomes consequently decreased to 2% again.<sup>283</sup>

Domestic poppy cultivation and opium production only reduced after 1955, with the implementation of the new drug law. Limited cultivation for personal use seems nevertheless to have continued.<sup>284</sup> The bulk of opium production, however, now simply moved to neighbouring Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey. This can be considered the beginning of the region as a main global opiate produceer, which continues to this day. In allusion to the

<sup>275</sup> **Groseclose** (1947), 214; **Hansen** (2001), 108.

<sup>276</sup> Groseclose reports in 1947 that opium "*is a source of great profit to [local] smugglers*": **Groseclose** (1947), 81, 214; **Malek-Moḥammadi** (2005/06), 98.

<sup>277</sup> Even 600-700 tons: **Groseclose** (1947), 214; the US State Department assumed that the bulk of these 600t were consumed domestically: **Hansen** (2001), 108.

<sup>278</sup> Iran was supposed to still provide for 30% of the world-wide (illegal) opium trade: **Groseclose** (1947), 108, 207.

<sup>279</sup> **Malek-Moḥammadi** (2005/06), 99f.

<sup>280</sup> **Hansen** (2001), 108.

<sup>281</sup> According to a report of the UN COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS in 1953: **Hansen** (2001), 109; FRÉDY Bémont assumed an increase of 12% in opium revenues: **Destrée** (1969), 86.

<sup>282</sup> Šāleḥ assumes an annual production of between 700-1,200 tons before 1955: **Saleh** (1956); according to a report in the *Illustrated Weekly of Indiana*, Iran again produced 700t per year until 1955: **Malek-Moḥammadi** (2005/06), 106.

<sup>283</sup> According to a report of the UN COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS in 1954: **Hansen** (2001), 109.

<sup>284</sup> **McLaughlin & Quinn** (1974), 495.

*Golden Triangle* in Southeast Asia, it consequently has become known as the *Golden Crescent*. From then onwards, opium of usually rather low quality was now trafficked into the continually profitable Iranian market.<sup>285</sup> Owing to serious interception efforts by the Iranian security forces, Turkish drug traffickers started to increasingly smuggle morphine and heroin instead of opium into Iran. These were processed in small laboratories in the vicinity to the Iranian border.<sup>286</sup> Raw opium, however, also continued to be imported from Afghanistan.

From the mid 1960s, morphine and heroin were increasingly trafficked from Afghanistan as well.<sup>287</sup> The Iranian government increasingly became disillusioned with this development. Not only did addiction rates barely decrease; but also drug addiction started to become more harmful with the consumption of morphine and heroin. In particular, however, Iran no longer gained any income from local opium production;<sup>288</sup> but additionally even lost currency to the drug producers abroad.<sup>289</sup> The well-known contemporary poet Amīrī Fīrūzkūhī summarized the common Iranian feeling about this development when he expressed: “*we give pure gold and buy pure filth [...]; [thus] we paint the loo of the others*”.<sup>290</sup> The government thus gradually became convinced that it needed to adapt its drug policy. In 1969, the parliament therefore passed a new drug law, which re-allowed limited poppy cultivation and opium production for a local maintenance programme. Originally, poppy was intended to be grown on 100,000 hectares.<sup>291</sup> The authority to decide the exact acreage was the *Ministry of Land Reform and Rural Cooperation* (*vezārat-e eṣlāḥāt-e aržī va ta‘āvon-e rūstā-yī*).<sup>292</sup> In 1969, the ministry first designated 1,000 hectares for legal poppy cultivation; but in 1972,

<sup>285</sup> Saleh (1956); Destrée (1969), 88f., 92f.; Mowlana (1974), 168; McLaughlin (1976), 736-742; like the Iranian opium in the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of the 19<sup>th</sup> cent., Afghan opium was infamous for a high water-content and many impurities: Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 107

<sup>286</sup> Iranian traffickers allegedly were often nomadic tribes, especially the Ġirzay (Ghilzai), Balūč, Šīnvarī and the Turkmen: Mowlana (1974), 170f.; according to the U.S. World Opium Survey of 1972: McLaughlin (1976), 726, 736; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 109f.

<sup>287</sup> Destrée (1969), 88f., 92f.; Mowlana (1974), 170; McLaughlin (1976), 736-742.

<sup>288</sup> Most authors are convinced that the Iranian government was more concerned with the negative economic than with the negative social effects: Destrée (1969), 89, 94; McLaughlin (1974), 741f.; Siassi & Fozouni (1980), 128; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 107.

<sup>289</sup> The capital outflow for opium was estimated to be 90 mio. US\$ per year: Destrée (1969), 89; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 106ff.

<sup>290</sup> (*ṭalā-ye ḥāleš mī-dehīm va [...] keṭāfat-e ḥāleš mī-ḥarīm va ḥalā-ye dīgar-ān-rā rangīn mī-konīm*): Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 108.

<sup>291</sup> According to the business paper *Būrs*, the government expected to earn 100 Mio US\$ from this acreage: Destrée (1969), 90.

<sup>292</sup> For a list of the provinces and districts that were allowed to grow poppy: Destrée (1969), 93<sup>4</sup>; the ministry was created in 1967: Lambton (1969), 359f.; McLaughlin calls it MINISTRY OF COOPERATIVES AND RURAL AFFAIRS: McLaughlin (1974), 743; entitled to harvest the licit opium were the *Agricultural Joint Stock Companies* and governmental rural cooperatives: Mowlana (1974), 168.

poppy was again grown on 21,000 hectares and in nineteen provinces.<sup>293</sup> Opium production accordingly increased from 8 tons in 1969 to 217 tons in 1972.<sup>294</sup> Given Iran's endemic corruption, illegal poppy cultivation in remote regions and thus an even higher production cannot be ruled out altogether.<sup>295</sup> Smuggling of Iranian opium indubitably existed to a certain degree<sup>296</sup> – as did more importantly the trafficking of the cheaper Afghan, Pakistani and to a lesser extent Turkish opium and of heroin.<sup>297</sup> From the 1970s, opium and heroin from the *Golden Crescent* additionally started to be smuggled through Iran towards Europe, thus initiating the infamous drug trail, which continues to flourish to this day.<sup>298</sup>

### **Governmental Provisions**

During the 1940s, a series of quickly changing governments were issuing a plethora of laws and governmental decrees against the production and consumption of opium, which all remained largely ineffective. A governmental decree in 1941 restricted the sale of opium to pharmacies, where registered consumers should purchase it with special coupons, but to no avail.<sup>299</sup> In March 1942, the government presented a bill to the parliament, which would have prohibited the production and consumption of opium; but the parliament refused to discuss it.<sup>300</sup> However, the government came under increasing pressure from international and domestic actors. In 1943, the *Society for the Fight Against Opium and Alcohol* (*anğoman-e mobārezeh bā taryāk va alkol*) demanded a total ban on drugs<sup>301</sup>, while the USA also increased their pressure on the Iranian government to ban local opium consumption<sup>302</sup>. Hence, in 1946 the government of Ahmad Qavam al-Saltaneh prohibited poppy cultivation as well as the sale and consumption of opium.<sup>303</sup> Shortly thereafter, some provisions were mitigated;<sup>304</sup>

<sup>293</sup> According to the newspaper *Kaihan*: **Destrée** (1969), 96, 98, 101; the figure of 21,835 ha in 1972 is given by: **Mowlana** (1974), 168f.; McLaughlin mentions 16,000 ha in 1974 but – rather incredible – only 2,500 ha in 1975: **McLaughlin** (1976), 743f.

<sup>294</sup> **Mowlana** (1974), 168f.

<sup>295</sup> **Malek-Mohammadi** (2005/06), 106ff.; Destrée and Mowlana in contrast maintain that Iran was seriously and efficiently fighting drug smuggling as it lost currency: **Destrée** (1969), 364; **Mowlana** (1974), 172.

<sup>296</sup> **McLaughlin** (1974), 741.

<sup>297</sup> **Destrée** (1969), 81, 99ff; **Mowlana** (1974), 169f., 173; **McLaughlin** (1976), 741, 752, 761; **Malek-Mohammadi** (2005/06), 109.

<sup>298</sup> Drug trafficking was also eased by new custom conventions, in particular the *Transport International Routiers* (TIR) system, which relied on a reduced inspection procedure: **McLaughlin** (1976), 761-763.

<sup>299</sup> Addicts above the age of forty were entitled to these coupons: **Groschlo** (1947), 215; **Hansen** (2001), 107.

<sup>300</sup> **Hansen** (2001), 381.

<sup>301</sup> **Groschlo** (1947), 215f.; **McLaughlin & Quinn** (1974), 489; **Hansen** (2001), 108; **Malek-Mohammadi** (2005/06), 105f.; for more details on the SOCIETY TO FIGHT OPIUM AND ALCOHOL, which had been inspired by similar organizations in the US: **Kūhī-Kermānī** (1945/46), 131, 155.

<sup>302</sup> In 1944 the USA sent a circular letter to Iran, asking it to limit opium production to medical needs; in response they offered Iran a guaranteed annual share of the licit opium trade – absurdly only amounting to 125kg: **Groschlo** (1947), 216; **Hansen** (2001), 108; **Malek-Mohammadi** (2005/06), 105f.

<sup>303</sup> **Groschlo** (1947), 216; **Saleh** (1956); **Hansen** (2001), 108; **Shahnavaz** (*Afjūn* – Elr).

and in 1949, the parliament declared the governmental decrees null and void by stressing that according to the UN CONVENTION FOR LIMITING THE MANUFACTURE AND REGULATING THE DISTRIBUTION OF NARCOTIC DRUGS of 1931, Iran had the right to produce an amount of opium “*large enough to ensure a sufficient amount of foreign currency*”.<sup>305</sup> This right consequently continued to be used as an economic tool, especially by the administration of Moṣaddeq.<sup>306</sup>

Soon after the return of Moḥammad-Rezā Šāh in 1953, then health minister Ġahān Šāleḥ presented a bill for a new drug law, which postulated a total ban on opium production.<sup>307</sup> The parliament and senate started a heated debate about the desirability of such a law but due to international and national pressure, they eventually passed the LAW ON PROHIBITION OF POPPY CULTIVATION AND OPIUM USE on 7<sup>th</sup> October 1955 (15<sup>th</sup> Mehr 1334). A cartoon in *Ṭehrān-e Moṣavvar* illustrates the ensuing popular animosity towards health minister Šāleḥ by depicting an addict grumbling: “*Why did you shatter my pipe, doctor? You shut me the door to the delightful life, doctor*”<sup>308</sup>.

#### LAW ON PROHIBITION OF POPPY CULTIVATION AND OPIUM USE

(*qānūn-e man‘-e kešt-e ḥaš-ḥāš va este‘māl-e taryāk*)

In five articles, the law of 1955 provided for the first time a clearly defined schedule to suppress poppy cultivation, opium production and drug consumption. Prohibited were poppy cultivation; the production and importation of opium, *šīreh* and further derivatives; visiting opium dens; and producing opium paraphernalia (§1). Opium consumption was banned as well, and opium addicts were instructed to register with the *Health Ministry* in order to start addiction therapy and withdrawal. The government additionally was tasked with providing enough financial support for (former) poppy farmers and drug addicts (§2). The penalties for contraventions against these provisions were to be approved within one month after the passing of the law (§4). Responsible for the implementation of the law were the ministries of Health, Interior, Finance, Agriculture and Justice (§5).<sup>309</sup>

The amendment defining punishments and fines was, however, only passed in 1959. The amendment expanded the list of banned drugs by including morphine and heroin amongst others (§1).

<sup>304</sup> Against the assertion of the government, opium continued to be produced between 1946-48: **Groseclose** (1947), 81; **Hansen** (2001), 108; **Malek-Moḥammadi** (2005/06), 100; for the abrogating decrees after 1946: **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EIr).

<sup>305</sup> The Iranian government sent a report to the UN pointing to the economic difficulties of crop substitution: **Saleh** (1956); according to the UN COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS of 1953: **Hansen** (2001), 109.

<sup>306</sup> **Groseclose** (1947), 108f.

<sup>307</sup> **Saleh** (1956); **McLaughlin & Quinn** (1974), 492; **Hansen** (2001), 109;

<sup>308</sup> (*vāfūr-e ma-rā čerā šekastī, doktor? – bar man dar-e ‘aiš-rā be-bastī, doktor*): **Malek-Moḥammadi** (2005/06), 103<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>309</sup> On the law of 1955: **Saleh** (1956); **Destrée** (1969), 86f.; **McLaughlin & Quinn** (1974), 492; **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EIr).



The *Health Ministry* (*vezārat-e beh-dārī*) was tasked with the production of drugs for medical and scientific purposes (§2), for which a specific administrative unit, the *General Office for Narcotics Control* (*edāreh-ye koll-e neẓārat bar mavādd-e moḥaddereh*), was created (§3). Articles 4 to 12 are regulating fines and punishments for cultivators, producers, traffickers and consumers of drugs. They range from penalties to prison terms and compulsory labour and stipulate the death penalty for the repeated production or trafficking of drugs. Articles 13 to 15 regulate the procedures of destroying poppy crops, while further articles are dedicated to officials violating the law.<sup>310</sup>

Responsible for the coordination of the interministerial efforts was the newly created *Organization for the Prevention of Poppy Cultivation and the Combat of the Use and Smuggling of Opiates* (*sāz-mān-e man‘-e kešt-e ḥaš-ḥāš va mobāreزه bā este‘māl va qāčāq-e mavādd-e afyūnī*).<sup>311</sup> The police and gendarmerie managed to gradually destroy thousands of hectares of poppy cultivation and closed down hundreds of opium dens (*šīreh-keš-ḥāneh*).<sup>312</sup> They also arrested opium addicts and transferred them to establishments where they were treated with ‘anti-opium pills’.<sup>313</sup> The law of 1955 with its amendment of 1959 thus was Iran’s first law that sanctioned the cultivation, production, smuggling and particularly consumption of drugs with heavy penalties. Yet, due to increased drug smuggling from Afghanistan and Turkey, the law largely remained ineffective in reducing opium consumption.<sup>314</sup>

Increasingly worried about the outflow of currency and the growing availability of heroin, the Iranian government started to look for a different solution. Drug policy specialists discussed a new approach, according to which limited poppy cultivation for a clearly defined domestic use should be re-introduced again.<sup>315</sup> Critical voices both in Iran and within the international community vehemently opposed this plan.<sup>316</sup> The Iranian parliament nevertheless passed the LAW OF LIMITED OPIUM CULTIVATION AND EXPORTS in 1969.

<sup>310</sup> The amendment was passed on 22<sup>nd</sup> June 1959 (1<sup>st</sup> Tīr 1338): **Destrée** (1969), 86ff.; **McLaughlin & Quinn** (19745), 493f.; **McLaughlin** (1976), 737; **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 105f.

<sup>311</sup> **Saleh** (1956); **Shahnavaz** (*Afyūn* – EIr).

<sup>312</sup> **Saleh** (1956); **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 104.

<sup>313</sup> **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 103.

<sup>314</sup> **Destrée** (1969), 88; **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 103f., 106f.

<sup>315</sup> A first draft of the law was presented at a session of the UN COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS in Geneva on 31<sup>st</sup> January 1969; Iran tried to defuse their worries by emphasizing that the plan was only directed against the smuggling of foreign drugs: **Destrée** (1969), 89.

<sup>316</sup> The newspaper *Eṭṭelā‘āt* on 17<sup>th</sup> January 1969 (27<sup>th</sup> Day 1347) pointed to the fact that drug trafficking will continue as long as drug consumption continues to be prohibited: **Destrée** (1969), 90; tellingly, next to the Western countries especially the pharmaceutical companies, which were also present at the session of the UN COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, opposed Iran’s plan: **McLaughlin** (1976), 743.

### THE LAW AUTHORIZING LIMITED OPIUM CULTIVATION AND EXPORTS

*(qānūn-e ejāzeh-ye kešt va šāder-āt-e maḥdūd-e taryāk)*

In nine articles, the law, which was passed on of 4<sup>th</sup> March 1969 (13<sup>th</sup> Esfand 1347), reorganized Iran's drug policy by stressing on the regulation of local opium production and expanding therapy measures.

Tasked with supervising poppy cultivation was the MINISTRY OF LAND REFORM AND RURAL CO-OPERATION (*vezārat-e eṣlāḥāt-e araṣṭ va ta'āvon-e rūstā-yī*) (§1), and the entire chain of production was monopolized by the governmental (§2). Drug consumption continued to be prohibited as a general rule, except for those with a medical licence (*mojavvez-e ṭebbī*) or for scientific purposes, and was punished even stricter than previously (§3). Special provisions applied for addicted civil servants, who were to be excluded from service after a certain period of grace (§4-7). The government finally was tasked with allocating sufficient funds for addiction therapy (§8).<sup>317</sup>

### THE LAW OF AGGRAVATED PUNISHMENTS FOR (DRUG) SMUGGLERS

*(qānūn-e tašdīd-e moğāz-āt-e mortakeb-īn-e qāčāq {mavādd-e afyūnī})*

Parallel to the re-allowance of limited poppy cultivation and opium consumption, this law, which was passed on 21<sup>st</sup> June 1969 (31<sup>st</sup> Ḥordād 1348), strengthened punishments for drug smuggling, in order to emphasize the state monopoly. According to a previous regulation, drug traffickers, who were not organized in gangs and did not smuggle more than a fixed amount of drugs, could be granted amnesty.<sup>318</sup> The new law aggravated the punishments. For organized drug trafficking, capital punishment could already be imposed for small amounts of drugs. Military tribunals tried these cases with the explicit aim of shortening court procedures. However, even for non-organized trafficking, or the possession of certain amounts, stiff prison sentences, hard labor or hefty fines were handed out.<sup>319</sup>

Various subsequent decrees defined the implementation of the law; especially concerning the acreage under cultivation, the exact mode of operation for poppy cultivation, or the treatment of drug addicted civil servants.<sup>320</sup> Other important enactments were related to law enforcement, therapy and rehabilitation programs, and particularly to the opium maintenance programme for severe drug addicts.<sup>321</sup>

<sup>317</sup> On the law of 1969, which also promised to cease opium production as soon as the neighbouring countries would do the same (§1): **Destrée** (1969), 93-95; **Mowlana** (1974), 172; **McLaughlin & Quinn** (1974), 498-503.

<sup>318</sup> **Destrée** (1969), 91f.

<sup>319</sup> **Destrée** (1969), 91f.; **Mowlana** (1974), 173; **McLaughlin** (1976), 751; **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 100.

<sup>320</sup> Addicted farmers initially were to lose their land if they did not quit addiction: **Destrée** (1969), 90f., 99f.; **Mowlana** (1974), 172; **McLaughlin** (1976), 290f.; on competences for and procedures of opium production: **Destrée** (1969), 96; **Mowlana** (1974), 172; **Siassi & Fozouni** (1980), 128; for students, too, harsh provisions were applied: **Mowlana** (1974), 173.

<sup>321</sup> According to the enactment of 11<sup>th</sup> September 1969 concerning § 3 and §4 of the 1969 law: **McLaughlin** (1976), 290f.; **Destrée** (1969), 99f.

Since 1969, Iranian drug policy was based on the three pillars of repression, addiction therapy and limited maintenance programme. Most contemporary observers have judged the controlled opium distribution programme as a regression to previous laissez-faire drug policy patterns. Yet, in reality, it might be considered as one of the first explicit global harm reduction measure.

### ***Repression by the police and gendarmerie***

Before the passing of the LAW ON PROHIBITION OF POPPY CULTIVATION AND OPIUM USE, the Iranian government had led joint campaigns with US assistance against drug smugglers.<sup>322</sup> From the 1950, two law enforcement agencies were tasked with combating drug trafficking. The *National Imperial Police* (*šahr-bānī-ye koll-e kešvar-e šāh-an-šāhī*) and its *Bureau to Combat Drugs* (*dawreh-ye mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḥadder*) were in charge of law enforcement in cities with more than five hundred inhabitant. The *Division to Combat Smuggling* (*vāhed-e mobārezeh bā qāčāq*) and the *Armed Customs Guard* (*gārd-e mošallah-e gomrok*), subordinated to the NATIONAL IMPERIAL GENDARMERIE (*žāndārmerī-ye koll-e kešvar-e šāh-an-šāhī*), enforced the law in smaller cities and villages as well as along the borders.<sup>323</sup> Both special drug units continued to cooperate with the USA and the *UN Division of Narcotic Drugs*.<sup>324</sup> In 1969, almost 20,000 drug traffickers remained incarcerated, thus putting a heavy burden upon the judiciary system.<sup>325</sup>

With the passing of the LAW OF AGGRAVATED PUNISHMENTS FOR (DRUG) SMUGGLERS of 1969, the persecution of drug traffickers intensified. Until 1976, military tribunals executed more than 200 drug traffickers.<sup>326</sup> Yet, borders were long and porous,<sup>327</sup> and corruption was widespread.<sup>328</sup> The police and gendarmerie furthermore competed with each other for budgets and responsibilities and generally refrained from cooperation.<sup>329</sup> At times, investigations simply were stopped because important officials or even members and the royal family were involved in drug smuggling.<sup>330</sup> Drug trafficking accordingly continued.

<sup>322</sup> **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 99f

<sup>323</sup> **McLaughlin** (1976), 755.

<sup>324</sup> US liaison officers regularly served as advisers to both agencies: **McLaughlin** (1976), 756f.

<sup>325</sup> **Destrée** (1969), 99f.

<sup>326</sup> **McLaughlin** (1976), 741, 752, 761; **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 109

<sup>327</sup> **McLaughlin** (1976), 766f.

<sup>328</sup> According to the historians Madanī-Kermānī and Rāvandī: **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 106f.

<sup>329</sup> The competition between the security agencies was also the result of a deliberate power strategy of Moḥammad-Rezā Šāh: **McLaughlin** (1976), 757-771.

<sup>330</sup> **McLaughlin** (1976), 760; e.g. Moḥammad-Rezā Šāh's twin sister Ašraf was accused of organizing drug trafficking: **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 110f.

### *Therapy and rehabilitation*

Coordinated governmental addiction therapy only started after the passing of the LAW ON PROHIBITION OF POPPY CULTIVATION AND OPIUM USE of 1955. At the beginning, common therapy measures consisted almost exclusively in mere detoxification without supportive consultations. Private physicians continued to dispense anti-opium pills – often still partly containing opium – but also started to experiment with methadone. Relapse rates accordingly were high.<sup>331</sup>

The *Health Ministry* continued to supervise addiction therapy after the law of 1969. However, their incompetence became increasingly evident as it had never established a national coordination plan for therapy measures, there were only a few existing therapy facilities and most often lacked skilled manpower.<sup>332</sup> In 1974 consequently, the newly created *Ministry of Social Welfare* (*vezārat-e refāh-e ejtemā'ī*) was tasked with supervising governmental addiction therapy, while the direct implementation was incumbent upon the *National Iranian Society for the Rehabilitation of the Disabled* (NISRD). This society was, however, again transferred back to the health ministry in 1976. Within short time, it reorganized the nationwide therapy administration. The bulk of therapy measures were assigned to community based mental health centres, which offered ambulatory psychological treatment alongside detoxification.<sup>333</sup> For heroin addicts, specific addiction treatment clinics were created, in which detoxification with methadone as well as psychological and occupational therapies were performed on an inpatient basis. In 1976, two such clinics were operating in Yāftābād near Tehrān and in Reżā'īyeh near Orūmiyyeh, while another clinic was under construction in Kermānshāh. Further three clinics existed in Mašhad, Rašt and Sarī, where addiction had been traditionally widespread.<sup>334</sup> The promising combination of medical and therapeutic treatment was new in Iran. Yet, these clinics, too, merely detoxified drug addicts to produce successful statistics, without longterm objectives.<sup>335</sup> Private physicians continued to treat addiction in cities, especially in the smaller towns and villages. As they continued to be supervised by the *Health Ministry*, an impending competition between the two ministries developed, further hampering successful addiction treatment.<sup>336</sup> Before the new

---

<sup>331</sup> Mowlana (1974), 174; Moharreri (1978), 70.

<sup>332</sup> McLaughlin (1976), 747.

<sup>333</sup> Mowlana (1974), 174; McLaughlin (1976), 748<sup>331</sup>; Moharreri (1978), 70; the community based centres had a capacity of 50 to 70 beds: Siassi & Fozouni (1980), 129, 133; Agahi & Spencer (1980), 43; Spencer & Agahi (1990), 173; Kamali (2011), 17.

<sup>334</sup> Mowlana (1974), 174; McLaughlin (1976), 748.

<sup>335</sup> McLaughlin (1976), 749f.

<sup>336</sup> McLaughlin (1976), 748ff.

therapy system and competing competences could be calibrated, the revolution of 1979 set in, eventually resulting in a temporary halt of most scientifically based addiction treatment.

### ***Addiction research and drug prevention***

For many years, the only drug related studies undertaken in Iran were analyses of the impact of the opium industry on Iran's economy rather than drug addiction. It was carried out under the supervision of Americans and mostly destined for the *League of Nations* and the *United Nations* respectively.<sup>337</sup> Proper domestic research on drug addiction only started in the mid 1970s. Studies by Agahi & Spencer, Siassi & Fozouni or Mehryar & Moharreri examined the efficiency of addiction treatment by methadone and mutabon, or the effects of the opium maintenance program on the behaviour of drug addicts and their families. Most of these studies were, however, only published after the revolution.<sup>338</sup>

Drug prevention was further neglected. The opinion was widespread that drug education would rather lead to an increase in drug consumption. With the development of addiction clinics, drug addicts in treatment at least were informed about the harm and the dangers of opium and heroin addiction and thus provided with secondary and tertiary prevention. Primary drug prevention only received a boost in 1974, when the government decided to make drug awareness a top priority. After a few months of intense state activities and media coverage, however, the enthusiasm soon faded. Unclear responsibilities once again impeded successful national measures.<sup>339</sup>

### ***The Opium maintenance programme***

The most striking change in the LAW OF LIMITED OPIUM CULTIVATION AND EXPORTS was the introduction of the opium maintenance programme. This idea was not new in Iran, as already in the 1940s a law restricting the sale of opium to pharmacies had been proposed. Such earlier measures were, however, rather aimed at ensuring the governmental monopoly and thus increasing state revenues. This motive, admittedly, was still present in the new maintenance programme, as the government explicitly was concerned with the loss of capital for the purchase of foreign-produced opium. Yet, at the same time, the government tried to

---

<sup>337</sup> MacCormack (1924); this is also supported by: Agahi & Spencer (1981), 43.

<sup>338</sup> For further details on these and similar studies: McLaughlin (1976), 763ff.; the second study mentioned is: Siassi & Fozouni (1980); other studies were conducted by: Moharreri (1987); Mehryar & Moharreri (1978).

<sup>339</sup> Before 1974 "no large-scale predrug education programs" existed: Mowlana (1974), 173; McLaughlin (1976), 451.

rein in the increasing spread of heroin consumption. Additionally, the programme attests to a realistic assessment of the inefficiency of the repressive drug policy that had been introduced by the LAW ON PROHIBITION OF POPPY CULTIVATION AND OPIUM USE of 1955.

According to the implementation provisions to the law, initially, only Iranians above the age of sixty could apply for participating in the opium distribution programme. Applicants had to be recommended by a private physician and approved by three medical doctors of the *Health Ministry*. If the assessment was positive, they received an identity card marked with a skull, bearing the name, address and a picture as well as the daily ration they were allowed to obtain from one of the countrywide 300 licenced pharmacies. They had the possibility to provide themselves with up to thirty daily rations at one time. This was meticulously noted on the card. The governmental opium, however, was not free, but had to be purchased for 17.5 *rīyāl* per gram.<sup>340</sup>

The stated rationale of the maintenance programme was to cure all drug addicts below the age of sixty;<sup>341</sup> while allowing people above this age – those considered to be economically unproductive – to continue controlled opium consumption until their eventual decease.<sup>342</sup> In practice, however, an ever-increasing number of people were supplied with governmental opium. The eligibility age was in practice soon lowered to fifty years and in exceptional cases even lower. Daily rations furthermore could vary considerably, while opium eaters at times would register as opium smokers, who generally were consuming more. Additionally, the law did not obligate opium smokers to return the dross (*sūhteh*), even though the cards mentioned that its consumption was illegal. Many holders of opium cards thus either smoked the *sūhteh* and / or sold the surplus in opium; or they sold the governmental opium altogether and provided themselves with cheaper, illegal Afghan or Turkish opium.<sup>343</sup> The government did not seem to be too worried about fraud within the maintenance program, as it was probably content that at least Iranian opium was consumed.<sup>344</sup>

---

<sup>340</sup> Mowlana (1974), 174; McLaughlin (1976), 738-742; Siassi & Fozouni (1980), 128.

<sup>341</sup> Drug addicts could, however, not be forced to undergo treatment: McLaughlin (1976), 745f., 750.

<sup>342</sup> For more details on the aim of the opium maintenance programme: McLaughlin (1976), 738-742; Moharrerri (1978), 69f.; Siassi & Fozouni (1980), 128.

<sup>343</sup> For more details on the problematic implementation of the opium maintenance programme: McLaughlin (1978), 739-742; Moharrerri (1978), 70; Siassi & Fozouni (1980), 128, 130ff.

<sup>344</sup> McLaughlin (1978), 739, 741f.

## II. 6) The Islamic Republic

After the revolution of 1979, the Islamist authorities often broke completely with the policies of the shah, even if certain administrative structures and practices were continued. This paradigmatically also applies to the drug policy. During the first months after the revolution, poppy cultivation and opium consumption seem to have greatly increased due to the lacking control of the new authorities. But, this situation soon changed. First practical measures against drug addiction were implemented from mid 1979 when security forces started to gather drug addicts in rehabilitation centres and increasingly in addiction camps and prisons. Soon, the recently increased poppy cultivation was forbidden again, and since then, no noteworthy opium production has taken place inside Iran. Yet, just like thirty years ago, ever-increasing amounts of opium and heroin started to be trafficked from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Iran again and through Iran towards Europe and the Middle East.

The incident that arguably should prove most decisive in changing the previous drug policy was, however, the war Iraq waged against Iran in 1980. It brought proper therapy measures against drug addiction to a halt and most probably led to a rise in addiction rates. The Iranian government only realized the extent of drug addiction – especially to heroin – towards the end of the war.

In the context of a general reconfiguration of the Islamic Republic at the end of Āyatollāh Ḥomaiṇī's reign, the newly created *Expediency Discernment Council* passed a new, harsh drug law in 1988. This law in particular led to the creation of the *Drug Control Headquarter* (DCHQ), a body tasked with coordinating all domestic drug demand and drug supply reduction measures. But, since the severe punishments against drug traffickers and addicts still did not yield the expected result, the Rafsanjānī administration gradually introduced a more progressive drug policy. The government started to re-emphasize drug therapy and rehabilitation, and private clinics again started to prescribe opioid-agonists such as methadone and buprenorphine, as had been the case before the revolution. In 1997, this new policy was embodied in an amendment to the drug law, which allowed for the treatment of drug addicts instead of imprisonment, even though the consumption of drugs continued to be criminally liable. The government of Khātāmī gradually replaced previous, prison-like addiction camps with new inpatient and outpatient therapy centres, in which increasingly progressive scientific treatment methods were applied. This development was supported by

the UNDCP office, which was opened in Tehran in 1999. Increased contacts with international addiction specialist and the return of Iranian addiction experts resulted in the introduction of further harm reduction measures, such as the distribution of sterile syringes or secondary and tertiary prevention campaigns. Besides, private clinics and governmental centers started to closely cooperate with each other, supervised by the DCHQ and new academic research institutes such as DARIUS or INCAS.

During Aḥmadīneżād's term, this progressive drug policy continued, with DARIUS experimenting with a tentative maintenance programs. At the same time, however, repressive measures were strengthened again. Drug addicts again started to be rounded up in prison-like addiction camps, as had become clear during the protests against the re-election of Aḥmadīneżād in 2009.

### ***Cultivation, Production, and Trafficking***

During the transition period of the revolution, governmental control waned, especially in the remote provinces. Poppy cultivation is accordingly assumed to have increased for a short period to approximately 33,000 hectares – including in provinces where no cultivation had taken place.<sup>345</sup> In the autumn of 1979, however, Āyatollāh Ḥomainī issued a *fatvā*, in which he prohibited poppy cultivation and opium production.<sup>346</sup> The new government consequently started to destroy existing cultivations in all provinces. Since, no noticeable opium production has taken place in Iran.<sup>347</sup> This is also true for during the war, as the situation after the war had corroborated.<sup>348</sup> The United Nations acknowledged this fact early on, but the USA continued to list Iran on its annual list of *Major Drug Producing and Trafficking Countries*.<sup>349</sup> Only in 1998, did president Clinton admit that Iranian poppy cultivation is negligible and that the Iranian security forces are waging successful combat against drug trafficking. Iran consequently was removed from the list.<sup>350</sup> The afresh prohibition of local opium production, however, produced the same dynamics as did the LAW ON PROHIBITION OF POPPY CULTIVATION AND OPIUM USE of 1955.

<sup>345</sup> Agahi & Spencer (1981), 44; Agahi & Spencer (1990), 174; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 112.

<sup>346</sup> Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 112; Spencer & Agahi (1981), 45.

<sup>347</sup> Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 2; CACI (2004).

<sup>348</sup> Only in the eastern provinces a limited cultivation still seems to have taken place: Spencer & Agahi (1990), 175.

<sup>349</sup> Samii & Recknagel (1999), 167; Reid & Costigan (2002), 101; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 2; CACI (2004).

<sup>350</sup> Not all members of congress agreed with this political switch: Samii & Recknagel (1999), 166f.; Reid & Costigan (2002), 101; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 2; CACI (2004); Navai (2005), 80.



### POPPY CULTIVATION IN AFGHANISTAN

After the prohibition of producing domestic opium in Iran, poppy cultivation immediately increased in the vast tribal belt between Afghanistan and Pakistan, from which it continued to be trafficked to Iran and further to European and Arab countries.<sup>351</sup> This development, admittedly, was reinforced by the Soviet-Afghan war, in which opium production served to bolster the war chests especially of the Mujahedeen (*moğāhedīn*).<sup>352</sup> This disastrous combination of armed resistance and drug trafficking, together with a lack of viable economic alternatives, is the main reason for which Afghanistan has remained the principal producer of opiates in the world to this day. Opium and heroin production in fact further increased during the Afghan civil war in the 1990s, not exclusively in the Taliban-controlled areas.<sup>353</sup> The Taliban admittedly had declared a ban on poppy cultivation in 2000; yet, this was only a strategic – and eventually futile – move to gain the acceptance of the international community. Opium and heroin sales continued unabatedly<sup>354</sup>

After the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the Americans announced the intention of ending the soaring opium production in the Golden Crescent. The USA indeed played a less ambiguous role than during the 1990s, when the CIA actually had participated in the trafficking of heroin. Yet, Afghan opium production continued to rise to unprecedented heights. The previous peak of 4,565 tons of opium under the Taliban was again reached in 2004. In 2007, this almost doubled to of 8,200 tons, which even exceeded the global demand for licit and illicit opiates.<sup>355</sup>

The shortest trafficking route for Afghan and Pakistani drugs towards Europe and the Middle East, which had been established before the revolution von 1979, continued to run through Iran.<sup>356</sup> After the collapse of the Soviet Union, illegal exports towards Central Asian countries and Russia have increased; but the Iranian route has remained the most important. In the 2000s, an estimated 60% of Afghan and Pakistani opium was trafficked through Iran, of which about 40% was consumed in Iran.<sup>357</sup> Of the 4,574 tons that the two countries

<sup>351</sup> The dislocation of the poppy cultivation to Afghanistan and Pakistan was also the subject of many Iranian newspaper articles in 1979 and 1980: **Agahi & Spencer** (1981), 44; **Spencer & Agahi** (1990), 175f.; **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 1f.; **CACI** (2004); **Navai** (2005), 79.

<sup>352</sup> The CIA was demonstrably actively involved in the transportation of Afghan opium and heroin: **McCoy** (2003); **Calabrese** (2007), 1.

<sup>353</sup> The acreage under poppy cultivation continued to be more extended in Southeast Asia until 2003; but in 1999, Afghanistan and Pakistan for the first time produced more opium than the countries of Southeast Asia: **UNDCP** (2000), 34; **UNODC** (2007), 40.

<sup>354</sup> **Samii & Recknagel** (1999), 153ff.; **Siyāsat** (2000), 9; **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 100f.; **Samii** (2003), 284f.; **Navai** (2005), 83.

<sup>355</sup> For charts analyzing the Afghan opium production: **UNODC** (2009), 34; generally on the development of the Afghan drug industry: **Samii** (2003), 285; **Catania** (2004), 17; **Curtis** (2004), 17; **CACI** (2004); **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 2; **Navai** (2005), 79f.; **Malek-Moḥammadi** (2005/06), 118; **GTZ** (2006); **Calabrese** (2007), 2.

<sup>356</sup> **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 100f.; **CACI** (2004); **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 2; **Navai** (2005), 79f.; **GTZ** (2006); **Calabrese** (2007), 2.

<sup>357</sup> According to estimations of the UNODC and Chouvy: **Samii & Recknagel** (1999), 162; **Samii** (2003), 287; **CACI** (2004); **Navai** (2005), 79f.; **Calabrese** (2007), 2.

produced in 1999, 2,744 tons were trafficked to Iran.<sup>358</sup> If one subtracts the estimated 15% percent that the Iranian security forces supposedly seize,<sup>359</sup> domestic consumption still would have amounted to over 2,000 tons.

Many details of the drug trafficking patterns naturally remain unknown. A coarse picture of drug trafficking routes and involved drug traffickers nevertheless can be gained from drug seizures and the interrogation of arrested traffickers. Addiction rates in Iranian cities are a further indication for trafficking routes, since these tend to be higher in cities that lie on such routes.<sup>360</sup> The available data thus point to two main trafficking routes, on which opium, morphine and heroin are smuggled from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Iran. The more important route enters Iran in the southeast of the country through the province of Sīstān va Balūčestān – either directly from Afghanistan or indirectly from Pakistan. The other route runs through the northeastern province of Ḥorāsān, to where the drugs are either smuggled directly from Afghanistan or indirectly from Turkmenistan.<sup>361</sup> Iran's long eastern border consists of rugged mountains and vast deserts. It is consequently porous and difficult to control.<sup>362</sup>

Drug trafficking in southeast Iran is almost exclusively organized by traffickers belonging to the Balūč minority,<sup>363</sup> which lives on both sides of the Iranian-Pakistani border. Sīstān va Balūčestān is the least developed province in Iran and smuggling – of all kinds of goods – thus often is the only viable income in the region.<sup>364</sup> In addition to their economic marginalization, the Balūč, as a Sunni ethnic group, are also politically and religiously disadvantaged. As a result, they started to form armed opposition groups, the most important of which is the ĞONDOLLĀH (Army of God).<sup>365</sup> Drug trafficking accordingly became closely intertwined with the armed combat against the central state and drug trafficking in Sīstān va Balūčestān took on rather violent forms. The traffickers are heavily armed with machine guns mounted on pick-up trucks and Kalashnikovs and they use satellite phones and night vision

---

<sup>358</sup> UNODC (2000), 34.

<sup>359</sup> Reid & Costigan (2002), 104;

<sup>360</sup> Cf. chapter VI.

<sup>361</sup> These two main routes consist of different subroutes, which constantly change according to specific counter-measures of the Iranian security forces: CACI (2004); AEGD 3:2 (2001), 6f.; AEGD 3:3 (2002), 6f.; Navai (2005), 80.

<sup>362</sup> Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 3; the border between Iran and Afghanistan and Pakistan is 1,925 km long: Navai (2005), 79; Samii & Recknagel (1999), 157; Calabrese (2007), 3.

<sup>363</sup> On the Balūč and their role in drug trafficking: Samii (2003), 294f.; CACI (2004); Navai (2005), 82; Calabrese (2007), 3.

<sup>364</sup> Samii & Recknagel (1999), 158; Samii (2003), 294; Navai (2005), 81; Calabrese (2007), 17.

<sup>365</sup> Calabrese (2007), 4, 8.

devices. This led to a veritable feud with the Iranian security forces, which resulted in many traffickers being killed in these fights. Executions and kidnappings of mostly non-Balūč persons also regularly take place.<sup>366</sup> The traffickers usually transport the drugs to the most important drug hub around Kermān – often in full daylight – or with the help of motorized boats to the countries of the Persian Gulf.<sup>367</sup>

Drug traffickers in northeast Iran, by contrast, are less organized. Many seem to be of Afghan origin – given the fact that indeed many Afghan refugees are living in the province of Ḥorāsān.<sup>368</sup> There can, however, be no doubt that Iranians are involved in trafficking as well. These traffickers usually operate in small groups of a few people and carry smaller amounts of drugs, usually by night. They either carry the drugs in backpacks; cross the borders with their sheep herds by sewing drugs under their skin; or sometimes pack a young camel with drugs, which follows the mother camel, with which the traffickers have crossed earlier, by itself. As the traffickers in Ḥorāsān do not necessarily have kinship relations to the local population, there is more information on murders, kidnapping and intimidation of the village people living in the vicinity of the border. The most important smuggling hub in the northeast is Mašhad from which the drugs are transported further to Iran and abroad.<sup>369</sup>

Besides the two main routes, whose importance alters according to the intensity of the counter-trafficking measures by the Iranian security forces,<sup>370</sup> drugs are also smuggled by individuals – so-called mules. This often takes place through the official border crossings, also at airports. Like everywhere else, they constantly adapt their tactics in concealing the drugs, sometimes in very creative ways.<sup>371</sup>

It is not entirely clear, who organizes the further transportation of drugs inside Iran from the important drug hubs around Kermān and Mašhad. It seems clear, however, that different, smaller groups take over from here.<sup>372</sup> Just like before the revolution, local and international transportation companies play a certain role.<sup>373</sup> Neither is it clear, how organized

---

<sup>366</sup> Navai (2007), 82.

<sup>367</sup> AEGD 3:2 (2001), 6f.; AEGD 3:3 (2002), 6f.; Reid & Costigan (2002), 101; CACI (2004); Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 3; Navai (2005), 80ff.; Calabrese (2007), 3.

<sup>368</sup> CACI (2004); Calabrese (2007), 4.

<sup>369</sup> AEGD 3:3 (2002), 6f.; Reid & Costigan (2002), 101; CACI (2004); Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 3; Navai (2005), 80; Calabrese (2007), 3.

<sup>370</sup> Navai (2005), 80.

<sup>371</sup> Samii (2003), 289; CACI (2004); Navai (2005), 80.

<sup>372</sup> Samii & Recknagel (1999), 162; Samii (2003), 287.

<sup>373</sup> Agahi & Spencer (1981), 45; Spencer & Agahi (1990), 175; Siyāsat (2000), 9.

retail dealing of drugs is. Mafia groups seem to control the retail distribution of drugs between and within the cities.<sup>374</sup> Thousands of petty dealers – often drug addicts themselves –sell the drugs to the consumers in the cities, in parks, around central squares, in cars or in abandoned houses<sup>375</sup>.

Rumours have even linked former president Rafsanjānī, who made his fortune in the pistachio business, to drug trafficking, although there is no evidence for this. Corruption – and probably active involvement in drug trafficking – is, however, undoubtedly present up to the highest echelons of power.<sup>376</sup> ‘Alī-zādeh Ṭabāṭabā’ī, responsible for budget planning in the combat against drug trafficking in 1986, in 2000 explicitly acknowledged this in an interview:

*“we knew from the beginning, when the drug problem wasn’t discussed yet very much, that this topic is much more powerful and entrenched than the usual reference to the number of traffickers, addicts and the thousands kilograms of smuggled opium and hashish”*<sup>377</sup>

The IRGC are said to be directly involved in drug trafficking, in particular by opposition groups. They are in control of the borders, especially of the ports and border crossings, and of ever-increasing parts of the domestic security and economy. It is thus indeed difficult to imagine that drug trafficking happens without a certain approval from the IRGC. Whether this happens in an organized way or just in individual cases remains speculative. Individual cases of corruption certainly cannot be ruled out in the police, neither.

The 60% of drugs that leave Iran are most often trafficked over the Western border, a smaller part also over the southern and northern borders. The bulk of drugs are transported by Kurdish traffickers to Turkey, from where they are shipped to Istanbul and by way of the Balkan route to Central and Western Europe.<sup>378</sup> After the fall of Ṣaddām Ḥussain, drugs have been increasingly trafficked to Iraq, either again by Kurdish traffickers in the north or by Arab traffickers in the south.<sup>379</sup> The Sunni Kurds are in many regards comparable to the Balūč.

<sup>374</sup> **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 102; in 2004, it was estimated that over 1,000 distribution networks exist: **CACI** (2004).

<sup>375</sup> Ṭabāṭabā’ī assumed a number of 200,000 drug dealers for the year 2000: **Siyāsat** (2000), 9;

<sup>376</sup> On specific assumptions of corruption among security and customs officers: **Samii & Recknagel** (1999), 159.

<sup>377</sup> **Siyāsat** (2000), 9.

<sup>378</sup> In the south, drugs are e.g. smuggled to Middle Eastern countries through the ports Bandar-e ‘Abbās and Būšehr, which also serve as entry points for precursor chemicals – and for designer drugs such as methamphetamines or hallucinogenic drugs: **CACI** (2004); **Navai** (2005), 80ff.; **Calabrese** (2007), 5.

<sup>379</sup> **Navai** (2005), 82; according to then INCB president Hamid Ghodse, some traffickers disguise themselves as pilgrims to the holy shrines in Karbalā’ and Nağaf: **Calabrese** (2007), 5.

Likewise economically marginalized, and equally connected to their ethnic kinsmen across the border, they also often live from smuggling – including drugs. This seems to apply in particular to the PJAK (*Partî Bo Žiyānî Āzādî la Kordestān – Pežāk*).<sup>380</sup> Further ethnic minorities, such as the Ādarī in the north or the Ahvāzī and Baḥtiyārī in the south, are however at times also involved in drug trafficking.<sup>381</sup> The predominant involvement of the Iranian minorities in drug smuggling is due to the fact that they settle along the borders.

Iranians are, however, not only involved in drug trafficking within Iran. After the revolution of 1979, many Iranians who left Iran were involved in the drug trafficking along the Turkey-Balkan route. In Western countries with considerable Iranian expatriate communities, such as Austria, Germany or England, heroin distribution networks, too, often have been in Iranian hands.<sup>382</sup>

Iran's security forces annually arrest ten thousands of drug traffickers and dealers.<sup>383</sup> Directly after the revolution thousands of drug smugglers and dealers were executed, 136 for instance alone in August 1980.<sup>384</sup> It was suspected this often included mere drug addicts but also political opponents.<sup>385</sup> This situation seems to have continued during the wartimes. Although from the early 1990s, the death penalty was only imposed on armed drug trafficking, in total more than 10,000 drug traffickers were executed in this decade.<sup>386</sup> Another 1,000 traffickers still were on the death row 2000.<sup>387</sup> In the same year, 121,742 traffickers were newly arrested, while a similar number of traffickers and dealers were already serving their sentence. In 2001, over the course of one day, almost 1,000 suspected drug dealers were arrested in the Hāk-e Sefīd quarter of Teheran.<sup>388</sup> Thus, it seems that drug trafficking has increased since the 1990s.<sup>389</sup>

<sup>380</sup> On the role of the Kurds in drug trafficking: **Samii & Recknagel** (1999), 159; **CACI** (2004); **Calabrese** (2007), 4.

<sup>381</sup> **Samii & Recknagel** (1999), 159; **CACI** (2004); **Calabrese** (2007), 4.

<sup>382</sup> **Agahi & Spencer** (1981), 43; **Samii & Recknagel** (1999), 159; according to THE GUARDIAN: **Calabrese** (2007), 5.

<sup>383</sup> **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 104; **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 4; **Razzāgī** (1999).

<sup>384</sup> Most executions took place in Ḥorāsān: **Agahi & Spencer** (1981), 44; even the responsible officials allegedly did not know the exact number of executions: **Siyāsat** (2000), 9.

<sup>385</sup> Specifically by the US STATE DEPARTMENT: **Samii** (2003), 290; also at: **Youtube** (2010); in 1979/80 AD (1358 ŠH), 18,000 people were incarcerated for drug related crimes (probably including addiction); in 1980/81 AD (1359 ŠH), there were already 30,000 imprisonments: **Siyāsat** (2000), 9; **Samii** (2003), 290.

<sup>386</sup> **Samii & Recknagel** (1999), 164; **Siyāsat** (2000), 9; **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 104; **Samii** (2003), 290.

<sup>387</sup> **Samii & Recknagel** (1999), 153, 164.

<sup>388</sup> **Samii & Recknagel** (1999), 162, 164; **Siyāsat** (2000), 9; **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 102; according to the DCHQ ,only' 80,000 drug convicts were in prison: **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 3.

<sup>389</sup> **Mokri** (2002), 3; **Samii** (2003), 288.

## *Drug Addiction*

Directly after the revolution, opium consumption seems to have increased.<sup>390</sup> This was a result of a greater availability of drugs due to the implosion of the state administration,<sup>391</sup> but probably also of the new alcohol prohibition, which seem to have driven Iranians more towards opiate consumption.<sup>392</sup> While the use of ‘Western’ drugs like cocaine and LSD always had been negligible, it certainly further decreased after Iran’s rupture with the West in the wake of the occupation of the US embassy on 4<sup>th</sup> November 1979. This might initially also have resulted in a shortage of medical drugs, which in turn further contributed to opiate consumption.<sup>393</sup> Iranians arguably still predominantly consumed opium and its by-products *sūḥteh* and *šīreh*.<sup>394</sup> No precise information is available for the consumption of cannabis.<sup>395</sup>

It is of interest to note that no information exists for the situation of drug consumption during the years of war. Inferring from the post-war situation, Iranians still predominantly consumed opiates. Due to a reinforced combat against drug trafficking in the east since 1980, opium had become more expensive, which in turn led to the increase in the consumption of heroin. Drug addicts either smoked it or increasingly started to inject it intravenously. It can only be assumed that the consumption of legal drugs, too, greatly increased in wartime.<sup>396</sup>

The continuing popularity of opiates after the end of the war was confirmed by the drug law of 1988, which mainly concentrates on opium and heroin.<sup>397</sup> Opium continued to be smoked, usually by improvised paraphernalia since the official sale of opium pipes is prohibited.<sup>398</sup> The consumption of opium, *sūḥteh* and *šīreh*, seems, however, to have further decreased in relation to heroin since the 1990s. This trend was exacerbated by the short-lived ban of the Taliban against opium production in 2000, which greatly increased trafficking in heroin. Since then it has been estimated that more heroin than opium is consumed in Iran,

---

<sup>390</sup> **Agahi & Spencer** (1981), 43; **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 114; **Calabrese** (2007), 1.

<sup>391</sup> Particularly a result of increased poppy cultivation: **Agahi & Spencer** (1981), 43; **Spencer & Agahi** (1990), 174.

<sup>392</sup> The prices for alcohol on the black market increased tenfold: **Agahi & Spencer** (1981), 44; on the campaign against alcohol: **Spencer & Agahi** (1990), 174; **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 102; **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 2.

<sup>393</sup> **Spencer & Agahi** (1981), 43f.

<sup>394</sup> **SPENCER & AGAHI** assume that in big cities, heroin consumption prevailed; yet, they rely on data from urban rehabilitation centres, where naturally more heroin addicts were treated: **Agahi & Spencer** (1981), 45; **Spencer & Agahi** (1990), 174; **CACI** (2004); **REID & COSTIGAN** assume that still more opium was consumed: **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 100;

<sup>395</sup> **Spencer & Agahi** (1990), 174; **CACI** (2004).

<sup>396</sup> **AGAHI & SPENCER** believe in an initially slight reduction in drug consumption in 1980: **Agahi & Spencer** (1981), 45; **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 114.

<sup>397</sup> **DCHQ** (1997), 4.

<sup>398</sup> **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 101.

especially in the cities.<sup>399</sup> An official of the *State Welfare Organization* (*sazeman-e behzisti-ye keshvar*) stated in this regard:

*“the purchase of heroin has become easier than the purchase of a bottle of milk. To buy bread, we are forced to wait in a line for a long time, but to purchase drugs, no problem exists”*<sup>400</sup>.

Heroin was almost exclusively injected.<sup>401</sup> Soon, new heroin products were brought onto the market, the most infamous of which is called “crack” (*krāk*). This is not to be confused with the internationally known crack, which is a mixture of cocaine and baking soda. Originally, Iranian crack was a particularly pure heroin – similar to the white heroin – with a morphine content of over 90%. Soon, however, it became known for being a particularly altered heroin, sometimes apparently even mixed with horse blood.<sup>402</sup> According to Iranian drug specialists, these impurities are responsible for the existence of worms in the bodies of drug addicts<sup>403</sup> – although this usually is rather a result of an unhygienic lifestyle. Another product is called crystal (*krīstāl*), which seems to be either synonymous with crack or a very pure heroin.<sup>404</sup>

Other drugs, however, also have increased in popularity. This is particularly true for methamphetamines, such as crystal meth, which is called “glass” (*šīšeh*) in Iran, or ecstasy (*ekstāsi / ekstāzi*). Originally rather used as a party drug, *šīšeh* has become a widely used and is a cheap drug. Methamphetamines are increasingly produced domestically, as the production is inexpensive and easy to manage in small laboratories.<sup>405</sup> Cocaine, for its part, only has a limited market amongst the rich, since it is comparably expensive. The consumption of LSD,

---

<sup>399</sup> According to SANDRO TUCCI, at the time the official spokesman for the UNDCP, a gram of heroin could be purchased for the equivalent of 1 US\$: **Samii & Recknagel** (1999), 176; in cities, now definitively more heroin than opium was consumed: **Razzaghi & al.** (1998/99), XXX; **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 102; **Calabrese** (2007), 2.

<sup>400</sup> According to treatment and prevention specialist BEHRŪZ MEŠKINĪ in the newspaper *Kār-o-Kārgar* of 2<sup>nd</sup> December 2000: **Samii & Recknagel** (1999), 163.

<sup>401</sup> **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 102; Mokri (2002), 4; **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 2;

<sup>402</sup> **Samii & Recknagel** (1999), 163; crack addicts are increasing in numbers and meanwhile comprise 23% of all drug users, according to ḤAMĪD-REẒĀ ḤOSAINĀBĀDĪ, head of the *Anti-Narcotics Police*: **Paik-e Īrān**, 15<sup>th</sup> April 2010 (26<sup>th</sup> Farvardīn 1389).

<sup>403</sup> This opinion was expressed by many Iranian drug addicts and addiction specialists, e.g. in the UNODC office in Tehran, to the author in 2008.

<sup>404</sup> *Deutsche Welle*, 8<sup>th</sup> August 2009; *Farārū*, 5<sup>th</sup> November 2009 (14<sup>th</sup> Ābān 1388); *Deutsche Welle*, 9<sup>th</sup> November 2009.

<sup>405</sup> At the end of the 1990s, the consumption of methamphetamine and ecstasy still was negligible: **Mokri** (2002), 4; in 2002 they were, however, already a matter of concern to the DCHQ: **Samii** (2003), 287; later, they became more widespread: **Calabrese** (2007), 5.

even though often mentioned by Iranian newspapers, also seems to be rather neglectable.<sup>406</sup> In contrast to most countries, cannabis also continues to be a rather marginal drug, which might be explained by its traditionally negative image in Iranian society.<sup>407</sup>

The real extent of drug addiction continues to be a highly controversial topic in Iran. Like in prerevolutionary times, official estimations of the addiction rates are certainly too low. Relevant data are primarily collected from prisons, courts, and health centres specialized in addiction treatment.<sup>408</sup> These produce relatively reliable data on heroin addiction, as heroin addicts are more likely to be in contact with such institutions. Questionnaires distributed in schools or households, or the mandatory blood tests for newlywed couples, learner drivers or government employees arguably provide less reliable information.<sup>409</sup>

Immediately after the revolution, the new government assessed a number of 2 million drug addicts, amounting to 5% of the population.<sup>410</sup> Some researchers have estimated this number to be too high;<sup>411</sup> and indeed, the Islamist government could have voluntarily exaggerated to justify the ensuing moral purge of the society. Yet, the last official estimation of less than 2% of the population in 1969 certainly had been too low – and, thus, the 2 millions might actually have been accurate. The number of drug addicts, or at least heroin addicts, seems to have further risen during the war years<sup>412</sup>, not last because of the war. The overall addiction rate might, however, have decreased slightly due to the population growth resulting from the new pro-natalist governmental policy.

The next official estimation of addiction rates dates from 1989. Based on the arrest of 100,000 drug consumers, the government extrapolated a total of 1 million drug addicts.<sup>413</sup> It took another ten years, until the first serious epidemiological study was commissioned in the Islamic Republic. In 1998/99, the *State Welfare Organization*, in cooperation with the UN

---

<sup>406</sup> For reports on (limited) cocaine and LSD consumption and seizures respectively: **Mokri** (2002), 4; **Samii** (2003), 287; **Calabrese** (2007), 5.

<sup>407</sup> ANTONIO MAZITELLI, the first representative of the UNDCP office in Tehran, assumed a shortlived increase in cannabis consumption after the Taliban ban on opium production in 2001: **Samii** (2003), 286.

<sup>408</sup> **Mokri** (2002), 1f.; **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 103.

<sup>409</sup> The social and religious stigmatization of drug addiction certainly leads to an underreporting of addiction cases: **Mokri** (2002), 1f.; **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 1-3; **Calabrese** (2007), 5.

<sup>410</sup> AGAHI & SPENCER only refer to „two separate official sources“: **Agahi & Spencer** (1981), 44; **Spencer & Agahi** (1990), 174; **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 1000; **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 1.

<sup>411</sup> **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 1.

<sup>412</sup> In 1986/87, then director-general of the PLANNING AND BUDGETED ORGANIZATION (*sāz-mān-e barnāhmeh va būdgeh*), Maḥmūd Karīmī, suggested a total of 500,000 drug addicts: **Siyāsat** (2000), 9; an increase in drug consumption assume: **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 2; **Calabrese** (2007), 2.

<sup>413</sup> In 1992, the number of convicted drug addicts fell to 25,000; this seems, however, rather to have been the result of a laxer law enforcement: **Mokri** (2002), 2f.; **Malek-Moḥammadi** (2005/06), 114.



Drug Control Program (UNDCP) conducted the most comprehensive epidemiological study so far: the RAPID SITUATION ASSESSMENT (*arz-yābī-ye sarī‘-e vaz‘iyat*), which evaluated the number of 700,000 drug users in Iran, based on data from addicts in prisons, detention and treatment centers.<sup>414</sup> At the same time, however, the DCQH declared a total of 1.2 million drug users, amounting to 2% of a population of sixty millions.<sup>415</sup> In 2000, the DCHQ calculated a total of 2 million drug users: 1.2 million drug addicts and 800,000 occasional drug users,<sup>416</sup> amounting to 3,3% of the population. This figure has remained the official, almost sacrosanct estimation ever since, repeated both by the DCHQ and the UNODC (former UNDCP).<sup>417</sup> This estimation has been disputed from the beginning. In 2000, the *National AIDS Committee* (*komīteh-ye kešvarī-ye aidz*), estimated a number of 3.3 million drug users.<sup>418</sup> A year later, the *Ministry of Health* even suggested a number of 3.7 millions.<sup>419</sup> Further addiction researchers and officials similarly started to challenge the official estimation of 2 millions<sup>420</sup>, which soon would be reflected in the press as well. Conservative officials, especially those close to the security forces, consequently started to warn officials and the press not to exaggerated addiction rate numbers. Thus, the deputy for security and law enforcement in the *Interior Ministry* said in 2001:

*“The presentation of strange drug statistics is dangerous for the country. I announce in my capacity as someone who is involved in and has a thorough view on drugs that the number of occasional and non-occasional drug users is approximately 3 percent [of the entire population]”*<sup>421</sup>.

There is, nevertheless, much evidence that the real addiction rate is higher than this official estimation and probably even higher than the maximal estimation of 5.7%. This is certainly

<sup>414</sup> Razzaghi & al. (1998/99), 17; Mokri (2002), 2.

<sup>415</sup> Razzaghi & al. (1998/99), 4, 16

<sup>416</sup> Mokri (2002), 3.

<sup>417</sup> Samii & Recknagel (1999), 162; Reid & Costigan (2002), 103; Samii (2003), 297; CACI (2004); Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 2; Navai (2005), 83; GTZ (2006); Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 114; most recently, ḤAMID-REZĀ ḤOSAINĀBĀDĪ, then director of the *Anti-Narcotics Police* repeated this number in April 2010: Paik-e Īrān, 15<sup>th</sup> April 2010 (26<sup>th</sup> Farvardīn 1389).

<sup>418</sup> Reid & Costigan (2002), 103; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 2; Kort & al. (2006), 40.

<sup>419</sup> Mokri (2002), 4; CACI (2004); Navai (2005), 83; Madani Ghahfarokhi (2006), 139; Calabrese (2007), 6.

<sup>420</sup> Even MOḤAMMAD FALLĀḤ, then secretary general of the DCHQ, admitted that the real number of drug addicts and drug users must be much higher: Samii (2003), 287; Gōlām-Rezā Anšārī, the former head of the STATE WELFARE ORGANIZATION, allegedly even mentioned the number of 6 million drug users in 2001: Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 115.

<sup>421</sup> (*erāyeh-ye āmār-hā-ye ‘aḡīb va ḡarīb dar bāreh-ye mavādd-e moḥadder, barāye kešvar ḥaṭar-nāk ast; beh ‘onvān-e dast-andar-kār va kašī keh beh mavādd-e moḥadder ešrāf-e kāmel dārad, e‘lām mī-konam keh šomār-e mo‘tādān-e tafannonī va ḡair-e tafannonī nazdīk beh 3 dar šad [az koll-e ḡam‘iyyat] ast*): Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 115.

true for some cities located on the main drug trafficking routes, where addiction rates are up to 10%.<sup>422</sup> This also seems to increase further.<sup>423</sup>

The RSA of 1998/99 was the first analysis since the studies of the late 1970s to examine exact demographic aspects of drug addiction in Iran. These early studies on the situation of drug addiction under Moḥammad-Rezā Shah had in fact been the first serious epidemiological studies in Iran, but most were only published after the revolution. Their results still applied for the situation of drug addiction directly after the revolution. Accordingly, most drug addicts were male, although addiction among women and even children was common too. The average starting age for opium seems to have been the in the late twenties, and drug users came from all social strata. Based on interviews with patients in the drug rehabilitation centre of Šīrāz, these researchers concluded that in the big cities, more heroin was consumed than opium.<sup>424</sup>

On first sight, the RSA of 1998/99 depicts a similar image of addiction patterns. Drug users were between twenty to forty years old and generally male, married and employed.<sup>425</sup> Like before the revolution, addiction rates among women might have been underrated though.<sup>426</sup> There was, however, one big difference to the early years of the Islamic Republic: the starting age for heroin now seemed to be under twenty,<sup>427</sup> and twenty-two for drug consumption in general.<sup>428</sup> Meanwhile, the starting age for drug consumption might have even dropped further.<sup>429</sup> Drug addiction among Iranian youth accordingly is one of the most discussed topics in Iran.<sup>430</sup> Youth addiction is of course a global problem, but is even more explosive in a country, where seventy percent of the population is younger than thirty years.<sup>431</sup>

---

<sup>422</sup> **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 103; **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 2; **Navai** (2005), 83; CATANIA even reports an addiction rate of 20% for Kermān in 2004: **Catania** (2004), 17.

<sup>423</sup> Assuming an unabated upwards trend in the addiction rate are: **Samii & Recknagel** (1999), 153; **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 101; **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 114; MOḤAMMAD-REZĀ ĠAHĀNĪ, then deputy of the DCHQ, assumed an annual growth of the addiction rate by 8%: *AFP*, 23rd May 2006; **Calabrese** (2007), 6.

<sup>424</sup> For more details: **Moharreri** (1978), 69-81; **Mehryar & Moharreri** (1978), 93-102; **Siassi & Fozouni** (1981), 1135f.; **Agahi & Spencer** (1981), 44f.; **Spencer & Agahi** (1990), 174.

<sup>425</sup> **Razzaghi & al.** (1998/99), 17-23; **Mokri** (2002), 2ff.; **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 103; **Catania** (2004), 17; **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 3; XXX

<sup>426</sup> **Madani Ghahfarokhi** (2006), 138.

<sup>427</sup> MOKRI mentions the average starting age for heroin consumption as 19.4: **Mokri** (2002), 4; **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 103.

<sup>428</sup> **Spencer & Agahi** (1990), 174; **Mokri** (2002), 4;

<sup>429</sup> Already in 2003, an official of the health ministry assumed the starting age for drugs to be between 10-19 years: **Samii** (2003), 287.

<sup>430</sup> This had also been stated by MOḤAMMAD FALLĀH: **Samii** (2003), 287.

<sup>431</sup> For basic demographic information on Iran: **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 101; **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 2.

### Heroin unse & HIV/AIDS

The trend towards the consumption of heroin has increased unabatedly since the 1960s, irrespective of the particular drug policies. The long-standing repressive approach of the Islamic Republic has only further aggravated this situation.<sup>432</sup> According to the RSA study of 1998/99, approximately 20% of the respondents had injected drugs at least once in their lifetime, most of them heroin.<sup>433</sup> Intravenous heroin consumption consequently is supposed to prevail in all Iranian cities.<sup>434</sup> The trend towards heroin in any case has further increased since.<sup>435</sup> The RSA evaluated in total 200,000 to 300,000 heroin addicts – a number that seems to have been too low already back then.<sup>436</sup> In contrast to opium addiction, heroin addiction implies more social stigmatization and heroin addicts consequently are more likely to live on the streets and commit acquisitive crimes.<sup>437</sup> According to the study, drug addicts are often married.<sup>438</sup> Yet, these marriages do not last. Drug addiction of the husband is in fact one of the few accepted, and often-stated reasons for a woman to divorce<sup>439</sup>.

The probably most calamitous effect of heroin consumption is, however, the transmission of HIV/AIDS and hepatitis. Most heroin users in Iran are injecting heroin intravenously.<sup>440</sup> Even though the majority of the respondents of the RSA already knew about the danger of HIV in case of needle, over 50% reported having shared syringes – often with rudimentary cleaning techniques.<sup>441</sup> This number might have been reduced since, as sterile syringes were made more available in pharmacies, clinics and DICs.

The first cases of HIV date back to 1986. A little later, Iran's blood bank had a scandal with HIV contaminated blood samples.<sup>442</sup> Until 2001, the *National AIDS Committee* had registered 2,710 cases of HIV infection and estimated a total of approximately 60,000 HIV positive cases.<sup>443</sup> The real number might, however, have been much higher and certainly has increased since. HIV/AIDS is a highly politicized topic in Iran, because it has been perceived for a long time as a symptom for of an amoral, sexually permissive – Western or African – lifestyle. In Iran, the transmission of HIV seems, however, to happen predominantly by needle sharing.<sup>444</sup> A quarter of the approximately 300,000 heroin addicts in Iran

<sup>432</sup> **Spencer & Agahi** (1990), 175f.; **Mokri** (2002), 8f.; **Calabrese** (2007), 2.

<sup>433</sup> **Mokri** (2002), 4; in some cities along the trafficking routes, up to 70% of the respondents were injecting heroin: **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 101f.; **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 2; according to a WHO/UNAIDS report: **Calabrese** (2007), 6.

<sup>434</sup> **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 102.

<sup>435</sup> **Mokri** (2002), 8; this also can be deduced from the increase in the number of drug deaths – from 717 in 1996 to 2989 in 2002: **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 103; **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 3; **CACI** (2004).

<sup>436</sup> **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 103; CATANIA seems to mistake the official number of 2 mio. drug addicts with heroin users: **Catania** (2004), 171; the annual growth rate was even assumed to be 33% in 2006: **Madani Ghahfarokhi** (2006), 139.

<sup>437</sup> **Mokri** (2002), 1; **Samii** (2003), 283; **Calabrese** (2007), 7.

<sup>438</sup> According to the RSA, approximately 50% of all intravenous heroin users were married: **Mokri** (2002), 4f.; **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 3.

<sup>439</sup> According to Hoġġat-ol-Eslām HOġĠATI-NIYĀ, a judge from Kermān, 90% of all divorces resulted from the drug addiction of the husband in 1998/99: **Malek-Mohammadi** (2005/06), 117.

<sup>440</sup> **Razzaghi & al.** (1998/99), 21f.; **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 102.

<sup>441</sup> **Razzaghi & al.** (1998/99), 28f.; **Mokri** (2002), 5; the cost of a sterile syringe was about 10 US cents in pharmacies: **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 102; **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 5.

<sup>442</sup> **Mokri** (2002), 6; **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 103; **Catania** (2004), 17; **CACI** (2004).

<sup>443</sup> **Mokri** (2002), 6; **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 103f.; **Samii** (2003), 288.; **CACI** (2004); **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 3; **Navai** (2005), 86.

<sup>444</sup> An estimated 60% to 70% of all HIV contaminations are assumed to be caused by needle sharing: **Samii & Recknagel** (1999), 153; **Mokri** (2002), 6; according to the MAP report of 2001 even 74%: **Reid &**

are estimated to be HIV positive.<sup>445</sup> This figure alone shows that the real extent of HIV infections must be higher than the alleged 60,000 cases. HIV is, however, of course also transmitted by sexual contact – a trend, which has increased in recent years. Contributing to the spread of HIV are female sex workers, who often are heroin users in the first place. This continues to be a taboo topic. Consequently, official organizations have developed few corresponding secondary prevention measures.<sup>446</sup>

Intravenous drug use and HIV infection remain a problem inside Iran's prisons. It actually even seems that it was first realized here.<sup>447</sup> Even after the amendment of 1997, drug addiction continues to be punishable by imprisonment. An estimated 60% of all prison inmates was incarcerated for drug related crimes during Ḥātāmī's presidency. Half of them were considered drug addicts who might, however, also have committed acquisitive crimes.<sup>448</sup> This number has rather increased since the implementation of the *Plan for the Enhancement of Social Security (tarḥ-e erteqā'-e amniyyat-e eḡtemā'ī)*<sup>449</sup> under president Aḥmadīnezhād. In prisons, more heroin than opium is consumed. Some have suggested that 20% of prison inmates consume heroin.<sup>450</sup> Until 2000, no clean syringes were distributed in prisons, so needle sharing was the rule.<sup>451</sup> The first official HIV case in prison was registered in 1996. In 2000, over 50% of heroin addicted inmates were HIV positive in certain prisons.<sup>452</sup> However, since then, triangular clinics have started to distribute sterile syringes and in some cases even methadone to heroin addicts.<sup>453</sup> Even if in reality only a minority might have access to these services, this represents an extraordinary and exceptional harm reduction measure in the entire region.

---

**Costigan** (2002), 104; **Samii** (2003), 288; **Catania** (2004), 17; **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 3; **Navai** (2005), 86; **GTZ** (2006); according to ANTONIO MAZITELLI, then UNODC representative in Tehran: **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06) 117; **Calabrese** (2007), 6f.

<sup>445</sup> The percentage of HIV positive heroin users differed sharply between addiction treatment centres (12%) and prisons (up to 63%); **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 104; **Samii** (2003), 288; **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 5.  
<sup>446</sup> In 2003, the WHO estimated that 3-4% percent of all IDUs - meaning over half of the drug injecting women – are female sex workers: **Madani Ghahfarokhi** (2006), 139.

<sup>447</sup> **Razzaghi & al.** (1998/99), 36f.; **Zamani & al.** (2006), 342-346; **Calabrese** (2007), 6.

<sup>448</sup> **Razzaghi & al.** (1998/99), 32f.; **Samii & Recknagel** (1999), 163; **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 103; **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 116; for slightly different figures: **Samii** (2003), 288.

<sup>449</sup> **Gooya**, 8th July 2008.

<sup>450</sup> **Razzaghi & al.** (1998/99), 32ff.; **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 103; **Catania** (2004), 17; **NAVAI** even maintains that half of the drug related inmates are consuming heroin: **Navai** (2005), 86.

<sup>451</sup> Another way of HIV transmission was homosexual contacts between the inmates, which already had been acknowledged by the RSA of 1998/99: **Razzaghi & al.** (1998/99), 34; **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 102, 104; **Samii** (2003), 288; **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 1; **Navai** (2005), 86.

<sup>452</sup> **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 104; **Catania** (2004), 17.

<sup>453</sup> The authors of the RSA of 1998/99 had warned of the explosive situation of drug addiction and the spread of HIV in prisons and postulated swift countermeasures: **Razzaghi & al.** (1998/99), 37.

## Legal measures

After the revolution, previous drug laws were not abolished immediately, but they were hardly enforced any more. The revolutionary committees initially rather concentrated on a strict alcohol prohibition.<sup>454</sup> After realizing that drug trafficking and consumption were increasing, Āyatollāh Ḥomainī in autumn 1979 issued a religious decree (*fatvā*) declaring poppy cultivation forbidden (*ḥarām*). It remains, however, unclear which punishments were envisaged.<sup>455</sup>

From the beginning of the year 1980, the new government initiated a broad campaign against drugs, targeting drug trafficking and drug consumption alike.<sup>456</sup> Before the revolution, the jurisdiction on drug delinquencies had been divided between penal courts and military courts. Now, the newly created *Islamic Revolutionary Courts* (sg. *dād-gāh-e enqelāb-e eslāmī*) were tasked with judging all drug related offences. They continued to hand out death penalties for drug traffickers.<sup>457</sup> Yet, they seem to have applied public hangings of drug related criminals much more extensively than before the revolution. In the beginning, the religious purification zeal seems to have included mere drug addicts as well.<sup>458</sup> In particular, Āyatollāh Moḥammad Šādeq Ḥalḥālī was notorious for his merciless strength. Hence his sobriquet “the hanging judge” or simply “killer” (*ādam-koš*).<sup>459</sup>

On 9<sup>th</sup> June 1980 (19<sup>th</sup> Ḥordād 1359), the *Council of the Islamic Revolution* (*šūrā-ye enqelāb-e eslāmī*) passed a new drug law, the LAW OF AGGRAVATED PUNISHMENTS FOR DRUG DELINQUENTS.

### LAW OF AGGRAVATED PUNISHMENTS FOR DRUG DELINQUENTS<sup>460</sup>

(*qānūn-e tašdīd-e moğāzāt-e mortakebīn-e ġarā'em-e mavadd-e moḥadder*)

In 28 articles, this law aimed at standardizing the initially rather improvisational and random sentences the revolutionary courts handed out against drug addicts and drug traffickers. The language still bears the characteristics of the prerevolutionary drug laws, and in fact, no allusion to the newly created

<sup>454</sup> Agahi & Spencer (1981), 43; Spencer & Agahi (1990), 173f.

<sup>455</sup> Agahi & Spencer (1981), 45; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 112.

<sup>456</sup> Agahi & Spencer (1981), 44; Spencer & Agahi (1990), 174.

<sup>457</sup> Agahi & Spencer (1981), 44.

<sup>458</sup> Within the first months, thousands of drug traffickers and dealers were executed, also as a deterrent; the executions regularly covered in the newspapers: Agahi & Spencer (1981), 44.

<sup>459</sup> Bakhash (1984), 111.

<sup>460</sup> Majles (1980); Agahi & Spencer (1981), 44; DCHQ (1997), 2; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 113

revolutionary institutions is found. The responsibility for the enforcement of the law still lay with the gendarmerie and the criminal courts.

The punishment meted for drug trafficking and drug consumption was increased. Traffickers were to be handed out the death penalty in case of repeated drug trafficking or for trafficking more than 1 gram of heroin or morphine (§ 6-7). Drug consumption remained prohibited except for those with a medical description. Illegal drug consumption accordingly was punished with prison sentences, but the judges could decide to replace imprisonment by either monetary fines or bodily punishment (§8). Drug addicts further could be sent to „detention and rehabilitation centers“ (*marākez-e negah-dārī va modāvā*) that were to be built by the government. This could be instead of but also in addition to a prison sentence, (§18-19). Addicts were given a timeframe of six months after the passing of the law to seek treatment and withdrawal with existing medical facilities, before the punishments would become effective (§20).

The first drug law of the Islamic Republic remained, however, provisional and eventually largely ineffective. By tasking the traditional institutions with its implementation, it was actually divorced from the realities on the ground, and thus, reflects the competition between the elected government and the real clerical power brokers at the time. The Iraq-Iran war further contributed to restraining the ability of the law enforcement and health care institutions to successfully combat drug trafficking and drug consumption.<sup>461</sup> In reality, drug crimes continued to be judged by revolutionary courts instead of criminal courts as envisaged by the law. However, the religious judges disagreed on how exactly to categorize drug traffickers on religious grounds.

#### „Fighting God“ and „corrupt on earth“

Judges were unanimous in treating armed drug traffickers as “fighting against God” (*moḥārebeh bā ḥodā*), which automatically entailed the death penalty. However, they disagreed on whether to judge milder cases of unarmed drug trafficking also as *moḥārebeh bā ḥodā* or as “corruption on earth” (*efsād fe-l-arḻ*), while the latter verdict did not automatically require a capital punishment. This legal dispute was not solved until the passing of a new drug law in 1989. Therefore, convictions of drug traffickers, dealers and even addicts remained highly arbitrary and ultimately depended upon the goodwill of the individual judge in charge.<sup>462</sup>

The need for an adjusted drug law had become evident before the end of the war. However, the stalemate between the parliament and the *Guardian Council* (*šūrā-ye negah-*

<sup>461</sup> Agahi & Spencer (1990), 174.

<sup>462</sup> Agahi & Spencer (1981), 44f.; Siyāsat (2000), 9; Samii (2003), 290; Malek-Moḥammadī mentions that drug traffickers were considered as „corruptors on earth“ (*mofsed fe-l-arḻ*) according to a *fatvā* of Āyatollāh Ḥomainī: Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06),

*bān*), the religious body responsible for verifying the religious constitutionality of all laws passed by the parliament, prevented it. As part of the constitutional reorganization of the Islamic Republic towards the end of Āyatollāh Ḥomainī's life, thus, the EXPEDIENCY DISCERNMENT COUNCIL OF THE SYSTEM (*mağma'-e tašhīṣ-e maṣlaḥat-e neẓām*) was created in 1988, in order to solve this stalemate. This new body, in which both then parliamentary speaker Rafsanjānī and president Ḥāmenē'ī were represented, swiftly moved to prepare the new ANTI NARCOTICS LAW.<sup>463</sup>

**The ANTI NARCOTICS LAW (*qānūn-e mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḥadder*)**

The *Expediency Council* on 25<sup>th</sup> October 1988 (3<sup>rd</sup> Ābān 1367) approved the law, which in thirty-five articles stipulates clearly defined penalties for drug crimes, thus passing the first effective drug law of the Islamic Republic.

The cultivation of poppy and cannabis, as well as the production, smuggling, distribution, dealing, carrying and storing of poppy, cannabis, heroin or morphine are prosecuted according to pre-defined amounts of drugs. Penalties can include imprisonment, whiplashes and the death penalty (§1-13). The death penalty is envisaged for persons who are caught cultivating drugs for the fourth time (§2), who are producing, smuggling or distributing more than 5kg *bang*, Indian hemp juice, opium or opium juice (*šīreh*) (§4) or more than 30g of heroin, morphine and other morphine derivatives (§8) or who are concealing, storing or possessing more than 5kg of the drugs mentioned in §4 (§5) or more than 30g heroin or morphine (§8). A person caught four times importing, exporting, carrying or simply possessing a total of more than 30g of heroin or morphine is considered a “corruptor on earth” (*mofsed fe-'l-arṣ*) and is to be executed in public (§9).

Drug addicts below the age of sixty are given a period of six months after the implementation of the law to undergo withdrawal treatment. The prosecutor general is tasked with sending those not succeeding in quitting their addiction to rehabilitation centers (*marākeẓ-e bāz-parvarī*). After this period of grace, drug addiction will be punished by monetary fines, prison sentences and whiplashes (§15). Recreational drug use is punished separately by monetary fines and whiplashes (§19).

Further articles prohibit the production or importation of drug paraphernalia or the instigation of drug addiction of a family member, students or members of law enforcement; regulate law enforcement competences of the police, municipalities and the Basīḡ; penalize false accusations of drug trafficking or possession; or determine the utilization of seized assets and further possessions. Convicts, who cannot pay imposed monetary fines, are to be imprisoned according to predetermined rates (§31). Death sentences are required to be endorsed by the chairman of the Supreme Court (*ra'īs-e dīvān-e 'ālī-ye kešvar*) or the Prosecutor General (*dād-setān-e koll-e kešvar*) and can be revised or quashed by them (§32). Finally, the law envisaged the creation of a specific headquarter to coordinate all state drug policy

<sup>463</sup> **Siyāsat** (2000), 9.

efforts, later to be named *Drug Control Headquarter* (DCHQ) (*setād-e mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḥadder*) (§33).<sup>464</sup>

From the onset, the *Expediency Council* was criticized for not having consulted relevant drug experts before passing the law and for unrealistically assuming that the problem of drug addiction could be solved within six months.<sup>465</sup> Immediately after its implementation, the law led to a new wave of execution of drug traffickers and often of petty dealers. As a result, the six-month period elapsed without the addiction problem having been solved.<sup>466</sup> It was arguably due to the pragmatism of president Rafsanjānī, chairman of the *Expediency Council*, that the Iranian authorities soon acknowledged the ineffectiveness of the repressive drug law.<sup>467</sup> From the beginning of the 1990s, accordingly, the death penalty was less often applied: even drug traffickers caught with high amounts of opium or morphine were sometimes spared from execution. Eventually it became clear that the drug law of 1988 had to be reformed in order to counter drug addiction more effectively, namely by putting more stress on drug demand reduction.

#### The AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW

(*qānūn-e eṣlāḥ-e mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḥadder*)

On 8<sup>th</sup> November 1997 (17<sup>th</sup> Ābān 1376), the *Expediency Council* passed the amended drug law consisting of forty-six articles. The law explicitly refers to the law of 1959 in listing the prohibited drugs (§1). It increased the penalties for trafficking, dealing or storing of drugs (§2-13). The law additionally introduces a differentiation between drug trafficking for local consumption and drug trafficking for transit, the latter of which is punished more leniently (§5, Note; §8, Note).<sup>468</sup>

The most important shift concerned the treatment of drug addicts (§15-19). The law notably still maintains, “drug addiction is a crime” (*e’tiyād ḡorm ast*). Now it specifies “all addicts are permitted to go to legal centers [...] and to use such centers for their treatment and rehabilitation” (*beh kolliyyeh-ye mo’tādān eḡāzeh dādeh mī-šavad, beh marākez-e moḡāzī [...] morāḡe’eh va nesbat beh darmān va bāz-parvarī-ye h’od eqdām nemāyand*) (§15). It further specifies: “the mentioned addicts are protected from the prosecution of this crime in the period of treatment and rehabilitation” (*mo’tād-ān-e maḡkūr dar tūl-moddāt-e darmān va bāz-parvarī az ta’qīb-e kaīfarī-ye ḡorm-e e’tiyād mo’af mī-bāšand*) (§15).

<sup>464</sup> On the Anti-Narcotics Law of 1988: **DCHQ** (1997); **DCHQ** (2010); **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 104; **Samii** (2003), 290; **Malek-Moḥammadī** (2005/06), 113.

<sup>465</sup> **Siyāsāt** (2000), 9.

<sup>466</sup> **Siyāsāt** (2000) 9; human rights organizations and the US State Department again expressed the concern that drug trafficking was used as a pretext to execute political dissidents: **Samii & Recknagel** (1999), §63; the court hearings again often were hasty and at times even presided over by an intelligence officer: **Samii** (2003), 290.

<sup>467</sup> **Siyāsāt** (2000), 9; **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 4.

<sup>468</sup> In practice, drug trafficking from Iran to foreign countries often was not punished by death sentences: **Siyāsāt** (2000), 9; **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 104.



Further articles rule that the revolutionary courts had to send a copy of their verdicts to the DCHQ (§36) and specify the conditions for converting a death sentence into life imprisonment (§38).<sup>469</sup>

Since 1988, the central coordinating and planning role for Iran's drug policy was assigned to *Drug Control Headquarter*, presided over by the state president. Since the amendment of 1997 it comprises the following institutions: the Prosecutor General (*dādestān-e koll-e kešvar*), the *ministers of Interior* (*kešvar*), *Intelligence and Security* (*eṭṭelā'āt va amniyyat*), *Health, Treatment and Medical Education* (*beh-dāšt, darmān va āmūzeš-e pezeškī*), *Education* (*āmūzeš va parvareš*), and of *Islamic Culture and Guidance* (*farhang va eršād-e eslāmī*), the manager of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) (*sāzemān-e šadā va sīmā-ye jomhūrī-ye eslāmī-ye īran*), the commander-in-chief of the *Law Enforcement Force* (*nīrū-ye entežāmī*), the head of Tehran's *Islamic Revolutionary Court* (*dād-gāh-e enqelāb-e eslāmī*), the head of the *Organization of Prisons and Penitentiaries* (*sāz-mān-e zandān-hā va eqdāmāt-e ta'mīnī va tarbiyyatī*) as well as the commander of the Basij (*farmāndeh-ye nīrū-ye moqāvamat-e basij*).<sup>470</sup> Initially, the cooperation between the individual members of the DCHQ, and between them and the administration of the DCHQ, had been rather ineffective and marred by conflicts of competence. Iran thus continued to almost exclusively concentrate on repressive drug policy measures. During Hātāmī's presidency, the administrative structure of the headquarters and its twenty-eight provincial offices were strengthened, however. Since, the DCHQ has become more effective and concentrates - at least nominally - equally on drug supply and drug demand reduction. The first executive director of the DCHQ was Moḥammad Fallāḥ, followed by 'Alī Hāšemī under Hātāmī, and Fadā Ḥossain Mālekī and Esmā'īl Aḥmadī-Moqaddam under Aḥmadīnežād. The mere fact that the latter concomitantly was the commander-in-chief of the Law Enforcement Forces indicates a new strengthening of repressive drug policy measures under Aḥmadīnežād, even if drug demand reduction activities were continued.<sup>471</sup>

One of the persisting problems of Iran's drug laws has been its implementation by the judges. According to the penal code of the Islamic Republic, individual judges are to a certain degree free in assessing a case according to their own knowledge of the Islamic sources. Thus, certain judges continued to imprison drug addicts instead of sending them to rehabilitation

<sup>469</sup> DCHQ (1997); DCHQ (accessed 2010); Reid & Costigan (2002), 104; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 10f.

<sup>470</sup> As specified in § 33 of the law: DCHQ (1997), 16.

<sup>471</sup> Siyāsat (2000), 9; Samii (2003), 291-293; CACI (2004); Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 113; Calabrese (2007), 8; on the aims and organizational structure of the DCHQ: DCHQ (accessed 2010).

centers, while others were even persecuting the service providers. The head of the judiciary at the time, Āyatollāh Maḥmūd Hāšemī Šāhrūdī, thus had to remind them in a circular letter of 2005:

*“Thus, this is to remind judges at all courts of justice and prosecutors' offices throughout the country that since a major element of accompaniment in crime needs to be verification of malicious intent, the said interventions are clearly intent but rather motivated by the will to fulfil the mission of protecting society from the spread of deadly contagious diseases such as AIDS and hepatitis. Therefore all judicial authorities must consider other centers and organizations which are active in this field and not accuse the service providers with unfair characterization of accompaniment in the criminal abuse of narcotics and not impede the implementation of such needed and fruitful programs”*<sup>472</sup>

#### ***Repressive drug supply reduction – and still in drug demand reduction - measures?***

During Moḥammad-Rezā Šāh's reign, the combat against drug trafficking and dealing had been primarily the duty of the police (*šahr-bānī*) and the gendarmerie (*žāndārmerī*) supported by custom guards. These security forces continued to exist after the revolution of 1979, and they were indeed still involved in drug supply reduction. While the gendarmerie and the custom officers initially still seem to have remained the primary force in combatting border trafficking, they soon started to be supported by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (*sepāh-e pās-dārān-e enqelāb-e eslāmī*), founded in April 1979. The gendarmerie furthermore continued to be responsible for the drug combat in the smaller cities and villages in the countryside, while the police had the same responsibility in bigger cities. At the beginning of the revolution, the police seem to have been the most active security force in this regard. Also fighting against drug dealing were, however, the many *Islamic Revolutionary Committees* (sg. *komīteh-ye enqelāb-e eslāmī*).<sup>473</sup> Together, these forces accounted for the seizure of thousands of kilograms of drugs and for the arrest of tens of thousands of drug traffickers, dealers – and often addicts.<sup>474</sup>

---

<sup>472</sup> The letter dates from 24<sup>th</sup> January 2005 (5<sup>th</sup> Bahman 1383): Nassirimanesh & Trace & Roberts (2005), 6; GTZ (2006); Calabrese (2007), 13.

<sup>473</sup> AGAHI & SPENCER report that they have been often obstructed by the *revolutionary committees* in their research: Agahi & Spencer (1981), 43, 45; CALABRESE mentions the repressive drug policy against drug traffickers and consumers as part of the “*jihad against sin*”: Calabrese (2007), 8.

<sup>474</sup> In August 1980 alone, the security forces seized 3,535kg opium, 97kg heroin and 238kg hashish; and the revolutionary courts executed 136 traffickers: Agahi & Spencer (1981), 44f.; according to ṬABĀṬABĀ'Ī,

According to Maḥmūd ‘Alizādeh Ṭabāṭabā’ī, director-general of the PLANNING AND BUDGET ORGANIZATION (*sāz-mān-e barnāhmeh va būdḡeh*) in 1986 and later a member of the DCHQ, however, the combat against drug trafficking and dealing virtually came to a halt in 1980/81 (1359 ŠH). He called the war years a “period of inactivity”, as no institution or organization was seriously active in drug policy.<sup>475</sup> This first seems to have been mainly the result of the dispute among judges of the revolutionary courts on whether to designate traffickers as *moḥārebeh bā ḥodā* or *mofsed fe-l-arż*. Later, the Iraq-Iran war contributed to shift the attention of the law enforcement forces and the whole security establishment away from the eastern border to the west. In 1986/87 AD (1365 ŠH), however, an ANTI-DRUGS UNIT (*vāḡed-e mobārezeḡ bā mavādd-e moḡadder*) was created within the *Islamic Revolutionary Committees* on proposal of Maḥmūd Karīmī, its first director general.<sup>476</sup>

After the passing of the new drug law, and after the end of the war, both in October 1988, the security forces started a reinvigorated combat against drug trafficking. Freed from their war duties, the IRGC together with the police and the revolutionary committees greatly enhanced their endeavours along the borders and within the country. They started to arrest thousands of drug traffickers and dealers, many of whom were executed in the late 1980s.<sup>477</sup> While the executions soon declined, the law enforcement measures did not abate. In 1991, then president Rafsanḡānī set about reforming the hitherto fragmented security forces. The POLICE (*šahr-bānī*), the GENDARMERIE (*žāndārmerī*), and the ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES (*kōmīteh-hā-ye enḡelāb-e eslāmī*) were all disbanded as independent units and integrated into the newly created LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC (*nīrū-ye entežāmī-ye ḡomhūrī-ye eslāmī*), commonly known by its acronym NAJA.<sup>478</sup> This new force continued to be the official leading agency in drug supply reduction.

But soon, the (para-)military forces of the IRGC, the ARMED FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (*nīrū-hā-ye mošallah-e ḡomhūrī-ye eslāmī-ye īrān*) and the Basīḡ started

---

18,000 drug related convicts were imprisoned in in 1978/79 AD (1358 ŠH), and 30,000 in 1980/81 (1359 ŠH): **Siyāsāt** (2000), 9.

<sup>475</sup> **Siyāsāt** (2000), 9.

<sup>476</sup> Karīmī was succeeded by Moḡtār Kalāntarī, whom CALABRESE mentions as the first executive director of „anti-narcotics task force“: **Siyāsāt** (2000), 9; **Calabrese** (2000), 8.

<sup>477</sup> Within the IRGC, the central headquarter *Moḡammad Rasūl-Allāh*, and the tactical headquarters *Salmān*, *Meqdād* and *Abū Zarr* were responsible for combatting drug trafficking; from 1991 this also applied to the *Qods* Headquarter: **Calabrese** (2007), 9.

<sup>478</sup> **Buchta** (2000), 65; the first unit responsible for combating drug trafficking was the *Meršād* Headquarter: **Calabrese** (2007).

to be increasingly involved as well.<sup>479</sup> Along the borders, the IRGC took the lead in the combat against drug trafficking. They formed numerous armed village militias, which they soon restructured into Basīḡ units.<sup>480</sup> In the mid 1990s, an estimated 30,000 troops were stationed at the eastern border with Afghanistan and Pakistan, including policemen and border guards.<sup>481</sup> The anti-narcotics police and border guards numbered 12,000. In 2000, the Iranian police created a special unit, the ANTI-NARCOTICS POLICE (*polīs-e mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḥadder*), in order to improve the coordination against drug trafficking and smuggling.<sup>482</sup> Together with the IRGC, the Basīḡ, custom guards and the army and various intelligence departments they continue to be responsible for Iran's drug supply reduction policy to this day.<sup>483</sup>

Iran legitimately takes pride in accounting for the highest rates of drug seizures, which the international community readily acknowledges.<sup>484</sup> It was estimated that Iran accounts for 85% of the global seizures of opiates and for 30% of the global seizures of heroin and morphine.<sup>485</sup> Iran supposedly confiscates 17% of drugs that are smuggled into and through the country, which is much higher than the average worldwide rate of 10%.<sup>486</sup> Thus, Iran is reported to have seized 27.6 tons of drugs in 1990, 250 tons in 2000 and 350 tons in 2005.<sup>487</sup> Tens of thousands of traffickers have been executed since the 1990s and hundreds of thousands of drug smugglers are arrested each year, including admittedly many petty dealers.<sup>488</sup>

<sup>479</sup> Samii & Recknagel (1999), 157; Samii (2003), 289; CACI (2004).

<sup>480</sup> A typical village militia contained 600 to 700 fighters; the militias were present in over 50 villages along the eastern border: Samii & Recknagel (1999), 157; Samii (2003), 289; Calabrese (2007), 9.

<sup>481</sup> Calabrese (2007), 9.

<sup>482</sup> This special unit seems to have inherited the respective duties of the *Merṣād Headquarter*: Samii & Recknagel (1999), 157; Samii (2003), 289.

<sup>483</sup> Samii & Recknagel (1999), 153; (Calabrese (2007), 8.

<sup>484</sup> Samii & Recknagel (1999), 157, 166f.; Samii (2003), 290; e.g. by the INCSR report of 2007: Calabrese (2007), 7; in 2009, *Tehran Times* published a four-page article on its successes in combating drug trafficking: *Tehran Times*, 28<sup>th</sup> June 2009.

<sup>485</sup> Razzaghi & al. (1999), 1; Samii & Recknagel (1999), 157; CACI (2004); Nassirimanesh mentions 25% of the worldwide drug seizures: Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 1f.

<sup>486</sup> Samii & Recknagel (1999), 157.

<sup>487</sup> Mokri (2002), 3; Reid & Costigan (2002), 101; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 2; the UNODC assume lower seizures, e.g. 124 tons in 2001: Samii (2003), 284, 287; CACI (2004); for the figures of 2005: Calabrese (2007), 9.

<sup>488</sup> Samii & Recknagel (1999), 164; TABĀTABĀ'Ī reported that 100,000 drug traffickers and dealers were imprisoned in 2000, while another 200,000 to 300,000 were still active outside: Siyāsāt (2000), 9; MOKRI reports an annual increase of 20% in drug related arrests between 1995 and 2000: Mokri (2002), 3; REID & COSTIGAN reported 121,742 imprisoned drug smugglers for 2000, and a total of 1.7 million for the years 1979 to 2000: Reid & Costigan (2002), 102; Iran's *National Prison Organization* only assumes 68,000 for the year 2001: Samii (2003), 290; CACI (2004); Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 4; according to the newspaper *Siyāsāt-e Rāz*, 314,268 drug-related arrests took place in 2006: Calabrese (2007), 7.

Iran has built an impressive security infrastructure particularly at the eastern border. Mountain passes have been blocked with concrete dams; major roads – also within Iran – are being controlled with vehicle berms and checkpoints; and flat plains are secured with a series of static defenses including ditches, dams, barbed wire fences, mine fields and observation towers. Observation techniques have become ever more sophisticated including unmanned drones and satellite technology. Controls along the roads are carried out with inspection mirrors, police dogs and regular inspections.<sup>489</sup> At the western border, however, much less efforts are invested in the fight against drug trafficking. As revealed by the more lenient punishments for transit trafficking in the amended drug law of 1997, Iran arguably is content in seeing the majority of drugs exiting Iran again. The security forces nevertheless lead a veritable war against the well-armed drug traffickers. Until 2005, more than 3,000 security officers have been killed in clashes with drug traffickers according to Iranian authorities.<sup>490</sup>

Despite these measures, the flow of opium and heroin has only increased. As Iran's borders are long and porous, even the most sophisticated reconnaissance technology, and the deployment of tens of thousands of security forces remains ineffective as long as drug trafficking remains such a profitable business, and as long as certain structural deficiencies persist. Iranian authorities often complain that the US and UN enforced embargo prevents them from acquiring necessary military and intelligence technology, thus impeding a more successful drug combat. Additionally, at least some critical voices have started to question the ongoing concentration on repressive drug supply reduction measures. Thus, Member of Parliament Moḥsen Armīn, for instance, warned that the problem of drug trafficking cannot be solved by repression alone, but also needs political, economic and diplomatic efforts.<sup>491</sup> Admittedly, drug traffickers and dealers started to be treated more leniently at intervals,<sup>492</sup> also due to financial concerns, as court proceedings and imprisonments pose a burden to the country's budget.<sup>493</sup> Nevertheless, certain security forces and radical ideological circles have a vested interest in continuing a repressive drug policy approach.<sup>494</sup>

---

<sup>489</sup> Samii & Recknagel (1999), 157; Samii (2003), 289; Navai (2005), 80; Calabrese (2007), 9.

<sup>490</sup> Samii & Recknagel (1999), 157; Reid & Costigan (2002), 101; Samii (2003), 289; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 3; CACI (2004).

<sup>491</sup> Samii (2003), 293; Malek-Moḥammadi (2005/06), 116.

<sup>492</sup> Siyāsat (2000), 9; Reid & Costigan (2002), 104.

<sup>493</sup> Samii & Recknagel (1999), 165; Samii (2003), 293; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 2; Navai (2005), 86.

<sup>494</sup> Samii (2001), 292.

## *Therapy and Rehabilitation*

Therapy and rehabilitation centres initially continued to exist under the Islamic Republic government, both public and private ones. These clinics and hospitals continued to be under the supervision of the Ministry of Health. Therapy generally still included medicinal treatment including methadone. However, the clinics and hospitals seem to have often lacked such drugs. Expert staff and treatment capacities were equally insufficient.<sup>495</sup> Since the inception of the anti-drug campaign in mid 1979, thus, even approximately 30 additional centres had been opened. These were rather improvised centres, often staffed with former drug addicts.<sup>496</sup> Instead of delivering scientific treatment, they increasingly concentrated on religious and moral instructions.<sup>497</sup> Outpatient treatment that had been offered by mental health clinics before the revolution, however, was discontinued, except for children.<sup>498</sup>

At the same time, however, the revolutionary committees and courts started to put drug-addicted people either in prisons or in prison-like camps, which sometimes seem to have been set up in buildings seized from former elites loyal to the shah.<sup>499</sup> Soon, however, the already insufficient therapy efforts seem to have halted altogether – arguably following the logic of the law of 1980, that all drug addicts had to be cured within six months. The *National Iranian Society for the Rehabilitation of the Disabled* (NISRD) accordingly ceased to be responsible for therapy and rehabilitation measures.<sup>500</sup>

Proper therapy treatment definitively came to a halt during the Iraq-Iran.<sup>501</sup> This is explainable by the fact that the health and rehabilitation services had to take care of the many war victims. Drug addicts consequently were put into prison or in desperately overstuffed and unhygienic prison-like rehabilitation centres, which often resembled penal camps. Here, addiction was predominantly treated from an ideological viewpoint, without medically supported withdrawal. Addicts were forced to undergo religious instructions, forced labour, but probably including other forms of occupational therapy forms. Even Iranian specialists

---

<sup>495</sup> Despite the official budget of 500 mio. *tūmān* (70 mio. US\$), hospital officials still reported a shortage in *methadone*: **Agahi & Spencer** (1981), 44f.; **Spencer & Agahi** (1990), 174.

<sup>496</sup> **Agahi & Spencer** (1981), 45.

<sup>497</sup> **Agahi & Spencer** (1981), 45.

<sup>498</sup> The newspapers at the time often covered the topic of addicted children: **Agahi & Spencer** (1981), 45.

<sup>499</sup> **Siyāsāt** (2000), 9.

<sup>500</sup> The *Health Ministry* was the first institution to realize the rapidly increasing drug addiction: **Agahi & Spencer** (1981), 43; **Spencer & Agahi** (1990), 173.

<sup>501</sup> **Siyāsāt** (2000), 9.

compared these rehabilitation centres to overcrowded prisons, which were desperately overstaffed and unhygienic.<sup>502</sup>

This situation continued until the mid 1990s. During this period, the rehabilitation camps treated— thousands of drug addicts.<sup>503</sup> It is also only from the post-war period that we are informed about measures applied by these centres. With the strict abstinence-based measures, they might indeed have cured some drug addicts; the majority, however, most probably have relapsed within a short time, since forcible withdrawal generally has limited success and since after-care therapies were lacking.<sup>504</sup> These rehabilitation camps continue to exist to this day, as even the amended drug law of 1997 still makes provisions for treatments in such “special camps” (*ordūgāh-hā-ye hāṣṣ*) under the supervision of the judiciary.<sup>505</sup> In 1999, there were still 12 similar centres operating across Iran under the supervision of the prevention department of the *National Social Welfare Organization*, which at the time formed part of the *Ministry of Health*.<sup>506</sup>

From 1994, however, the Rafsanjānī administration initiated an important shift in the drug policy approach. Almost fifteen years after their closure, OUTPATIENT TREATMENT CENTRES (*marākez-e darmān-e sar-pā'ī*) usually affiliated to hospitals were reintroduced again. In 1999, already 40 of these centres were operative – typically, one per province, but several in bigger cities like Tehran.<sup>507</sup> Unlike in the traditional rehabilitation centres, drug users were seeking treatment here on a voluntary basis. This did, however, not prevent them from being prosecuted until the legislative reform of 1997.<sup>508</sup> These centres again offered medical detoxification by opioid-agonists like *clonidine* and other sedatives like *NSAIDs* or *phenothiazines*. They also applied supportive therapies such as hypnosis, acupuncture or herbal medicine. At times, withdrawal was simply achieved by a gradual reduction of drug consumption. Mere detoxification treatment generally lasted for two weeks. However,

---

<sup>502</sup> In 1989, an estimated 100,000 drug addicts were imprisoned: **Samii & Recknagel** (1999), 164; **Mokri** (2002), 185; information on the rehabilitation camps are only available from the time after the war: **Razzaghi & al.** (1998/99), 4; **Samii** (2003), 291; **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 4.

<sup>503</sup> It has been estimated that 25,000 to 30,000 drug addicts have been treated in these rehabilitation centres until 1989: **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 100, 104.

<sup>504</sup> 90% of the admissions happened by court order; the average duration of therapy in these centres was between 2-6 months: **Razzaghi & al.** (1999), 4.

<sup>505</sup> According to § 42 of the law: **DCHQ** (1997), 18.

<sup>506</sup> One centre was reserved for female drug addicts: **Razzaghi & al.** (1998/99), 4; **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 104; **Madani Ghahfarokhi** (2006), 138.

<sup>507</sup> **Razzaghi & al.** (1998/99), 4f.

<sup>508</sup> After 1997, state officials were repeatedly pointing out to the fact that drug addicts would not be prosecuted anymore: **Samii & Recknagel** (1999), 164; **Siyāsat** (2000), 9.

patients now also received after-treatment in the form of psychological consultation in individual, group and family therapy.<sup>509</sup> Admittedly, these first therapy measures were only partly satisfactory. The prescribed medication, namely *clonidine*, still involved heavy withdrawal symptoms, and resulted in very high relapse rates.<sup>510</sup> Addiction withdrawal and therapy were, however, concomitantly offered by private organizations. Initially, these rather operated on a shaky legal ground.<sup>511</sup> Soon, however, they started to be supervised by the National Welfare Organization, with which they cooperated closely.<sup>512</sup> The first and arguably still most famous of these organizations are the NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS (*mo'tādān-e gom-nām*), who had started their activities in 1994.

After the passing of the amended drug law of 1997, the government of Ḥātāmī encouraged new scientific addiction treatment methods. In 1999, the Rūzbeh Hospital, affiliated to the *Tehran University of Medical Sciences*, introduced a pilot programme experimenting with the opioid receptor agonist *naltrexone*. During the first six months, addicts were passing by once a week in order to collect their ration of naltrexone and to receive additional consultation and check-ups. This meant that the relapse rate decreased in comparison with *clonidine*. The programme consequently was extended to more clinics, where the drug addicts continued to participate in individual and family therapies sessions.<sup>513</sup> The Rūzbeh Hospital concurrently started to introduce the *ultra-rapid detoxification* (URD) technique, in which addicts were treated with the sedative *midazolam* and the opioid antagonist *naloxone*. This method, however, did not prove to be very successful in decreasing relapse rates.<sup>514</sup> The number of addiction treatment centers nevertheless continued to increase to almost 100 in the year 2000, and 138 in the year 2003.<sup>515</sup>

Private associations also expanded their services. The first private organization offering medical detoxification and counselling services to drug addicts was *Persepolis* (*pers-pōlīs*). In 1998, *Persepolis* opened a general practice clinic in Marvdašt near Šīrāz and soon

<sup>509</sup> Razzaghi & al. (1998/99), 4f., 30f.; Mokri (2002), 6f.; Reid & Costigan (2002), 100, 104f.; Samii (2003), 290; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 5; Calabrese (2007), 10.

<sup>510</sup> Estimates of the relapse rates of drug addicts treated with *clonidine* differed between 60% and 95%: Razzaghi & al. (1998/99), 31; Mokri (2002), 188; Reid & Costigan (2002), 105.

<sup>511</sup> Other self-help groups, which were also supported by the government, are not mentioned by name: Mokri (2002), 189; Reid & Costigan (2002), 100.

<sup>512</sup> The *State Welfare Organization* sent cured addicts after their release to NA sessions: Razzaghi & al. (1998/99), 5, 30.

<sup>513</sup> Relapse rates on *naltrexone* first accounted to 50% and later to 35-40%: Mokri (2002), 188.

<sup>514</sup> The *ultrarapid detoxification* only lasted 6 hours: Mokri (2002), 188.

<sup>515</sup> Admittedly, the numbers of such centres vary considerably: Samii & Recknagel (1999), 164; Reid & Costigan (2002), 104f.; Samii (2003), 291; CACI (2004); Calabrese (2007), 12.



started to experiment with *buprenorphine* and *methadone*. These medications had proved to be effective as a substitution to opiates in Western countries, but were prohibited at the time in Iran – even though they had been used in addiction therapy before the revolution.<sup>516</sup> In 1999, *Persepolis* was the first institution to obtain an official permit to test a long-term substitution treatment programme in the Islamic Republic, by distributing buprenorphine tablets to 3,000 patients. The pilot program proved to be a huge success, as many more patients remained in the program than in previous programs that had prescribed clonidine and naloxone.

Iranian authorities consequently started to accept substitution treatment and to offer similar programs in their own clinics and hospitals.<sup>517</sup> Soon, further private organizations followed, while complementing the medicinal treatment with therapeutic, vocational and sometimes even financial support.<sup>518</sup> Besides, a privately funded hotline for drug addicts was founded in 2000.<sup>519</sup> In 2001, various *therapeutic communities* (TC) started to operate in Tehran, Eşfahān and other cities. Just like the NA, TCs pursue a purely abstinence-oriented approach and consequently are willingly supported by the government.<sup>520</sup> In 2002, there were nine TCs in Iran with the capacity to support about 5,000 drug addicts.<sup>521</sup>

At the beginning of the 2000s, the Iranian government increasingly started to introduce further progressive *harm reduction* measures. Already the prescription of *buprenorphine* tablets, which was aimed at substitution instead of pure abstinence, can be considered a harm reduction measure. Now, the addiction experts of the *Ministry of Health* and the *National Welfare Organizations* were explicitly encouraged to seek international expert advice and to travel abroad to study best practices of other countries. Additionally, many Iranian addiction specialists returned to Iran amidst the general opening of the society under Ḥātāmī.<sup>522</sup> In 2000, the Health Ministry consequently launched a pilot methadone program for 140 drug addicts in the psychiatric clinic of Zāhedān, one of the cities with the highest addiction rates in Iran.<sup>523</sup> This development was mainly the result of an increased awareness about the rapid spread of HIV infection among intravenous drug users (IDUs). The RSA study of 1998/99 had in fact

---

<sup>516</sup> Mokri (2002), 188; Calabrese (2007), 10.

<sup>517</sup> Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 5.

<sup>518</sup> Mokri (2002), 188;

<sup>519</sup> Samii (2003), 291.

<sup>520</sup> Mokri (2002), 188f.; Reid & Costigan (2002), 105; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 4; Calabrese (2007), 11.

<sup>521</sup> Reid & Costigan (2002), 105.

<sup>522</sup> Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 5.

<sup>523</sup> Samii (2003), 291; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 5; Calabrese (2007), 12.

shown that 70% of all HIV cases were due to needle sharing.<sup>524</sup> In the same year, the government decided to introduce further harm reduction programmes in existing addiction clinics, specifically in the cities of Tehran, Šīrāz and Kermānšāh. IDUs and HIV positive people consequently started to receive free counselling, sterile syringes and methadone, which meanwhile had become legal for this purpose. The results of these pilot studies were presented to the president and his cabinet in mid 2001 and met with unanimous endorsement.<sup>525</sup>

Despite ongoing resistance by conservative political circles, the government further expanded these programs to another 15 clinics.<sup>526</sup> The first regular methadone maintenance treatment clinic was established in 2002, in the Rūzbeh Hospital in Teheran.<sup>527</sup> In the same year, the *Health Ministry* created a NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR HARM REDUCTION (*komīteh-ye kāheš-e āsīb-hā-ye kešvar*) as a sub-committee to the NATIONAL AIDS COMMITTEE.<sup>528</sup> In 2003, the *Health Ministry* declared methadone programmes to be a core principle of the official drug policy.<sup>529</sup> In 2002, the DCHQ and the UNODC created the DRUG ABUSE RESEARCH AND INTERVENTION UNIFIED STRATEGY (DARIUS) Institute, which also offers harm reduction programs; as does the IRANIAN NATIONAL CENTER FOR ADDICTION STUDIES (INCAS) (*markaz-e mellī-ye moṭāle‘āt-e e‘tiyād*), whis is affiliated to the Tehran University of Medical Sciences.<sup>530</sup> Today, *methadone* programmes and other harm reduction measures are integral parts of many clinics and hospitals in Iran. In 2005, eventually, the parliament ratified a law legalizing methadone treatment by private practitioners.<sup>531</sup>

The explosive nexus between intravenous drug use and the spread of HIV by way of needle sharing, seems to have been realized in prisons first,<sup>532</sup> even though the prison authorities continued to deny or downplay this for a long time in public.<sup>533</sup> Initially, prison

<sup>524</sup> Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 7; Navai (2005), 86; Calabrese (2007), 11.

<sup>525</sup> Samii & Recknagel (1999), 164; in the clinic of Kermānšāh, each month approximately 700 drug addicts were being treated, 150 of which with *methadone* while 50 used the needle exchange program: Reid & Costigan (2002), 105; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 5; Calabrese (2007), 10.

<sup>526</sup> Reid & Costigan (2002), 105; this plan, however, never was fully realized, as in 2005 there were still only „a small number of clinics [...] offering some form of substitution therapy“: Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 5.

<sup>527</sup> Razzaghi & al. (2005), 1f.; Calabrese (2007), 12.

<sup>528</sup> Calabrese (2007), 10.

<sup>529</sup> Calabrese (2007), 12.

<sup>530</sup> 30% of the budget of DARIUS are reserved for treatment and rehabilitation measures, and 10% for harm reduction measures: Calabrese (2007), 12, 16.

<sup>531</sup> Calabrese (2007), 12.

<sup>532</sup> Reid & Costigan (2002), 102; Catania (2004), 17; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 5f.; Calabrese (2007), 11.

<sup>533</sup> Razzaghi & al. (1998/99), 33f.

staff tried to separate IDU or HIV positive inmates from other prisoners.<sup>534</sup> However, due to chronic overcrowding of prisons, and due to the fact that released prisoners were spreading HIV within the broader society, this plan was never really implemented. In 2000, thus, first harm reduction measures were introduced to the Iranian prisons. The brothers' Alā'ī initiated the first so-called triangular clinic in the central prison of Kermānšāh in 2000. These clinics offered addicts a variety of services, including sterile syringes, hygienic kits, and even condoms, in order to reduce cases of HIV/AIDS and (other) sexually transmitted disease (STDs). Later, they included methadone maintenance treatment.<sup>535</sup> In 2002, the *Health Ministry* organized a roundtable with the participation of the *Welfare Organization*, the *State Prison Organization* (*sāzemān-e zendān-hā-ye kešvar*) as well as non-governmental and community-based organizations, where it was decided to further expand triangular clinics in the prison system.<sup>536</sup> The authorities have established triangular clinics in more than 40 prisons throughout the country since.<sup>537</sup> The distribution of syringes in prisons continues, however, to be disputed, since some officials fear that this reveals that drug consumption takes place in prisons.<sup>538</sup> Officially, thus, Iranian authorities only admit that drug addicts receive sterile syringes after being released and admitted to outpatient treatment centers and clinics.<sup>539</sup> Today, Iran belongs to a group of 22 countries worldwide that distribute methadone and syringes in prisons.<sup>540</sup>

From 2003, triangular clinics were also created outside of the prison system. Since then, more than 60 such clinics have been established in different Iranian cities.<sup>541</sup> Further created were drop-in-centers (DICs) in deprived quarters of larger cities, which often overlapped with general outpatient addiction clinics.<sup>542</sup> Persepolis, for instance, has built a DIC in Teheran, which conducts outreach work. The staff, often former drug addicts themselves, go out into the nearby streets and parks in order to approach drug users, inform

<sup>534</sup> According to MAḤMŪD BAḤTİYĀRĪ, head of the *State Prison Organization*: **Samii & Recknagel** (1999), 163.

<sup>535</sup> The entire study is dedicated to Iran's first Triangular Clinic in Kermānšāh: **WHO** (2004), 17f.

<sup>536</sup> **Catania** (2004), 17.

<sup>537</sup> **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 6;

<sup>538</sup> In 2001, the authorities still seem to have opposed the distribution of syringes: **Reid & Costigan** (2002), 105; **Catania** (2004); some even still opposed it in 2005: **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 6; **Calabrese** (2007), 11.

<sup>539</sup> **Catania** (2004); **Nassirimanesh & al.** (2005), 6; **Calabrese** (2007), 11.

<sup>540</sup> **Calabrese** (2007), 11.

<sup>541</sup> **Mokri** (2002), 189; **Catania** (2004); **Calabrese** (2007), 12.

<sup>542</sup> The first drop-in centres were located in the Qār and Bāġ-e Āzarī quarters in Tehran: **GTZ** (2006).

them about drug-related harms, and invite them into the centers, where they are offered showers, free meals, clothing, medical check-ups, counselling and injection paraphernalia.<sup>543</sup>

Until the end of Ḥātāmī's presidency, the number of governmental and private addiction clinics, therapy centres, drop-in-centres and triangular clinics has ranged into the thousands.<sup>544</sup> Despite a generally more repressive approach towards drug addicts under Aḥmadīnēžād, these clinics continue to operate to this day. Even the trend towards more progressive addiction therapies has continued. In 2007, for instance the *Iranian National Center For Addiction Studies* (INCAS) started to experiment with opium tincture – officially still with the ultimate goal of abstinence, in reality, however, arguably as a new maintenance treatment.<sup>545</sup> Also treating addicts with – apparently gradually decreasing amounts of – proper opium is the CONGRESS 60 (*kongreh 60*). This society was founded in 1999/2000 AD (1378 ŠH) by Ḥossain Dežākām, a long-time former opium addict himself, and combines this form of maintenance program with psychological counselling and sports activities.<sup>546</sup> A further discussed – though not implemented – measure was for instance the distribution of sterile syringes in vending machines.<sup>547</sup> In practice, thus, the Iranian government actually has started to reintroduce parts of the prerevolutionary maintenance program.

### **Prevention**

Drug prevention conceived as general awareness raising about drugs and drug addiction, has always been a weak spot in Iran. During the first months of 1979, even the limited public information campaign disappeared. In the autumn of 1979, the new authorities admittedly started a national campaign against drugs, similar to the campaign against alcohol that had started directly after the revolution. This consisted, however, in mere demonization. Iranian newspapers, which reported extensively on the drug problem in 1979 ad 1980, often portrayed male drug addicts as homosexuals, adulterers or pimps; and female drug users as prostitutes.<sup>548</sup> In combination with further repressive measures against drug users, this moral campaign only contributed in further driving drug addiction underground.<sup>549</sup> Hospitals and

---

<sup>543</sup> On the DIC of *Persepolis* in Bāg-e Āzarī: Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 5; GTZ (2006).

<sup>544</sup> Madani Ghahfarokhi (2006), 138; in the province Āzarbāyğān-e Ġarbī, 221 drug treatment centres were operating in 2007: Calabrese (2007), 12f.

<sup>545</sup> The author visited INCAS in summer 2008 and was presented a sample of the opium tincture; controlled distribution of opium had already been proposed by Ṭabāṭabā'ī in 2000: Siyāsāt (2000), 9.

<sup>546</sup> On Dežākām, his Congress 60 and his popular book, which is already printed in a seventh edition: Dežākām (1998/99).

<sup>547</sup> Burrows & Wodak (2005), 28.

<sup>548</sup> Agahi & Spencer (1981), 44.

<sup>549</sup> Agahi & Spencer (1981), 44f.; Spencer & Agahi (1990), 174.

clinics might initially still have informed drug users about harms related to intravenous drug use. Prisons and rehabilitation centres in contrast, arguably, simply condemned drug use instead of providing unbiased information on drugs and drug addiction.<sup>550</sup> The public religious campaign against drugs ceased with the beginning of the Iraq-Iran war.<sup>551</sup>

The available information suggests that new preventive measures were only implemented from the end of the 1990s. At the time, even experts were of the opinion that public information on drugs rather contributes to drug consumption.<sup>552</sup> New prevention measures were considerably influenced by concepts and best practices of the international community, in particular by the WHO, the UNODC and by European countries. The basic conception accordingly differentiates between primary prevention targeting the general population, with and secondary and tertiary prevention programmes targeting people who are already drug addicts.

Official drug prevention in Iran continues to suffer from frailties in all three areas, yet arguably most in primary prevention. Lacking governmental efforts in this regard can be explained by the fact that drug prevention does not yield immediately observable success; but also by continuing religious reservations towards the topic. Still, from the mid 1990s, the national media started to increasingly provide more or less unbiased information on drugs and drug addiction – with the exception of the national television, which continues to ignore the topic. The development of the public press discourse will be the task of the subsequent analysis. At the same time, the DCHQ and the *State Welfare Organization* started to print brochures and posters informing about drugs and drug addiction.<sup>553</sup> Then managing-director of the DCHQ Fallāḥ also encouraged the clerics in Qom to issue religious edicts against drug consumption. As the main coordinative agency, the DCHQ has a strategic role in drug prevention as well, and at least during the Ḥātāmī administration it started to closely cooperate with the UNDCP, which in 2002 was renamed UNODC. They jointly organized demonstrations against drug addiction, sportive events and exhibitions, all particularly targeted at Iran's predominantly young population.<sup>554</sup> In this regard, the INTERNATIONAL DAY AGAINST DRUG ABUSE AND ILLICIT TRAFFICKING has become of particular importance in Iran,

---

<sup>550</sup> **Agahi & Spencer** (1981), 45.

<sup>551</sup> **Spencer & Agahi** (1990), 174.

<sup>552</sup> This opinion was still expressed by MEHDĪ ABŪ'Ī, commander-in-chief of the *Anti-Narcotics Police* in 2002: **Samii** (2003), 287.

<sup>553</sup> On written prevention material and prevention activities of the media in Yazd: **Samii & Recknagel** (1999), 163.

<sup>554</sup> E.g. according to Ṭabāṭabā'ī: **Siyāsat** (2000), 9.

as in few countries so many public events are organized on this occasion. During these years, drug prevention had become increasingly factual and unbiased.

Nevertheless, inter-agency cooperation on drug prevention remains problematic. As will be shown in the analysis, the government often sees primary prevention as the duty of the media, while the media complain about not being provided with enough or precise information, in addition to the general restrictions imposed on them. The *Education Ministry*, which is responsible for drug education among the millions of pupils and students, is repeatedly accused by the press of being largely inactive.

The Aḥmadīnežād government continued drug prevention programs, albeit to a reduced extent. The media were in general less free to discuss delicate topics or to criticize lacking governmental measures. The DCHQ became more biased towards drug supply reduction and a repressive drug policy. A case in point was the international drugs day of 26<sup>th</sup> June 2008, where the DCHQ displayed an educational video consisting exclusively of scare tactics.<sup>555</sup>

Far better developed than primary prevention are in contrast secondary and tertiary prevention. Responsible for designing these measures are *Health Ministry* and the *National Welfare Society*, the *National AIDS Committee* and the *National Harm Reduction Committee* as well as the *National Prison Organization*. The implementation of secondary and tertiary prevention takes place in inpatient and outpatient addiction clinics, drop-in-centres, triangular clinics and through outreach work in the streets.<sup>556</sup> Here, addiction specialists inform drug users about therapy programs, safe ways of drug injection and HIV/AIDS prevention. Since the introduction of respective prevention programs in the triangular clinics, the general awareness about such dangers has greatly increased among drug users outside and inside of prisons.<sup>557</sup> However, in this area inter-agency competitions contribute to prevent a more effective cooperation. The prevention departments of the DCHQ, the *National Welfare Organization* and the *National AIDS Committee* have been accused of pursuing each its own agenda, without consulting each other.<sup>558</sup> Strongly increased inter-factional fighting between

---

<sup>555</sup> On the occasion of the *International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking* in summer 2008, which the author attended, such a prevention spot was shown.

<sup>556</sup> Reid & Costigan (2002), 105; GTZ (2006); Calabrese (2007), 11.

<sup>557</sup> Navai (2005), 86.

<sup>558</sup> Reid & Costigan (2002), 105; Catania (2004), 17.

conservatives and reformists during the Ḥātami administration further exacerbated this situation.

### ***Research on drug addiction and trafficking***

During the first years after the revolution, scientific research on drug addiction in Iran continued to be published reflecting the situation before the revolution. Particularly active in this field have been America-based Īrağ Siyāsī and Iran-based Bahman Fozūnī who wrote two studies on the efficiency of the governmental opium maintenance programme.<sup>559</sup> Not long after, Christopher Spencer from the University of Sheffield and Cyrus Agahi from the University of Eṣfahān published the first general overview on situation of drug addiction directly after the revolution. The same authors published further articles on general addiction patterns in Eṣfahān<sup>560</sup> or on rehabilitation measures in Šīrāz<sup>561</sup>. At the time, these researchers complained about the revolutionary committees increasingly obstructing their research activities, and consequently, addiction research soon ceased in Iran.

Unsurprisingly, the first researchers to publish a coarse overview on the situation of drug addiction after the war were again Spencer and Agahi.<sup>562</sup> Meanwhile, precise information on epidemiological aspects of drug addiction in Iran had been almost entirely lost. Agahi and Spencer therefore emphasized the urgent need for new studies. However, it would take the Iranian government another decade to respond to this postulation. The first countrywide study was the *Rapid Situation Assessment* (RSA) of 1998/99 AD (1377 ŠH), commissioned by the prevention department of the *State Welfare Organization* and the UNDCP under the Ḥātami administration, and headed by the psychiatrist ‘Emrān Moḥammad Razzāgī, later director of INCAS.<sup>563</sup> This study evaluated the number of 1.2 million drug addicts and another 600,000 to 800,000 recreational drug users, which would remain the officially accepted estimation for the coming decades.

From 1999 to 2005, Iranian academic institutions published a plethora of research papers on drug addiction, the overwhelming part of which in the field of addiction medicine. Here, only a short overview on the main research field shall be provided. It is worth

---

<sup>559</sup> Siassi & Fozouni (1980a), 1127-1140; Siassi & Fozouni (1980b), 127-133.

<sup>560</sup> Spencer & Agahi (1982), 77-84; Agahi & Spencer (1982a), 99-110; Agahi & Spencer (1982b), 235-242.

<sup>561</sup> Šahīn Dalvand, co-author of the study, was executed with other Bahā’īs in 1983: Dalvand & Agahi & Spencer (1984), 87-92.

<sup>562</sup> Spencer & Agahi (1990), 171-179.

<sup>563</sup> Razzaghi & al. (1998/99).

mentioning the two research centres INCAS and DARIUS, headed by the luminaries of the Iranian addiction research, Ādaraḥš Mokrī and Hūmān Nārenḡihā respectively. Iranian research centres publish articles both in Persian and English. Besides general epidemiological studies,<sup>564</sup> articles are written on drug addiction in specific cities;<sup>565</sup> on addiction among specific sections of the population: in particular among men,<sup>566</sup> women,<sup>567</sup> the youth,<sup>568</sup> intravenous heroin users (IDUs)<sup>569</sup> or prison inmates;<sup>570</sup> on addiction causes such as the influence of the family environment;<sup>571</sup> on effects of harmful ways of drug use;<sup>572</sup> on the efficiency of *methadone* or *buprenorphine* in relapse prevention;<sup>573</sup> on the correlation of drug addiction and (acquisitive) crime;<sup>574</sup> on HIV/AIDS among IDUs or students;<sup>575</sup> and many more aspects.

Further research has been carried out on legal aspects of drugs, such as drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, or acquisitive crimes since 2000.<sup>576</sup> This legal literature often amounts to mere legal compendia, without a critical discussion of the predominant prohibition system that criminalizes mere drug addiction and puts a heavy burden on the Iranian judicial system. More interesting in this regard are the compilations of religious opinions (sg. *fatvā*) as they reflected a broader range of views.<sup>577</sup> Often also religiously inspired, albeit more from a religious-moral or religious-political, rather conspiratorial point of view, are works on the history of drugs and drug addiction in Iran. Proper historical or sociological studies in contrast are largely lacking. Of use that is more practical are the many guidebooks for parents and for drug addicts, with titles like “*What is Addiction? Who is an Addict?*” or “*Who is an Addict? What are Drugs?*”<sup>578</sup>

<sup>564</sup> Mokri (2002), 184-190; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 1-7.

<sup>565</sup> Ahmadi & Ghanizadeh (2000); Sobhani & al. (2000); Ziaaddini & Ziaaddini (2005).

<sup>566</sup> E.g.: Fāzeli & Mawlawī (2003).

<sup>567</sup> E.g.: Raḥmatī (2003); Šafarī (2003).

<sup>568</sup> E.g.: Ahmadi & Hasani (2003); Qavvī-Del (2003/04).

<sup>569</sup> E.g.: Nassirimanesh & al. (2006).

<sup>570</sup> E.g.: Būlhārī & al. (2003); Šahīdzādeh (2003/04); Bāqerī (2004/05); Esmā‘īlī & al. (2004/05).

<sup>571</sup> E.g.: Esmā‘īlī (2003/04).

<sup>572</sup> E.g.: Haghpānah & al. (2005).

<sup>573</sup> E.g.: Ahmadi (2002); Ahmadi & al. (2004); Šādeqī & Bordbār (2005/05); Razzaghi (2005).

<sup>574</sup> E.g.: Ra‘īsdānā (2003/04); Moḥtāriyān (2003/04); Pālāhang (2003/04); Ġavānfar (2003/04);

<sup>575</sup> E.g.: Mansoori & al. (2003); Tavoosi & al. (2004); Adibi & al. (2004); Gheiratmand & al. (2005); Nakhaee (2005); Vazirian & al. (2005); Zamani & al. (2005); Zamani & al. (2006a); Zamani & al. (2006b); Naderi & al. (2006); Eshtrati & al. (2008).

<sup>576</sup> E.g.: Moẓafferī (2003/04); Raḥmdel (2005/05); Bāḡter & Ra‘īsī (2004/05); Badriyān (2006/07); Zerā‘at (2007/08); Yūsefi-Maḡalleh & Maẓlūmī (2007/08).

<sup>577</sup> E.g.: Hendī (1999/2000); Tabrīzī (2000/01), „Devil’s Trade“ (*teḡārat-e šaiṡānī*); Reẓāpūr-Poršokūhī (2002/03); Šahīdī (2003/04); Zakariyyā‘ī (2006/07); Qāderiyān (2005/06).

<sup>578</sup> E.g.: Deẓākām (1998/99); Mīr-Faḡrā‘ī (2004/05); (*e‘tiyād čīst? mo‘tād kīst?*); Dāneš (2006/07); (*mo‘tād kīst? mavādd-e moḡadder čīst?*); As‘adī (2005/06).



### *International cooperation and agreements*

The Islamic Republic did not end its multiple memberships in different international organizations and treaties. It remained for instance signatory to the UN SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS of 1961, which the previous authorities had signed in 1973. In practice, however, Iran's once close international cooperation, especially with the USA, in the fields of drug trafficking and drug addiction, ceased after the revolution. This situation continued during the Iraq-Iran war.<sup>579</sup>

After the war, Rafsanjānī decided against much domestic resistance to improve Iran's relation with the international community, not last because of the dire economic situation. This resulted inter alia in first contacts with the recently established UNDCP.<sup>580</sup> Iran initially only was interested in an exchange of information, but the foundations for further cooperation had been laid.<sup>581</sup> A first tangible consequence of the improved relations was the signing of the UN CONVENTION AGAINST ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES of 1988 in December 1992.<sup>582</sup> The UNDCP for its part also realized the importance of a close cooperation with Iran in the combat against drug trafficking, and started to seek a closer cooperation towards the end of the 1990s. Albeit the USA continued to oppose financial aid to Iran's drug supply reduction efforts,<sup>583</sup> Iran and the UNDCP agreed to the opening of a UNDCP country office in Iran in 1999.<sup>584</sup> Not long after, Iran signed the UN CONVENTION ON TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME of 2000 – although it has not ratified it yet.<sup>585</sup> In 2001, it ratified the 1972 PROTOCOL AMENDING THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS OF 1961<sup>586</sup>.

The UNDCP/UNODC office in Tehran further initiated and facilitated a series of bilateral or multilateral agreements and memoranda of understanding between Iran and different countries. The most important ones were naturally concluded with the main opium

---

<sup>579</sup> On the negative impact of Iran's rupture with the international community on Iran's drug policy: **Agahi & Spencer** (1981), 43f.; **Spencer & Agahi** (1990), 171f., 175.

<sup>580</sup> In general on contact with the *World Bank*, the *International Monetary Fund* and the *United Nations*: **Milani** (1994), 231, 239.

<sup>581</sup> **Samii & Recknagel** (1999), 153; in November 1990, Qodratollāh Asadī from the *Health Ministry* met with representatives of the UNDCP; in May 1991, an Iranian observer-team travelled to Vienna to meet with Giorgio Giacomelli, then director of the UNDCP and ask for support for the Iranian drug policy: **Calabrese** (2007), 15.

<sup>582</sup> **Samii & Recknagel** (1999), 165; **Samii** (2003), 295; **Calabrese** (2007), 14.

<sup>583</sup> **Samii & Recknagel** (1999), 167f.

<sup>584</sup> **Samii** (2003), 295.

<sup>585</sup> **CACI** (2004).

<sup>586</sup> **CACI** (2004); **Calabrese** (2007), 14.

producing countries Afghanistan and Pakistan.<sup>587</sup> Despite Iran's keen interest in a close cooperation with Afghanistan, the political and economic situation in Afghanistan rendered such efforts largely futile. Different factions in Afghanistan continued to profit from the opium trade, as did subsequent governments. Although vehemently opposing the US conquest of Afghanistan, Iran at least expected a positive impact on a reduction of the opium industry. Subsequently, Iran succeeded in concluding different agreements with the new Afghan administration. In 2001, Iran proposed a crop substitution programme, which in February 2002 led to an agreement, according to which Iran guaranteed to purchase these alternative crops.<sup>588</sup> In another agreement in 2004, Iran consented to train Afghan anti-drug trafficking experts and to finance 25 additional border checkpoints. This intention was reaffirmed in June 2006.<sup>589</sup> In December 2005, the UNODC initiated a first agreement between Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan on joint border control activities and an exchange of information on drug trafficking. This agreement was followed by two similar agreements in 2007 and 2008.<sup>590</sup> Also facilitated by the UNODC was the BERLIN DECLARATION ON COUNTER-NARCOTICS of 2004, in which Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and China promised a closer cooperation in countering drug cultivation and trafficking.<sup>591</sup> The sheer number of such agreements indicates that their implementation has been rather ineffective so far.<sup>592</sup>

Iran is, additionally, a member of many further multilateral organizations that cooperate in the combat against drug trafficking. It is a principal member of the ECONOMIC COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (ECO), which was created in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, and which since 1992 includes Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. As part of its secretariat, the ECO maintains a DRUG CONTROL COORDINATION UNIT (DCCU) in Tehran.<sup>593</sup> Iran is also part of the SIX PLUS TWO GROUP, comprising Afghanistan's neighbours Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and China as well as Russia and the USA, which aims at solving the conflict in

---

<sup>587</sup> Iran has signed agreements with the EU Commission (2005), and bilaterally with its member states France, Great Britain (February 2001), Italy (October 2004), Spain, Greece and Cyprus; but also with Norway and Switzerland; it has signed further agreements with naturally Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia (July 2007), Russia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and the UAE (May 2005); as well as with Australia, Japan, Lebanon, Oman, Singapore and Thailand: **Samii & Recknagel** (1999), 165; **Samii** (2003), 295; **CACI** (2004); **Navai** (2005), 87; **Calabrese** (2007), 14f.

<sup>588</sup> **Samii** (2003), 285f.

<sup>589</sup> **CACI** (2004); **Calabrese** (2006), 15.

<sup>590</sup> On the details of these agreements: **Calabrese** (2007), 16.

<sup>591</sup> **CACI** (2004).

<sup>592</sup> **Calabrese** (2007), 17; **TIME Online**, 28<sup>th</sup> October 2009.

<sup>593</sup> **Samii & Recknagel** (1999), 165; **Samii** (2003), 295; **CACI** (2004).

Afghanistan and the related problem of drug trafficking.<sup>594</sup> It is also included in the PARIS PACT, which had been created in 2003 by countries affected by the Afghan drug trade.<sup>595</sup> Iran takes part in further international cooperation mechanisms against drug trafficking, for instance with the European Union and individual member states,<sup>596</sup> as well as the *Anti-Drug Liaison Officials' Meetings for International Cooperation*, whose second conference took place in Mašhad in 2000<sup>597</sup>.

---

<sup>594</sup> Samii & Recknagel (1999), 165; Samii (2003), 295; CACI (2004).

<sup>595</sup> Samii (2003), 295; CACI (2004).

<sup>596</sup> Samii & Recknagel (1999), 165; Calabrese (2007), 14.

<sup>597</sup> Samii & Recknagel (1999), 165.

### III. A Short History of the Press in the Islamic Republic of Iran

„One cannot imagine any means better than a free newspaper  
to save the people of Iran and promote their progress”<sup>598</sup>

#### III. 1. Iran's fourth press spring during the revolution of 1979

During the last weeks of Moḥammad-Rezā Šāh's reign in 1978, the Iranian press had successfully fought for more freedom and the Iranian government increasingly had given in to their demands for press freedom. The Iranian newspapers in fact were at the forefront in the political struggle against the shah, especially the two traditional and influential newspapers *Eṭṭelā'āt* and *Kaiḥān*, as well as the newspaper *Āyandegān*. *Eṭṭelā'āt*. It has been recorded that by this time *Kaiḥān*'s circulation attained the unprecedented number of 1,5 million copies, while *Āyandegān*'s readership reached 300'000.<sup>599</sup> At the same time, the various political parties and factions that took part in the revolution started to publish their own newspapers, often continuing earlier publications, which were banned under the shah.<sup>600</sup> Even the ethnic minorities could publish newspapers in their own languages.<sup>601</sup> From the shah's departure on January 16, 1979 to September 1980, approximately 250 new publications appeared.<sup>602</sup> Thus, after the Constitutional Revolution in the early 20th century, the interregnum between Rezā Šāh and his successor Moḥammad-Rezā Šāh in the 1940s, and Moḥammad Mosaddeq's short-lived cabinet in the early 1950s, a fourth period of almost unrestrained press freedom set in.

Newspapers that continued to be published from before the revolution of 1979 were *Bāmdād* (Morning),<sup>603</sup> the traditional *Tehrān-e Moṣavvar* (Illustrated Tehran)<sup>604</sup>, or the leftist *Paygām-e Emrūz* (Today's Message).<sup>605</sup> The political parties and factions, for their part, used the new press freedom to start their own newspapers, some of which admittedly already have been published clandestinely before. As a result, the NATIONAL FRONT (*ḡabheh-ye mellī-ye*

<sup>598</sup> According to *Qānūn*, Esfand 1, 1268 (February 20, 1890): **Shahidi** (2008), 741.

<sup>599</sup> **Rawan** (2000), 124; **Shahidi** (2007) 15f.

<sup>600</sup> In the last month of Moḥammad-Rezā Šāh's rule alone, 105 new publications were launched: **Shahidi** (2007), 16.

<sup>601</sup> **Saeed** (1981), 13; **Sa'edi** (1984), 18.

<sup>602</sup> **Shahidi** (2007), 25; 400 new publications appeared in 1979, of which 122 dailies, weeklies and monthlies: **Rawan** (2000), 127.

<sup>603</sup> Basically a now independent successor to the organ of the shah's RASTĀḤİZ single party: **Saeed** (1981), 13.

<sup>604</sup> **Sa'edi** (1984), 18; **Shahidi** (2007), 43.

<sup>605</sup> *Paygām-e Emrūz* originally was the organ of the NEW IRAN PARTY (*ḥezb-e īrān-e novīn*): **Gehrke & Mehner** (1975), 109; **Sa'edi** (1984), 18; **Shahidi** considers *Paygām-e Emrūz* to have been a very influential newspaper after the revolution – despite its comparably small circulation: **Shahidi** (2007), 4, 43.

*īran*) published its party organs *Ḥabarnāmeḥ* (Newspaper) and *Ārmān-e Mellat* (Ideal of the Nation),<sup>606</sup> and the politically influential FREEDOM MOVEMENT (*nahẓat-e āzādī-ye īrān*) and its organ *Mīzān* (Scale).<sup>607</sup>

More active in this regard were, however, the leftist and communist parties. The TŪDEH PARTY (*ḥezb-e tūdeh*) openly published its organ *Navīd* (Good News), but also reactivated its previous organ *Mardom* (People) and the more theoretical *Donyā* (World), which for many years had appeared in exile.<sup>608</sup> The *Moğāhedīn-e Ḥalq*, which had split up into two factions in 1974, also published their own newspapers. The majority faction, which had renamed itself ORGANIZATION OF THE BATTLE ON THE WAY TO THE LIBERALIZATION OF THE WORKING CLASS (*sāzemān-e paykār dar rāh-e āzādī-ye ṭabaqeh-ye kārgar*), launched its new organ *Paykār* (Combat).<sup>609</sup> The faction that synthesized Islam with Marxism published for its part the organ *Moğāhed* (Fighter). The People's Devotees (*fadā'īyān-e ḥalq*) – or officially the ORGANIZATION OF THE GUERILLAS DEVOTED TO THE IRANIAN PEOPLE (*sāzemān-e ʃerīk-hā-ye fadā'ī-ye ḥalq-e īrān*) published the weekly *Kār* (Work) and the theoretical journal *Nabard-e Ḥalq* (Battle of the People).<sup>610</sup> Other communist organs were for instance *Komūnīst* (Communist) and *Ḥaqīqat* (Truth) of the UNION OF IRANIAN COMMUNISTS (*etteḥādiyyeh-ye kōmūnīst-hā-ye īrān*); *Zahmat* (Hardship) of their splinter group REVOLUTIONARY SOLIDARITY / UNITY (*vaḥdat-e enqelābī*); *Ranğbar* (Toiler) of the anti-Soviet PARTY OF THE TOILERS in Iran (*ḥezb-e ranğbarān-e īrān*); and *Čeh Bāyad Kard* (What has to be Done) of the Trotskyists (*trotskīst-hā*).<sup>611</sup>

However, the most important new newspaper to appear was launched by the Islamist and religious groups. The religious opposition against the shah had never owned a real newspaper before but the ALLIED ISLAMIC GROUPS (*hay'at-hā-ye mo'talafeh-ye eslāmī*) and the SOCIETY OF ISLAMIC COALITION (*ḡam'īyyat-e mo'talafeh-ye eslāmī*), which were led by the clerics Moṭṭaharī, Bāhonar and Rafsanğānī, had published the newsletter *Enteqām*

<sup>606</sup> Saeed (1981), 13; Abrahamian (1982), 501<sup>17</sup>, 504, 506<sup>23</sup>, 511<sup>36</sup>; Rawan (2000), 133.

<sup>607</sup> Sa'edi talks about „another“ newspaper (additionally to *Mīzān*) that was only published from November 1979, without mentioning its name: Sa'edi (1984), 18f.

<sup>608</sup> Abrahamian (1982), 454ff.; Milani (1993), 310, 319 no 20; Rawan (2000), 133; Ḥaqšenās (*Communism* – EIr); Shahidi (2007), 25.

<sup>609</sup> Abrahamian (1982), 493ff.; ḤAQŠENĀS was a cofounder of the SĀZEMĀN-E PAIKĀR: Ḥaqšenās (*Communism* – EIr).

<sup>610</sup> Abrahamian (1982), 483ff.; Ḥaqšenās (*Communism* – EIr).

<sup>611</sup> On the smaller communist parties and their organs: Ḥaqšenās (*Communism* – EIr).

(Vengeance) from 1966<sup>612</sup>. After the creation of their own party in February 1979, the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC PARTY (*ḥezb-e ḡomhūrī-ye eslāmī*) started to publish their eponymous newspaper: *Ḡomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* (Islamic Republic). The first editor was ‘Alī Ḥāmeneh’ī. But the newspaper was never able attain the same circulation as *Eṭṭelā’āt*, *Kaihān* or *Āyandegān*.<sup>613</sup> The MUSLIM PEOPLE REPUBLIC PARTY (*ḥezb-e ḡomhūrī-ye ḥalq-e mosalmān*), which supported Ḥomainī’s main rival Āyatollāh Šarī’atmadārī, published the newspaper *Ḥalq-e Mosalmān* (Muslim People). Another newspaper that was launched by a person close to Ḥomainī was *Enqelāb-e Eslāmī* (Islamic Revolution), which was published by the later president ‘Abd ol-Ḥasan Banī Šadr on June 19, 1979.<sup>614</sup>

There had been early signs that Ḥomainī would not prove to be a champion of press freedom. Even before his return to Tehrān on February 11, 1979, the SYNDICATE OF NEWSPAPER WRITERS AND JOURNALISTS (*sandīkā-ye nevisande-gān va ḥabar-negar-ān-e maṭbū’āt*) had met on the same day first with the shah’s secret service SAVAK and then with representatives from Ḥomainī, while the latter complained that the newspapers would provide too much coverage to the secular opposition. A journalist present at the meetings later reported: “*we left a meeting with the SAVAK, only to participate in a meeting with the SAVAH*” – referring to Ḥomainī with the replacement of the last letter.<sup>615</sup> The shah’s last prime minister, Šāpūr Baḥtiyār, warned the press of an imminent censorship if Ḥomainī was to assume power.<sup>616</sup> On January 17, 1979, a group of the imam’s followers demonstrated against *Kaihān*, which had published critical articles against them.<sup>617</sup> This resulted in an increasing pressure on the press almost immediately after the return of Āyatollāh Ḥomainī. Already in March 1979, Ḥomainī personally started to warn the press “*there would be freedom of expression, pen and views for all*” but “*people will not tolerate conspiracies*”.<sup>618</sup> The followers of the imam then first set about bringing the most widely read newspapers *Eṭṭelā’āt*, *Kaihān* and *Āyandegān* under control.

<sup>612</sup> **Vakili-Zad** (1990), 11ff.; the theological seminaries in Qom also published journals, among them *Maktab-e Eslām* (School of Islam): **Sreberny-Mohammadi** (1990), 356.

<sup>613</sup> Generally on the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC PARTY: **Corstange** (2000), XXX; **LoC** (2009); **Sciolino** (1983), 897; **Hassan** (1984), 678-680; **Buchta** (2000), 12, 212; on the newspaper *Ḡomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*: **Sciolino** (1983), 897; **Sa’edi** (1984), 18; **Shahidi** (2007), 45.

<sup>614</sup> **Parvin** (*Enqelāb-e Eslāmī* – EIr); **Sa’edi** (1984), 18; concomitantly, the newspaper *Bāmdād* also received its official license, although it probably had appeared before: **Shahidi** (2007), 43.

<sup>615</sup> Ḥomainī’s delegation included Āyatollāh Moḥammad Beheštī, Āyatollāh Morteżā Moṭahharī and Moḥammad Mofatteḥ, all belonging to his close circle; on the part of of the syndicate were Raḥmān Hātefī from *Kaihān* and Gōlām-Ḥossain Šaleḥyār from *Eṭṭelā’āt*: **Rawan** (2000), 131; **Shahidi** (2007), 17f.

<sup>616</sup> Baḥtiyār was the leader of the NATIONAL FRONT after Mošaddeq: **Shahidi** (2007), 20f.

<sup>617</sup> By *vaḥdat-e kalām*, Ḥomainī originally rather referred to Islamic solidarity in the society: **Sreberny-Mohammadi** (1990), 359; **Shahidi** (2007), 20.

<sup>618</sup> **Sa’edi** (1984), 17; **Shahidi** (2007), 31; on similar later threats: **Rawan** (2000), 127.

The first target of the concerted actions of the Islamist factions was the newspaper *Kaihan*. *Kaihan* had become the highest-circulating newspaper in Iran, especially due to its critical reporting on Ḥomainī's political initiatives such as the referendum for an Islamic republic, or the abrogation of the family law.<sup>619</sup> Even prime minister Bāzargān, who himself felt increasingly powerless against the Islamist parallel institutions, accused *Kaihan* of dedicating too much coverage to rival political groups such as the MOĞĀHEDĪN-E ḤALQ.<sup>620</sup> Islamist pressure groups consequently started to threaten critical journalists and the editorial board.<sup>621</sup> But pressure also mounted from the inside. The administrative and technical staff, which had created ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF KAIHĀN (*anğoman-e eslāmī-ye Kaihān*), started to interrogate and expel many journalists: a practice which Mesbāḥzādeh, the owner of *Kaihan*, apparently supported.<sup>622</sup> On March 18, 1979, *Kaihan* officially declared itself as an organ of the Islamic Republic and a supporter of Islam;<sup>623</sup> and in April, the recently created editorial council was forced to disband. Raḥmān Hātefī initially remained chief editor.<sup>624</sup> In May, eventually, after *Kaihan* had reprinted a critical article on Ḥomainī, the ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF KAIHĀN removed twenty critical journalists and members of the editorial board.<sup>625</sup> When, as a result, the journalists went on strike, the society started to publish the newspaper itself albeit on a rather low journalistic level. The same day, a delegation of the society was received by Ḥomainī in Qom, who reiterated: “*the press and public media have to correct themselves*”<sup>626</sup>. Not long afterwards, Mesbāḥzādeh agreed to confer the assets of *Kaihan* to the wealthy Ḥossain Mahdiyān.<sup>627</sup> Mahdiyān managed to negotiate an end of the journalists' strike by paying golden parachutes to critical journalists willing to resign. He replaced them with

<sup>619</sup> Ḥomainī's followers accused *Kaihan* of having caused the ‘chador crisis’ by printing Ḥomainī's speech, in which he accused Bāzargān's administration of being full of naked women: **Nikazmerad** (1980), 351f.; **Shahidi** (2007), 24.

<sup>620</sup> **Nikazmerad** (1980), 351f.; **Shahidi** (2007), 24.

<sup>621</sup> The well-known satirist Hādī Ḥorsandī e.g. was threatened with death and eventually had to flee the country: **Shahidi** (2007), 24ff.

<sup>622</sup> The ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF KAIHĀN – which cooperated closely with the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC PARTY – apparently forwarded the names of critical journalists to the demonstrators in front of the *Kaihan* offices, who then asked for their dismissal or even execution: **Shahidi** (2007), 29f.

<sup>623</sup> **Shahidi** (2007), 26f., 29.

<sup>624</sup> The ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF KAIHĀN – which cooperated closely with the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC PARTY – apparently forwarded the names of the critical journalists to organized demonstrators in front of the *Kaihan* offices, which then asked for their dismissal or even execution: **Shahidi** (2007), 29f.

<sup>625</sup> Some journalists assumed the TUDEH PARTY to have provided the ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF KAIHĀN with the list of journalists to be banned: **Shahidi** (2007), 38.

<sup>626</sup> **Shahidi** (2007), 39.

<sup>627</sup> Mesbāḥzādeh probably agreed into this deal in order to safeguard his considerable other assets in Iran; Ḥossain Mahdiyān was a wealthy ironmonger, who had been active in publishing Islamic literature from the 1960s, and was the co-director of the ISLAMIC CULTURAL PUBLISHING HOUSE (*daftar-e našr-e fahang-e eslāmī*): **Shahidi** (2007), 40.

younger, less experienced colleagues, who published *Kaihān* as “the first newspaper of the dispossessed”.<sup>628</sup> A “group of twenty”, however, refused Mahdiyān’s offer and launched their own newspaper *Kāihān-e Āzād* (Free World / *Kaihān*). However this was to last only for about a week.<sup>629</sup>

*Eṭṭelā’āt*, which always had been a more moderate newspaper, was the next newspaper to be brought into the official line. While the conflict in *Kaihān* took mainly place between the administrative and technical staff on the one side and the journalists on the other, the journalists of *Eṭṭelā’āt* disagreed on the future alignment of the newspaper. The ongoing conflict provoked the interference of Moḥammad Mofatteḥ, one of Ḥomainī’s representatives for the press. He decided to call back Mas’ūdī, still the official owner of the newspaper, who had left Iran concomitantly with the shah in January 1979.<sup>630</sup> Mas’ūdī expelled *Eṭṭelā’āt*’s most respected and critical journalists, and, on 8<sup>th</sup> May 1979, set up an editorial council, which promised to report in accordance with the “line of Emām” (*haṭṭ-e emām*).<sup>631</sup>

On September 9, 1979, Ḥomainī eventually assigned both newspapers to the FOUNDATION OF THE DISPOSSESSED (*bonyād-e mostaẓ’afān*), which managed the huge assets of the confiscated PAHLAVI FOUNDATION (*bonyād-e pahlavī*). He reserved for himself the right to personally appoint the editors of *Eṭṭelā’āt* and *Kaihān* respectively.<sup>632</sup> Initially, *Kaihān* continued to be managed by Mahdiyān, while Mas’ūdī was removed from the masthead of *Eṭṭelā’āt*, which no seems to have been managed directly by Mofatteḥ.<sup>633</sup> In May 1980, Ḥomainī appointed Maḥmūd Do’ā’ī as chief editor of *Eṭṭelā’āt*,<sup>634</sup> and in 1981, the following president Moḥammad Ḥātāmī was appointed as chief editor of *Kaihān*.<sup>635</sup>

The first move against the newspaper *Āyandegān* came from the highest echelons of power by Āyatollāh Ḥomainī. *Āyandegān*, on May 2, 1979, had published an article, in which the obscure religious group FORQĀN declared responsibility for the murder of Āyatollāh

<sup>628</sup> Nikazmerad (1980), 356; Saeed (1981), 12; Rawan (2000), 131ff.; the takeover of *Kaihān* is particularly well documented in Ġavānrūdī’s account “Conquest of *Kaihān*” (*tashṭīr-e kaihān*): Shahidi (2007), 37ff.;

<sup>629</sup> On the short-lived *Kaihān-e Āzād*: Saeed (1981), 12f.; Shahidi (2007), 41.

<sup>630</sup> Shahidi (2007), 28; Parvin (*Eṭṭelā’āt* – EIr).

<sup>631</sup> Sa’edi (1984), 18; Rawan (2000), 129f.; Shahidi (2000), 28f.

<sup>632</sup> Nikazmerad (1980), 362; Rawan (200), 132; Parvin (*Eṭṭelā’āt* – EIr); according to some reports, *Eṭṭelā’āt* already had been handed over to the FOUNDATION OF THE DISPOSSESSED on 8<sup>th</sup> August 1979: Shahidi (2007), 42f..

<sup>633</sup> Shahidi (2007), 42f.

<sup>634</sup> Shahidi (2007), 42.

<sup>635</sup> Shahidi (2007), 44.



Moṭṭaharī, one of the ideologues of the Islamic Republic and a close associate of Ḥomainī. Trying to hide possible internal tensions between the religious factions, Akbar Rafsanḡānī, then a member of the influential COUNCIL OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION (*šūrā-ye enḡelāb-e eslāmī*), however, accused the leftists to be behind the murder. In an article published on 10<sup>th</sup> May 1979, *Āyandegān* nevertheless continued to hold *Forqān* responsible for Moṭṭaharī's assassination and quoted an interview of Ḥomainī with the French newspaper *Le Monde*, in which he denied the involvement of the leftists. On the very same day, the national radio and television stations cited Ḥomainī with a statement that he was quoted wrong and that he would never again read *Āyandegān*. The following day, pressure groups attacked the premises of the newspaper offices. Ceding to the pressure, *Āyandegān*'s staff decided to publish one last issue, which became known as the *White Āyandegān* (*āyandegān-e sefīd*), and in which the newspaper listed its merits for the revolution in general and the freedom of opinion and the press in particular. 500'000 copies of this special issue were sold.<sup>636</sup> The new MINISTRY FOR INFORMATION AND PUBLIC RELATIONS (*vezārat-e eṭṭelā'āt va ravābeṭ-e 'omūmī*), however, assured that *Āyandegān* was not banned.<sup>637</sup> The newspaper soon re-appeared in the newsstands and it emerged as being more popular than before mainly because it was the last large independent newspaper. Although generally advancing rather leftist positions, the entire secular and moderately religious opposition gathered around it.<sup>638</sup> Yet, on August 7, 1979, armed unities of the IRGC occupied the editorial offices of the newspaper *Āyandegān* and arrested most of its staff. *Āyandegān* continued to be published afterwards, albeit – unlike *Kaihān* and *Eṭṭelā'āt* – under a new name: *Šobḡ-e Āzādegān* (Morning of the Free). All three continued to be widely read newspapers in Iran.<sup>639</sup> Despite big demonstrations against the increasing press censorship,<sup>640</sup> Āyatollāh Ḥomainī continued to criticize the independent press. This was usually followed by immediate attacks of pressure groups against newspaper premises and journalists as well as newsstands that were selling the papers and even against

<sup>636</sup> **Sa'edi** (1984), 18; **Rawan** (2000), 128; on more details on the religious group *Forqān*, and on *Āyandegān*'s coverage: **Shahidi** (2007), 33ff.

<sup>637</sup> **Shahidi** (2007), 38.

<sup>638</sup> **Elwell-Sutton** (*Āyandegān* – EIr); even *Kaihān*, which was meanwhile brought into the official line, often reprinted *Āyandegān*'s articles: **Shahidi** (2007), 41.

<sup>639</sup> **Saeed** (1981), 13; **Sa'edi** (1984), 18; **Beeman** (1984), 153f.; Milani ascribes the closure of *Āyandegān* to the imminent referendum on the new constitution of the Islamic Republic: **Milani** (1994), 155; **Rawan** (2000), 129f.; the staff of *Āyandegān* was accused of being spies of the CIA and Mossad; but with the exception of the members of the editorial board they were never convicted and soon released: **Shahidi** (2007), 41

<sup>640</sup> The protests were particularly triggered by the attacks on *Āyandegān*: **Nikazmerad** (1980), 357; **Rawan** (2000), 130.

readers.<sup>641</sup> *Āyandegān* in fact had listed many corresponding instances in its famous special „white edition“.<sup>642</sup> Soon, the newspaper *Paigām-e Emrūz* met the same fate, while its editor went into hiding.<sup>643</sup>

The Islamist authorities, had, however also more systematic plans to control the press. Officially responsible for licensing and regulating newspapers was the MINISTRY OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE (*vezārat-e eršād-e mellī*), which was created on May 27, 1979. During the transitional period of the revolution, this ministry, however, simply lacked power. It only restrictively issued new licenses but most newspapers simply appeared without license. More assertive were the new regulations that were passed by the COUNCIL OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, which in vague terms penalized the defamation of religious scholars (*‘olamā’*) and the religion of Islam in general.<sup>644</sup> The SYNDICATE OF NEWSPAPER WRITERS AND JOURNALISTS were also penalized as it appeared that its leaders seemed to be keener to purge its ranks than the culture minister Nāṣer Mīnāčī.<sup>645</sup> This did not help the syndicate much, since it was never allowed to convene during the following years.<sup>646</sup> In particular, however, the new government planned to regulate the media with a new press law, which eventually was passed in August 1979 even before the adoption of the new constitution.<sup>647</sup>

#### The Press Law of August 8, 1979

The Islamic Republic’s first press law was based on a bill, which had been prepared under the shah.<sup>648</sup> On first sight, it did not differ much from the press law of 1955, and even seemed to be more liberal than the amended press law of 1963, which was nominally still in force. But it introduced various new offenses, whose fatal character was enshrined in vague wording.

The provisions on publication licenses were similar to those of 1955 and 1908 respectively. Barred from obtaining a license were now all persons, who had rendered “*media services*” to the monarchy, which in effect would have included all experienced journalists, editors and publishers. To obtain a license, furthermore, editors had to prove their “political piety” and “moral competence”. As had been

<sup>641</sup> Sa’edi gives a pictographic description of the concerted procedure against disliked newspapers: **Sa’edi** (1984), 16ff.

<sup>642</sup> **Shahidi** (2007), 27, 36.

<sup>643</sup> **Sa’edi** (1984), 16ff.; **Rawan** (2000), 127f.

<sup>644</sup> **Milani** (1988), 155ff.

<sup>645</sup> **Shahidi** (2007), 32.

<sup>646</sup> **Shahidi** (2007), 43, 110; **Shahidi** (2008), 746.

<sup>647</sup> The SYNDICATE OF NEWSPAPER WRITERS AND JOURNALISTS wanted to be involved in the preparation of the new press law, but was ignored: **Shahidi** (2007), 31, 42.

<sup>648</sup> Sa’edi ascribes the new press bill to an earlier press draft under the military administration of general Azhārī – instead of Šarīf-Emāmī: **Sa’edi** (1984), 18.

the case for the shah, all libel or defamation of Āyatollāh Ḥomainī, clerical and lay leaders, as well the religion of “Islam” and the “revolution” was punishable.

On the other hand, the law also sanctioned all governmental pressure on the press. Court proceedings against editors or publishers were envisaged to take place in the presence of a jury.<sup>649</sup> The law also affirmed the right of the journalists to self-organize professional associations.<sup>650</sup>

The authorities wasted no time to put the law into practice. Directly after the enactment of the press law, the new prosecutor-general Aḥmad Āḍarī-Qommī announced a long list of newspapers whose publication henceforth would be banned. This list included almost all remaining independent newspapers: *Kaiḥān-e Āzād* and *Paigām-e Emrūz*, whose publication factually already had ceased before due to attacks of the pressure groups; *Bāmdād*, *Omīd-e Irān* and *Tehrān-e Moṣavver*; MOĞĀHEDĪN-E ḤALQ’s *Moğāhed*, FADĀ’IYĀN-E ḤALQ’s *Kār* and *Nabard-e Ḥalq*, *Paikār* of the PAIKĀR PARTY, and the various organs of the smaller communist and leftist parties like *Komūnīst*, *Ḥaqīqat*, *Zaḥmat*, *Rahā’ī*, *Ranğbar*, *Kand-o-Kāv*, *Čeh Bāyad Kard*, *Etteḥād-e Čāp* and *Āzādī*; as well as probably the newspapers of the NATIONAL FRONT, *Ḥabarnāmeḥ* and *Ārmān-e Mellat*. Also banned were the popular satirical journals *Hāğḡī Bābā*, *Āhangar* and *Ferdowsī* and all other weekly publications. Only the newspapers of the TŪDEH PARY were still allowed to appear, mainly due to its unconditional support of Ḥomainī.<sup>651</sup>

While already plans for the new press law had led to protests, the passing of the law provoked again a big demonstration on August 12, 1979, which was violently attacked by the pressure groups.<sup>652</sup> These same groups also carried on their physical attacks against the editorial offices of the banned newspapers, which despite the ban continued to be published.<sup>653</sup> It would take almost another two years until all these newspapers effectively ceased their publication.<sup>654</sup> The factual closure of the already banned newspapers then occurred concomitantly with the suppression of the respective political groups or the expression of opposing political view. The independent newspaper *Bāmdād* was also shut

<sup>649</sup> On the press law of 1979: **Nikazmerad** (1980), 361; **Sa’edi** (1984), 18; the law came into force on 11<sup>th</sup> August 1979: **Rawan** (2000), 132f.; **Shahidi** (2007), 42f.; **Shahidi** (2008), 746.

<sup>650</sup> **Shahidi** (2007), 43, 110; **Shahidi** (2008), 746.

<sup>651</sup> According to Saeed and Sa’edi, 40 newspapers had ceased their publication by 9<sup>th</sup> or 12<sup>th</sup> August 1979: **Saeed** (1981), 13; **Sa’edi** (1984), 18; According to Nikazmerad and Rawan, 22 newspapers and magazines were shut within the next two weeks: **Nikazmerad** (1980), 361; **Rawan** (2000), 132; Shahidi mentions 63 banned publication: **Shahidi** (2007), 42;

<sup>652</sup> **Saeed** (1981), 13.

<sup>653</sup> **Sa’edi** (1984), 181; **Rawan** (2000), 132f.; **Shahidi** (2007), 42.

<sup>654</sup> **Sepehri** (1982), 9.

down in the run-up to the ballot on the new constitution in November 1979.<sup>655</sup> After the adoption of the constitution in December 1979, which in article 24 actually enshrined the press freedom “*except when it is detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public*”,<sup>656</sup> the PARTY OF THE MUSLIM PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC was banned together with its newspaper *Ḥalq-e Mosalmān*.<sup>657</sup> In April 1980,<sup>658</sup> the authorities proceeded against the NATIONAL FRONT, whose newspapers *Ḥabarnāmeḥ* and *Ārmān-e Mellat* had also ceased to appear. The same situation applied to the publications *Ġonbeš*, *Negīn*, *Ketāb-e Ġom’eh*.<sup>659</sup>

With the start of the war against Iran in September 1980, Ḥomainī intensified his criticism of the residual party papers by complaining that “*unfortunately and most surprisingly*” some newspapers still serve “*the evil intentions of the right and the left in Iran*”.<sup>660</sup> In June 1981, he dismissed president Banī Šadr, who increasingly had aligned with the MOĞĀHEDĪN-E ḤALQ,<sup>661</sup> and consequently his newspaper *Enqelāb-e Eslāmī* as well as the FREEDOM MOVEMENT’S *Mīzān* were shut down.<sup>662</sup> As a result, the MOĞĀHEDĪN-E ḤALQ, who were now bereft of any direct political influence, started what was to become known as the “summer of terror”: a killing spree of dozens of the highest-ranking officials of the Islamic Republic. The Iranian authorities paid back by brutally repressing the group.<sup>663</sup> At the same time, they also focused on the minority faction of the *Fadā’īyān-e Ḥalq* and the smaller leftist group. Consequently, all critical leftist newspapers were closed, namely *Moğāhed*, *Komūnīst*, *Ḥaqīqat*, *Rahā’ī*, *Paikār*, *Rāzmanegān*, *Ranğbār*, *Rāh-e Kārgar*, *Kand-o-Kāv* and *Beh Sū-ye Āyandeh*.<sup>664</sup> The only surviving political groups now were the TÜDEH PARTY and the majority faction of the FADĀ’IYĀN-E ḤALQ, which had entirely adopted the official TÜDEH line in

<sup>655</sup> Shahidi gives no date for the closure of *Bāmdād*: **Shahidi** (2007), 43.

<sup>656</sup> On the new constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and on opposing voices: **Nikazmerad** (1980), 362; **Menashri** (1980), 122-132; **Sciolino** (1983), 897; **Hassan** (1984), 681ff.; **Milani** (1994), 154-161.

<sup>657</sup> On the conflict between the followers of Ḥomainī and the followers of Šarī’atmadārī: **Nikazmerad** (1980), 365f.; **Menashri** (1980), 1356ff.; **Saeed** (1981), 12; **Milani** (1994), 174f.

<sup>658</sup> On the incidence of Ṭabas and the subsequent purge in the army: **Sciolino** (1983), 898; **Milani** (1994), 178ff.

<sup>659</sup> On the closure of the newspapers of the NATIONAL FRONT and other publications: **Saeed** (1981), 14; **Sciolino** (1983), 898; **Beeman** (1984), 154; **Milani** (1994), 178ff.; **Rawan** (2000), 131; according to Shahidi, *Bāmdād* was definitively closed on this occasion: **Shahidi** (2007), 43.

<sup>660</sup> According to a study on the Iranian press by the MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE: **Shahidi** (2007), 44.

<sup>661</sup> On Ḥomainī’s dismissal of Banī Šadr, who later would say: ‘*I felt like a child watching my father slowly turn into an alcoholic. The drug this time was power*’: **Sciolino** (1983), 896f.; **Milani** (1994), 184f.

<sup>662</sup> **Sa’edi** (1984), 18; Rawan also mentions a few newspapers of the NATIONAL FRONT (e.g. *Ārmān-e Mellat*) and the TÜDEH PARTY (e.g. *Mardom*) to have been banned at this date; they might, however, already have been closed before: **Rawan** (2000), 133; **Shahidi** (2007), 42.

<sup>663</sup> On the attacks of the MOĞĀHEDĪN-E ḤALQ on the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC PARTY: **Sciolino** (1983), 896ff.; **Sa’edi** (1984), 19f.; **Milani** (1994), 186ff.

<sup>664</sup> After the dissolution of the MOĞĀHEDĪN-E ḤALQ and the FADĀ’IYĀN-E ḤALQ, all oppositional political mass demonstrations ended: **Sa’edi** (1984), 18.

1980.<sup>665</sup> When in 1983, a hidden network of TÜDEH sympathizers was detected within the army,<sup>666</sup> the ruling Islamists eventually dissolved the TÜDEH PARTY and closed its newspapers *Mardom*, *Navīd* and *Donyā*, as well as the party organs of the FADĀ'İYĀN-E ḤALQ, *Kār* and *Nabard-e Ḥalq*.<sup>667</sup> By 1983, the followers of Ḥomainī were in total control of the political and the public spheres. The press spring had definitely come to an end with the only remaining newspapers of importance that still appeared being *Kaihān*, *Eṭṭelā'āt*, *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* and *Šobḥ-e Āzādegān*.

### III. 2. Total Press Censorship in the Islamic Republic of Iran

With nearly all the left and right opposition parties having being suppressed, the ruling ISLAMIC REPUBLIC PARTY achieved total control of the political sphere. It emerged that the only other party that was still tolerated was the FREEDOM MOVEMENT, the most centrist of Iran's parties. However, as soon as the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC PARTY achieved its political dominance, it started to fall apart into two competing factions: a leftist, more progressive faction, and a rightist, conservative faction. Ideological differences in the party had existed from the start but they were concealed through a common fight against the opposition.<sup>668</sup> Differences of opinion, especially about the right interpretation of the Islamic law, had existed for centuries within the clerical establishment.<sup>669</sup> But in this instance, they became more pronounced as the clerics were in power.

#### The Islamic Left vs. the Islamic Right

##### The Islamic Left

Directly after the revolution, after the occupation of the American embassy, the Islamic left (*čāp-e eslāmī*) or the radicals (*rādikāl-hā*) were the most influential political faction among the Islamists. The members of the leftist faction were in general younger, and thus lower-ranking clerics. They represented the interests of the lower classes: the urban working-class, the small merchants, and also the students. Their ideological concepts were strongly influenced by leftist thoughts, in particular by the 'Alī Šarī'atī.

<sup>665</sup> On the repression of the FADĀ'İYĀN-E ḤALQ in 1980: **Ḥaqšenās** (*Communism – EIr*).

<sup>666</sup> On the double game of the TÜDEH PARTY: **Milani** (1994), 190ff.

<sup>667</sup> **Hassan** (1984), 684; **Milani** (1994), 190ff.

<sup>668</sup> Hassan calls the Islamic left "radicals" and the traditional right "moderates": **Hassan** (1984), 685; **Akhavi** (1987a), 184; **Akhavi** (1987b), 54; Siavoshi criticizes the classification in two factions as being too simple: **Siavoshi** (1992), 27f., 29f.; **Buchta** (2000), 11f.; **Milani** (1994), 197ff.; **Keddie** (2006), 255.

<sup>669</sup> **Hassan** (1984), 686; Milani and Buchta correctly point to the fact that this multi-factional system is also a characteristics of the clerical system in Shi'a Islam, where there are always several clerical authorities (*marāḡe'-e taqlīd*) at a given time: **Milani** (1994), 198; **Buchta** (2000), 11.

The long serving prime minister Mīr-Ḥossain Mūsavī and president ‘Alī Ḥāmeneh’ī belonged to this current.<sup>670</sup> The Islamic left won a majority of seats in the elections to the 2<sup>nd</sup> parliament (*mağles*). It had a strong representation in the IRGC, and initially also in the JUDICIARY (*qovveh-ye qažā’iyyeh*). Of further importance were the representatives of the Islamic left such as Āyatollāh ‘Abd-ol-Karīm Mūsavī-Ardebīlī, chairman of the SUPREME COURT (*dīvān-e ‘ālī-ye kešvar*); the state prosecutor Āyatollāh Moḥammad Mūsavī-Ḥo’ainīhā; and ‘Alī-Akbar Moḥtašamī-Pūr, cofounder of the Lebanese Ḥezbollāh; Mehdī Karrūbī, parliament speaker for two terms and presidential candidate; Moḥammad Ḥātāmī, then MINISTER FOR ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE and chief-editor of *Kaiḥān*; and Behzād Nabavī, later chairman of the ORGANIZATION OF THE FIGHTERS FOR THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION (*sāzemān-e moğāhedīn-e enqelāb-e eslāmī*).<sup>671</sup>

The Islamic left, thus, dominated both domestic politics and foreign policy. Their ideological positions leaned towards the nationalization of the economy, the exportation of the Islamic revolution to other countries and was outspokenly anti-imperialist, especially against the West hence their designation as “radicals”. They were seen as advocating progressive ideas in social as well as cultural issues.

### The Islamic Right

The traditional right (*rāst-e eslāmī*) consisted of higher-ranking clerics who had dominated the religious sphere before the revolution. Often rich landowners – either personally or as administrators of religious endowments (*ouqāf*, sg. *vaqf*) – they were closely interrelated with the influential and rich merchant (*bāzārī*) class. As the interest of both groups had been affected by Moḥammad-Rezā Šāh’s agrarian reform, the so-called „White Revolution“ (*enqelāb-e sefid*), they supported the revolution of 1979.

Until the passing of Ḥomainī, the Islamic right was under-represented in the executive and the parliament. Yet, by virtue of their high religious qualification, they were strongly represented in the middle and low ranks of the judiciary, and particularly in the powerful GUARDIAN COUNCIL OF THE CONSTITUTION (*šūrā-ye negah-bān-e qānūn-e asāsī*). Members of this council were e.g. the āyatollāhs Moḥammad-Rezā Mahdavi-Kanī, Qāsem Ḥaz‘alī, Moḥammad Emāmī-Kāšānī, Moḥammad Moḥammadi-Gīlānī, Moḥammad Yazdī, Aḥmad Āḍarī-Qommī or Aḥmad Ğannatī. The Islamic right was furthermore in control of influential mosque networks and accounted for the majority of the religious teachers in the seminaries in Qom.<sup>672</sup>

In contrast to the Islamic left, the Islamic right, however, consequently opposed any further erosion of property rights and thus the left’s nationalization project. They were generally for modernization,

<sup>670</sup> Akhavi (1987b), 53f.

<sup>671</sup> On the Islamic left: Akhavi (1987a), 185; Akhavi is of the opinion that the judiciary and the parliament were dominated by the conservatives: Akhavi (1987b), 53; Siavoshi (1992), 29ff.; on the foreign policy positions of the Islamic left: Sciolino (1983), 909ff.; Milani calls the Islamic leftists also “crusaders”: Milani (1994), 198f.; on the influence of the Islamic left in the IRGC and the religious foundations (sg. *bonyād*): Buchta (2000), 17f.; Keddie (2006), 255ff.

<sup>672</sup> On the traditional right: Akhavi (1987a), 184ff.; Akhavi (1987b), 54f.; Siavoshi (1992), 29ff.; Milani (1994), 198; the traditional right was of the opinion that economic differences in a society are God-given and that they can be eased by religious solidarity: Buchta (2000), 13ff.; Keddie (2006), 256.

especially the Western model the shah had tried to impose. But they were at least interested in a working peace with the West, also to secure their business interests. Consequently, they were less enthusiastic about exporting the revolution and soon advocated for an end of the war against Iraq hence their designation as “moderates”. In social and cultural matters, they were usually staunchly conservative and backward looking.

### **Āyatollāh Ḥomainī: the arbiter**

Āyatollāh Ḥomainī was seen as holding himself above the factions as he cleverly pitted both factions against each other to balance their differences so as to secure his own power.<sup>673</sup> Although he had attained fame by denouncing Moḥammad-Rezā Šāh’s reforms, he appeared to have favored the positions of the Islamic left, including the nationalization of the economy, the exportation of the revolution, as well as social and cultural openings such as airing music or Western movies on radio and television. He could, however, not afford to alienate the powerful traditionalist clerics because other high-ranking clerics did not always accept his leadership role without challenge. He therefore often accommodated their moral rigor, even though he re-allowed certain cultural freedoms they abhorred, such as for instance airing Western movies on television or the playing of music.

In the following years, the conflict between the two factions increasingly paralyzed the country. Many urgent problems, such as high inflation, unemployment and receding oil production, remained unsolved. Mainly responsible for this was the frequent stalemate between the leftist dominated parliament and the traditionalist dominated Guardian Council, the latter of which had a veto right on all laws passed by the parliament. A similar stalemate soon developed between Prime Minister Mūsavī and president Ḥāmeneh’ī, who subsequently joined the camp of the traditional right.<sup>674</sup>

Logically, the debates between the left and the right faction also started to take place in the press. Since the shutdown of the independent and alternative press, Iran’s media had become been vastly synchronized. It reported almost exclusively along the official line about the “holy defence” (*defā’-e moqaddas*) against Iraq by glorifying the thousands of martyrs (sg. *šahīd*), propagated the official Islamic commands and values and condemned an alleged “Western cultural invasion” (*tahāğom-e farhang-e ġarbī*).<sup>675</sup> Yet, with the increasing disagreement on war and economic policies, cracks soon appeared in the press as well.

<sup>673</sup> According to the Islamic Republic’s first prime minister Bāzargān, Ḥomainī would let none of the factions know, how much power they exactly have: **Milani** (1994), 199; **Buchta** (2000), 12; **Keddie** (2006), 255.

<sup>674</sup> On the stalemate between the two factions: **Sciolino** (1983), 899, 906ff.; **Milani** (1994), 199f.; **Corstange** (2000);

<sup>675</sup> On the predominant war-coverage of the newspapers before 1983: **Sciolino** (1983), 906.

Initially, the Islamic left was in control of most newspapers that still existed. *Kaihān* had been edited from 1981, by the leftist cleric and minister for ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE Moḥammad Ḥātāmī, and particularly voiced its support for the export of the revolution. It soon developed a reputation as a radical newspaper.<sup>676</sup> *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, too, rather was a leftist paper, as the Islamic left dominated the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC PARTY. The most vocal newspaper of the Islamic left was, however, *Šobḥ-e Āzādegān*.<sup>677</sup> *Eṭṭelā‘āt* for its part, traditionally a moderate outlet, seems to have been rather neutral in this conflict.<sup>678</sup> Ḥomainī often deliberately used the respective positioning of *Kaihān* and *Eṭṭelā‘āt* according to his current political expediency.<sup>679</sup> In 1984, the Worker’s House (*ḥāneh-ye kārgar*), the official workers’ syndicate, which was controlled by the Islamic left, started to publish the new newspaper *Kār va Kārgar* (Work and Worker).<sup>680</sup>

### III. 3. A timid opening for more press criticism

The traditional right, by contrast, initially did not have a public organ to promote its political views. The TEHRAN SOCIETY OF THE BAZAR AND THE GUILDS (*ḡāme‘eh-ye anḡoman-hā-ye eslāmī-ye aṣṇaf va bāzār-e tehrān*) admittedly published the economic journal *Eqtešād-e Eslāmī* (Islamic Economy), which as a specialized magazine never attained a wide readership.<sup>681</sup> In 1985, the traditional right created the RESĀLAT FOUNDATION, right before the second presidential elections of August 1985. The foundation included Member of Parliament Āyatollāh Āḍarī-Qommī, labor minister Aḥmad Tavakkolī and Mortazā Nabavī, another member of Mūsavī’s cabinet, amongst many others. The foundation also had the support of the influential conservative SOCIETY OF THE TEACHERS OF THE (THEOLOGICAL) SEMINARIES OF QOM (*ḡāme‘eh-ye modarresīn-e ḥouzeh-ye ‘elmiyyeh-ye qom*) and the equally important COALITION OF ISLAMIC ASSOCIATIONS (*hai‘at-hā-ye mo‘talefeh-ye eslāmī*), which was close to the *bāzār* merchants. The RESĀLAT FOUNDATION consequently launched the newspaper *Resālat* (Mission), whose first editor was Tavakkolī, who later would be replaced by Kāžem Anbarlū‘ī. Within a short time, *Resālat* became one of the most influential Iranian newspapers. Repeatedly voicing the conservatives’ critical stance towards the continuation of the war, Ḥomainī banned its distribution on the front, and the leftist dominated government threatened

<sup>676</sup> Shahidi (2007), 44.

<sup>677</sup> On *Šobḥ-e Āzādegān* and its political position: Šahrvand-e Emrūz (1364).

<sup>678</sup> Akhavi calls it a „militantly fundamentalist“ (leftist) newspaper: Akhavi (1987), 53.

<sup>679</sup> Shahidi (2007), 44, 46.

<sup>680</sup> Shahidi (2007), 45, 64;

<sup>681</sup> Akhavi (1987a), 185.



it with closure. It is barely astonishing then, that the leftist government often threatened it with its closure.<sup>682</sup> Thus, despite being a staunchly conservative newspaper, *Resālat* actually was responsible for a limited re-opening of the public sphere, in which criticism of the official politics again became possible to a certain degree.

This criticism continued to an astonishing degree. The two factions particularly attacked each other in their main organs, *Resālat* and *Šobḥ-e Āzādegān*. Member of parliament Ġalāl al-Dīn Fārsī for instance harshly criticized the nationalization of the economy by the leftist government *Resālat*. As a result of which, *Šobḥ-e Āzādegān*, the most outspoken newspaper of the Islamic left, openly accused him of tax fraud. Ḥomainī, who always tried to hide internal conflicts from the public, eventually ordered the closure of *Šobḥ-e Āzādegān* in the beginning of 1986. The newspaper was soon replaced by the less aggressive successor *Abrār* (Good Men). However, the fact that the only newspaper of the Islamic left was closed points to a growing influence of the traditional right.<sup>683</sup>

Arguably as a means to control the belligerent press, the parliament passed a new press law on 13<sup>th</sup> March 1986 – only seven years after the Islamic Republic’s first press law. Neither faction is known to have protested against this new restrictive law, maybe because both hoped they could use the law against the rival faction.<sup>684</sup>

#### The press law of 1986<sup>685</sup>

The new press law introduced a number of further duties and responsibilities on the press. Newspapers explicitly had to serve the Islamic Republic in its “fight against the manifestations of the colonialist culture [] and the promotion and propagation of the noble Islamic culture” (*mobārezeh bā mażāher-e farhang-e este’mārī [...] va tarvīḡ va tablīḡ-e farhang-e aṣīl-e eslāmī*). Publication licenses, furthermore, now officially had to be obtained from the MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE. (§2). To be sure, the press was given the right for criticism, and press censorship continued to be prohibited. But in contrast to the law of 1979, criticism had to take place within – not further defined – ‘Islamic norms’ (*mavāzīn-e eslāmī*) and the expediency of the society (*maṣāleḥ-e ḡāme’eh*); and the law did not specify any sanctions against the violation of the freedom of the press. (§3). Violations against the mentioned norms and expediency of the Islamic society, by contrast, were defined in detail in the next article: liable to punishment were for instance atheist (*elḥādī*) articles;

<sup>682</sup> On Āḡarī-Qommī, who even criticized the political system of *velāyat-e faqīh*, and his brainchild *Resālat*: Akhavi (1987a), 184ff.; Akhavi (1987b), 54; Siavoshi (1992), 32, 45.

<sup>683</sup> On the accusations of *Šobḥ-e Āzādegān*, whose closure was notably – though probably not voluntarily – ordered by state prosecutor Ḥo’ainihā: Akhavi (1987a), 185; Šahrvand-e Emrūz (1364).

<sup>684</sup> Rawan (2000), 114.

<sup>685</sup> Rasāneh (2008).

articles against Islamic norms (*mavāzīn-e eslāmī*) or the foundations of the Islamic Republic (*asās-e ḡomhūrī-ye eslāmī*); the publication of prostitution (*fahšā'*); the propagation of extravagance and profligacy (*tablīḡ va tarvīḡ-e esrāf va tabdīr*); inciting persons and groups to commit activities against the security (*tašvīq-e afrād va groūh-hā be ertekāb-e a'mālī 'alai-he amniyyat*); offending the religion of Islam (*ehānat-e dīn-e mobīn-e eslām*); or publishing issues that are against the principles of the constitution (*oṣūl-e qānūn-e asāsī*), the Supreme Leader (*maqām-e mo'azzam-e rahbarī*), the grand āyatollāhs (*marāḡe'-e mosallam-e taqlīd*) or generally all officials and clerical persons (§5). The same article furthermore provided for the creation of a SUPERVISORY BOARD FOR THE PRESS (*hai'at-e nezārat bar maṭbū'āt*) consisting of five members, which was to take responsibility to issue or withdraw media licenses, to observe press content, and to initiate legal measures against contravening publishers and editors (§5).<sup>686</sup> In praxis, the board even could withdraw licenses without a court order, as could other institutions such as the state prosecutor.<sup>687</sup>

Towards the end of the 1980s, the left and right factions of the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC PARTY had become so alienated that Rafsanḡānī Ḥāmeneh'ī approached Ḥomainī to ask for his permission to dissolve the party.<sup>688</sup> The opposing political camps did, however, not disband. Instead they simply gathered around different organizations. The clerics of the traditional right took control of the COMBATANT CLERGY ASSOCIATION (*ḡāme'eh-ye rūḥāniyyat-e mobārez*), which had been created before the revolution by some of the most important politicians of the Islamic Republic, among them Ḥāmeneh'ī and Rafsanḡānī. The clerics of the Islamic left, by contrast, left this association and founded their own, competing body, ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS (*maḡma'-e rūḥānī-yūn-e mobārez*).<sup>689</sup> These two bodies rather acted as umbrella organizations for a variety of political actors than as proper political parties.

The traditional right meanwhile had become increasingly influential, while the Islamic left gradually started to loose influence. This development was accelerated and emphasized by a number of crucial events. First, Āyatollāh Ḥossain-'Alī Montazarī, one of Ḥomainī's closest associates and from the beginning of the 1980s his designated successor, fell from the grace of the Supreme Leader. He was an outspoken representative of the Islamic left and vehemently opposed any ties with the West. In 1986, his son-in-law, Mehdī Hāšemī, was found guilty to have disclosed the arms deal with the USA and Israel – better known as the

<sup>686</sup> Rawan (2000), 11f.; Shahidi (2007), 123f.; Shahidi (2008), 746f.

<sup>687</sup> Rawan (2000), 114; Shahidi (2007), 123; Shahidi (2008), 746f.

<sup>688</sup> On the dissolution of the IRP: Milani (1994), 200; Buchta (2000), 12; Keddie (2004), 260.

<sup>689</sup> On the COMBATANT CLERGY ASSOCIATION, which continued to be led by Moḥammad-Rezā Mahdavi-Kanī, and on the ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS, which was led by Mehdī Karrūbī: Siavoshi (1992), 28f.; Buchta (2000), 11ff., 17f.

Iran-Contra affair – to a Lebanese newspaper, and consequently was sentenced to death by the SPECIAL COURT FOR CLERICS (*dādgāh-e vīžeh-ye rūḥāniyat*), which specifically was created for this purpose. This seems to have been the decisive moment that turned Montazarī into a critic of the system. When he publicly criticized the assassination of thousands of imprisoned political opponents in July 1988, he definitively fell out of favor with Ḥomainī and consequently was dismissed as prospective successor.<sup>690</sup>

The demise of the founder of the Islamic Republic on June 3, 1989, took away the most important protector of the Iranian left. Already during his lifetime, Ḥomainī had to accommodate to the often more pragmatic positions of the traditional right, often rather against his own will. When on July 18, 1988, he had to agree to a ceasefire with Iraq, his position was further weakened, as was the Islamic left, which had been ardent proponents of the continuation of the war. Ḥomainī's age and illness further reduced his influence.<sup>691</sup> The young Islamic Republic, still weak and unstable due to the long war and the increasing factionalism, was faced the challenge of managing the transition towards a new generation. Still in 1988, the EXPEDIENCY DISCERNMENT COUNCIL OF THE SYSTEM (*mağma'-e tašḥīṣ-e maṣlaḥat-e nezām*) was created, in order to solve the chronic stalemate between the parliament and the GUARDIAN COUNCIL.<sup>692</sup> On June 4, 1989, the ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS FOR THE CONSTITUTION (*mağles-e ḥobre-gān-e qānūn-e asāsī*) elected 'Alī Ḥāmeneh'ī, the long-time president of the Islamic Republic, as successor of Ḥomainī.<sup>693</sup> Even before, it had started to draft a new constitution, which was put to a public referendum on July 28, 1989. The new constitution dissolved the office of the prime minister (*naḥost-vazīr*) and conferred his competences to the office of the president (*ra'īs-e ḡomhūr*), to which Akbar Rafsanḡānī was elected on August 16, 1989.<sup>694</sup> It subsequently conferred new powers to the office of the Supreme Leader.<sup>695</sup>

<sup>690</sup> On Montazarī's dismissal: **Akhavi** (1987a), 198-201; **Akhavi** (1987b), 83; **Milani** (1994), 211ff.; **Buchta** (2000), 92, 97f.; **Keddie** (2006), 260-262.

<sup>691</sup> On the ceasefire: **Milani** (1994), 213f.; **Keddie** (2006), 250, 259; as a reaction on the ceasefire, the MOĞĀHEDĪN-E ḤALQ, launched their operation "eternal light" (*forūğ-e ḡāvīdān*) against the Islamic Republic, in September 1980, thousands of imprisoned members of the MKO and other opposition groups were executed: **Milani** (1994), 215, 220; **Buchta** (2000), 52, 92, 114; **Keddie** (2006), 260.

<sup>692</sup> On the EXPEDIENCY COUNCIL: **Milani** (1994), 200; **Keddie** (2006), 260.

<sup>693</sup> On Ḥāmeneh'ī's election by the ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS: **Siavoshi** (1992), 44f.; **Milani** (1994), 224f.; **Keddie** (2006), 261;

<sup>694</sup> On Rafsanḡānī's election: **Siavoshi** (1992), 42; **Milani** (1994), 225ff.; **Keddie** (2006), 261ff.

<sup>695</sup> On the amended constitution of 1989: **Milani** (1994), 221ff.; particularly on the new constitutional rights and duties of different institutions: **Buchta** (2000), 22ff., 46ff., 61ff., 73ff. **Keddie** (2006), 260f.

**From left vs right  
to reformist vs conservative**

With the shifts in the power structure of the Islamic Republic, the political landscape also started to change. The Islamic right (*rāst-e eslāmī*) continued to gain influence at a much accelerated pace as the new Supreme Leader Ḥāmeneh'ī increasingly started to align with them to secure and expand his power. It was now rather called the traditional right (*rāst-e sonnati*). The Islamic left (*čāp-e eslāmī*), in contrast, started to be increasingly excluded from the echelons of power – at least for the moment. This was, however, also caused by the emergence of a new faction: the modern right (*rāst-e modern*), which gathered around the new president Rafsanḡānī.

**The modern right**

Even during the first decade of the Islamic Republic, there had always existed more independent and pragmatic persons, who did not easily align with one of the opposing – left or right – factions. Initially, however, they did not form a discernable entity. Arguably the most outstanding representative of this current was Rafsanḡānī, who at least ever more developed into a pragmatist during the 1980s.<sup>696</sup> After becoming president in 1989, Rafsanḡānī saw himself confronted with the huge challenge of rebuilding the destroyed country and in particular its ruined economy. He consequently called for a new way of thinking (*andīšeh-ye nou*) and gathered a group of professional technocrats (sg. *teknōkrāt*) around himself, among them Ġolām-Hossain Karbāsčī, the mayor of Tehrān from 1990. These pragmatists shared the liberal economic positions of the traditional right and accordingly started a gradual privatization campaign – admittedly also to secure a badly needed credit from the World Bank. However, they exceeded the realm of the traditional right and opened the market to foreign products.<sup>697</sup> In order to attract highly qualified Iranians, many of which had left Iran after the revolution and during the war, Rafsanḡānī, however, also promised an easing of the rigorous social and cultural restrictions. This definitively contradicted the positions of the traditional right and initially at times even those of the Islamic left.<sup>698</sup>

**The traditional right / the conservatives**

The traditional right, who would soon simply be called conservatives (*oṣūl-gerāyān*), further expanded their power in the Islamic Republic. In August 1989, Ḥāmeneh'ī appointed the extremely conservative Āyatollāh Moḥammad Yazdī as new head of the Judiciary, replacing the leftist Āyatollāh Mūsavī-Ardebīlī.<sup>699</sup> In 1992, the GUARDIAN COUNCIL, which had always been controlled by members of the traditional right, disqualified a quarter of all candidates to the fourth parliament elections. The conservatives consequently gained a majority of seats in the fourth parliament. Many former leftist members of parliament were not allowed to compete again, among them the “hanging judge” Ḥalḡālī,

<sup>696</sup> Hassan still counted Rafsanḡānī – together with Montazerī – among the radical (leftist) wing: **Hassan** (1984), 685; Rafsanḡānī's economic pragmatism might have been influenced by his treatise on the eminent Qāḡār grand-vizier Amīr Kabīr: **Buchta** (2000), 16;

<sup>697</sup> On the political ascent of the modern right and their pragmatism: **Siavoshi** (1992), 31f., 42f.; **Milani** (1994), 228ff.; **Corstange** (2000), XX; **Buchta** (2000), 16f.; **Keddie** (2006), 261ff.

<sup>698</sup> **Hassan** (1984), 685ff.; **Siavoshi** (1992), 29ff.; **Milani** (1994), 198f., 205ff.; **Buchta** (2000), 16f.; **Keddie** (2006), 255;

<sup>699</sup> Yazdī already stood out as ultraconservative during his parliamentary mandate: **Siavoshi** (1992), 43.

Ho'ainihā, Mohtašamīpūr, Behzād Nabavī and even parliamentary speaker Mehdī Karrūbī. The conservative cleric 'Alī-Akbar Nāṭeq-Nūrī was elected as his successor instead.<sup>700</sup>

### The Islamic left / the reformists

The Islamic left had therefore lost its influence both in the executive and the legislative: their traditional spheres of influence. While the economic politics and their ideological foreign policy contributed to their loss of power, their demise coincided with the perceived failure of the leftist ideology in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union.<sup>701</sup> But the Islamic left underwent a catharsis of sorts and would soon reappear as reformists (*eṣlāḥ-talab-ān*), spearheading democratic concepts like democracy (*mardom-sālārī*), human rights (*hoqūq-e bašar*), women's rights (*hoqūq-e zanān*), and civil society (*ḡāme'eh-ye madanī*). They might have been influenced in their repositioning by Āyatollāh Montazerī, arguably the first Islamic leftist to openly advocate respect for human rights. However, they also realized, that Iranian society had changed after the war and that the Islamic Republic thus was in need of new political and social prescriptions.<sup>702</sup> In this transformation process, the press would prove crucial both as purpose and means for advancing such progressive ideals and safeguarding popular support.

The boundaries between the different factions have, however, always been blurred as there always were personal contacts and often family ties between them. Thus a constant ideological cross-fertilization took place between the different factions, which continued to contribute to the longevity of the Islamic Republic.<sup>703</sup>

Arguably the most important member of president Rafsanḡānī's cabinet for the reawakening of both the Islamic left as reformists and a reinvigorated press was Moḥammad Ḥātāmī. He had been the supervisor of the KAIHĀN PUBLISHING INSTITUTE (*mo'asseseh-ye maṭbū'āt-e kaihān*), and as such editor of the newspaper *Kaihān* from 1981, and minister for ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE from 1982. In this function, he had been responsible for a certain easing of the otherwise strict cultural policy and press landscape.<sup>704</sup> Already from the mid 1980s, a first controlled cultural and intellectual opening had taken place in *Kaihān-e Farhangī*, to which many Islamic leftist intellectuals contributed.<sup>705</sup> In 1989, he had approved

<sup>700</sup> Already during these elections, the Islamic left presented themselves as "followers of the line of the imam [Ḥomainī]" (*pairūyān-e ḥaṭṭ-e emām*) while the members of traditional right rather depicted themselves as guardians of the *velāyat-e faqīh*: **Siavoshi** (1992), 27, 41ff.; the selection criteria for the members of the GUARDIAN COUNCIL were changed too, which naturally disadvantaged the religiously less educated members of the Islamic left: **Milani** (1994), 229; **Corstange** (2000), XX; **Keddie** (2006), 266.

<sup>701</sup> **Siavoshi** (1992), 46; **Keddie** (2006), 266f.

<sup>702</sup> After the war, the authorities of the Islamic Republic's realized that the Iranian society had changed dramatically: **Yavari d'Hellencourt** (1995), 96, 113.

<sup>703</sup> On the blurred factional borders: **Siavoshi** (1992), 27f.

<sup>704</sup> Such new cultural liberties were for instance less strict dress codes for women and the readmission of female musician in public concerts: **Milani** (1994), 229; **Keddie** (2006), 269.

<sup>705</sup> Some of the contributors to *Kaihān-e Farhangī* later founded the influential journal *Kiyān*: **Yavari d'Hellencourt** (1995), 98.

eighty five new publications, and until 1995, again 500 newspapers and journals appeared. Partly responsible for this increase in publications was the re-allowance of commercial advertisements in the media, which had been banned before.<sup>706</sup> Many of these new publications were published from so-called “different-minded” (sg. *degar-andīšeh*), intellectuals who did not represent the official ideological line of the Islamic Republic but were still tolerated.<sup>707</sup> Ḥātāmī was a member of the leftist ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS, but seems to have been more pragmatic and moderate than the bulk of the Islamic left. He nevertheless maintained close ties to the Islamic left and arguably was at the forefront of their transformation into the reformists.<sup>708</sup>

Naturally, it was especially the reform-minded Islamic leftist who took advantage of Ḥātāmī’s liberal press policy. The media soon appeared to be the stage of bitter political feuds, as actually had always been the case in the history of the press in Iran during periods of greater press freedom. This was all the more true because political parties officially were not allowed resulting in the press serving as a substitute for political parties.<sup>709</sup> The Iranian media scholar Gū’el Kohan aptly described the ensuing result: “*those different groups and their factional disputes have turned the press into an instrument of their own interests, like in a feudal and despotic society*”.<sup>710</sup> It was exactly in this process that the Islamic left – partly joined by member of the modern right – gradually turned into reformists.

The most important new publications of the early 1990s were literary or religious-philosophical journals, which were to have a huge impact on the development of new critical thinking in Iran. Also appearing were new women’s journals and newspapers, which illustrate the invigorated self-consciousness of Iran’s women as active members of Iranian society. However, as crucial as they were as pioneers for a new atmosphere of intellectual openness and criticism, these specialized journals and magazines never attained a wide readership.<sup>711</sup>

---

<sup>706</sup> According to Yavari d’Hellencourt, in 1988 a total of 183 publications appeared: **Yavari d’Hellencourt** (1995), 93; according to Rawan, 531 publications appeared in 1995: **Rawan** (2000), 136; according to Shahidi, the number of daily newspapers increased from 10 in 1988 to 19 in 1990: **Shahidi** (2007), 47.

<sup>707</sup> Merat mentions in particular secular intellectuals, yet the *degar-andīšeh* were not all secularists: **Merat** (1999), 33, 35<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>708</sup> Merat denies that Ḥātāmī had any decisive role in initiating these new cultural liberties: **Merat** (1999), 32; Tarrock mentions Ḥātāmī as the main driving force behind the reforms: **Tarrock** (2001), 588f.

<sup>709</sup> **Kian** (1995); **Sarkoobi** (1999), 139; **Rawan** (2000), 141f.; **Tarrock** (2001), 585.

<sup>710</sup> **Rawan** (2000), 142.

<sup>711</sup> The only exception is probably *Kiyān*, which found a considerable readership among the modern and Islamic middle classes in Iran: **Yavari d’Hellencourt** (1995), 99.

In 1990, the author ‘Abbās Ma’rūfī launched the literary journal *Gardūn* (Firmament).<sup>712</sup> In 1991, Reżā Tehrānī started to publish the arguably most influential philosophical journal *Kiyān* (Existence), which later would be edited by Mašā’ollāh Šamsolvā‘eżīn, one of the most prominent Iranian journalists. Both had been on the editorial board of *Kaihān-e Farhangī* before.<sup>713</sup> Further contributing to *Kiyān* were such famous intellectuals as ‘Abd-ol-Karīm Sorūš<sup>714</sup> and Moḥammad Moğtahed Šabestarī.<sup>715</sup> The journal soon acquired fame for questioning and reinterpreting the role of religion in the Iranian state. Some of *Kiyān*’s articles even explicitly questioned aspects of the ruling system of the Guardianship of the Jurist (*velāyat-e faqīh*).<sup>716</sup> In the same year, ‘Ezzatollāh Šaḥābī from the FREEDOM MOVEMENT together with the progressive cleric Ḥasan Yūsefī-Eškevārī launched *Irān-e Fardā* (Iran of Tomorrow). This journal dared to open up the discussion on the relationship between religion and democracy, requested the admission of political parties and condemned the widespread corruption in the wake of Rafsanğānī’s economic privatization.<sup>717</sup>

It was not long after that other journals started to address similarly fundamental topics. *Goft-o-Gū*, which was edited from 1992 by Morād Saqafī, wrote profound analyses of social and historical events and dealt with the concepts of “civil society” (*ğāme‘eh-ye madanī*), “democracy” (*mardom-sālārī*) and “dialogue of civilizations” (*goft-o-gū-ye tamaddon-hā*) – all of which would become hallmarks of Ḥātāmī’s election campaign and government.<sup>718</sup> *Negāh-e Nou* for its part excelled with translations of foreign authors;<sup>719</sup> and *Takāpū* reproduced poems of dissident Iranian authors.<sup>720</sup> Other important literary-philosophical journals were *Ğāme‘eh-ye Šāleḥ* (Healthy Society) and *Kelk* (Pen). Furthermore, still important were the journals *Ādīneh* and *Donyā-ye Soḥan*, which had been published from 1985.<sup>721</sup> A more political monthly was the leftist *Bayān* (Expression), published by the leftist

<sup>712</sup> Generally on the new specialized journals: **Yavari d’Hellencourt** (1995), 97; **Merat** (1999), 33; **Rawan** (2000), 155.

<sup>713</sup> **Khiabany & Sreberny** (2001), 204.

<sup>714</sup> On Sorūš, who wrote his famous treatise „Sturdier than Ideology“ (*far-behtar az īdeyōlōžī*) for *Kiyān*: **Keddie** (2006), 305f.

<sup>715</sup> On „reform-theologian“ Šabestarī: **Rawan** (2000), 157f.; **Keddie** (2006), 307f.

<sup>716</sup> Generally on *Kiyān*: **Kian** (1995), XX; **Yavari d’Hellencourt** (1995), 98ff.; **Merat** (1999), 33; **Rawan** (2000), 156f.; **Khiabany & Sreberny** (2001), 204; **Shahidi** (2007), 59; *Kiyān*’s articles provoked fervid reactions among the conservatives: **Yavari d’Hellencourt** (1995), 107f.

<sup>717</sup> On *Irān-e Fardā* and its critical discussion of theoretical and practical concepts of politics: **Yavari d’Hellencourt** (1995), 100 no. 11; **Merat** (1999), 33; **Rawan** (2000), 155f.

<sup>718</sup> On the journal *Goft-o-Gū*: **Yavari d’Hellencourt** (1995), 100 no. 11; **Merat** (1999), 35.

<sup>719</sup> Translated authors were for instance Hannah Arendt, Isaiah Berlin or Karl Popper: **Merat** (1999), 35.

<sup>720</sup> On *Takāpū*: **Shahidi** (2007), 49.

<sup>721</sup> **Yavari d’Hellencourt** (1995), 97; **Merat** (1999), 33; **Rawan** (2000), 155;

cleric ‘Alī-Akbar Moḥtašamīpūr from 1990, which was banned again in 1991.<sup>722</sup> Adjacent to these literary and philosophical journals a number of further academic journals appeared and amongst them were *Fārād* (Farad, the capacitance unit of measure according to Faraday), *Yād* (Memory) or *Nāmeḥ-ye Farhang* (Culture Journal).<sup>723</sup>

Before the new cultural opening, only three women’s magazines had been published in Iran: *Zan-e Rūz* (Women of Today) belonging to *Kaiḥān*, *Rāḥ-e Zainab* (The Path of Zainab, daughter of *emām* ‘Alī) belonging to *Eṭṭelā’āt*, and *Payām-e Hāġer* (Message of Hagar), published by A‘zam Ṭāleqānī, who was the daughter of Āyatollāh Ṭāleqānī, co-founder of the FREEDOM MOVEMENT. In 1991, *Kiyān* started to publish the women’s newspaper *Zanān* (Women), which, however, soon was published independently by Šahlā Šerkat, the long-time editor of *Zan-e Rūz*. *Zanān* was the first journal to criticize the existing patriarchal structures and to vehemently defend women’s rights. Another famous contributor was the lawyer and feminist Mehrāngīz Kār.<sup>724</sup> Meanwhile in 1991, Zahrā Mostafavī, Āyatollāh Ḥomainī’s daughter, launched her newspaper *Nedā* (Call), which became the organ of the WOMEN’S SOCIETY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC (*ġāme‘eh-ye zanān-e ġomhūrī-ye eslāmī*). In 1992, another famous woman launched the newspaper *Payām-e Zan* (Message of the Woman). This was launched by Ma‘šūmeh Ebtakār, who had participated in the occupation of the American embassy in 1979, and later proceeded to become vice president under Ḥātāmī.<sup>725</sup>

The MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE also started to publish its own organ *Resāneh* (Media). This quarterly was a journal for media professionals and critically discussed theoretical, historical and social aspects of the media. Ḥātāmī invited many independent and respected media professionals to contribute to *Resāneh* and allowed an open discussion of the problems of the Iranian press.<sup>726</sup> In 1991, Ḥātāmī furthermore convened a first national media seminary under the motto “*discussion of the problems of the Iranian press*”, in which the participants in an unprecedented openness discussed topics like state

<sup>722</sup> Siavoshi (1992), 32; HRW (1993).

<sup>723</sup> *Fārād* was banned in 1992 due to an allegedly offensive cartoon depicting a bearded foot-ball player; *Yād* was the organ of the FOUNDATION FOR THE HISTORY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC (*bonyād-e tāriḥ-e enqelāb-e eslāmī*), which Rafsanġānī had co-founded; *Nāmeḥ-ye Farhang* among other topics discussed negative and positive aspects of Western influence: Rawan (2000), 151ff.; Shahidi (2007), 47, 49.

<sup>724</sup> On *Zanān* and its outspoken articles on women’s rights: Rawan (2000), 149; Keddie (2006), 294; Shahidi (2007), 86f.

<sup>725</sup> On the women’s press in Iran after 1989: Yavari d’Hellencourt (1995), 97f.; Motamed-Nejad (1995); Rawan (2000), 149; detailed in: Shahidi (2007), 82ff.

<sup>726</sup> *Resāneh* was published by the OFFICE FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEDIA (*daftar-e moṭāle‘eh va touse‘eh-ye rasāneh-hā*) of the MINISTRY FOR ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE: Yavari d’Hellencourt (1995), 95; Rawan (2000), 134ff.; Shahidi (2007), 116f.



censorship, self-censorship, the lack of professional staff and economic difficulties.<sup>727</sup> Ḥātāmī himself said in the opening speech:

*“We cannot impose the will of the governing on the people in the name of Islam [...] We are not allowed to restrict the natural potential of the people of our society to develop their personality. We have to strive to develop the people of our society in such a way that they can resist in a political dispute with different-minded. No country can be interested in a homogenization of the political ideology”*<sup>728</sup>

The daily press, otherwise, largely had remained unchanged. However, the most important newspapers were *Kaiḥān*, *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, *Abrār*, *Resālat* and *Kār va Kārgar*. *Eṭṭelā‘āt* and *Kaiḥān*’s editors-in-chief continued to be appointed by the Supreme Leader, now Ḥāmeneh’ī. But while the moderate *Eṭṭelā‘āt* supported Rafsanḡānī’s modernization campaign, *Kaiḥān* initially still seems to have continued its traditional leftist tone.<sup>729</sup> *Resālat* continued to be the official organ of the COMBATANT CLERGY ASSOCIATION and the COALITION OF ISLAMIC ASSOCIATIONS. It initially appeared to have supported Rafsanḡānī’s liberal economic policies but vehemently opposed his social and cultural reforms.<sup>730</sup> *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* first appeared to have been officially edited by Ḥāmeneh’ī, who, however, soon transferred it to the COMBATANT CLERGY ASSOCIATION. It, too, initially supported Rafsanḡānī’s economic policies, but vehemently defended the *velāyat-e faqīh*<sup>731</sup>. Although still controlled by the WORKER’S HOUSE, *Kār va Kārgar* as a governmental newspaper, it appeared to have voiced support for Rafsanḡānī,<sup>732</sup> while *Abrār*

<sup>727</sup> Yavari d’Hellencourt (1995), 95ff.; Rawan (2000), 134f.; Shahidi (2007), 47.

<sup>728</sup> Rawan (2000), 134.

<sup>729</sup> The circulation of both newspapers seems to have been between 100,000 and 300,000 copies: Rawan (2000), 137f.; Hyman assumes a circulation of 150,000 copies for *Kaiḥān* and 120,000 for *Eṭṭelā‘āt*: Hyman (1990), 26; Motamed-Nejad assumes a circulation of below 100,000 copies – probably for the later years: Motamed-Nejad (1995), no. 4; certainly too high are the estimated 400,000 to 500,000 copies: Malek & Mohsenian-Rad (1994), 77, 89; next to the daily *Kaiḥān*, the publishing house *Kaiḥān* continued to publish *Kaiḥān-e Farhangī*, *Kaiḥān-e Varzešī*, *Kaiḥān-e Havā’ī*, the English *Kayhan International* and the Arabic *al-Kaiḥān al-‘Arabī*: HRW (1993); Motamed-Nejad (1995), no. 29; *Eṭṭelā‘āt* also published *Eṭṭelā‘āt-e Haftegī*, *Donyā-ye Varzeš*, *Gavān-e Emrūz*, and *Rāh-e Zainab*: Motamed-Nejad (1995).

<sup>730</sup> HRW (1993); Rawan (2000), 140; Hyman (1996), 26.

<sup>731</sup> *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*’s circulation was approximately 30,000: Hyman (1990), 26; HRW (1993); Rawan (2000), 138f.

<sup>732</sup> In 1993, however, *Kār va Kārgar* still seems to have been a newspaper of the Islamic left: HRW (1993).

ceased to be the organ of the ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS and gradually became a moderately conservative newspaper.<sup>733</sup>

Yet, the ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS had launched a new organ in October 1990, before losing its dominance in the election to the third parliament: the newspaper *Salām* (Hello). The editor was the former state prosecutor Moḥammad Mūsavī-Ḥo'ainihā, an influential member of the ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS. Initially, *Salām* continued to voice economic protectionism and a radical foreign policy position; the traditional positions of the Islamic left. But the newspaper was published in a new, attractive style. In the popular column *Ālō Salām* (Hello, Hello – a greeting used on telephone), alleged critical reader comments were published, which, however, often seem to have been written by *Salām*'s journalists. In the column *Grew News* (*aḥbār-e ḥākestarī*), *Salām* also introduced investigative stories disclosing political scandals, which it soon had to halt due to governmental pressure.<sup>734</sup> Another newspaper representing the views of the ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS was *Ġahān-e Eslām* (World of Islam), which Hādī Ḥāmeneh'ī, the 'maverick' brother of the Supreme Leader, published from 1991.<sup>735</sup> Simultaneously, starting to side with the Islamic left was the newspaper *Ḥorāsān*, which had existed since 1949 and was one of the few local newspapers distributed countrywide. It belonged to the influential MARTYR'S FOUNDATION (*bonyād-e šahīd*), which was under direct control of the Supreme Leader. But it was still edited by the leftist cleric Abo' l-Faḡl Mūsavīyān.<sup>736</sup> Further reformist publications launched during the early 1990s were the women's magazine *Farzāneh* (Erudite);<sup>737</sup> Hešmatollāh Ṭabarzadī's important student newspaper *Payām-e Dānešgū-ye* (Message of the Student);<sup>738</sup> and *Hamšahrī*'s youth magazine *Āftābgardān* (Umbrella)<sup>739</sup>.

<sup>733</sup> According to HRW, Ġāfūr Ġasābī seems to have been the editor of the allegedly still leftist *Abrār* in 1993: **HRW** (1993); **Siavoshi** (1992), 39; *Abrār* also continued to publish its sports magazine *Abrār-e Varzešī: Motamed-Nejad* (1995); according to Rawan, *Abrār* again served as the organ of the ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS: **Rawan** (2000), 140

<sup>734</sup> On the beginnings of the influential leftist – and later reformist – newspaper *Salām*, which according to HRW initially was critical towards Rafsanjānī's liberal cultural policies: **HRW** (1993); **Haeri** (1993), 39; **Milani** (1994), 230; **Rawan** (2000), 140; **Shahidi** (2007), 47f.

<sup>735</sup> *Ġahān-e Eslām* had to cease its publication for a certain period during Rafsanjānī's second term in office: **Menashri** (2001), 329; **Shahidi** (2007), 49.

<sup>736</sup> On the newspaper *Ḥorāsān*: **HRW** (1993); **Malek & Mohsenian-Rad** (1994), 77f.; on Mūsavīyān's conviction: **Shahidi** (2007), 125.

<sup>737</sup> On *Farzāneh*: **Rawan** (2000), 149f.

<sup>738</sup> Ṭabarzadī was a member of the ISLAMIC STUDENT UNION, which originally was the youth organization of the COMBATANT CLERGY ASSOCIATION; in the early 1990s, the ISLAMIC STUDENT UNION fell out with the traditional right and turned into a radical, leftist organization – similar to the OFFICE FOR STRENGTHENING UNITY (*daftar-e taḥkīm-e vaḥdat*): **Menashri** (2001), 331.

<sup>739</sup> On *Āftābgardān*, which was banned in 1996 due to an allegedly offensive statement on IRIB: **Rawan** (2000), 147; **Shahidi** (2007), 55.

Concurrently, the modern right also started to publish its own newspapers. In 1992, Karbāsčī, the popular mayor of Tehrān and close ally of Rafsanġānī, launched *Hamšahrī* (Fellow Citizen) as the newspaper of the Tehrān municipality. The first editor-in-chief was Aḥmad Saṭṭārī, who managed to turn *Hamšahrī* within a few months into Iran’s widest-read daily newspaper, reaching a circulation of approximately 300,000 – more than *Kaiḥān* and *Eṭṭelā’āt*.<sup>740</sup> In 1995, the *Islamic Republic News Agency* (IRNA) (*ḥabar-goṣārī-ye ġomhūrī-ye eslāmī-ye īran*), which was under the control of the MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE, started to publish the newspaper *Irān* (Iran), the first real governmental newspaper of the Islamic Republic. Although *Irān* was seen as the mouthpiece of Rafsanġānī’s government, it soon developed a reputation as a reliable and serious newspaper. Also due to its modern, colorful layout, it soon became popular as well.<sup>741</sup> More conservative, though still supporting Rafsanġānī-Far, were the newspapers *Āfarīneš* and *Aḥbār*. *Āfarīneš* (Creation) was published from 1991 by ‘Abdollāḥ Ģāsebī, co-founder and director of the ISLAMIC AZAD UNIVERSITY (*dānešgāh-e āzād-e eslāmī*); while *Aḥbār* (News) was launched by the journalist Aḥmad Šafā’ī-Far in 1994<sup>742</sup>

As has always been the case in Iran, this new opening of the intellectual and media sphere, soon led to a backlash of the powers that be. The traditional right or rather the conservatives, who always had been stern in cultural matters, vehemently opposed these new liberties. They consequently started to push back against the increasingly critical press, editors and journalists, using the same tactics that had been used to silence the independent media at the beginning of the Islamic Republic.

Therefore, in 1991, Moḥtašamīpūr’s monthly *Bayān* and the scientific journal *Fārād* were banned by a court decision. In 1992, the parliament, which was now dominated by the conservatives, finally succeeded in dismissing Ḥātamī as minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance, who was replaced by Mošṭafā Mīr-Salīm.<sup>743</sup> In 1993, a court issued an occupational ban against Ḥo’ainīhā, the editor-in-chief of *Salām*, based on the accusation of “spreading defamation and lies”. This verdict, was in fact the first issued by a jury court, as actually required by to the press law of 1986. The implementation of his punishment was, however,

<sup>740</sup> HRW (1993); Motamed-Nejad (1995); RAWAN questions the self-declared circulation of 360,000 copies: Rawan (2000), 139ff.; due to his modern approach to journalism, Saṭṭārī was called the “father of the modern journalism” in Iran: Shahidi (2007), 48.

<sup>741</sup> On the newspaper *Irān*: Ghaffari-Farhangi (1995), 226f.; Rawan (2000), 139, XX; Shahidi (2007), 49.

<sup>742</sup> On *Aḥbār*: Rawan (2000), 147; Menashri (2001), 326.

<sup>743</sup> Siavoshi (1992), 32; HRW (1993).

postponed for five years. In October 1993, a revolutionary court (*dādgāh-e enqelābī*) banned ‘Abbās Ma‘rūfī’s *Gardūn* for a short time and in 1995 Ma‘rūfī himself was convicted to imprisonment and lashes while *Gardūn* was banned for two years.<sup>744</sup> In the following years, the revolutionary courts and the SPECIAL COURT FOR CLERICS would ban many more newspapers, while the press law of 1986 only vaguely had given this competence to “competent courts”. In 1994, the conservative majority in the parliament tried to ban the newspaper *Hamšahrī* albeit without success. In 1997, the youth magazine *Āftābgardān*, published by the municipality of Tehrān was banned, because it had called the national television “*the constant babbler*” of the Supreme Leader.<sup>745</sup>

The court procedures often were preceded by verbal attacks of conservative newspapers, such as particularly *Kaihān*, by accusations in Friday prayers, or by public speeches of the Supreme Leader himself against the critical press.<sup>746</sup> In 1996 for instance, Ḥāmeneh’ī lashed out against the critical press calling them hostile towards the Islamic Republic and extremely Marxist and asking them to correct their attitude and to respect the red lines.<sup>747</sup> By controlling the allocation of subsidized paper and advertisements, the government had further means to apply pressure on the critical press, and indeed largely privileged the conservative press. Concomitantly, security agencies and pressure groups again resorted to intimidation tactics, including demonstrations against disliked newspapers, physical assaults on publishers and journalists and arson attacks on publishing houses. They initially targeted *Eṭṭelā‘āt* and *Kaihān* by attempting to bring them into the line of the new Supreme Leader, to be followed by attacks against the leftist publications *Abrār*, *Salām*, *Gardūn* and *Donyā-ye Soḥan*.<sup>748</sup>

In 1995, the judiciary decided to assemble a first press jury, as the press laws of 1979 1986 always had required. This jury, whose members were elected for two years, exclusively consisted of well-known conservatives, among them Ḥabībollāh Asgar-Oulādī, Rūḥollāh Ḥossainiyān or Ġolām-Ḥossain Elhām. Yet, the press jury only convened once during Rafsanḡānī’s presidency, tellingly acquitting – rather than sentencing – Ḥossain Šarī‘atmadārī,

<sup>744</sup> On the incident leading to the short ban of *Gardūn*: **HRW** (1993); **Rawan** (2000), 159.

<sup>745</sup> **Rawan** (2000), 139; **Buchta** (2000), 195; on *Āftābgardān*: **Rawan** (2000), 147; **Shahidi** (2007), 55.

<sup>746</sup> Generally on the tactics of the traditional right in intimidating the critical and rival press: **Yavari d’Hellencourt** (1995), 95; **Rawan** (2000), 144.

<sup>747</sup> **Rawan** (2000), 144; **Shahidi** (2007), 53f.

<sup>748</sup> On physical attacks against disliked newspapers, editors and journalists: **HRW** (1993).

the sharp-tongued editor-in-chief of *Kaihān*, of a case.<sup>749</sup> In 1995, the parliament additionally tried to amend the press law by adding a teacher (*modarres*) of the theological seminaries in Qom to the PRESS SUPERVISORY BOARD. However, in the face of the opposition of virtually all publishers in Iran, it eventually withdrew the bill.<sup>750</sup> After the dismissal of Ḥātāmī, even the MINISTRY FOR ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE was brought into line. On occasion of the annual press festival of 1994, Ḥossain Entezāmī, a senior official of the ministry, classified the press into four categories: progressive and goal-oriented newspapers, which have a “correct understanding” of society; neutral newspapers, whose presence would not make any difference; superficial newspapers like sports or entertainment publications; and intellectual “sleeper” publications, which always had been sick.<sup>751</sup> The topic of the press festival in 1996 was compliance with “ethical standards”, which caused ‘Abbās ‘Abdī, *Salām*’s then editor-in-chief, to sarcastically comment that one could only speak of ethics in a society where the rule of law already had been established.<sup>752</sup>

Towards the end of Rafsanjānī’s second term as president, the modern right had become increasingly estranged with the traditional right or conservatives. This was due not last to an increasing competition between Rafsanjānī and Ḥāmeneh’ī, but also to the social and cultural policies of Rafsanjānī’s administration.<sup>753</sup> As a consequence, the modern right and the meanwhile reformed Islamic left increasingly grew closer, eventually forming a new political entity: the reformists (*eṣlāḥ-talabān*). This rapprochement was especially triggered by the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. In the run-up to the elections of the fifth parliament in 1996, Karbāščī formed the quasi-party EXECUTIVES OF CONSTRUCTION (*kārgozārān-e sāzandegī*), which comprised various technocrats of Rafsanjānī’s administration, and whose undeclared patron was Rafsanjānī.<sup>754</sup> They formed a coalition of interests with the leftist ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS and FIGHTERS FOR THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION. The conservatives still won a majority of the seats, but with a slighter margin, while the EXECUTIVES OF CONSTRUCTION, the Islamic left, and a few officially independent representatives all gained new seats.<sup>755</sup> The coalition between the Islamic left and the modern right proved all the more successful, as the EXECUTIVES OF CONSTRUCTION seem

<sup>749</sup> **Shahidi** (2007), 44, 49, 129.

<sup>750</sup> Also expressing their opposition to the bill were many influential politicians and clerics: **Shahidi** (2007), 52.

<sup>751</sup> **Rawan** (2000), 142f.; on Entezāmī’s categorization of the Iranian press: **Shahidi** (2007), 52ff.

<sup>752</sup> According to *Resāneh* 7:3 (Autumn 1996): **Shahidi** (2007), 54.

<sup>753</sup> On the deteriorating relationship between the modern right and the traditional right: **Keddie** (2006), 169.

<sup>754</sup> Rafsanjānī personally never became a member of the EXECUTIVES OF CONSTRUCTION: **Buchta** (2000), 16.

<sup>755</sup> On the elections to the sixth parliament: **Buchta** (2000), 122; **Keddie** (2006), 267.

to have been more liberal than Rafsanjānī. They consequently strengthened their coalition in the run-up to the fifth presidential elections in 1997. The two outstanding candidates facing each other in the elections were Nāteq-Nūrī, then present speaker of parliament, and Moḥammad Ḥātāmī, then president of the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF IRAN (*ketāb-hāneh-ye mellī*).<sup>756</sup> With Karbāsčī as campaign manager, Ḥātāmī ran a progressive campaign, in particular targeting the women and the youth. His election program centered on the concepts of democracy (*mardom-sālārī*), civil society (*ḡāme‘eh-ye madanī*), women’s rights (*hoqūq-e zanān*), the rights of ethnic minorities, freedom of speech, press freedom, and the release of political prisoners, XXX – in short, all the concepts and demands that the intellectuals of the Islamic left had developed in their respective publications during the previous years.<sup>757</sup> Finally, the tactic of the reformists succeeded. Ḥātāmī was elected president on 2<sup>nd</sup> Ḥordād 1376 (23<sup>rd</sup> May 1997) with a landslide of 69% of the votes.<sup>758</sup> Thus, the former Islamic left managed to reassert political influence, against the explicit wish of the conservatives.

In the run-up to these elections, ‘Aṭā’ollāh Mohāḡerānī, a member of the EXECUTIVES OF CONSTRUCTION and later Ḥātāmī’s culture minister, launched the weekly *Bahman* (Bahman – the penultimate month of the Iranian year), whose publication he ceased again immediately after the elections.<sup>759</sup> Other publications being launched by *degar-andīšeh* were the political weeklies *Bahār* (Spring) and *Mobīn* (Manifest).<sup>760</sup> Together with the newspapers *Hamšahrī* and *Salām*, and with the women’s magazines *Zanān*, *Nedā* and *Payām-e Zan*, these publications served as the main forum for the elections campaign of the reformists.

### III. 4. Iran’s fifth press spring during the reformist administration of Ḥātāmī

Almost immediately after Ḥātāmī’s election to the presidency, the conflict between the reformists and the conservatives started to escalate. The battles between the factions in particular took place in and over the media, which experienced a new period of openness and freedom. The reformists virtually only had the public sphere at disposal. The MINISTRY FOR ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE consequently initiated a liberal press policy. As a result, the number of reformist and progressive newspapers exploded with many reaching a much

<sup>756</sup> On the presidential elections: **Buchta** (2000), 124; **Keddie** (2006), 269.

<sup>757</sup> On Ḥātāmī’s election program: **Merat** (1999), 34f.; **Buchta** (2000), 123; **Tarrock** (2001), 590; **Keddie** (2006), 269f.

<sup>758</sup> **Buchta** (2000), 124; **Keddie** (2006), 269.

<sup>759</sup> Mohāḡerānī later was to republish *Bahman* as a daily newspaper: **Rawan** (2000), 155, 159; **Menashri** (2001), 372.

<sup>760</sup> On the two political weeklies: **Merat** (1999), 33f.; **Menashri** (2001), 372.

wider circulation than the traditional main newspapers *Kaihān* and *Eṭṭelā'āt*. The conservatives also used their media to strike back but they additionally had the judiciary and security services at their disposal, which they continued to use to silence the critical, reformist press. This led to a phenomenon the Iranian press had experienced at various intervals before – the appearance of so-called “serial newspapers”. In other words, newspapers that immediately were published under a new name after being shut by the courts. In this political fight, the reformists were naturally disadvantaged due to the increasing pressure of the conservatives which led to a split within the reformist camp and eventually to a loss of influence. This was exemplified by the closure of practically all reformist newspapers in the years 2000-2001, even though Ḥātāmī would secure a second term and govern until 2005. Despite this backlash, the reformist press was to have a lasting effect on the media scene, which has continued to be relatively critical and self-confident to this day.<sup>761</sup>

Ḥātāmī assembled a cabinet consisting predominantly of members of the Islamic left and the modern right. The most important member of his cabinet for the development of the reformist press was the Minister for Islamic Culture and Guidance, ‘Aṭā’ollāh Mohāğērānī. Mohāğērānī was the deputy leader of the EXECUTIVES OF CONSTRUCTION, and in this position also had launched his – meanwhile defunct – newspaper *Bahman*.<sup>762</sup> On the occasion of his confirmation in the parliament, he set the tone for his cultural policy:

*“I disagree with almost all of the present practices in the culture ministry. We have to protect artists and provide an atmosphere for creativity, tranquillity, and freedom. [...] I condemn the burning of bookshops, the beating of university lecturers and attacks on magazine offices”.*<sup>763</sup>

In 1997, he gave permission for the formation of the TRADE UNION OF JOURNALISTS IN IRAN (*anğoman-e šanafti-ye rūz-nāmeḥ-negār-ān-e īrān*), the quasi-successor to the SYNDICATE OF NEWSPAPER WRITERS AND JOURNALISTS (*sandīkā-ye nevīsandegān va ḥabarnegārān-e maṭbū'āt*), which was dissolved in 1990.<sup>764</sup>

<sup>761</sup> Generally on the reformist press during Ḥātāmī's presidency (1997-2001): **Merat** (1999), 35; **Buchta** (2000), 196; Mobasser calls the reformist newspapers ‘the people's chosen representatives’ – in contrast to the members of parliament: **Mobasser** (2001) 86; **Tarrock** (2001), 589; **Keddie** (2006), 270f.

<sup>762</sup> Mohāğērānī was married to Ġamīleh Kadīvar, sister of the famous intellectual Moḥsen Kadīvar: **Buchta** (2000), 124, 180f.

<sup>763</sup> Quoted in *Reuters* (20<sup>th</sup> August 1997): **Samii** (2001), 2.

<sup>764</sup> **Shahidi** (2007), 56.

It would, however, take another half a year until new reformist newspapers started to be launched. Until February 1998, the press situation in Iran had remained the same as during the end of Rafsanjānī's second term. The conservatives still published the newspapers *Kaihān*, *Resālat*, *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* and *Āfarīneš*; rather neutral and moderate were the dailies *Eṭṭelā'āt* and arguably *Īrān* and *Abrār*; and the reformists continued to publish *Hamšahrī* and *Salām*, with *Kār va Kārgar* now also turning into a reformist paper. Of these newspapers, however, members of the former Islamic left published *Salām*. But this would soon change.

On February 5, 1998, Ḥamīd-Rezā Ġalā'īpūr, an academic from Tehran, and Moḥsen Sāzegarā, co-founder of the IRGC, launched the newspaper *Ġāme'eh* (Society). Editor-in-chief was Māšā'ollāh Šams ol-Vā'eẓīn, a well-known journalist, former contributor to *Kaihān* and *Kaihān-e Farghanī*, and once editor of the outspoken journal *Kiyān*. Another popular contributor to *Ġāme'eh* was 'Emād al-Dīn Bāqī, who later founded the COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE PRISONERS' RIGHTS (*komīteh-ye defā' az ḥoqūq-e zandānī-yān*). Innovatively, all articles were signed with the authors' real names. *Ġāme'eh* thus took open responsibility for the sharp criticism it started to direct at the political class, including the allied president Ḥātāmī. It furthermore demanded full freedom of speech, including for Marxists and Communists. As a result, *Ġāme'eh* became very popular, reaching a circulation of 300,000.<sup>765</sup> In the same month, Fā'eẓeh Hāšemī, herself a member of parliament since 1996, launched *Zan* (Woman), Iran's first daily that specifically targeted women. Hāšemī was closer to the reformist policies than her father Rafsanjānī's. *Zan* consequently advocated for gender equality and informed readers about women's rights such as divorce or blood money. Famous contributors were for instance the lawyers and women activists Mehrāngīz Kār and Šīrīn 'Ebādī.<sup>766</sup> In May 1998, the prominent journalist Akbar Ganḡī launched the weekly *Rāh-e Nou* (New Way). Ganḡī became particularly famous for his attacks on Rafsanjānī and on the conservatives and *Rāh-e Nou*, which wrote on a wide range of topics, became popular due to its humorous columns and interviews with *degar andīšeh-hā*.<sup>767</sup>

The conservatives, increasingly confronted with criticism and embarrassing disclosures, reacted as usual, particularly through the courts. By 1997, the popular student

<sup>765</sup> On the newspaper *Ġāme'eh*: **Mobasser** (1998), 16f.; Sarkoohi even assumes a circulation of 400,000: **Sarkoohi** (1998), 136ff.; **Merat** (1999), 34; **Karimian & Bahrampour** (1999), 38f.; **Buchta** (2000), 144; **Mobasser** (2000), 86; **Samii** (2001), 2; **Menashri** (2001), 329; **Shahidi** (2007), 59f., 78.

<sup>766</sup> *Zan* was predominantly edited by women: **Karimian & Bahrampour** (1999), 38f.; **Merat** (1999), 34; **Samii** (1999), 3; **Rawan** (2000), 149f.; **Buchta** (2000), 149; **Menashri** (2001), 332; **Samii** (2001), 4f.; **Shahidi** (2007), 56, 87f.

<sup>767</sup> **Merat** (1999), 35; **Menashri** (2001), 331.



newspaper *Payām-e Dānešgū-ye Basīḡī* has been banned<sup>768</sup> because it had called for the election of the Supreme Leader by direct popular vote. Ṭabarzadī, however, soon replaced it with *Hovviyyat-e H'īš* (Self-Identity) as the new organ of the ISLAMIC STUDENT UNION.<sup>769</sup> In May 1998, the FOUNDATION OF THE OPPRESSED AND DISABLED (*bonyād-e mostaẓ'afān va ḡān-bāzān*), *nota bene* the publisher of the newspaper *Kaihān* and *Eṭṭelā'āt*, and Yaḥyā Raḥīm-Şafavī, the commander of the IRGC, filed a lawsuit against against *Ġāme'eh*. They accused it of having printed Raḥīm-Şafavī threats against the critics of the Islamic Republic and having compared him to Pol Pot and Şaddām Ḥussain.<sup>770</sup> In April 1998, a court sentenced Karbāsčī, the mayor of Tehrān and publisher of *Hamšahrī*, for corruption and mismanagement to a five-year prison term and a two-year ban from political activities. *Hamšahrī* and *Salām* tried to defend him publicly by pointing to financial irregularities of the FOUNDATION OF THE OPPRESSED AND DISABLED. *Hamšahrī* subsequently was edited by Mortaẓā Alvīrī, another member of the EXECUTIVES OF CONSTRUCTION.<sup>771</sup>

Concomitantly, pressure groups attacked the premises of the newspaper *Irān-e Fardā*, which was published by the brother of the Supreme Leader.<sup>772</sup> On June 22, 1998, a court eventually banned *Ġāme'eh*.<sup>773</sup> Following this, the pro-reformist daily *Gozāreš-e Rūz* (Report of the Day) and the weekly *Pančšambēh-hā* (Thursdays) were banned as well.<sup>774</sup> Ġalā'īpūr, the editor of *Ġāme'eh*, had, however, anticipated this move and had already secured a new license for the newspaper *Ṭūs* (Ṭūs – a city in NE-Iran). The design and layout of *Ṭūs* were exactly the same as for *Ġāme'eh* and this continuity was even explicitly made clear in headline of the first issue, which described the new paper as “*Ṭūs in the Service of the Society / Ġāme'eh*” (*tūs dar ḥedmat-e ḡāme'eh*). Head of judiciary Moḥammad Yazdī immediately condemned this strategy as a tactic that had been applied in the mid of the 20<sup>th</sup> century by the communist TÜDEH PARTY and warned that this time, the people would not be deceived by

<sup>768</sup> The organ of the ISLAMIC STUDENT UNION apparently added the name *basīḡī* to its former title (*Payām-e Dānešgū*): **Menashri** (2001), 331.

<sup>769</sup> *Hovviyyat-e H'īš* was banned by a press court in spring/summer 1999: **Samii** (1999), 2; **Samii** (2000); **Menashri** (2001), 329; **Samii** (2001), 5.

<sup>770</sup> **Mobasser** (1998), 16f.; **Sarkooḥi** (1998), 136ff.; **Merat** (1999), 34; **Karimian & Bahrampour** (1999), 38f.; **Buchta** (2000), 144; **Mobasser** (2000), 86; **Samii** (2001), 2; **Menashri** (2001), 329; **Shahidi** (2007), 59f., 78.

<sup>771</sup> Karbāsčī had already angered the traditional right in the beginning of the 1990s by introducing a new property tax: **Sarkooḥi** (1998), 137; **Buchta** (2000), 140ff.; **Keddie** (2006), 274f.

<sup>772</sup> **Rawan** (2000), 144.

<sup>773</sup> **Sarkooḥi** (1998), 136ff.; **Mobasser** (1998), 16f.; **Karimian & Bahrampour** (1999), 38f.; **Merat** (1999), 34; **Buchta** (2000), 144; **Mobasser** (2000), 86; **Menashri** (2001), 329; **Shahidi** (2007), 59f.

<sup>774</sup> Editor-in-chief of *Gozāreš-e Rūz* was 'Alī-Moḥammad Mahdavi-Ḥorramī: **Sarkooḥi** (1998), 136; **Menashri** (2001), 329, 331; according to Samii, Ṭabarzadī was the publisher of *Gozāreš-e Rūz*: **Samii** (2000).

such practices.<sup>775</sup> As a result, pressure groups destroyed the editorial offices of *Tūs* on the next day and beat up its editor-in-chief Šams-ol-Vā‘ezīn. A day after, the press court issued a ban against *Tūs*, arguing that it is not a different newspaper from *Ġāme‘eh*.<sup>776</sup> The newspaper staff, however, immediately launched the next newspaper *Āftāb-e Emrūz* (Sun of Today), yet this time with a distinctive logo and a different layout.<sup>777</sup> As the closure of *Tūs* led to large student demonstration, culture minister Mohāğērānī pleaded for the re-allowance of the banned newspaper, and on 4<sup>th</sup> August 1998, *Tūs* could appear again. Thus, there were now actually two successors to *Ġāme‘eh*.

The conservatives consequently continued to attack the reformist press. Āyatollāh Ġannatī, the chairman of the GUARDIAN COUNCIL and an influential member of the COMBATANT CLERGY ASSOCIATION accused the “mushrooming” press of insulting religious leaders. The Supreme Leader soon after lashed out against the newspapers accusing them of paving the way for cultural attacks by the West (*tahāğom-e farhangī-ye ġarb*).<sup>778</sup> This resulted in a next court procedure against *Tūs*. The newspaper was accused on September 17, 1998 of having published material jeopardizing national security.<sup>779</sup> The real reason for the procedure might, however, have been the publication an interview with Valéry Giscard D’Estaing, according to whom Āyatollāh Ĥomainī had asked for asylum in France in 1978. Twelve days later, the PRESS SUPERVISORY BOARD withdrew the license of *Tūs*. It appeared that Mohāğērānī supported this move by pretending to support Ĥātāmī when in reality it was an organ of the FREEDOM MOVEMENT. Concurrently, the editors Ġalā’īpūr and Šams-ol-Vā‘ezīn, as well as the satirist Ebrāhīm Nabavī were accused of “fighting against God” (*moğāreb bā ġodā*), an act which usually results in the death penalty. This charge was, however, later dropped. With *Tūs* banned and its editors behind bars, *Āftāb-e Emrūz* was edited by Feraidūn ‘Ammūzādeh Ĥalīlī.<sup>780</sup> But the conservative attacks continued unabatedly. The parliament, in which the conservatives still dominated, prepared a bill aimed at prohibiting the publication of articles on women’s right, which would create a conflict between men and women.<sup>781</sup> Ĥāmeneh’ī continued to complain about the press, calling the MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE

<sup>775</sup> **Shahidi** (2007), 61f.

<sup>776</sup> Ġalā’īpūr and Šams-ol-Vā‘ezīn used the dormant license of the newspaper *Tūs*, which had been published in the province of Ĥorāsān: **Mobasser** (1998), 171; **Karimian & Bahrampour** (1999), 38f.; **Merat** (1999), 34.; **Shahidi** (2007), 61f.

<sup>777</sup> **Mobasser** (1998), 17; **Merat** (1999), 34; **Shahidi** (2007), 61.

<sup>778</sup> **Shahidi** (2007), 61f.

<sup>779</sup> **Buchta** (2000), 143ff.; **Keddie** (2006), 271.

<sup>780</sup> On the second closure of *Tūs*: **Merat** (1999), 34; **Buchta** (2000), 144; **Menashri** (2001), 323; **Shahidi** (2007), 62f.

<sup>781</sup> **Samii** (1999), 5; **Buchta** (2000), 144.

AND GUIDANCE to finally enforce the limits of the press.<sup>782</sup> Even though Mohāğērānī promised to reign in the reformist newspapers, he could not avoid the dismissal of his deputies Aḥmad Borqānī and ‘Isā Šaḥarḥīz, both staunch advocates of press freedom.<sup>783</sup>

In October 1998, the conservatives further escalated their attacks, when the intelligence division of the IRGC arrested four well-known authors, among them Hūšang Golšīrī.<sup>784</sup> This was, however, only the prelude to a much more ferocious assault: a string of assassinations of famous opposition figures, which became known as the “chain murders” (*qatl-hā-ye zanğīreh’ī*). On 22<sup>nd</sup> November, Dāryūš and Parvāneh Forūhar, the leaders of the small NATION PARTY OF IRAN (*ḥezb-e mellat-e īrān*), who had been publishing a weekly bulletin on the situation of human rights in Iran, were stabbed at their home. While still speculating on the murders of these famous former members of the NATIONAL FRONT, *Hamšahrī* reported two days later, that the critical journalist Mağīd Šarīf was assassinated as well. Not long after, the press reported the assassination of the authors Moḥammad Moḥṭārī and Ġa‘far Pūyāndeh.<sup>785</sup> While the judiciary and the INTELLIGENCE MINISTRY ostensibly led their own investigations into these murders, Ḥātāmī commissioned his own investigative team comprising of Alī Yūnesī, ‘Alī Rabī‘ī and Sa‘īd Ḥağarīyān-Kāšānī. Yūnesī and Rabī‘ī had both earlier worked for the INTELLIGENCE MINISTRY. Rabī‘ī also had been the long-time editor of *Kār va Kārgar* and Ḥağarīyān-Kāšānī was preparing to launch the newspaper *Šobḥ-e Emrūz*. Yet, the investigations yielded no results.<sup>786</sup>

In 1999, Ḥātāmī organized the first elections for the local councils, which, despite being envisioned in the constitution of 1979, had never taken place so far. The reformists camp again formed a coalition consisting of the ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS, the ORGANIZATION OF THE FIGHTERS FOR THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, the WORKER’S HOUSE, the OFFICE FOR STRENGTHENING UNITY, the EXECUTIVES OF CONSTRUCTION, and a new political organization Ḥātāmī specifically had launched for this purpose called the ISLAMIC IRAN PARTICIPATION FRONT (*ğebheh-ye mošārekāt-e īrān-e eslāmī*)<sup>787</sup>. The participation front practically included important leftist reformists, namely Moḥammad Ḥātāmī, Ma‘šūmeh Ebtēkār, ‘Abdollāh Nūrī, Sa‘īd Ḥağarīyān-Kāšānī, Ġamīleh Kadīvar, ‘Abbās ‘Abdī. It was

<sup>782</sup> Buchta (2000), 144f.; Shahidi (2007), 61f., 65.

<sup>783</sup> Buchta (2000), 145; Shahidi (2007), 150 no. 39.

<sup>784</sup> Buchta (2000), 145.

<sup>785</sup> Mağīd Šarīfī in an article had advocated for a separation of religion and politics; Moḥṭārī and Pūyāndeh had requested for more freedom of opinion in a letter to Rafsanğānī in 1994: Buchta (2000) 156f.; Keddīe (2006), 275.

<sup>786</sup> ‘Alī Yūnesī had been the highest military judge before: Buchta (2000), 158.

<sup>787</sup> Buchta (2000), 178ff.; Keddīe (2006), 276,

headed by Moḥammad-Reżā Ḥātāmī,<sup>788</sup> and launched its own organ *Mošārekāt* (Participation), whose editor-in-chief was ‘Alī Ḥātāmī – both brothers of the president.<sup>789</sup> *Mošārekāt* was however not the only new paper to be launched before these elections.

In December 1998, Ḥātāmī’s first interior minister, ‘Abdollāh Nūrī, started to publish *Ḥordād* (*Ḥordād* - the month of Ḥātāmī’s election). Due to Nūrī’s ongoing popularity and its outspoken style, *Ḥordād* soon became a widely read newspaper in Iran. The newspaper even served as platform for Āyatollāh Montazerī, who had been the religious teacher of Nūrī in the 1980s.<sup>790</sup> In December 1998, Sa‘īd Ḥaḡariyān-Kāšānī started to publish the newspaper *Šobḥ-e Emrūz* (Morning of Today). *Šobḥ-e Emrūz* was even more belligerent than *Ḥordād* and became particularly famous for its incessant attacks on the conservatives, in particular during the disclosure of the perpetrators of the chain murders.<sup>791</sup> In the same year, a whole range of other reformist publications appeared. These include the newspaper *Āzād* (Free), which was published in the free trade zone in Kīš; Abo ‘l-Qāsem Golbāf’s newspaper *Bāmdād-e Nou* (New Morning)<sup>792</sup>; and Moḥammad-Reżā Zohdī’s newspaper *Āryā* (Arian)<sup>793</sup>. Arguably the most exceptional newspaper was, however, *Enteḥāb* (Choice). *Enteḥāb* was published by Ṭāḥā Ḥāšemī of the ISLAMIC PROPAGATION ORGANIZATION (*sāzmān-e tablīḡāt-e eslāmī*) in Qom, an organization under the supervision of the Supreme Leader. Despite this affiliation, the newspaper soon turned into an extremely open-minded and critical newspaper.<sup>794</sup> On 19<sup>th</sup> February 1999, Ġalā’īpūr and Šams-ol-Vā‘eẓīn, who had been released from prison, launched the newspaper *Našāṭ* (Joy) as the factual successor to *Tūs*. Due to its blunt style, *Našāṭ* soon gained a wide readership.<sup>795</sup> It is also interesting to note that in 1999, Hādī Ḥāmeneh’ī’s newspaper *Ġahān-e Eslām* resurfaced for a short time.<sup>796</sup>

<sup>788</sup> On the ISLAMIC IRAN PARTICIPATION FRONT: **Buchta** (2000), 180.

<sup>789</sup> *Mošārekāt* was launched on 2<sup>nd</sup> January 2000: **Mobasser** (2000), 86; **Buchta** (2000), 180; **Menashri** (2001), 330.

<sup>790</sup> On the newspaper *Ḥordād*: **Samii** (1999), 2f.; according to Karimian & Bahrampour, *Ḥordād* was close to the modern right: **Karimian & Bahrampour** (1999), 39; **Merat** (1999), 34; **Mobasser** (2000), 86; **Buchta** (2000), 186, 194f.; **Menashri** (2001), 330; **Tarrock** (2001), 593; **Samii** (2001), 4; **Shahidi** (2007), 78f.

<sup>791</sup> On *Šobḥ-e Emrūz*: **Merat** (1999), 34; on Ḥaḡariyān-Kāšānī: **Buchta** (2000), 161, 167, 195; **Mobasser** (2000), 86; **Samii** (2000), XX; **Menashri** (2001), 332; **Shahidi** (2007), 78f.

<sup>792</sup> **Menashri** (2001), 327.

<sup>793</sup> **Karimian & Bahrampour** (1999), 39; **Menashri** (2001), 327; **Shahidi** (2007), 78f.

<sup>794</sup> On the newspaper *Enteḥāb*: **Karimian & Bahrampour** (1999), 39; **Menashri** (2001), 328.

<sup>795</sup> *Našāṭ*’s editor-in-chief was Laṭīf Šafarī, a former member of parliament: **Samii** (1999), 4; **Karimian & Bahrampour** (1999), 39; **Merat** (1999), 34; **Buchta** (2000), 193ff.; **Menashri** (2001), 331; **Tarrock** (2001), 591; **Samii** (2001), 3f; **Shahidi** (2007), 63.

<sup>796</sup> On the republication of *Ġahān-e Eslām*: **Menashri** (2001), 329.

During the run-up to the elections of the local councils, the press intensified the speculations as to who was behind the chain murders. Ostensibly, the obscure group DEVOTEES OF THE PURE ISLAM OF MOḤAMMAD (*fadā'ī-y-ān-e eslām-e nāb-e moḥammadi*) had taken responsibility for it. *Salām*, in contrast, published parts of the report of Ḥātāmī's commission of inquiry, which identified members of the INTELLIGENCE MINISTRY as the true perpetrators. The chain murder had, however, not yet stopped. In January 1999, another four persons were assassinated. As a result of these revelations, the newspapers *Salām* and *Resālat* started a heated dispute centering on the dismissal of intelligence minister Dorrī-Naḡafābādī, who was eventually replaced by 'Alī Yūnesī and 'Alī Rabī'ī, both members of Ḥātāmī's commission of inquiry.<sup>797</sup> The reformist eventually won the elections with a large margin.<sup>798</sup>

As a result, the conservatives again intensified their campaign against the reformist press. By September 1998, a pressure group physically attacked former vice-president Nūrī, the editor of *Ḥordād*, and the minister for Islamic Culture and Guidance Mohāḡerānī, when they attended a Friday prayer in Qom. In November 1998, Rafsanḡānī's former interior minister and publisher of *Bayān*, Moḡtašamīpūr, had to leave Mašhad because of a bomb threat. In January 1999, a bomb was detonated in the editorial offices of *Ḥordād*, while a death list was left behind, including the names of Nūrī, Montazerī, Fā'ezeḡ Hāšemī, Meḡdī Karrūbī, and the Supreme Leaders' brother Hādī Ḥāmeneh'ī.<sup>799</sup> In the spring of 1999, a revolutionary court closed down Hāšemī's newspaper *Zan*, after it had published Nourūz greetings of the former queen Faraḡ Dībā.<sup>800</sup> Yet, they increasingly felt, they had to proceed more systematically and comprehensively against the press. Therefore, on May 30, 1999, the conservative dominated parliament started to discuss an amendment to the press law of 1986. On June 6, 1999, *Salām* revealed an interesting detail on the press bill: Sa'īd Emāmī had recommended a law that would legalize the security measures which to date had been applied against media professionals and would also hold journalists responsible. This same Emāmī in question was a member of the Intelligence Ministry, who as the main suspect behind the chain murders allegedly had committed suicide only a few weeks before due to his implication.<sup>801</sup>

<sup>797</sup> MERAT ascribes the disclosure of the perpetrators of the chain murders to the newspapers *Ḥordād* and *Šobh-e Emrūz*: **Merat** (1999), 34; **Buchta** (2000), 159ff.; **Keddie** (2006), 275f.

<sup>798</sup> **Buchta** (2000), 181f.; **Keddie** (2006), 276.

<sup>799</sup> On the physical attacks on these famous media professionals and reformists: **Buchta** (2000), 176ff.

<sup>800</sup> On the closure of *Zan*: **Karimian & Bahrampour** (1999), 38; according to Samii, *Zan*'s closure was caused by a cartoon on gender (un-)equality: **Samii** (1999), 3; **Buchta** (2000), 183; **Menashri** (2001), 332; **Samii** (2001), 4.

<sup>801</sup> On Sa'īd Emāmī's (also known als Sa'īd Eslāmī) letter and on his involvement in the chain murders: **Karimian & Bahrampour** (1999), 39; **Samii** (1999), 2, 5f.; **Buchta** (2000), 169f, 187; **Samii** (2001), 10; **Tarrock** (2001), 590f.; **Shahidi** (2007), 66.

Despite resolute opposition of jurists, media professionals and politicians, the parliament eventually passed the amendment on June 7, 1999.<sup>802</sup>

#### The 1999 Amendment to the Press Law<sup>803</sup>

The amendment to the press law of 1986 eventually added a teacher of the religious seminaries in Qom as well as a clerical member of the ISLAMIC PROPAGATION ORGANIZATION to the PRESS SUPERVISORY BOARD. The PRESS SUPERVISORY BOARD, which not only regulated the licenses of publications but also the allocation of subsidized paper and advertisement, furthermore obtained the right to close down a publication even before a court trial took place.

The press court for its part obtained the right to choose the members of the jury itself. This would greatly empower then president Sa'īd Mortazavī, a nephew of Āyatollāh Yazdī and a radical judge, to shut down disliked newspapers. Furthermore, revolutionary courts and the SPECIAL COURT FOR CLERICS now explicitly were named as competent courts to deliver judgments on press offenses, which they had done for a long time in practice.

The most disputed amendment was, however, that not only the publishers and editors could be held responsible for possible offenses, but also the journalists and even the photographers. They were furthermore newly forced to disclose their sources.

Finally, the publishers were prohibited from replacing a banned publication by a new publication bearing a similar name, logo or layout thus explicitly trying to prevent the appearance of serial newspapers

With the approval of the amendment, the SPECIAL COURT FOR CLERICS accused *Salām*'s publisher Ḥo'ainihā and editor-in-chief 'Abdī of having revealed classified documents by disclosing information on Emāmī, and consequently banned the newspaper *Salām*. The Minister for Islamic Culture and Guidance Mohāğērānī publicly reacted by stating that the newspaper would have deserved an award for having revealed the "*trend, which had started with the threat of intellectuals, the press and authors and which had ended with the assassination of authors*".<sup>804</sup> Immediately after, the new press law and the closure of *Salām* evoked the protest the students Tehrān University because Ḥo'ainihā had been the founder of the students' organization OFFICE FOR STRENGTHENING UNITY. Since Ḥātāmī's election, there had been regular student demonstrations, the last of which only dating back a few weeks after the closure of Ṭabarzadī's newspaper *Hovviyyat-e Ḥ'īš*. The police and pressure groups like

<sup>802</sup> Merat (1999), 35; Karimian & Bahrapour (1999), 39; Samii (1999), 1f.; Buchta (2000), 187; Samii (2001), 3; Keddie (2006), 276; quoted in: Shahidi (2007), 66.

<sup>803</sup> On the amendments to the press law: Karimian & Bahrapour (1999), 39; according to Samii, the head of the press law even had the right to overrule the decision of the PRESS SUPERVISORY BOARD: Samii (1999), 5, 9; Buchta (2000), 187; Samii (2001), 10f.; Shahidi (2007), 65, 128f.; Shahidi (2008), 748.

<sup>804</sup> Merat (1999), 35; Karimian & Bahrapour (1999), 39; Samii (1999), 1f.; Buchta (2000), 187; Samii (2001), 3; Keddie (2006), 276; Shahidi (2007), 66.

ANŞĀR-E ĤEZBOLLĀH violently suppressed the protests on the campus, which only further infuriated the students. The students subsequently poured out in large numbers into the streets asking for the punishment of the responsible police forces and the readmission of *Salām*. Provoked by ANŞĀR-E ĤEZBOLLĀH, the demonstrations, which lasted for days and increasingly attracted other people, turned violent and was brutally suppressed by the police and Basīğ units. The student leaders were arrested and later paraded on television with forced confessions.<sup>805</sup>

After the repression of the largest demonstration since 1979, the conservatives started to blame Ĥātāmī for the escalation. On 19<sup>th</sup> July 1999, *Kaihān* published a letter signed by twenty-four commanders of the IRGC, who threatened Ĥātāmī with removal if he did “*not make revolutionary decisions and act in accordance with [your] Islamic and national mission*”.<sup>806</sup> Ĥātāmī reacted to the letter by publicly distancing himself of the “seditious” student leaders, but also by condemning the attacks of the ANŞĀR-E ĤEZBOLLĀH. His cautious reaction, however, only contributed to further alienate him from the more progressive and radical wing of the reformists.<sup>807</sup> Like *Salām* before, *Kaihān* was also accused of having published confidential information but it eventually was acquitted of all charges.<sup>808</sup> In contrast, the SPECIAL COURT FOR CLERICS issued a five-year ban for *Salām* and a three-year professional ban for its publisher Ĥo’ainīhā on August 5, 1999.<sup>809</sup> As a reaction, Moḥtašamīpūr reactivated his weekly *Bayān* (Expression) and started to publish it as the daily organ of the ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS.<sup>810</sup> As a calming measure, Ĥāmeneh’ī ordered the release of most students except the alleged ‘ringleaders’, and opened court hearings against more than one hundred policemen. Additionally, as requested repeatedly by the reformists he dismissed the hardline head of judiciary Yazdī and replaced him with Maḥmūd Hāšemī-Šāhrūdī.<sup>811</sup> But these appeasement measures proved to be only a short reprieve.

<sup>805</sup> On the student demonstrations of July 1999: **Samii** (1999), 2; **Samii** (2000), XX; **Buchta** (2000), 187ff.; **Tarrock** (2001), 591; **Samii** (2001), 1; **Keddie** (2006), 276f.; **Shahidi** (2007), 66.

<sup>806</sup> **Buchta** (2000), 190.

<sup>807</sup> On reactions of the reformists to the suppression of the student unrest: **Samii** (2000), XX; **Keddie** (2006), 277.

<sup>808</sup> *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* and the radical newspaper *Ġavān*, which both also had reprinted the letter of the IRGC commander, were not even charged: **Samii** (1999), 2; **Buchta** (2000), 190; **Samii** (2001), 3.

<sup>809</sup> On the conviction of Ĥo’ainīhā and ‘Abdī: **Karimian & Bahrampour** (1999), 39; **Samii** (1999), 2; **Buchta** (2000), 191; **Tarrock** (2001), 590f.; **Samii** (2001), 3.

<sup>810</sup> On Moḥtašamīpūr’s – now daily – newspaper *Bayān*: **Menashri** (2001), 327; **Mianeh** (8<sup>th</sup> July 2010).

<sup>811</sup> **Buchta** (2000), 191ff.; **Tarrock** (2001), 595; **Keddie** (2006), 277.

The Supreme Leader himself soon continued his attacks against the press, accusing them of exposing the Iranian youth to the “poisonous forces” of the enemy, lying to the people and being mouthpieces of Radio Israel and Radio America. His accusations in particular targeted Ġalā’īpūr and Šams ol-Vā’ezīn’s newspaper *Našāṭ*, the successor of *Ṭūs*, which recently had sharply criticized the existing retaliation laws (*qeṣāṣ*), and in which ‘Ezzatollāh Šaḥābī, the ninety-five year old leader of the FREEDOM MOVEMENT had publicly requested to limit the powers of the Supreme Leader. At the same time, Ḥāmeneh’ī expressed his dissatisfaction with Mohāğērānī and his MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE.<sup>812</sup> Repeating the already established pattern, the prosecutor general, the police, the SPECIAL COURT FOR CLERICS, the ISLAMIC ĀZĀD UNIVERSITY and a number of conservative lawmakers filed a lawsuit against *Našāṭ*. On September 5, 1999, the press court eventually banned *Našāṭ* and opened court proceedings against the managing director Laṭīf Šafarī and the columnist and satirist Ebrāhīm Nabavī.<sup>813</sup>

Unimpressed, Ġalā’īpūr and Šams-ol-Vā’ezīn proceeded to publish yet another newspaper, ‘*Aṣr-e Āzādegān* (Afternoon / Age of the Free), which was edited primarily by Maḥmūd Šams and subsequently by Ġāfūr Ġasābī, the former editor-in-chief of *Abrār*. Further, ‘Īsā Šaḥarḥīz, who after his dismissal from the MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE had become a regular contributor to Ġalā’īpūr and Šams-ol-Vā’ezīn’s serial newspapers, took over the recently dormant license of *Aḥbār*, and published it as *Aḥbār-e Eqtešādī* (Economic News). Both, ‘*Aṣr-e Āzādegān* and *Aḥbār-e Eqtešādī* often published articles, which had appeared in *Āftāb-e Emrūz* before, the other successor to *Ṭūs*.<sup>814</sup>

On October 30, 1999, the SPECIAL COURT FOR CLERICS summoned ‘Abdollāh Nūrī, the publisher of *Ḥordād*, and accused him of long litany of transgressions: libel against state officials, defamation of Ḥāmeneh’ī, spreading lies, propagating war against the system, breaching religious taboos, supporting negotiations between Iran and America, advocating for the official recognition of Israel and in particular promoting the views of Āyatollāh Montazerī, his former mentor. Nūrī’s trial gained huge public attention since he eloquently defended himself and categorically questioned the legitimacy of the SPECIAL COURT FOR CLERICS. He

<sup>812</sup> Buchta (2000), 193f.; Shahidi (2007), 66.

<sup>813</sup> On the closure of *Našāṭ*: Samii (1999), 3f.; Buchta (2000), 193f.; another plaintiff apparently was IRIB: Samii (2001), 3; according to Tarrock, *Našāṭ* was closed by the SPECIAL COURT FOR CLERICS – which seems questionable, as neither Ġalā’īpūr nor Šams-ol-Vā’ezīn were clerics: Tarrock (2001), 591.

<sup>814</sup> ‘*Aṣr-e Āzādegān*’s deliberately seems to have chosen its name in reference to the defunct Islamic leftist newspaper *Šobḥ-e Āzādegān*: Samii (1999), 7f.; Menashri (2001), 326f.; Samii (2003), 3, 8.



was eventually sentenced to a five-year prison sentence and a further five-year publication ban while *Ḥordād* was shut down. But the real reason for his conviction arguably was to prevent his candidacy for the upcoming elections to the sixth parliament in February 2000.<sup>815</sup> It was not long after that ‘Emād al-Dīn Bāqī and ‘Alī Ḥekmat, both contributors to *Ḥordād*, launched the newspaper *Fath* (Conquest), as a quasi-successor to *Ḥordād*.<sup>816</sup>

Meanwhile, due to the constant attacks by the conservatives, the reformist became somehow estranged from each other. While they still maintained the common interest in winning the parliamentary elections, the constant attacks of the conservatives had left the more centrist members of the former modern more cautious. Ḥātāmī and the leftist members of the reformists consequently formed their own political election campaign group, the SECOND ḤORDĀD FRONT (*ḡebhe-ye dovvom-e ḥordād*). It included the ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS, the ORGANIZATION OF THE FIGHTERS FOR THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, the ISLAMIC IRAN PARTICIPATION FRONT and some smaller reformist groups, but not the EXECUTIVES OF RECONSTRUCTION. Contributing to the alienation were the continued attacks of radical reformists against the former modern right. In his famous article “The Red Eminence and the Grey Eminence” (*‘ālī-ḡanāb-e sorḥ-pūš va ‘ālī-ḡanāb-e ḥākestarī*), Akbar Ganḡī accused Rafsanḡānī for being responsible for many political murders in the early 1990s.<sup>817</sup> It must be noted that in the end, the SECOND ḤORDĀD FRONT eventually won the elections again with a landslide, securing over 70% of the seats.<sup>818</sup>

This freshly heralded reformist victory proved to be the straw that broke the back of the camel of the independent press. Using their well-proven tactics, the conservatives consequently set about finally silencing the reformist newspapers, editors and journalists once and for all. On 5<sup>th</sup> March 2000, unidentified persons tried to kill Ḥaḡariyān-Kāšānī, the publisher of *Šobḥ-e Emrūz* and the main strategist of the reformists. He survived the assassination attempt but was permanently paralyzed.<sup>819</sup> Ḥāmeneḥ’ī publicly condemned the attack. However, in the same speech again lashed out at “*the tongues and pens intensively creating turbulence and rumours [...] leveling unfounded accusations against named*

<sup>815</sup> On the conviction of Nūrī: **Samii** (1999), 2f.; **Mobasser** (2000), 86; **Buchta** (2000), 194; **Samii** (2001), 4.

<sup>816</sup> On the launch of *Fath*: **Menashri** (2001), 328; Tarrock mentions *Fath* as a newspaper close to the ideas of Monatazerī: **Tarrock** (2001), 592.

<sup>817</sup> Generally on the attacks by different journalists on Rafsanḡānī: **Tarrock** (2001), 596f.

<sup>818</sup> On the elections to the sixth parliament and the SECOND ḤORDĀD FRONT: **Samii** (2000); **Tarrock** (2001), 596; not only radical conservatives but also members of the modern right – and even Fā’ezeh Ḥāšemī – lost their mandates: **Keddie** (2006), 278f.

<sup>819</sup> **Samii** (2000); **Keddie** (2006), 279; **Shahidi** (2007), 66f.

individuals and even raising doubts about trusted organizations such as the [Revolutionary] Guards and the baseej”. Two days later, he became even more explicit stating there are “10 to 15 newspapers” in Iran, which are “directed by the same centre [...] making the people pessimistic about the system”.<sup>820</sup>

It was not long after, as usual, different conservative bodies immediately proceeded to shut down the remaining independent reformist newspapers. This was made easier as the amendment to the press law of 1986 was finally passed on 14<sup>th</sup> April 2000.<sup>821</sup> Soon after, the INTELLIGENCE MINISTRY, the PRESS SUPERVISORY BOARD, the SPECIAL COURT FOR CLERICS and even the MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE filed lawsuits against exactly fifteen reformist newspapers. On 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2000, the courts consequently shut down the newspapers *Fath*, successor to *Ĥordād*; *‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān*, successor to *Našāṭ*, itself successor to *Ṭūs*; *Āftāb-e Emrūz*, the other successor to *Ṭūs*; Ṭabarzadī’s *Gozāreš-e Rūz*; the newspapers *Bāmdād-e Nou*, *Āryā*, *Āzād* and *Payām-e Āzādī*; the weekly *Ābān*; Ṣaḥābī’s monthly *Irān-e Fardā*; and A’ḡam Ṭāleqānī’s women’s magazine *Payām-e Ḥāḡer*. On 27<sup>th</sup> April 2000, a court also banned Ḥaḡarīyān-Kāšānī’s *Ṣobḡ-e Emrūz* on the sarcastic basis that the disabled publisher was incapable of managing it; as well as *Mošārekāt*, the organ of Ḥātāmī’s ISLAMIC IRAN PARTICIPATION FRONT; and *Avā*, a weekly from Eṣfahān, which was close to Āyatollāh Montazerī.<sup>822</sup> By April 10, 2000, Šams-ol-Vā‘ezīn had been sentenced to imprisonment, which was followed soon after by the sentencing of Akbar Ganḡī and other journalists.<sup>823</sup>

This mass-closure of reformist newspapers was a major blow to the reformist camp but not yet its total demise. The ISLAMIC IRAN PARTICIPATION FRONT still managed to replace *Mošārekāt* with the newspaper *Nourūz* (New Year);<sup>824</sup> and Ġalā’īpūr, co-publisher with Šams-ol-Vā‘ezīn of the serial newspapers *‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān*, launched the newspaper *Gūnāgūn* (Miscellaneous)<sup>825</sup>. But these newspapers would remain more cautious in tone and consequently never reached the same circulation as their predecessors. The other reformist and moderate newspapers, such as *Irān*, *Hamšahrī* or *Kār va Kārgar*, had meanwhile become more cautious, refraining from publishing polarizing editorials. The courts nevertheless

<sup>820</sup> Samii (2000); Samii (2001), 5; Shahidi (2007), 67f.

<sup>821</sup> On the passing of the press law: Keddīe (2006), 278; Shahidi (2007), 68.

<sup>822</sup> On the first mass closure of reformist newspapers in April 2000: Mobasser (2000), 86f.; Samii (2000); according to Samii, the weekly *Arzeš* (Value) was also closed on 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2000: Samii (2001), 5; Tarrock (2001), 592f.

<sup>823</sup> On the conviction of Šams-ol-Vā‘ezīn, Ganḡī and others: Mobasser (2000), 87; Tarrock (2001), 594f; Shahidi (2007), 67.

<sup>824</sup> On the launch of *Nourūz*: Shahidi (2007), 72f..

<sup>825</sup> On the launch of *Gūnāgūn*: Samii (2001), 5.

continued to ban further reformist newspapers and journals in the following months.<sup>826</sup> These included the newspaper *Bahār*, which Sa‘īd Pūr-‘Azīzī had published as a pro-reform paper since the mass closure of newspapers in April 2000; the newspaper *Bayān*, which Moḥtašamīpūr had published as the new organ of the ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS; the newspaper *Ham-Mīhan* (Compatriot), which Karbāsčī had launched after his release from prison and shortly before the parliamentary elections; the extremely critical newspaper *Mellat* (Nation), which Sa‘īd Ḥaqqī and ‘Alī Moṭbat had published from 22<sup>nd</sup> May 2000; and the newspaper *Hambastegī* (Correlation) – which all were banned on 8<sup>th</sup> August 2000. Soon after, the ban was extended to the newspaper *Gūnāgūn*; the popular youth magazine *Irān-e Ğavān* (Young Iran) of the publication group IRNA; the weekly *Mobīn* (Manifest), which ‘Alī-Moḥammad Ğarībā’ī and Kamāl Morād had published from the mid 1990s; and finally the famous journal *Kiyan*, which once had lit the spark of a reinvigorated critical media discourse.<sup>827</sup>

Additionally, many prominent journalists were now convicted on the basis of the new press law. These included on 29<sup>th</sup> May 2000 ‘Emād al-Dīn Bāqī, the freelance journalist and editor-in-chief of *Fath*; on 7<sup>th</sup> August 2000 Aḥmad Zaidābādī; on 9<sup>th</sup> August 2000 Mas‘ūd Behnūd; on 12<sup>th</sup> August the satirist Ebrāhīm Nabavī; and on 13<sup>th</sup> August Moḥammad Qūčānī. These were all prominent journalists who would continue to play an important role in Iran’s media landscape, in particular, Qūčānī, the later editor of the newspaper *Šarq* (East).<sup>828</sup>

When the sixth parliament convened for the first time on 27<sup>th</sup> May 2000, the reformist majority, in a last defensive effort, immediately planned the revision of different laws, among them in particular a reversion of the recently amended press law. Yet, before the discussion on a new press bill really could take off, Ḥāmeneh’ī in an exceptional move directly intervened and explicitly prohibited all further discussions, stating: “*the present law has been able to some extent to prevent this great calamity from occurring and it would not be legitimate or in the interests of the system and the country to change it*”.<sup>829</sup> On the occasion of the press festival of 2000, the head of the TRADE UNION OF JOURNALISTS IN IRAN

<sup>826</sup> According to Shahidi, 23 publications were banned until August 2000, and another 23 until May 2001: **Shahidi** (2007), 69f.

<sup>827</sup> On the second mass closure of newspapers in August 2000: **Samii** (2001), 6f.; **Menashri** (2001), 327f., 330.

<sup>828</sup> On the conviction of dozens of journalists, media professionals and intellectuals: **Mobasser** (2000), 87; **Samii** (2000); **Samii** (2001), 8; **Keddie** (2006), 278f.; **Shahidi** (2007), 67, 69.

<sup>829</sup> On the reformist draft for a new press bill: **Samii** (2001), 6; **Tarroch** (2001), 586; 597ff.; **Keddie** (2006), 278; **Shahidi** (2007), 67f.

appropriately called it a press funeral.<sup>830</sup> By the end of the year 2000, the Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance ‘Aṭā’ollāh Mohāğherānī eventually had to give in to the constant attacks on his person and resigned from his post.<sup>831</sup> As a result by the end of the year 2000, the reformist media were largely silenced and contained, as the press spring had come to an end.<sup>832</sup> The reformists admittedly still were popular, as was revealed by the re-election of Ḥātāmī in 2001, and the era of cultural and intellectual openness proved to have a lasting influence on the Iranian public sphere, which continued despite tightly controlled limits during Aḥmadīnezād’s presidency.

---

<sup>830</sup> **Shahidi** (2007), 69.

<sup>831</sup> **Keddie** (2006), 278; **Shahidi** (2007), 70.

<sup>832</sup> Until spring 2001, the courts were to ban dozens of other publications, among them: *Ahrār* (Freemen) from Tabriz; *Dourān-e Emrūz* (Today’s Era); *Gonbad-e Kabūd* (Azure Cupola); *Nousāzī* (Rebuilding); *Rūzdārā*; *Arzeš* (Value); *Amīn-e Zanḡān* (Trustee of Zanḡān); *Bāzār-e Rūz* (Market of Today); *Češmeh* (Source / Eye); *Fardā-ye Roušan* (Bright Tomorrow); *Golbāng-e Irān* (Cry of Iran); *Ḥadīt-e Qazvīn* (Narration of Qazvīn); *Ḥarīm* (Frontage); *Čāhān-e Pezeškī* (Medical World); *Ḥalīğ-e Fārs* (Persian Gulf); *Mīhan* (Motherland); *Milād* (Birth); *Naḥl* (Date-Palm); *Qešseh-ye Zendegī* (Stories of Life); *Sepīdeh-ye Zendegī* (Dawn of Life); *Šobḥ-e Omīd* (Morning of Hope); *Tavānā* (Powerful); *Čavānān-e Qorveh* (Youth of Qorveh); or *Payām-e Emrūz* (Message of Today): **Samii** (2001), 6.

## IV. Aims, Sources and Methodologies of the Analysis

### IV. 1. Aims and Scope of the Analysis of the Iranian Press Discourse on Drugs

The present analysis begins at the intersection of a political and cultural reform movement in Iran that has its beginnings during the administration of Rafsanjānī, but in reality gained pace under the reformist administration of Ḥātāmī. The policy changes induced by the two consecutive administrations are of crucial relevance for the subsequent analysis; in as far as they affected both the drug policy and the press. As has been shown, first drug policy changes already took place under Rafsanjānī, and continued with ever more progressive *drug demand reduction* measures under Ḥātāmī. The same applies to the press: cultural and media freedoms were first introduced during the Rafsanjānī administration, specifically by then culture minister Ḥātāmī, and greatly expanded during the beginning of Ḥātāmī's presidency.

While the media around the world have been reporting on the increasingly progressive Iranian drug policy for years, little is known about how Iranian public opinion perceives this topic. The present analysis aims to fill this gap by analyzing Iranian press discourse on drugs. The press in Iran comes closest to the concept of a public sphere, where the widest variety of voices are expressed and heard, particularly during the administrations of Rafsanjānī and Ḥātāmī. At the same time, however, the press also fulfills a basic function in simply informing public opinion about drug-related issues, and thus becomes itself a crucial tool for drug prevention. National television and radio channels, in contrast, are a much more closed venue, because they are under direct supervision of the Supreme Leader.

Iranian newspapers serve as organs for the different, often competing political factions in Iran. It is, thus, not surprising the many reformist newspapers that appeared after the inauguration of Ḥātāmī took advantage of the new media freedom to advance their opinions and positions. As a result, the press can be expected to express differing opinions on matters of drug policy, and thus becomes an interesting field of investigation. As a consequence, the conservative faction, diametrically opposed to the reformists, used various means to silence the reformist newspapers, especially through the courts. They eventually succeeded in banning practically all reformist newspapers by the year 2000.

Against this background, the present study analyzed Iranian press discourse on drugs over a time period comprising the transition from the Rafsanjānī to the Ḥātāmī administration. This seemed particularly promising because the most important changes in the official drug policy took place during this time, and because the press turned into a hotly disputed arena, in which the competing political factions used their respective newspapers to attack each other. Iranian press discourse during these years, thus, can be expected to reflect both, major changes in the drug policy, and heated debates over it. Such a diachronic analysis, despite being time-consuming, permits the following of the gradual changes that are taking place both, within the official drug policy and Iranian press discourse on drugs. The author analyzed drug-related press coverage between the years 1995-2000. This period looks at the development, which started with the first liberalizations in the fields of the drug and the press policy under Rafsanjānī, and continued with almost unprecedented reforms in both fields, and finally ended shortly before the mass closure of reformist newspapers.

Within this period, the study aims at addressing three basic aspects of the Iranian press discourse on drugs: the range of predominant topics, arguments and further characteristics; shifts within this order over the sample period; and finally inconsistencies and differences within the press. This last aspect is of particular interest. Through such differing opinions and discrepancies, discourses are renegotiated and constantly change. But all three aspects are naturally closely interwoven, as the subsequent methodological chapter will further elaborate (**chapter IV. 3**) A follow-up aspect that will be addressed at the end of the analysis, is the possible impact this interplay might have on the development of a new self-consciousness of the press and of a more professional journalism.

## IV. 2 Sources: Selection, Quantity and Quality of Drug-Related Iranian Newspaper Articles

The task of the present analysis first consisted in the procurement and identification of drug-related newspaper articles that appeared in the Iranian press during the sample period of 1995-2000. Baring in mind that the Iranian newspapers basically serve as organs for the various political factions in Iran, the political affiliation of the respective newspapers as well as the peculiarities of the development of the Iranian press are of crucial importance for their characterization and a first assessment of their significance for the public drugs discourse.

### *Ideological affiliation*

A first essential consideration in this regard is the probably changing political affiliation of a specific newspaper over the years. In the present analysis, such changes are gradual but nevertheless worth mentioning. Thus, *Hamšahrī* for instance remained a newspaper affiliated with the modern right or more concretely with the EXECUTIVES OF CONSTRUCTION, who were in control of the municipality of Tehrān during the entire sample period. Initially, it was edited by the outspoken mayor Ġolām-Ĥossayn Karbāsčī, who turned into one of the main architects of the reformist victory in the presidential elections of May 1997. He was succeeded as the mayor of Tehran and consequently as the publisher of *Hamšahrī* by Mortazā Alvīrī. Alvīrī also was a member of the EXECUTIVES OF CONSTRUCTION, but was, in general, more cautious than his predecessor. This change could of course also be reflected in *Hamšahrī*. The same applies to the governmental newspaper *Irān*, which after Ĥātāmī's election changed hands from the pragmatist to the reformist administration, although here, too, the expected changes might rather be gradual. A similar political repositioning could however also be assumed for the more conservative newspapers of the modern right, such as *Āfarīneš*, which might have rather become more conservative.

A second consideration concerns the reformist newspapers, in particular the new reformist papers that appeared from the beginning of 1998. Due to the increasing pressure of the judiciary, which forced the closure of many newspapers, their qualitative representation in the Iranian press discourse on drugs most probably is distorted. The publishers of the banned newspapers usually managed to publish a successive newspaper within a short time. Yet gaps

between the closure of the old and the appearance of the new publication, as well as the difficulties of organizational restructuring probably still affected the output of these papers.

At the beginning of the sample period – 1995 – Iran was still governed by the pragmatic president Rafsanjānī, who had initiated first liberalizations in the official drug and press policy. The variety of newspapers increased under his presidency, adding a few popular newspapers to the traditional set of newspapers in the Islamic Republic. Practically all established newspapers, namely *Kayhān*, *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, and *Resālat* now were affiliated with the traditional right, as did for instance the local newspaper *Qods*, the newspaper of the vast and wealthy administration of the shrine of Emām Reżā – known as *Āstān-e Qods-e Rażavī* – in Mašhad. *Eṭṭelā‘āt* was however an exceptional case, as it always has been a comparatively moderate newspaper, and as it continued to address a more moderate constituency. Similarly, nestled between the traditional and the modern right was the newspaper *Āfarīneš* of the ISLAMIC ĀZĀD UNIVERSITY.

The modern right around Rafsanjānī particularly controlled the popular newspapers *Irān* and *Hamšahrī*, both of which had appeared at the beginning of the 1990s. But other newspapers that originally had been controlled by the Islamic left now also seem to have become close to them. This is especially true for *Kār va Kārgar* and *Abrār*, which had replaced *Šobḥ-e Āzādegān*, itself the successor of the famous *Āyandegān*.

Initially, thus, the views of the Islamic left only seem to have been reflected in the newspaper *Salām*, and probably in *Ĥorāsān*, the newspaper of the MARTYR’S FOUNDATION (*bonyād-e šahīd*), which at the time was still headed by the leftist cleric Raḥīmīyān. This situation initially remained unchanged after Ḥātāmī’s elections in May 1997. The first new reformist newspapers only appeared from the beginning of 1998 – with the notable exception of *Payām-e Dānešgū-ye Basīḡī* and its more famous successor *Hovviyaat-e Ḥīš* of the ISLAMIC STUDENT UNION. They were all published by influential members of the former Islamic left, who thus now had an entire armada of newspapers at their disposal. Since the conservatives controlled the national television and radio channels, these newspapers became all the more important to the reformists. Next to their outspokenness, the most obvious characteristic of these newspapers is their appearance as ‘serial newspapers’. This practice of practically continuing banned newspapers by simply launching new ones was of course not voluntary. The most prominent of these serials were *Ġāme‘eh – Ṭūs – Āftāb-e Emrūz – Nešāṭ*



– ‘*Aṣr-e Āzādegān* – *Aḥbār-e Eqteṣādī* – *Gūnāgūn*, published by a circle of leftist and reformist intellectuals around Ḥamīd-Reżā Ġālā’īpūr and Māšā’ollāh Šams-ol-Vā’eẓīn; as well as *Ḥordād* – *Fath*, published by Ḥātāmī’s first interior minister ‘Abdollāh Nūrī; and *Salām* – *Bayān*, published by the influential leftist cleric Moḥammad Mūsavī-Ḥo’aynīhā and the important intellectual ‘Abbās ‘Abdī. Further important reformist newspapers were *Šobḥ-e Emrūz*, published by Sa’īd Ḥaġarīyān, one of the architects of the reformist movements; and *Mošārekāt*, the newspaper of Ḥātāmī’s ISLAMIC IRAN PARTICIPATION FRONT and published by his brother Moḥammad-Reżā Ḥātāmī. Other, smaller reformist newspapers were *Gozāreš-e Rūz*, the newspaper of the student leader Hešmatollāh Ṭabarzadī; Dāvūd Bahrāmī Sīyāvošanī’s *Payām-e Āzādī*; Karbāsčī’s new publication *Ham-Mīhan*; and the newspapers *Āryā*, *Āzād*, *Vohūman*. There were certain ideological differences between the reformist newspapers, reflecting certain diversity within the reformist camp, which accrued from ideological and organisational differences between the former member of the Islamic left and the modern right. The same is true for the more traditional newspapers *Hamšahrī*, *Irān* and *Kār va Kārgar*, which now sided with the reformists.

The conservatives, too, launched a few new publications in addition to their newspapers *Kayhān*, *Resālat*, *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, *Qods*, and the more moderate *Eṭṭelā’āt* and *Āfarīneš*. These include Aḥmad Tavakkolī’s *Fardā* and the radical *Ġavān*, which both were launched in 1998. A peculiar case was the newspaper *Entehāb*. Although published by the ISLAMIC PROPAGATION ORGANISATION, which is directly controlled by the Supreme Leader, *Entehāb* was in many regards equally critical and outspoken as the reformist newspapers. The executive manger Ṭaha Hāšemī and the editor Moḥammad-Mehdī Faqīhī both belonged to the current of the ‘religious new thinking’ (*nou-andīštī-ye dīnī*). *Entehāb* eventually stopped publishing in 1383 (2004-05).

### ***The IRANIAN NATIONAL LIBRARY***

The author visited the IRANIAN NATIONAL LIBRARY (*ketāb-ḥāne-ye mellī-ye īrān*), which recently had relocated to northern Tehran where it was greatly expanded, for a first time in 2006. This library dates back to the Qāġār time, when the scientific college *Dār ol-Fonūn* had founded a small library in the early 1860s. The library was, however, only officially inaugurated in 1941.

Initially, the plan consisted of searching through consecutive volumes of individual newspapers, which would have been a time-consuming task. Yet, as part of the profound organizational restructuring, which the director at the time, Moḥammad Ḥātāmī, had commissioned, the NATIONAL LIBRARY had undertaken a comprehensive digitalization project. It had developed an electronic library called *Namāye (index)*, which theoretically contains scanned and digitalized newspapers and magazine from at least 1995. A keyword search allows identifying, and more importantly, directly accessing relevant articles as electronic files. In practice, the newspapers and magazines have, however, only systematically been stored in digital form from 1998 onwards. Articles from earlier years still had to be copied from hardcopy issues.

In initially applying a rather improvised trial-and-error method, the author started to search for newspaper articles with the simple keywords “drugs” (*mavādd-e moḥadder*) and “addiction” (*e’tiyād*). Eventually, the used keywords became ever more refined, including: ‘addict’ (*mo’tād*), ‘opium’ (*taryāk / afyūn*), ‘heroin’ (*herō’īn*), ‘crack’ (*krāk*), ‘methadone’ (*metādōn*), ‘hashish’ (*ḥašīš*), ‘cannabis’ (*kānābīs*), ‘marihuana’ (*mārī-ḡuvānā*), ‘cocaine’ (*kōkā’īn*), ‘ecstasy’ (*ekstāsī*), ‘poppy’ (*ḥaš-ḥāš*), ‘opium addict’ (*taryākī*), ‘syringe’ (*sorang*), ‘traffic’ (*qāčāq*), or ‘trafficker’ (*qāčāq-čī*).

These keywords already yielded hundreds of drug-related articles for the years 1995-2000, and even more for the subsequent years. As a result, the author decided to take into consideration only every alternate year within this time span, three years in total. The analysis thus will start with the drug-related newspaper articles of the year 1374 (1995-96), when Rafsanḡānī still was president; the second year in consideration is 1376 (1997-98), during which Ḥātāmī was elected president; and the third and last year is 1378 (1999-2000), which represents the peak of the reformist press and thus the period of the greatest press freedom.

In analyzing the results yielded by the search in *Namāyeh*, it became obvious that the Iranian press is addressing the drug problem already in 1374 (1995-96), but with increasing frequency over the course of the years. The drug-related newspaper articles that were listed in *Namāyeh* for the years 1374 and 1376 could, however, not all be found in hardcopy, due to incomplete recordings of the library. Since the missing articles were equally distributed among conservative and reformist newspapers, this should not lead to a major distortion of the press discourse. Accordingly, in 1374 (1995-96), the Iranian press published fifty-one

articles, of which only thirty-three could be identified. In 1376 (1997-98), a total of sixty-nine drug-related articles appeared, of which sixty-four could be identified. And in 1378 (1999-2000) the press published one hundred and twenty-five drug-related articles, of which all but two were accessible. The sample for the subsequent analysis consequently consists in total of two hundred and forty-five articles.

### ***Number of drug-related newspaper articles appearing over the course of the sample period***

The following paragraph lists the newspapers of each year in order of the amount of drug-related articles that have been published. The distribution of drug-related articles shows that the newspapers adequately represent the situation of the press, including all important reformist newspapers. At the end of the chapter, a complete list of the newspapers represented in the Iranian press discourse on drugs will be reproduced.

In **1374 (1995-96)**, the fifty-one articles are distributed as follows among the newspapers. The newspaper publishing most drug-related articles is the moderate newspaper *Eṭṭelā'āt* (ten articles), followed by the progressive *Hamšahrī* (nine articles) and the radically conservative *Kayhān* (eight articles). Slightly fewer articles are published by the governmental newspaper *Irān* (seven articles), the moderate *Abrār* (seven articles) and the staunchly conservative *Resālat* (five articles); the conservative *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* as well as the Islamic left *Salām* each only print two drug-related articles; and *Aḥbār*, a newspaper close to the modern right only one article. Although this overview does not yet reveal, how exactly the newspapers discuss the topic of drugs, it already points to the relative importance of specific newspapers in shaping the Iranian press discourse on drugs. Strikingly, the newspapers of the modern right – including the moderately conservative *Eṭṭelā'āt* – are more represented than both the newspapers of the traditional right and *Salām*, the only newspaper of the Islamic left.

<b>Drug related articles in Iranian newspapers</b>									
<b>1374 (1995-96)</b>									
<b>Total</b>	<i>Eṭṭelā'āt</i>	<i>Hamšahrī</i>	<i>Kayhān</i>	<i>Irān</i>	<i>Abrār</i>	<i>Resālat</i>	<i>Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī</i>	<i>Salām</i>	<i>Aḥbār</i>
<b>51</b>	10	9	8	7	7	5	2	2	1

In **1376 (1997-98)**, still the same newspapers are dominating the drug coverage; yet, this time their order of importance changed. Still most drug-related articles were published by

the moderate newspapers *Hamšahrī* (sixteen articles) and *Eṭṭelā'āt* (fourteen articles). Next come the two important conservative newspapers *Resālat* (nine articles) and *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* (eight articles), which increased their coverage compared to two years ago; and the moderately conservative *Āfarīneš* (six articles), the usually very conservative *Qods* (four articles), the moderate *Abrār* (five articles), the radical *Kayhān* (four articles), and the moderate *Aḥbār* (two articles). Astonishingly the leftist *Salām* (one article) again comes last. This distribution suggests that *Hamšahrī*, meanwhile a reformist newspaper, definitively had started to take a leading role in the media scene. The governmental newspaper *Irān*, however, is conspicuously absent from the Iranian press discourse on drugs this year. In contrast, the conservative newspapers had become much more vocal.

Drug related articles in Iranian newspapers										
1376 (1997-98)										
Total	<i>Hamšahrī</i>	<i>Eṭṭelā'āt</i>	<i>Resālat</i>	<i>Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī</i>	<i>Āfarīneš</i>	<i>Abrār</i>	<i>Kayhān</i>	<i>Qods</i>	<i>Aḥbār</i>	<i>Salām</i>
69	16	14	9	8	6	5	4	4	2	1

In 1378 (1999-2000), not only much more newspapers are reporting on drug-related issues, but the reformist newspapers are now clearly dominating the discourse – at least quantitatively. Remarkably, however, most articles are published by the conservative newspaper *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* (fourteen articles). It is followed by Nūr's reformist serial *Ḥordād – Faṭḥ* (together twelve articles); the more religious but reformist newspaper *Ḥorāsān* (ten articles); and by the governmental newspapers *Irān* and *Kār va Kārgar* (each nine articles). Then comes the nominally conservative, but still progressive newspaper *Entehāb* (eight articles). *Āftāb-e Emrūz*, *Nešāṭ*, *‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān*, and *Aḥbār-e Eqtešādī*, all successors to Ġalā'īpūr's famous reformist newspaper *Ġāme'eh*, together publish an equivalent number of drug-related articles as the serial *Salām – Bayān* (seven articles each). They are followed by moderately conservative *Abrār* (six articles), which publishes about the same number of articles as in the previous years; and *Eṭṭelā'āt* and *Hamšahrī* (both five articles), which thus have much less articles than in the previous years. An equal number of drug-related articles is published by the reformist *Šobḥ-e Emrūz* (six vs. five articles). Fewer articles appear in the reformist newspapers *Payām-e Āzādī* (four articles) and *Gozāreš-e Rūz* (three articles), as well as in the staunchly conservative newspapers *Ġavān* and *Qods* (three articles each). Much less significant than in the previous years have become the radical *Kayhān* (two articles) and

*Resālat* (one article), as well as the moderately conservative *Āfarīneš* (one article). Last rank Ḥātāmī's party organ *Mošārekāt* (one article) and Karbāšči's *Ham-Mīhan* (one article).

The strong representation of the reformist newspapers in the ranking of drug-related newspaper articles is not further astonishing. The strong standing of *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* and *Entehāb*, in contrast is remarkable, probably indicating at first glance, that the conservative circles in Qom were more adept in responding to the reformist challenge than other conservatives represented by *Kayhān*, *Resālat* or even *Eṭṭelā'āt* and *Āfarīneš*. Even the radical *Ġavān* and *Qods* wrote more articles than these latter newspapers. Also worth mentioning is the reinvigorated role of the governmental newspapers *Irān* and *Kār va Kargar*, which had both been absent two years ago.

Drug related articles in Iranian newspapers in 1378 (1999-2000)									
Total	<i>Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī</i>	<i>Ḥordād</i>	<i>Fatḥ</i>	<i>Ḥorāsān</i>	<i>Irān</i>	<i>Kār va Kargar</i>	<i>Entehāb</i>	<i>Āftāb-e Emrūz</i>	<i>Nešāt</i>
125	14	5 (12)	7 (12)	10	9	9	8	3 (7)	1 (7)
	<i>'Aṣr-e Āzādegān</i>	<i>Aḥbār-e Eqtešādī</i>	<i>Salām</i>	<i>Bayān</i>	<i>Abrār</i>	<i>Šobḥ-e Emrūz</i>	<i>Hamšahrī</i>	<i>Eṭṭelā'āt</i>	<i>Payām-e Āzādī</i>
	1 (7)	2 (7)	5 (7)	2 (7)	6	6	5	5	4
	<i>Ġavān</i>	<i>Gozāreš-e Rūz</i>	<i>Qods</i>	<i>Āzād</i>	<i>Āryā</i>	<i>Kayhān</i>	<i>Āfarīneš</i>	<i>Ham-Mīhan</i>	<i>Mošārekāt</i>
	3	3	3	2	2	2	1	1	1
	<i>Tarġomān-e Rūz</i>	<i>Vohūman</i>	<i>Resālat</i>						
	1	1	1						

In total, the distribution of drug related newspaper article over the course of the sample period thus closely corresponds to the general development of the press, namely the increasing importance of the reformist newspapers. Surprising, however, is a reinvigorated presence of new conservative newspapers from the second year in consideration, as well as the continuing influence of conservative newspapers, in particular of *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*.

### Formal details

A serious content analysis in the field of media studies not only requires taking into account the political and personal affiliation of newspapers, but also additional details such as the genre and style of the articles, the rubric in which they appear, the authors of the articles,

as well as their length, format, and layout. Unfortunately, this is only possible to a limited extent in the present analysis. The NATIONAL LIBRARY's electronic program *Namāyeh* only displays the newspaper articles in isolated form, cut out from the whole page. Additionally, articles from the year 1378 (1999-2000) are often saved in BMP (bitmap) format, which does not depict the original format of the articles. Further details, such as for instance the rubric, advertisements, images, charts, and page numbers, are thus often missing. Only from 2005 onwards, articles are saved in PDF format, which adequately reproduces the original appearance. Additionally, authorship is, in general, only rarely disclosed in the Iranian press.

The lack of such details, therefore, makes a consistent analysis of the formal aspects impossible. This is certainly detrimental to carrying out a thorough analysis comprising form and content, as particularly requested by the critical discourse analysis. Since the present analysis, however, is more interested in the topics and arguments of the Iranian press discourse on drugs, this has to be accepted. Nevertheless, based on the author's observation of the press discourse on drugs, especially also in later years, a general formal characterization will be given here.

The newspaper articles all consist of longer reports or comments on various aspects of drugs in Iran and abroad. Shorter agency reports on drug seizures or the arrest of drug traffickers, which are a common feature in the Iranian press, are not recorded by *Namāyeh*, and consequently will not be considered in the present analysis either. The newspapers are usually published in DIN-A2 or DIN-A3 format. Drug-related articles typically cover a space ranging from an eighth of a page up to an entire page. They are arranged in up to nine relatively narrow columns, and the font-size is usually small.

Not all newspapers have the same rubrics, which makes a comparison difficult. Based on an analysis of the drug-related articles of 1374 (1995/96), where the author had access to the original newspapers, the articles typically appear in the rubrics "social" (*eğtemā'ī* – fourteen articles); "comment" (*gozāreš* – twelve articles) or "daily comment" (*gozāreš-e rūz* – 2 articles); or "news" (*aḥbār* – eight articles), which at times is differentiated between "foreign news" (*aḥbār-e dāḥelī* – five articles) and "domestic news" (*aḥbār-e dāḥelī* – two articles). Further irregular rubrics are "roundtable" (*mīz-gerd* – one article), "political" (*siyāsī* – one article) and "miscellaneous" (*bā ḥādeṭeh-hā* – one article). The fact that most articles appeared in the rubric "social" at least indicates, that already in the first year of the analysis,

the press openly acknowledged a domestic problem of drug addiction. More light will of course only be shed by the subsequent content analysis.

### *List of consulted Iranian newspapers*

Name	Political affiliation <sup>833</sup>	Date of appearance	Circulation	License holder / editor
<b>Newspapers of the traditional right / conservatives</b>				
<b><i>Kayhān</i></b> (Universe)	radical / traditional right – conservative	1942 – ongoing	< 250,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>license holder:</b> FOUNDATION OF THE OPPRESSED AND DISABLED (<i>bonyād-e mostaẓ‘afān va ġānbāzān</i>)</li> <li>- <b>editor-in-chief:</b> from 1992, Hossain Šarī‘at-Madārī, directly appointed by Hāmeneh’ī</li> <li>- long-time rival of the newspaper <i>Eḡḡelā‘at</i>, both of which have dominated the Iranian press scene for decades</li> <li>- from the Islamic revolution, the most radical newspaper: first, however, close to the Islamic left, since the early 1990s close to the traditional right</li> <li>- radical mouthpiece of the Supreme Leader ‘Alī Hāmeneh’ī</li> </ul>
<b><i>Resālat</i></b> (Message / Mission)	radical / traditional right – conservative	1985 – ongoing	50,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>license holder:</b> Mortazā Nabavī, a member of the EXPEDIENCY COUNCIL</li> <li>- <b>editor-in-chief:</b> Amīr Moḡebbiyān</li> <li>- main organ of the COALITION OF ISLAMIC ASSOCIATIONS (<i>hay‘at-e mo‘talafe-ye eslāmī</i>)</li> <li>- also close to the traditional right COMBATANT CLERGY ASSOCIATION</li> </ul>
<b><i>Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī</i></b> (Islamic Republic)	traditional right – conservative	1979 – ongoing	50,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>license holder &amp; editor-in-chief:</b> first ‘Alī Hāmene’ī, then Masīḡ Mohāġerī</li> <li>- originally the organ of the ISLAMIC</li> </ul>

<sup>833</sup> Referring to the political affiliation of the newspaper during the sample period (1995-2000).

				<p>REPUBLIC PARTY</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- today close to the SOCIETY OF TEACHERS OF QOM THEOLOGICAL SEMINARIES and the COMBATANT CLERGY ASSOCIATION</li> </ul>
<i>Qods</i> (Jerusalem)	radical / traditional right – conservative	1987 – ongoing	< 50,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>license holder:</b> <i>Āstān-e Qods-e Rażavī</i>, the administration of the shrine of Emām Reżā in Mašhad</li> <li>- <b>managing director:</b> Ġalāl Fayyāzī</li> </ul>
<i>Ġavān</i> (Young) <sup>834</sup>	radical / conservative	1981 – ongoing	50,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- radical newspaper close to the the IRGC</li> </ul>
<i>Eṭṭelā'āt</i> (Information)	moderate - progressive / traditional right – conservative	1926 – ongoing	> 120,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>license holder:</b> FOUNDATION OF THE OPPRESSED AND DISABLED</li> <li>- <b>editor-in-chief:</b> Maḥmūd Do'ā'ī, directly appointed by Ḥāmeneh'ī</li> <li>- the oldest still existing Iranian daily</li> <li>- always more moderate, and especially since the Islamic revolution more factual, than its rival <i>Kayhān</i></li> <li>- moderate mouthpiece of the Supreme Leader 'Alī Ḥāmeneh'ī</li> </ul>
<i>Āfarīneš</i> (Creation)	moderate / modern right – conservative	1991 – ongoing	unknown / average	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>license holder:</b> 'Abdollah Ġasbī, co-founder and president of the ISLAMIC ĀZĀD UNIVERSITY</li> </ul>
<i>Abrār</i> (the Pious)	moderate / modern right – conservative	1986 – ongoing	< 50,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>license holder &amp; editor-in-chief:</b> Moḥammad Šāfīzādeh</li> <li>- originally the organ of the Islamic left and successor to their newspaper <i>Šobḥ-e Āzādegān</i>, itself the successor of the prestigious <i>Āyandegān</i></li> <li>- from the beginning of the 1990s, increasingly conservative</li> </ul>
<i>Entehāb</i> (Choice)	progressive / (officially) conservative	1998 – 2004	50,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>license holder:</b> ISLAMIC PROPAGATION ORGANISATION OF QOM</li> <li>- <b>publisher &amp; editor-in-chief:</b> Taḥa Ḥāšemī and Moḥammad Mehdī Faqīhī</li> </ul>

<sup>834</sup> According to Samii, *Ġavān* is a hardliner or radical conservative weekly newspaper: Samii (1999), 2; Samii (2001), 3.



				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- supervised by <i>āyatollah</i> Ḥāmeneh'ī</li> <li>- despite being affiliated with the conservatives, <i>Entehāb</i> was an outspoken and critical newspaper</li> </ul>
<b>Newspapers of the modern right / later mostly reformists</b>				
<i>Hamšahrī</i> (Fellow-Citizen)	moderate – progressive / modern right – reformist	1992 – ongoing	350,000 – 450,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>license holder:</b> municipality of Tehrān</li> <li>- founded by Tehrān's popular mayor Ġolām-Ḥosayn Karbāsčī</li> <li>- as such: the unofficial organ of the EXECUTIVES OF CONSTRUCTIONS</li> <li>- later a reformist newspaper, although still close to the pragmatists</li> </ul>
<i>Īrān</i> (Iran)	moderate – progressive / modern right – reformist	1995 – ongoing	330,000 – 350,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>license holder:</b> Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), government of Iran (executive)</li> <li>- <b>editor-in-chief:</b> Ḥosayn Žiy'āt</li> <li>- the only official governmental newspaper</li> <li>- as such changing its affiliation with the respective governments</li> <li>- during the sample period: always a moderate, informative newspaper</li> </ul>
<i>Kār va Kārgar</i> (Work and Worker)	moderate / modern right – reformist	1984 – ongoing	50,000 – 100,000?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>license holder:</b> WORKER'S HOUSE / 'Alī Rabī'ī</li> <li>- <b>editor-in-chief:</b> Mortežā Loṭfī</li> <li>- a publication of the official Iranian workers association</li> <li>- as such originally close to the Islamic left, then to the modern right</li> <li>- with Rabī'ī as publisher, it moved to the reformist camp, especially after the chain murders</li> <li>- later again more moderate</li> </ul>
<i>Aḥbār</i> (News)	moderate / conservative	1994 – mid 1999?	unkown / low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>license holder &amp; editor-in-chief:</b> Aḥmad Šafā'ī-Far</li> <li>- close to the modern right / pragmatists around Rafsanġānī</li> </ul>

Newspapers of the Islamic left / reformists				
<b><i>Ḥorāsān</i></b> (Khorasan)	Moderate – progressive / Islamic left – reformist	1949 – ongoing	unknown / average	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>license holder:</b> MARTYR’S FOUNDATION (<i>bonyād-e šahīd</i>)</li> <li>- <b>managing director:</b> Ḥossain Ġazālī</li> <li>- after the Islamic revolution first published by the FOUNDATION OF THE OPPRESSED AND DISABLED</li> <li>- in 1984, transferred to the MARTYR’S FOUNDATION and thus close to the Islamic left</li> </ul>
<b><i>Salām</i></b> (Hello)	progressive / Islamic left – reformist	October 1990 – July 2000	50,000 – 100,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>license holder &amp; managing director:</b> Moḥammad Mūsavī-Ḥo’ainihā</li> <li>- <b>editor-in-chief:</b> ‘Abbās ‘Abdī</li> <li>- unofficial organ of the Islamic left ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS</li> <li>- very critical and popular</li> <li>- banned on 6 June 1998</li> </ul>
<b><i>Bayān</i></b> (Statement)	progressive / reformist	autumn 1999 – April 2000	> 200,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>license holder &amp; managing director:</b> ‘Alī-Akbar Moḥtašamī-Pūr</li> <li>- <i>Bayān</i> already had appeared from June 1990 – March 1991 as the unofficial organ of the FREEDOM MOVEMENT</li> <li>- replaced <i>Salām</i> as the organ of the ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS</li> </ul>
<b><i>Āftāb-e Emrūz</i></b> (Today’s Sun)	progressive/ reformist	July 1998 – August 2000	< 100,000?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>license holder:</b> Feraiḍūn ‘Ammūzādeh Ḥalīlī</li> <li>- successor of Ġalā’ī-Pūr und Šams-ol-Vā‘ezīn’s newspaper <i>Ṭūs</i>, successor of <i>Ġāme‘eh</i></li> </ul>
<b><i>Nešāṭ</i></b> (Joy)	progressive / reformist	February – September 1999	150,000 – 200,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>license holder:</b> Māšā’ollāh Šams-ol-Vā‘ezīn</li> <li>- <b>editor-in-chief:</b> Laṭīf Šafarī</li> <li>- the more famous and later successor of the newspapers <i>Ṭūs</i>, successor of <i>Ġāme‘eh</i></li> </ul>

<i>‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān</i> (Afternoon of the Free)	progressive / reformist	September 1999 – April 2000	> 200,000?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>license holder &amp; publisher:</b> Ḥamīd-Reżā Ġalā’ī-Pūr &amp; Māšā’ollāh Šams-ol-Vā’eżīn</li> <li>- <b>editor-in-chief:</b> Maḥmūd Šams</li> <li>- successor of the newspaper <i>Nešāṭ</i>, successor of <i>Ṭūs</i> and <i>Ġāme‘eh</i></li> </ul>
<i>Aḥbār-e Eqtešādī</i> (Economic News)	progressive/ reformist	September 1999 – August 2000?	Unknown / > 50'000?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>publisher:</b> ‘Īsā Šaḥarḥīz</li> <li>- successor of the newspaper <i>Nešāṭ</i>, successor of <i>Ṭūs</i> and <i>Ġāme‘eh</i></li> <li>- taking over the recently dormant license of <i>Aḥbār</i></li> </ul>
<i>Ḥordād</i> (Khordad – the month of Ḥātāmī’s election)	progressive/ reformist	December 1998 – October 1999	150,000 – 200,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>managing director:</b> ‘Abdollāh Nūrī</li> <li>- close to the ISLAMIC IRAN PARTICIPATION FRONT</li> </ul>
<i>Fatḥ</i> (Victory)	progressive/ reformist	November 1999 – April 2000	> 150,000?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>license holder &amp; managing director:</b> ‘Alī Ḥekmat and ‘Emād-al-Dīn Bāqī</li> <li>- close to the ISLAMIC IRAN PARTICIPATION FRONT</li> <li>- successor of the newspaper <i>Ḥordād</i></li> </ul>
<i>Šobḥ-e Emrūz</i> (Today’s Morning)	progressive / reformist	December 1998 – April 2000	150,000 – 200,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>license holder &amp; managing director:</b> Sa’īd Ḥaġariyān-Kāšānī</li> <li>- close to the ISLAMIC IRAN PARTICIPATION FRONT</li> </ul>
<i>Mošārekat</i> (Partnership)	progressive / reformist	December 1998 – April 2000	50,000 – 100,000?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>license holder:</b> ISLAMIC IRAN PARTICIPATION FRONT</li> <li>- <b>editor-in-chief:</b> Moḥammad-Reżā Ḥātāmī</li> <li>- official organ of the ISLAMIC IRAN PARTICIPATION FRONT</li> </ul>
<i>Gozāreš-e Rūz</i> (Daily Report)	progressive / reformist	early 1998? – April 2000	< 50,000?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>publisher:</b> Hešmatollā Ṭabarzadī</li> <li>- <b>editor-in-chief:</b> ‘Alī-Moḥammad Mahdavi-Ḥorramī</li> <li>- close to the ISLAMIC STUDENT UNION</li> <li>- somehow a successor to Ṭabarzadīs</li> </ul>

				student newspapers <i>Payām-e Dānešgā</i> and <i>Hovviyyat-e H'īš</i>
<i>Payām-e Āzādī</i> (Free Message)	progressive / reformist	early 1998 – April 2000	< 20,000	- <b>managing director:</b> Davūd Bahrāmī Siyāvūšānī
<i>Ham-Mīhan</i> (Compatriot)	progressive / reformist	early 2000 – August 2000	< 100,000	- <b>license holder &amp; editor:</b> Ġolām- Ḥosayn Karbāsčī - published on occasion of the sixth parliamentary elections
<i>Āzād</i> (Free)	moderate / pragmatist to reformist	early 1998 – April February 1999	50,000	- <b>license holder:</b> administration of the free trade zones of Kīš and Qešm islands - <b>managing director:</b> Moḥammad-Režā Yazdān-Panāh - <b>editor-in-chief:</b> Sa'īd Laylāz - sometimes also referred to as <i>Manāteq-e Āzād</i> (free zones) - emphatic on economic reforms, generally reformist
<i>Āryā</i> (Arian)	nationalist / reformist	early 1998 – April 2000	< 50,000	- <b>managing director:</b> Moḥammad-Režā Zohdī - presumably a paper of the nationalists, close to the reformist camp
<i>Vohūman</i> (Vohu-Mana / Good Spirit)	reformist?	2000??	unknown	- probably successor to the newspaper <i>Bahman</i> , which had been published by 'Aṭā'ollāh Mohāḡerānī before the 1996 parliamentary elections

### IV. 3. The Methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis

The present analysis of the Iranian press discourse on drugs is based on the general epistemological assumption of *pragmatism* and the *linguistic turn* that a society interprets reality by an active – that is speaking and thinking – examination of the social and material world. Foucault's *discourse analysis* sees language or more generally discursive practices, decisive for the interpretation and even the constitution of social realities. It naturally presents itself as an adequate methodology for the analysis of the Iranian press discourse on drugs, which concentrates more on the discussion of the drug problem than on the 'realities behind'. discourse analysis, therefore, is an adequate methodological tool, as it essentially concentrates on power effects of discourses.

*Discourse analysis* maintains that specific discourses rule, by relatively consistent orders of discourse, how a society perceives and talks about social realities. Discourses thus actually exercise power on individual members of society by regulating what is considered to be true and real. This power also contributes to the continuity of discourse orders or certain elements within. Yet, at the same time, discourses are always characterized by inconsistencies and contradictions. These reflect past and present hegemonic struggles in a society because the discourse itself becomes a tool for attaining sovereignties of interpretation. Like social power relations, *orders of discourse* thus are unstable. Individual members accordingly can choose *discursive strategies* to influence these *orders of discourse*, and consequently are responsible for the discontinuity of discourses or certain elements within.

While providing to be the fundamental methodological tools for the analysis of the Iranian press discourse on drugs, Foucault's *discourse analysis* or Jäger and Fairclough's *critical discourse analysis* respectively do have certain disadvantages. In identifying the topical and formal structures of the discourse, it does not address the problem of the relationship between necessarily existent previous knowledge and the generation or discovery of new knowledge that is adequate to the data material. This is, however, of crucial importance in the present analysis, as the topics of the European (or more generally the international scientific) drug discourse are not automatically congruent with the topics of the Iranian drug discourse. The present analysis, therefore, additionally takes inspiration from the *grounded theory* in developing an appropriate relational model of concepts present in the Iranian press discourse on drugs, yet by continuing to principally follow the procedure of *discourse analysis*.

### *Pragmatism as an epistemological background*

The philosophical theory of *pragmatism* in the tradition of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) and later of Hilary Putnam (b. 1926) or Richard Rorty (1931-2007) questions the assumption of rationalism or classic transcendentalism, which says that there are supra-historical and stable theoretical explanations of the world. Instead of such deterministic universal rules, *pragmatism* claims that the world is constructed in a pluralistic and procedural way; hence, it is not possible to reduce explanations of the world to one ideal organizing principle, but different theories forcibly reflect multiple perspectives.<sup>835</sup> Theories on the social world are only valid for a specific location and time, and they remain open for falsification and amelioration.<sup>836</sup> Particularly this latter view of Peirce and Rorty has been criticized for eventually still pursuing an idealistic, more comprehensive and truer description of the world.<sup>837</sup> What remains still crucial is the pragmatist proposition that terms such as judgments and theories are finite tools to describe a temporary reality.<sup>838</sup>

To attain nevertheless an adequate and valid explanation of phenomena of the “real” world, *pragmatism* proposes a methodological procedure called *belief-doubt-belief* scheme. Accordingly, it puts previous knowledge into doubt and generates new knowledge by asking abductive or suggestive questions, whose practicability has to be proven by the material of investigation.<sup>839</sup> Important in pragmatism is, however, not an – always illusionary – objectivity of such an explanation, but its validity in terms of how practical and effective it is in describing a specific social reality.<sup>840</sup>

This basic epistemological assumption of *pragmatism* is an important point of reference for the *grounded theory*, which the present analysis uses as an auxiliary methodological tool to identify the topical structure of the Iranian press discourse on drugs. It applies, however, generally to the present study, which is aware of its inevitable subjectivity

---

<sup>835</sup> Particularly William James and Richard Rorty have accentuated this pluralistic world outlook: Nagl (1998), 7-19, 67f.; Strübing (2004), 37ff.

<sup>836</sup> This view is shared by Peirce, James, George Herbert Mead, John Dewey and Rorty: Nagl (1998), 29ff., 65ff., 89ff., 113f., 116ff., 123ff. 167ff.

<sup>837</sup> James, in contrast, stresses the pluralism of experiences and explanations, which always will retain their provisional character: Nagl (1998), 47, 58ff., 170ff.

<sup>838</sup> Particularly Dewey understands his version of pragmatism as instrumental, that is as a situational tool instead of a universal theory: Nagl (1998), 113ff.

<sup>839</sup> In his *pragmatic maxim*, Peirce has differentiated between four historical strategies to resolve a practical (as opposed to a categorical) doubt: Nagl (1998), 23ff., 32ff., 115ff.; Strübing (2004), 40ff.

<sup>840</sup> Nagl (1998), 22ff.

but attempts to provide the reader with a comprehensible and valid description of the Iranian press discourse on drugs.<sup>841</sup>

In talking about “reality”, *pragmatism* is however aware that a society always interprets external phenomena – that are independent of language – through the lens of language. Objects of the “real” world only gain meaning by the active – that is thinking or speaking – interaction of human beings with elements of the social and material world.<sup>842</sup> A specific society thus always mediates “reality” through particular sets of language signs.<sup>843</sup> This mediation consequently not only represents elements of “reality”, but a specific society or *community of investigators* as Peirce has called it, actually constitutes its own reality – or the conception of it – by deciding what is real and true.<sup>844</sup> Such a society consequently influences the constitution of its individual members and their actions and opinions respectively.<sup>845</sup> This assumption of *pragmatism* is a crucial point of reference for the *discourse analysis*, which serves the present analysis of the Iranian press discourse on drugs as the main methodological tool.

### ***Discourse Analysis***

Consistent with *pragmatism* and more particularly with the current of *linguistic turn*, Michel Foucault’s *discourse analysis*, too, postulates that each – historically or geographically distinctive – society constitutes its specific reality through language and especially through various and often overlapping discourses.<sup>846</sup> *Discourse analysis* understands a discourse as a regulated way of talking – and thus thinking – about different social and other phenomena of the “real world”, and maintains that such discourses rule what is to be considered true or wrong, real or unreal. The relationship between discourses and other social elements is indeed an intricate one. Discourses do not passively represent existing

---

<sup>841</sup> Discourse analysis also assumes that there are no external and objective but only temporary and historical truths: **Jäger** (2004), 54f.; the inevitable selectivity and thus subjectivity also applies to discourse analysis: **Fairclough** (2003), 14.

<sup>842</sup> Dewey regards cognition as an active process: **Nagl** (1998), 153.

<sup>843</sup> Already Peirce has deliberated on semiotics and maintained that only the mediating act of an interpreter of signs establishes a link between object and subject; later, James, Mead and especially Putnam have sharpened this argument by emphasizing the somehow arbitrary distinction between object and subject: **Nagl** (1998), 21f., 39ff., 85f., 92., 148f., 157ff.; **Strübing** (2004), 48.

<sup>844</sup> James and Putnam, too, have emphasized that the human beings claim truth – and not the ‘*ready made world*’: **Nagl** (1998), 28, 66.

<sup>845</sup> This point is particularly highlighted by Mead: **Nagl** (1998), 92f.

<sup>846</sup> On the constitutive function of language for the perception of reality and the reality itself: **Landwehr** (2001), 9-64; **Sarasin** (2003), 10-31; **Fairclough** (2003), 24; **Jäger** (2004), 94.

social “realities” but contribute to construct and organize them.<sup>847</sup> Discourses – or more generally language – thus have the function of depicting reality in a particular way, in which a society perceives it.<sup>848</sup>

A discourse indeed organizes itself according to particular – linguistic, intellectual, social, economic, political, and so forth – conditions of a society, or according to an *order of discourse* as Foucault has called it. Orders of discourse regulate the discourse by the recurrence of contents, forms, classifications, symbols or strategies; as a result, such orders of discourse are relatively strict and forcibly subject the participants of a discourse to its rules and regulations.<sup>849</sup> Yet, within this regulatory framework, the individual discourse participants retain a certain degree of interpretative autonomy – or in other words a possibility to formulate their own *discourse positions* and *strategies*.<sup>850</sup> Orders of discourse thus contain both homogenizing and heterogenizing elements, which are the result of historical continuities and discontinuities as well as of discursive entities and the overlapping of such entities.<sup>851</sup> While both forces are present to various degrees in discourses, it also depends on the focus of the analysis, whether it puts the stress more on the homogenizing or the heterogenizing aspects of a discourse.

---

<sup>847</sup> Foucault regards a discourse as an ‘*organisational principle*’ regulating scattered events: **Foucault** (1981), 34; Jäger defines discourse as an articulatory practice, which actively constitutes and articulates social conditions ‘*als Fluss von sozialen Wissensvorräten durch die Zeit*’ (as a flow of stocks of knowledge through time): **Jäger** (2004), 23.; Fairclough regards discourses as ways describing ‘*processes, relations and structures of the material world, the ‘mental world’ of thoughts, feelings, beliefs*’, but also focuses on the ‘*dialectical relationship*’ between discourses and other elements of the social life: **Fairclough** (2003), 18f., 22ff., 126, 207f.; **Fairclough** (2009), 4., 59, 131; Link defines discourse as ‘*geregelte Redeweise mit Machteffekt in einem beschränkten Sprechraum*’ (a regulated way of speaking with power effect in a restricted area of what is capable of being said): **Link** (2006), 407, 410.

<sup>848</sup> Generally on the intricate relationship between language or discourses and reality, or between subject and object (and mediating (discursive) action): **Jäger** (2004), 83ff., 88ff., 144ff.

<sup>849</sup> Foucault differentiates particularly between *formations, topics, modalities of expression, concepts, strategies, and consequences*: **Foucault** (1981), 33-112, esp. 33-47; Jäger does not explicitly use the term order of discourse when referring to such regularities of a discourse: **Jäger** (2004), 170, 208; **Link** (2006), 420f.; Fairclough sees the orders of discourse as representations of social practices that are networked to a social order; he puts a particular emphasis on classifications as a constituent of orders of discourse and following Bourdieu calls them ‘*unconscious instruments of construction*’: **Fairclough** (2003), 3, 124f., 130f., 206f.

<sup>850</sup> **Foucault** (1981), 56f., 100ff.; Jäger puts more emphasis on the homogenising effects of discourses and accordingly regards individual discourse positions as ‘*Spielart des Gleichen*’ (variation of the same): **Jäger** (2004), 107f., 169f., 208f.; Link also emphasises that individual discourse positions use the same inter-discourse: **Link** (2006), 419f.; BERNSTEIN (1996) has described the possibility for an individual discourse position as follows: ‘*every time a discourse moves, there is a space for ideology to play*’ – quoted in: **Fairclough** (2009), 57, 78.

<sup>851</sup> **Jäger** (2004), 208f.; these forces are responsible for both continuity and change in discourses: **Fairclough** (2003), 3; **Fairclough** (2009), 57f., 73.



Both, these unifying and dis-unifying forces reflect power struggles within a society. Foucault, in his definition of *discourse analysis*, has put a particular emphasis on the power effects of discourses.<sup>852</sup> On the one hand, a discourse is indeed exercising power by actually constituting – that is producing and defining – knowledge and thus establishing dominant representations of the world or ideologies that claim to have universal status. Only due to such hegemonic *discourse practices* and *strategies*, a specific society considers certain opinions to be true or wrong. A discourse thus actually exerts power on its participants by predetermining a specific, relatively consistent and uniform set of rules and regulations.<sup>853</sup> Yet on the other hand, a specific discourse is also a reflection of power relations in a society. Such past and present contestations of power are consequently also responsible for contradictions, ambivalences and heterogeneities inherent in a discourse. A discourse does, however, not only passively reflect such struggles for hegemony and in particular for ideological domination, but the discourse itself becomes a crucial tool for the exertion of power, as it establishes sovereignties of interpretation.<sup>854</sup> Owing to this dual power effects, Fairclough perceives discourses as one of various social actions to exercise and contest power; yet more often, discursive power relations are not separate from other social power relations, but they are in fact also innate to them as Foucault emphasizes.<sup>855</sup> As the equilibrium of power in a society is always unstable and temporary, power relations shift, and so do the discourses, with which respective social actors seek to achieve interpretative hegemony over others.<sup>856</sup> Such changes in the *orders of discourse* typically happen by a rearrangement of different elements constituting a discourse or for instance by a recontextualisation of elements of one discourse

---

<sup>852</sup> Foucault particularly exposed the power-effects of discourses in his first volume of the *History of Sexuality* (*The Will To Knowledge*): **Foucault** (1976); **Jäger** (2004), 23f., 127ff., 142ff., 149ff.; **Landwehr** (2001), 83ff.

<sup>853</sup> **Foucault** (1981), 33-47, 58; Jäger put more emphasis on the (homogenizing) power effects of discourses than on hegemonic struggles within – yet without ignoring the latter: **Jäger** (2004), 54f., 149ff., 210ff.; Fairclough maintains that social actors try to influence and dominate discourses in order to dominate and exploit others; and that the struggle for ideological hegemony is tied to action not to truth: **Fairclough** (2003), 9; **Fairclough** (2009), 29, 62, esp. 127ff.;

<sup>854</sup> **Foucault** (1981), 56f., 96ff.; **Jäger** (2004), 127, 153, 210f.; Fairclough puts more emphasis on the hegemonic struggle within discourses than on the power effects of dominant discourses, and thus considers discourses to be less ‘*closed or rigid*’ than Jäger does; he has developed his view of *hegemonic struggle* on the basis of Gramsci’s concepts of hegemonic strategies: **Fairclough** (2003), 41, 45f., esp. 55ff., 207; particularly such contradictions create room for individual discourse positions and changes of the orders of discourse: **Fairclough** (2009), esp. 61f.

<sup>855</sup> There are of course other factors of power in a society – such as for instance physical violence; Foucault (*The Will To Knowledge*) quoted in: **Jäger** (2004), 142ff, 152; Fairclough admits that hegemonic struggles ‘to a substantial extent’ take place in and by means of discursive practices: **Fairclough** (2009), 129.

<sup>856</sup> Discourse participants can oppose dominant discourses by adapting specific discourse tactics; at times, different dominant discourses are also fighting each other: **Jäger** (2004), 23f., 127ff., 142ff., 149ff.

into another.<sup>857</sup> The new *orders of discourse* continue, however, to be characterized by both homogeneous and heterogeneous aspects.<sup>858</sup>

In analyzing discourses, the materials of investigation are generally texts as the immediate product of the human action of speaking, comprising any forms of written or otherwise recorded forms of speech production.<sup>859</sup> Individual texts – like individual persons – consequently are not only the expression of individual opinions, but they are always part of and thus regulated by specific discourses.<sup>860</sup> *Discourse analysis* consequently predominantly consists in analyzing text corpora, albeit other discursive practices do exist as well.<sup>861</sup>

Jäger provides the probably most concrete instruction manual for the practical application of discourse analysis or *critical discourse analysis* as he and Fairclough each call their version of this methodology.<sup>862</sup> For the sake of the analysis, he proposes to differentiate between different levels and aspects of discourses.<sup>863</sup> Essentially, he makes a distinction between the totality of discourses in a society, which he calls *discourse swarm* or *entire discourse*; and *discourse strands*, which differ from each other by covering distinctive topical entities but which are entangled within each other. Such *discourse strands* usually correspond to the common use of the term *discourse*, and together they constitute the entire discourse of a society.<sup>864</sup> In the present study, the relevant *discourse strand* is accordingly the Iranian drug discourse in all its occurrences. The smallest entities to analyze such a discourse strand are the

---

<sup>857</sup> Jäger (2004), 128; regarding orders of discourse as intersections of different discourses, Fairclough also talks about the mediation of meaning from one text (or also discourse) to another, or of denaturalisation of existing conventions: Fairclough (2003), 30f., 128; such strategies for a transformation of the orders of discourse are not only pursued by rival social actors but also by the already dominant actors, which either try to preserve the existent order of discourse or to restructure and renew it themselves; Fairclough also talks of a “*continual ‘negotiation’ of differences of meaning*”: Fairclough (2009), 78, 127ff..

<sup>858</sup> Fairclough (2003), 3, esp. 55ff., and 126ff.; Fairclough (2009), 9, esp. 62ff., and 127ff.

<sup>859</sup> Jäger defines *text* as “*das sprachlich gefasste Ergebnis einer mehr oder minder komplexen individuellen Tätigkeit*” (the result of a more or less complex, individual actions packed in language); in seeing discourses as social actions he closely follows Aleksei Leontiev’s activity theory: Jäger (2004), 78-112; 118f., 167ff.; according to Fairclough, any examples of “*language in use*” is text: Fairclough (2003), 3.

<sup>860</sup> Jäger (2004), 22, 117f., 169ff.; according to Fairclough, however, texts also “*bring about changes*”: Fairclough (2003), 8.

<sup>861</sup> Foucault later has put more emphasis on non-linguistic discursive practices – as for instance visible in institutions, apparatus or architecture – the totality of which he called *dispositif* (device): Foucault (1981), 99f.; Jäger (2004), 24; Link defines *dispositif* as a relatively stable interlinking of a specific inter-discursive combination with a specific power relation: Link (2006), 418f.

<sup>862</sup> Even though both authors call their methodology *critical discourse analysis*, their theoretical presumption and methodological procedure differ from each other, as especially Jäger stresses: Jäger (2004), 122.

<sup>863</sup> On the practical implementation of discourse analysis: Jäger (2004), 158ff.; Landwehr (2001), 103-134; Fairclough also proposes a ‘relational approach’ to discourse analysis by analyzing different levels (such as for instance genres or styles) of a discourse and the relation between them: Fairclough (2003), 37f.

<sup>864</sup> Jäger emphasizes the mutual influence between the entire discourse and the different discourse strands that constitute it: Jäger (2004), 167ff.

*discourse fragments*, which Jäger defines as texts or particular parts of texts.<sup>865</sup> In the case of the Iranian drug discourse, this comprises all written – or otherwise recorded – texts dealing with the issue of drugs. The analysis of the entire Iranian drug discourse would however go beyond the scope of the present study. Jäger additionally differentiates between various *discourse levels*, which correspond to functionally different settings, in which the same topic is discussed.<sup>866</sup> In the case of the Iranian drug discourse, there are for instance the *discourse levels* of politics, the medical profession, religious institutions or the media, which all are discussing the international and national drug problem.

This research undertakes an analysis of the *discourse level* of media, and within it the *sector* of the daily press.<sup>867</sup> This choice presents itself because the relevant *discourse fragments* – that is drug related articles from the Iranian press – are readily accessible in the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF IRAN. On the other hand, however, and more importantly, the press represents the most contested section of the public sphere in Iran and thus mirrors the widest variety of opinions or discourse positions – in particular during the years of the sample period (1995-2000). As a rule, Iranian newspapers serve as political organs for the various ideological factions of the Islamic Republic; but the press fulfills a more complex function in the Iranian society, as the present study will show. The press, furthermore, reflects many aspects of other *discourse levels* as well, thus being sort of an intersection between the different *discourse levels*. The Iranian press consequently can be considered the best segment to analyze the various homogenizing and heterogenizing forces within the Iranian drug discourse.<sup>868</sup>

Discourses on the level of media are indeed particular discourses, because media discourses can be seen as bringing together – or according to Fairclough mediating – various specialized discourses for mass communication.<sup>869</sup> Media, especially in the Iranian context, and the press in particular are an important tool in the hegemonic struggle for the control of

---

<sup>865</sup> Jäger (2004), 159f.; Landwehr (2001), 106f.

<sup>866</sup> Jäger (2004), 163.

<sup>867</sup> Jäger also advises to concentrate on only one sector if the data abound: Jäger (2004), 189.

<sup>868</sup> The Iranian television and radio channels for instance, all belong to the IRIB, which the Supreme Leader and his conservative allies control; they would accordingly reflect a much narrower bandwidth of discourse positions as the Iranian press.

<sup>869</sup> Link – and partly based on him Jäger – define general, non-scientific discourses – such as for instance in the media – as inter-discourses – which they define as locations where different discourses are entangled with each other; Link additionally sees discourses of the public sphere as a combination of inter-discourses and elementary discourses (that is everyday discourses with anthropological constants such as death, love or generations): Link (2006), 408, 412, 414; Jäger (2004), 159; on the particularity of media discourses, which Fairclough not explicitly subsumes under inter-discourses: Fairclough (2009), 78f.

the public opinion and generally for the political and ideological sovereignty of interpretation. As such they are a prime example for the dual power effects of discourses: on the one hand they reflect the dominant drug discourse as specified by the Iranian state<sup>870</sup>; on the other hand, they mirror ideological differences concerning drug policy, which not only exist between different political factions and between different state institutions, but also reflect historical discontinuities.<sup>871</sup>

Having thus chosen the object and scope of research, Jäger then proposes the following practical procedure. As a first step, he recommends assembling the *material corpus* or the relevant *discourse fragments*, which in the present case comprises all drug related newspaper articles having appeared during the sample period. The task consists of arranging these articles in chronological order, of thoroughly reading them through, and of recording first details such as the date of publication, the ideological alignment of the respective newspaper, the author, the genre and the type of the article, the column where it appeared, and other details into a database.<sup>872</sup>

Jäger suggests identifying simultaneously the *discursive context*, which he defines as the chronological sequence of *discursive events*. *Discursive events* are events of the “real life”, which appear as important events in a discourse. As such, they typically cause – or at least indicate – a transformation of discourse, because they spark off new elements to be discussed or existing elements to be reassessed, either by all discourse members in the same way or by different members in different ways.<sup>873</sup> Not all significant events are however *discursive events*, as shows for instance the Iranian press’ astonishing silence on the opening of an UNODC office in Tehran in the year 1998. In the present analysis, the identification of the *discursive context*, however, only follows the main analysis, because some discursive events only have become evident in the course of the analysis.<sup>874</sup>

After the survey of the *material corpus*, Jäger proposes what he calls *structural analysis* or *summary analysis* as the next methodological step. The *structural analysis*

---

<sup>870</sup> Fairclough calls mass media a tool of governance and generally sees them as an important instrument in ideological processes and struggles: **Fairclough** (2003), 34; **Fairclough** (2009), 69, 78f.

<sup>871</sup> Foucault (*Truth and Power*) has also stressed that the state is far from being omnipotent and occupying all power relations: **Jäger** (2004), 156.

<sup>872</sup> **Jäger** (2004), 171, 175, 191.

<sup>873</sup> **Jäger** (2004), 132, 190f., 210.

<sup>874</sup> Foucault has emphasised that the exact appearance of such (discursive) events are often obscure: **Foucault** (1981), 38f.

consists of identifying the *qualitative width of the topics* of a discourse, that is the thematic diversity of the *main* and *secondary topics*. In the Iranian press discourse on drugs, such main topics are for instance drug trafficking, drug addiction or addiction therapy, while the sub-topics of addiction therapy for example include medicinal addiction withdrawal, psychological therapies or acupuncture. Whereas *discourse analysis* – unlike *grounded theory* – basically incorporates a prefixed amount of texts to analyse a certain discourse, it does not request the mentioning of all instances for a topic, if they do not contribute new aspects. *Discourse analysis* is more concerned with the qualitative distribution of the topics than with their quantitative occurrence – even though the quantity is in as far revealing, as it indicates certain trends and emphases of a discourse. The result of the structural analysis is the *dossier*, which is complete when all aspects of the different topics have been identified.<sup>875</sup> In ideally depicting the topics and their constitutive sub-topics in a relational model, Jäger advises thinking in terms of the data material.<sup>876</sup> This is indeed essential advice. However, Jäger, Fairclough and other discourse analysts do not deliberate enough on the problem of how to proceed from necessarily existent previous knowledge to the generation – or rather discovery – of new knowledge.<sup>877</sup> But this analytical step is of crucial importance for the present analysis, where the concepts of the European – or more generally the “international” scientific (and political) – drug discourse are not automatically congruent with the concepts of the Iranian drug discourse. To enhance the adequacy of the structural analysis, the present analysis therefore additionally takes inspiration from the methodology of *grounded theory*.

#### Grounded Theory<sup>878</sup>

Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss have developed *grounded theory* as a variation of qualitative social research in the 1960s.<sup>879</sup> Based on the fundamental assumptions of *pragmatism*, they maintain that explanations – or theories as they call them – of elements of the social and material world are always provisional and thus adaptable to new insights.<sup>880</sup> And like *discourse analysis*, *grounded theory* aims at detecting social structures and strategies behind the surface of individual texts. It puts, however, more emphasis on the necessity to develop such theories directly from the empirical material, in particular from

<sup>875</sup> Jäger talks about the qualitative width or qualitative totality of topics: **Jäger** (2004), 192f., 204.

<sup>876</sup> **Jäger** (2004), 197.

<sup>877</sup> Jäger is nevertheless aware of the inevitable bias of every researcher: **Jäger** (2004), 59ff.; Fairclough admittedly seeks inspiration from qualitative social analysts such as Wordsmith in identifying *keywords* in a text corpus, but does not provide a concrete description for such a procedure: **Fairclough** (2003), 6.

<sup>878</sup> Grounded Theory denominates both the ‘theory’ or explanation that is developed and the methodological procedure: **Strübing** (2004), 13f.; **Böhm** (2004), 475f.

<sup>879</sup> Glaser and Strauss laid the foundation for the grounded theory in particular in their book *The Discovery of Grounded Theory*: **Glaser & Strauss** (1974).

<sup>880</sup> Strauss is located within the tradition of the Chicago School of pragmatism: **Strübing** (2004), 37f.

written material.<sup>881</sup> In practice, the methodological approach of *grounded theory* is admittedly different from *discourse analysis*, in as far as the latter presupposes a theoretical model for the analysis, while the latter develops its case-related and material-based theory only in the course of the analysis.

The analysis of the Iranian press discourse on drugs generally follows the theoretical assumptions and methodological procedure of (*critical*) *discourse analysis*. It is, however, only partly convinced of the discourse analytical assumption, that in identifying the topics of a discourse, these emerge quasi automatically from the texts. Since *grounded theory* has developed a more convincing procedure to detect new concepts that are adequate to the material of investigation, the present analysis additionally consults this method; yet, it does so only in as far as *grounded theory* helps to identify the system of topics but without developing a proper theory.<sup>882</sup>

Similar to the identification of topics in the *discourse analysis*, *grounded theory* aims at discovering the – increasingly abstracted – main categories and sub-categories of a subject area and at merging them into a ‘theoretical’ relational model.<sup>883</sup> As *category*, *grounded theory* defines a “theoretical” concept, whose structural attributes it obtains by comparing different empirical phenomena of texts with each other.<sup>884</sup> It is however aware, that in this process each researcher is initially guided by previously acquired concepts or generally by a specific previous knowledge, which do not forcibly correspond to the concepts present in the area of investigation. To identify new and adequate concepts, which are *grounded* in the research material, the researcher has to actively and creatively proceed from his previous knowledge to a new knowledge; this, he attains by a methodological procedure *grounded theory* calls *theoretical sampling*.<sup>885</sup>

*Theoretical sampling* denotes a process, in which the researcher simultaneously samples data, encodes them and analyses or interprets them in order to decide which data he has to sample next. The *theoretical sampling* contributes to the conceptual denseness of a theory (or explanation) by systematically identifying all variants of the concepts or categories.<sup>886</sup> Since in the present case, the amount of data has already been established in advance by including all drug related newspaper articles of the sample period, the encoding and interpretation of the data actually follows the data collection. Within this comprehensive set of data, however, the procedure of identifying the categories – or as the discourse analysis would say the topics – does not differ in practice from the procedure of *grounded theory*.<sup>887</sup> The

<sup>881</sup> **Strübing** (2004), 19; the Grounded Theory analyses texts in the broadest sense: **Böhm** (2004), 476.

<sup>882</sup> “Theory” in terms of the Grounded Theory is admittedly rather to be understood as a plausible and fit interpretative model than an abstract, universal *theory of a specific reality*; important of such a theory is that it is reliable and valid (that is internally consistent and reflecting the social reality adequately), while it’s representativeness (and repeatability respectively) is only possible to a limited degree: **Strübing** (2004), 31f., 59f., 75ff.

<sup>883</sup> **Strübing** (2004), 55.

<sup>884</sup> **Böhm** (2004), 476; **Strübing** (2004), 19f.

<sup>885</sup> Generally on the relationship between previous knowledge and the generation of new knowledge that is grounded in the text material: **Strauss** (1994), 36f., 48; **Strübing** (2004), 53ff.;

<sup>886</sup> On the fundamental methodological procedure of theoretical sampling, which requires that the material provides concrete examples for the theory: **Strübing** (2004), 29ff., 44f.; **Strauss** (1994), 43f., 49ff.

<sup>887</sup> Consequently, not all instances for a specific phenomenon have to be mentioned, if they do not add a new aspect to the categories: **Strübing** (2004), 32f.

procedure of *theoretical sampling* starts with asking relatively open, tentative questions to the text material, which the researcher bases more or less consciously on his previous knowledge. Only then, he looks for new, adequate concepts and new attributes and dimensions of such concepts by using generative or in other words hypothetical questions, which he develops in accordance with the text material.<sup>888</sup>

In order to *discover* the relational model of categories, *grounded theory* has developed the essential process of coding.<sup>889</sup> Coding is a procedure, according to which the researcher constantly compares different phenomena of the textual corpus with each other by noting their differences, commonalities, and specifications as *codes* or annotations next to the respective passages. In this way, categories that are natural to the material slowly emerge from the texts – or obtain their full *dimension*, as *grounded theory* also says.<sup>890</sup> The concrete process of coding takes place in three steps; in a first step, the *open coding* aims at detecting as many categories and sub-categories as possible; in a second step, the *axial coding* generates a phenomenal model by relating the different categories to each other, and by identifying *core categories* or *key categories*, which fundamentally structure the subject area; and in a third and last step, the *selective coding* again revises the material in regard to the *key categories*, and if necessary codes them once more, in order to check and reassert the importance of single key categories in relation to others and in relation to the constitutive sub-categories.<sup>891</sup>

The process of coding has to be repeated until all aspects of the phenomenal model of categories are identified and assigned. *Grounded theory* calls this accomplishment *theoretical saturation*, which basically corresponds to the *qualitative width of topics* in *discourse analysis* – yet, with the difference that *grounded theory* puts more emphasis on an interrelation of the categories.<sup>892</sup> As an important feature of coding, *grounded theory* in addition recommends the writing of analytical *memos* simultaneously with the process of *coding*, in order to improve the process of data analysis and to enhance the analytical creativity.<sup>893</sup>

The present study makes use of *grounded theory* to discover categories or topics that are natural and innate to the data material, and thus tries to avoid imposing previous, inadequate concepts on the material of investigation. Generally, however, it follows the methodological procedure of *critical discourse analysis*, because it is better suited for considering argumentative entities and thus probably distinct

---

<sup>888</sup> Strauss and particularly Glaser are talking about *inductive* questions when actually referring to *abductive* questions in the sense of pragmatism: **Strauss** (1994), 37-40; **Strübing** (2004), 44-48, 63-73; **Böhm** (2004), 476f.

<sup>889</sup> The process of coding – together with the writing of analytical *memos* – accounts for the essential method of the Grounded Theory: **Strübing** (2004), 17.

<sup>890</sup> The codes are constantly developed into more analytical concepts and later into categories, for whose purpose the data material generally has to be re-coded; one aim herein consists of making implicit decisions (of the texts) explicit: **Strauss** (1994), 49; **Strübing** (2004), 22-26.

<sup>891</sup> On the three steps of coding: **Strauss** (1994), 40ff., 49, 56ff., 65ff., **Strübing** (2004), 19ff., 26ff.; **Böhm** (2004), 478ff.

<sup>892</sup> **Strauss** (1994), 54f.; **Strübing** (2004), 31; **Böhm** (2004), 477.

<sup>893</sup> On the importance of the analytical *memos* as a thinking tool and a documentation of the theoretical process of decision-making: **Strauss** (1994), 33, 45f.; **Strübing** (2004), 33ff.; Jäger also recommends the writing of *memos* in *discourse analysis*: **Jäger** (2004), 187.

discourse positions within individual texts, which can be expected in the context of the Iranian press discourse on drugs.

Following the structural analysis, Jäger proposes in a second step what he calls *fine analysis*. The *fine analysis* consists of a detailed topical and formal – that is in particular linguistic – examination of selected texts that are considered typical for the afore-established topics or the discourse in general.<sup>894</sup> The fine analysis should comprise a more exhaustive examination of the institutional frame of the drug related newspaper articles, such as for instance an ideological characterization of the respective newspapers, information on the authors and the supposed target audiences, a description of the locations or columns of the articles within the newspapers, or an identification of the styles and genres of the articles. It should entail a comprehensive analysis of the surface of the newspaper articles including a description of their layouts, fonts, titles, photographs, illustrations, and in particular a fragmentation of the texts into different paragraphs, which are characterized in compliance with their contents and their assumed entanglement to other discourse strands. Last, but not least, it should conduct a thorough examination of the linguistic and rhetorical means such as for instance speech acts or transitions, noun categories or verb modalities, which are structuring the text and contributing to its coherence.<sup>895</sup> Even though he does not differentiate between a *structural* and *fine analysis*, Fairclough also puts crucial emphasis on such formal and linguistic aspects of a discourse.<sup>896</sup> Both authors generally emphasize the close functional relationship between form and content of discourses, as has already Foucault with his *formation of concepts*.<sup>897</sup>

Both Jäger and Fairclough particularly point out to the significance of automatic mechanisms of speech and of essential metaphorical images for detecting collective discursive patterns of a specific society. Jäger for instance calls such discursive or linguistic automatisms *routines* and *operations*, which are *speech acts* the producers and recipients of texts mostly use mechanically and unconsciously. He deems these routines to be of particular

---

<sup>894</sup> Jäger refers to the fine analysis as the core of discourse analysis; as criteria for choosing typical articles he mentions the respective discourse position of the article, its thematic main focus, its style, or its entanglement with other discourse strands: **Jäger** (2004), 171ff.; **Link** (2006), 420; Landwehr similarly differentiates between two levels of analysis, but calls them macro- and micro-structure: **Landwehr** (2001), 111ff.

<sup>895</sup> **Jäger** (2004), 171ff., esp. 176-184.

<sup>896</sup> On Fairclough's linguistic aspects – such as for instance different categories of nouns or adjectives, and different moods or voices of verbs – of discourse analysis: **Fairclough** (2003), 12f., 35ff., 129ff.; **Fairclough** (2009), 129ff.

<sup>897</sup> **Foucault** (1981), 83-103; Generally on the correspondence between form and content of discourses: **Jäger** (2004), 113, 179ff., 184ff.; **Fairclough** (2003), 12f.; **Fairclough** (2009), 60.



importance, because he understands discourses as groupings of such *routines*, which have historically grown into formal rules and regulations.<sup>898</sup> The fundamental imagery of a language of a specific society becomes visible in *metaphors* or *collective symbols* as Jäger calls them in following Jürgen Link, which comprise the totality of a society's allegories, emblems, metaphors, topics, analogies or comparisons. This *synchronous system of collective symbols* (*sysycol*) is in as far significant, as it reveals fundamental patterns of perception of a society, which its members typically also follow unconsciously.<sup>899</sup>

The accentuation of the close relationship between form and content is undeniably crucial to any *discourse analysis*, and by no means restricted to linguistic analyses. Yet, as Jäger emphasizes, such a detailed linguistic and topical analysis needs much time and effort and can only be carried out for a limited number of texts.<sup>900</sup> The issue at stake is how detailed such an analysis of both the contents and the forms of a discourse has to be, or which aspect is considered more important respectively. Since the present study locates itself within the field of historical *discourse analysis*, its focus is admittedly more on the topics of the Iranian press discourse on drugs, and particularly on the – probably different – lines of argumentation. Such argumentation is defined here as the rhetoric and logical combination of different sub-topics and topics into argumentative strategies. The present study nevertheless recognizes the importance of the formal and linguistic aspects of a discourse, but only takes into consideration in as far as they help to explicate the topical combinations and argumentative logics of the Iranian press discourse on drugs.

Accordingly, the present analysis does not differentiate in principle between a *structural* and *fine analysis*, as neither does Fairclough. Instead, it conducts a more comprehensive *structural analysis*, which also includes elements Jäger subsumes under *fine analysis* – such as particularly the internal rhetorical and argumentative logic of the drug related newspaper articles.<sup>901</sup> These aspects are of crucial importance in the context of the

---

<sup>898</sup> Jäger has developed the concept of operations on the basis of Leontiev's activity theory: **Jäger** (2004), 97f., 180, 211; Fairclough generally talks about presuppositions, implicatures, general assumptions, and conventions, which he considers crucial in defining the '*common ground*' of a specific knowledge of a society: **Fairclough** (2009), 60.

<sup>899</sup> Such collective symbols always imply elementary ideological judgements and basically depict what is familiar in a positive way, and what is unfamiliar in a negative way: **Link** (2006), 413, 420; **Jäger** (2004), 133ff., 180; Fairclough simply talks about *metaphors* and differentiates between a *lexical metaphor* and *grammatical metaphor*: **Fairclough** (2009), 131f.

<sup>900</sup> **Jäger** (2004), 171f.

<sup>901</sup> Jäger considers such topical entanglements or knots – together with the collective symbols – to form the cement of discourses; he suggests to analyse them as part of the analysis of the text surface: **Jäger** (2004), 168, 178,

Iranian press discourse on drugs, because the focus of the analysis is not only on the common topical patterns but also on different discourse positions and lines of argumentation.

The present analysis nevertheless makes an exception of the decision not to differentiate between a *structural* and a *fine analysis*, by separately carrying out a linguistic – or more concretely semantic – examination of the imagery of the Iranian drug discourse. The analysis of these *collective symbols* is of particular interest, as they indeed reveal common and often traditional patterns of perception in Iran. The focus on the *collective symbols* is admittedly also owed to the comparatively easy identification of such terms if compared to the disclosure of the routines and operations of speech.

Yet, the more crucial reason for not conducting a more detailed formal and linguistic analysis is the study's focus on the development of the Iranian press discourse on drugs. Instead of just analyzing one synchronic section of a discourse, it is more interesting to analyze the development of the discourse as seen in a sequence of synchronous sections.<sup>902</sup> Foucault, in his *Archaeology of Knowledge* has paid special attention to such a diachronic view of discourses. The analysis of the historical development of a discourse is in as far more revealing for the present study, as only in its evolution the importance of discursive events for the future development of the discourse can be assessed. This is true for the hegemonic or ideological struggles taking place in a discourse. Only in a diachronic analysis it becomes clear, how different hegemonic strategies bring about a transformation of the orders of discourse by re-contextualizing elements of the discourse and by restructuring *discursive strategies*.<sup>903</sup>

The aim of the entire analysis and interpretation of the Iranian press discourse on drugs consequently not only consists of identifying its constitutive topics and arguments regarding commonness and difference, continuity and discontinuity, consistency and inconsistency. More importantly, it includes an examination of the various effects of the hegemonic or more precisely ideological struggle for the *sovereignty of interpretation*, which are as well responsible for a certain uniformity of the discourse as for certain inconsistencies. Of particular importance is the analysis of the *collective symbols*, which reflect a common, homogenizing ground in the discourse, and of the discursive events, which are contested and

---

<sup>902</sup> Generally on the historical, diachronic discourse analysis and the choice of the exact synchronous sections: **Jäger** (2004), 169, 196ff.

<sup>903</sup> **Foucault** (1981); **Jäger** (2004), 169, 196ff.; **Link** (2006), 408f.; **Fairclough** (2009), 20, 61ff., 78, 130f..

result in heterogeneities and changes of the discourse.<sup>904</sup> Thus, the analysis of the Iranian press discourse on drugs is essentially an ideological analysis<sup>905</sup>, which will consider the wider social context – including other discourses and non-discursive practices – in the final interpretation.<sup>906</sup>

To conclude, the question remains what exactly makes *critical discourse analysis* of Jäger and Fairclough critical? Accordingly, a critical approach in research is a matter of self-evidence, and *critical discourse analysis* indeed aims higher. Both authors stress the importance of critically assessing *discursive structures* and especially the motivations behind – the dominant or competing – hegemonic strategies within a discourse. They suggest interpreting discourses against an ethical guideline of universal human values, with the aim of improving the circumstances for a specific society and its individuals.<sup>907</sup> Yet, such allegedly universal values remain forcibly linked to the system of values and norms of the specific society, in which a researcher lives, as well as to his personal convictions.<sup>908</sup> Hence, this critical approach has to be rather seen as an idealistic approach. Crucial for *critical discourse analysis* – as for all methodologies – is therefore the criterion that the necessarily subjective and selective analysis and its inherent judgments are comprehensible and verifiable in an intersubjective way. The study remains, however, open to new interpretations and insights in the future.

---

<sup>904</sup> Fairclough conceptualizes such external and internal influences on discourses in a slightly different way; he talks about “intertextuality” when referring to external influences – that is the influence of one text on another/others, which the present analysis subsumes under discursive events; and he speaks of (general) assumptions as being internal influences, which here more or less correspond to the routines and operations and to the collective symbols: **Fairclough** (2003), 39-61.

<sup>905</sup> **Fairclough** (2009), 79.

<sup>906</sup> On the importance to consider the entire social context in order to fully comprehend the significance and role of discourses: **Jäger** (2004), 184ff.; **Fairclough** (2009), 130f.

<sup>907</sup> Detailed on the *critical Discourse Analysis*: **Jäger** (2004), 62ff., 215ff.; **Fairclough** (2003), 24f., esp. 202ff.; Fairclough has shifted his attention from a critique of (social) structures to a critique of (social and discursive) strategies in his later works: **Fairclough** (2009), 7f., 10f., esp. 14ff.

<sup>908</sup> Jäger also addresses this problem: **Jäger** (2004), 230f.

## **V. Analysis of the Iranian Press Discourse on Drugs**


### **V. 1. The Iranian Press Discourse on Drugs: *Discourse events*: the Basic Structure**

In a first step, the present content analysis will demonstrate the distribution of drug-related newspaper articles over the course of each respective year of the sample period. The articles often appear in clusters, centering on specific events, which have triggered their publication. These *discourse events*, as the *discourse analysis* calls them, fundamentally structure the Iranian press discourse on drugs. They can be divided into different types, each having different effects on the overall discourse.

First, the newspapers naturally do not write about all drug-related events of importance in the real world, either internationally or domestically. Not all events thus become *discourse events*. Additionally, not all events the newspapers report on forcibly become *discourse events* in the narrower sense. The present analysis basically differentiates between main *discourse events*, which fundamentally influence both the quantitative distribution of articles and the distillation of central topics; and minor *discourse events*, which only might be addressed by a few newspapers

Second, the present analysis differentiates between international and national *discourse events*. Both international and domestic developments and incidents in the fields of drug production, drug consumption and drug policy elicit the newspapers to publish relevant articles. Admittedly, a differentiation cannot always be made, since certain events might both be of international and national importance. The present analysis focuses more on national events; while only considering international events, if they are of relevance to the domestic context.

## Quantitative distribution of newspaper articles over the course of the sample period (1374-1378 / 1995-2000)




At first glance noticeable is that all three charts show a particular peak in June. More precisely, most drug-related articles appear around 26 June. This date has been defined by resolution 42/177 of the United Nations as *international day against drug abuse in illicit trafficking* on 7 December 1987. This international event thus is the single most important event that triggers Iranian newspapers articles on drugs.

Particularly the second and third year, however, show further peaks. While the exact reasons for the appearance of these clusters of articles cannot be guessed without a closer look

at the content, it is nevertheless obvious, that the next most distinct peak takes place in August 1997, the month of Ḥātāmī's presidential inauguration. Further reasons will become evident from the following analysis of *discourse events*, based on the titles and contents of the newspaper articles.

### *Discourse events in 1374 (1995-96)*



The fact, that most drug-related newspaper articles of the first sample year appear around 26 June is indeed not a mere coincidence. The newspapers explicitly refer to the *international day against drug abuse and illicit trafficking* (*rūz-e ḡahānī-ye mobārezeḥ bā mavādd-e moḥadder*).<sup>909</sup> Especially in the first year of the sample period, this day is clearly an international *discourse event*. The newspapers reproduce much information on the international drug situation and on the general phenomenology of drugs from reports provided by relevant UN bodies, such as the UN OFFICE FOR DRUG CONTROL AND CRIME PREVENTION (UNDCP) or the WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO), in particular by the *World Drug Report* (*gozāreš-e ḡahānī-ye mavādd-e moḥadder*). A second, albeit minor international discourse event might be the meetings of the ECONOMIC COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (ECO) in November 1995, to which however only *Abrār* explicitly refers.<sup>910</sup>


But it becomes already evident here, that such international events have an impact on domestic events, which themselves cause the appearance of related newspaper articles. In fact, the *international day against drug abuse and illicit trafficking* had inspired the Iranian government to organize related events only a few weeks earlier. Thus, in May 1995, the

<sup>909</sup> *Resālat*, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995) I; *Resālat*, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995) II; *Resālat*, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I; *Resālat*, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) II; *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995); *Salām*, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I; *Salām*, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) II; *Īrān*, 8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995); *Hamšahrī*, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995); *Eṭṭelā'āt*, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995); *Eṭṭelā'āt*, 11 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995); *Eṭṭelā'āt*, 12 Tīr 1374 (3 July 1995); *Eṭṭelā'āt*, 13 Tīr 1374 (4 July 1995); *Eṭṭelā'āt*, 14 Tīr 1374 (5 July 1995).

<sup>910</sup> *Abrār*, 14 Ābān 1374 (5 November 1995).

newspapers report on a workshop organized by the STATE WELFARE ORGANIZATION (SWO) in Gačsar, where a ‘draft for a national program of addiction prevention and rehabilitation (*pīš-nevīs-e barnāmeḥ-ye mellī-ye pīš-gīrī va bāz-parvarī-ye e’tiyād*)’ was presented. On the same occasion, the creation of a NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST ADDICTION (*komīteh-ye kešvarī-ye mobārezeh bā e’tiyād*) was announced, and the press and a delegation of the INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD (INCB) were invited to visit the rehabilitation center (*markaz-e bāz-parvarī*) of Qarčak Varāmīn.<sup>911</sup>

### Discourse events in 1376 (1997-98)



Like in the first sample year, again many drug-related newspaper articles are published around the *international day against drug abuse and illicit trafficking* of June 26.<sup>912</sup> In 1376 (1997-98), however, another international event triggers drug-related newspapers in a broader sense: the WHO’s *world no tobacco day* or more precisely *week* according to the Iranian newspapers (*haftēh-ye bedūn-e doḡhānīyāt*), which takes place on 31 May.<sup>913</sup> Conspicuously, this specific attention of the Iranian press on smoking is only observable in this second year, although tobacco continues to be discussed as starter drugs in later years. Admittedly, it remains unclear, whether the press later ignored the *world no tobacco day*, or whether the NATIONAL LIBRARY’s *Namāyeh* did not index it any more with the keywords „drugs“ or „addiction“. Also directly triggered by the international drug day are reports on the Taliban as emerging rulers of Afghanistan, their role in the increasingly thriving drug production and

<sup>911</sup> *Hamšahrī*, 19 Ordībehešt 1374 (9 May 1995); *Kaiḥān*, 15 Ābān 1374 (6 November 1995); *Hamšahrī*, 27 Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995) II; *Īrān*, 8 Ḥordād 1374 (29 May 1995); *Kaiḥān*, 25 Ḥordād 1374 (15 June 1995); *Kaiḥān*, 27 Ḥordād 1374 (17 June 1995); *Eṭṭelā’āt*, 27 Ḥordād 1374 (17 June 1995); *Eṭṭelā’āt*, 28 Ḥordād 1374 (18 June 1995); *Eṭṭelā’āt*, 29 Ḥordād 1374 (19 June 1995); and much later: *Īrān*, 18 Āḡar 1374 (9 December 1995).

<sup>912</sup> *Resālat*, 26 Ḥordād 1376 (16 June 1997); *Hamšahrī*, 3 Tīr 1376 (24 June 1997); *Resālat*, 3 Tīr 1376 (24 June 1997); *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 4 Tīr 1376 (25 June 1997); *Aḡbār*, 8 Tīr 1376 (29 June 1997); *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997); *Kaiḥān*, 17 Tīr 1376 (8 July 1997).

<sup>913</sup> *Kaiḥān*, 7 Ḥordād 1376 (28 May 1997); *Kaiḥān*, 8 Ḥordād 1376 (29 May 1997); *Hamšahrī*, 10 Ḥordād 1376 (31 May 1997); *Eṭṭelā’āt*, 18 Ḥordād 1376 (8 June 1997); *Eṭṭelā’āt*, 19 Ḥordād 1376 (9 June 1997); *Eṭṭelā’āt*, 1 Tīr 1376 (22 June 1997); *Eṭṭelā’āt*, 2 Tīr 1376 (23 June 1376).

trafficking, and the consequences for the transit country Iran.<sup>914</sup> This development might, however, also be assessed as an *international discourse* event in its own right. A first domestic discourse event, by contrast, is a speech of Āyatollāh Makārem-e Šīrāzī on occasion of a Friday prayer on blurring borders between habits (sg. ‘*ādat*) and addiction (*e‘tiyād*).<sup>915</sup>

Next important discourse events can only be identified after Ḥātāmī’s inauguration in August 1997. The graph actually shows a series of peaks, continuing for several months. The new press freedom under Ḥātāmī might itself have caused an increasing coverage of the national drug problem, and thus be considered a domestic discourse event in its own right. More directly discernable is, however, the upcoming amendment to the drug law of 1988, which the EXPEDIENCY COUNCIL was to pass in November 1997. This is arguably the most interesting discourse event of the entire sample period, because it causes a disagreement between the conservative and the reformist press. All newspapers generally use the amendment to describe the legal situation of drug consumption and drug addiction in Iran. And practically all welcome the amendment, which put new addiction therapy and prevention measures on a legal basis. But the radical *Resālat* explicitly refutes the changes by advocating the traditional, repressive drug policy of the Islamic Republic.<sup>916</sup> This discussion especially centers around the most crucial question of the Iranian press discourse on drugs, namely whether “the addict [is] a sick or a criminal” person (*moğrem – bīmār yā moğrem?*)<sup>917</sup>. The DRUG CONTROL HEADQUARTER (DCHQ) seems to have explicitly provided the Iranian press with drug-related information on occasion of the drug law amendment, by translating drug-related articles of foreign newspapers and magazines.<sup>918</sup> Additional domestic *discourse events* are an exhibition on drug addiction Ḥātāmī’s administration had organized under the title “war without borders” (*ğang bedūn-e marz*) in Tehrān;<sup>919</sup> an “interregional session on the

<sup>914</sup> *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 4 Tīr 1376 (25 June 1997); *Aḥbār*, 6 Tīr 1376 (27 June 1997); *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 4 Dey 1376 (25 December 1997).

<sup>915</sup> This is, admittedly, only mentioned by *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, and, thus, not really a discourse event: *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, 20 Farvardīn 1376 (9 April 1997).

<sup>916</sup> *Hamšahrī*, 16 Šahrīvar 1376 (6 September 1997); *Hamšahrī*, 17 Šahrīvar 1376 (7 September 1997); for *Resālat*’s article: *Resālat*, 6 Ābān 1376 (28 October 1997); and the reply of the DCHQ: *Resālat*, 14 Ābān 1376 (5 November 1997); *Āfarīneš*, 20 Ābān 1376 (11 November 1997); *Āfarīneš*, 21 Ābān 1376 (12 November 1997); *Āfarīneš*, 22 Ābān 1376 (3 November 1997); *Āfarīneš*, 24 Ābān 1376 (15 November 1997); *Qods*, 7 Dey 1376 (28 December 1997); *Qods*, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997); *Qods*, 9 Dey 1376 (30 December 1997); *Qods*, 10 Dey 1376 (31 December 1997).

<sup>917</sup> Thus the title of: *Hamšahrī*, 24 Mehr 1376 (16 October 1997).


<sup>918</sup> *Kaiḥān*, 18 Šahrīvar 1376 (8 September 1997); *Hamšahrī*, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 (10 September 1997); *Hamšahrī*, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 (10 September 1997); *Salām*, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 (10 September 1997); *Hamšahrī*, 24 Šahrīvar 1376 (14 September 1997); except probably the article on the role of the CIA in the international drug traffic: *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 27 Šahrīvar 1376 (18 September 1997).

<sup>919</sup> *Abrār*, 12 Šahrīvar 1376 (3 September 1997).



drug war” (*eḡlās-e bain-ol-manṭaqeh’ī-ye mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḥadder*) in Eṣfahān;<sup>920</sup> a workshop by the clerical establishment in Qom on the national drug policy, which particularly focused on addiction prevention;<sup>921</sup> and the publication of a research study on the influence of addicted fathers on their families, which *Eṭṭelā’āt* describes as one of the first drug addiction studies in Iran.<sup>922</sup> However, the most interesting domestic *discourse event* is the second anniversary of the NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS (NA) (*mo’tād-ān-e gom-nām*), the first private organization officially permitted to be active in the field of addiction therapy and prevention in the Islamic Republic.<sup>923</sup>

### Discourse events in 1378 (1999-2000)



In the year 1378 (1999-2000), *international day against drug abuse and illicit trafficking* is again the most important *discourse event*, triggering most drug-related articles. The newspapers accordingly report on the celebrations organized on this occasion by the DCHQ, in which it publicly burned tons of seized drugs.<sup>924</sup> The newspapers also print interviews with various drug policy officials, in particular with officials of the DCHQ, the SWO, with Pino Arlacchi, the secretary general of the UNDCP, and with further academic

<sup>920</sup> *Hamšahrī*, 2 Mehr 1376 (24 September 1997); *Eṭṭelā’āt*, 13 Mehr 1376 (5 October 1997); *Eṭṭelā’āt*, 14 Mehr 1376 (6 October 1997); *Eṭṭelā’āt*, 15 Mehr 1376 (7 October 1997); *Eṭṭelā’āt*, 16 Mehr 1376 (8 October 1997); *Eṭṭelā’āt*, 17 Mehr 1376 (9 October 1997); *Eṭṭelā’āt*, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 October 1997).

<sup>921</sup> *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 23 Dey 1376 (13 January 1998).

<sup>922</sup> *Eṭṭelā’āt*, 20 Bahman 1376 (9 February 1998).

<sup>923</sup> *Eṭṭelā’āt*, 24 Mehr 1376 (16 October 1997); *Hamšahrī*, 24 Mehr 1376 (16 October 1997).

<sup>924</sup> *Salām*, 2 Tīr 1378 (23 June 1999); *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999); *Īrān*, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999); *Ĥorāsān*, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999); *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999); *Ĥorāsān*, 5 Tīr 1376 (26 June 1999); *Ĥorāsān*, 5 Tīr 1376 (26 June 1999); *Entehāb*, 5 Tīr 1378 (6 June 1999); *Nešāt*, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999); *Hamšahrī*, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999); *Eṭṭelā’āt*, 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999); *Abrār*, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999); *Ĥordād*, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999); *Šobḥ-e Emrūz*, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999); *Ĥorāsān*, 6 & 7 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 June 1999); *Kār va Kārgar*, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999); *Qods*, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999); *Entehāb*, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999); *Īrān*, 8 Tīr 1378 (29 June 1999).

and private addictions specialists.<sup>925</sup> Noticeable in this regard is the fact, that only the newspaper *Tarğomān-e Rūz* mentions the opening of the UNDCP country office in Tehran in the previous year;<sup>926</sup> and that only few newspapers refer to Antonio Mazitelli, the UNDCP representative of the Tehrān office at the time.<sup>927</sup> The newspaper, however, point to other international contacts, such as a visit of representatives of the UNDCP and the MINI DUBLIN GROUP to the Eastern border with Afghanistan, in order to inspect Iran's combat against drug trafficking;<sup>928</sup> or the posting of a French trainer of sniffing dogs in Iran.<sup>929</sup>

Like in the previous years, the government and further national and international organizations organized specific events on different drug-related topics: for instance a congress on the “immunization of the children and adolescents against the appearance of harms” (*maṣūn-sāzī-ye koudak-ān va nou-ḡavān-ān dar barābar-e āsīb-zāyī*);<sup>930</sup> an “educational congress on drugs for judicial assistants of the ECO member countries” (*hemāyeš-e āmūzešī-ye mo‘āvenat-hā-ye qažā’ī-ye mavādd-e moḥadder-e kešvar-hā-ye ‘ożv-e ekō*)<sup>931</sup>; the “second conference on addiction prevention among high school students” (*dovvomīn hemāyeš-e pīš-gīrī az e‘tiyād-e dāneš- āmūzān*);<sup>932</sup> or the “conference on socio-economic issues of economically developing countries” (*hemāyeš-e masā’el-e eḡtemā’ī-ye eqtešādī-ye kešvar-hā-yī keh marḡaleh-ye godār-e (enteqāl-e) eqtešādī-rā ṭayy mī-konand*).<sup>933</sup>

Of increased importance in the year 1378 (1999-2000) is the reporting on domestic drugs statistics and addiction research. The newspapers often cite the DCHQ with statistics on national drug seizures and addiction rates;<sup>934</sup> and present an increasing number of research

<sup>925</sup> Particularly on interviews with Arlacchi: *Kār va Kārgar*, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999); *Qods*, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999); *Abrār*, 14 Tīr 1378 (5 July 1999); *Vohūman*, 7 Šahrīvar 1378 (29 August 1999).

<sup>926</sup> *Tarğomān-e Rūz*, 8 Esfand 1378 (27 February 2000); a superficial survey of the drug-related newspaper articles of 1377 (1998/99) did not yield an explicit reference to the opening of the UNDCP office either: *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, 21 & 22 Šahrīvar 1377 (12 & 13 September 1998).

<sup>927</sup> *Ḥorāsān*, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999); *Ḥorāsān*, 7 Āḍar 1378 (28 November 1999); *Šobḥ-e Emrūz*, 5 Esfand 1378 (25 February 2000).

<sup>928</sup> *Entehāb*, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999); *Qods*, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999).

<sup>929</sup> *Īrān*, 11 Āḍar 1378 (12 December 1999).

<sup>930</sup> *Īrān*, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999).

<sup>931</sup> *Entehāb*, 28 Farvardīn 1378 (17 April 1999).

<sup>932</sup> *Mošārekāt*, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000).

<sup>933</sup> *Entehāb*, 28 Farvardīn 1378 (17 April 1999).

<sup>934</sup> *Kār va Kārgar*, 21 & 22 & 24, Farvardīn 1378 (10 & 11 & 13 April 1999); *Entehāb*, 28 Farvardīn 1378 (17 April 1999); *Salām*, 1 Ḥordād 1378 (22 May 1999); *Payām-e Āzādī*, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 1999); *Qods*, 25 Ābān 1378 (16 November 1999); *Āftāb-e Emrūz*, 26 Ābān 1378 (17 November 1999); *Īrān*, 29 Ābān 1378 (20 November 1999); *Ḥordād*, 1 & 2 Āḍar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999); *Īrān*, 2 Āḍar 1378 (23 November 1999); *Kaiḥān*, 8 Āḍar 1378 (29 November 1999); *‘Ašr-e Āzādegān*, 17 Āḍar 1378 (8 December 1999); *Bayān*, 28 Āḍar 1378 (19 December 1999); *Payām-e Āzādī*, 7 Bahman 1378 (27 January 2000); *Āftāb-e Emrūz*, 27 Bahman 1378 (16 February 2000).

studies,<sup>935</sup> notably the *Rapid Situation Assessment* (*arz-yābī-ye sarī'-e vaz'iyat*), the first comprehensive study on drug addiction since the revolution of 1979, which established the hitherto official figure of two million drug users in Iran; and a study on intravenous drug use and HIV in the prisons of Kermānshāh and Kahnavāğ.<sup>936</sup> The DCQH, furthermore, still seems to have provided the press with translations of international articles on drugs, even though it remains unclear, whether this also applies to the *Newsweek* article on poppy cultivation and opium production under the Taliban that is quoted by various newspapers.<sup>937</sup>

This short overview on the most important preliminary *discourse events* reveals two main characteristics. First, the Iranian press discourse is strongly influenced by international events and reports as inspired by the UNDCP, the WHO, or international newspaper and magazine articles. This is particularly true for the first sample year, but continues in the other two years. Secondly, these *international discourse events* are increasingly embedded in a domestic context, thus, eventually becoming domestic *discourse events*. These national *discourse events* are predominantly influenced by the government, especially by events and publications originating from the DCQH and the SWO. But the Iranian press also starts to increasingly refer to private organizations and researchers, thus indicating a shifting relationship between the Iranian state and the Iranian civil society. The subsequent content analysis will shed further light on the development of such characteristics.

---

<sup>935</sup> *Šobh-e Emrūz*, 25 & 26 & 27 Ĥordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999); *Ĥorāsān*, 5 Tīr 1376 (26 June 1999); *Šobh-e Emrūz*, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999); *Īrān*, 8 Tīr 1378 (29 June 1999); *Ĥorāsān*, 7 & 9 Mordād 1378 (29 & 31 July 1999); *Vohūman*, 7 Šahrivar 7 1378 (29 August 1999); *Kār va Kārgar*, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999); *Kār va Kārgar*, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999); *Qods*, 25 Ābān 1378 (16 November 1999); *Āftāb-e Emrūz*, 26 Ābān 1378 (17 November 1999); *Ĥordād*, 1 & 2 Āḍar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999); *Kaihān*, 8 Āḍar 1378 (29 November 1999); *‘Ašr-e Āzādegān*, 17 Āḍar 1378 (8 December 1999); *Āftāb-e Emrūz*, 27 Bahman 1378 (16 February 2000).

<sup>936</sup> On the RSA: *Kār va Kārgar*, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999); on the prison research: *Ĥordād*, 1 & 2 Āḍar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999).

<sup>937</sup> *Bayān*, 28 Āḍar 1378 (19 December 1999); *Abrār*, 8 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999); *Fath*, 18 Esfand 1378 (8 March 2000).

## V. 2. The Iranian Press Discourse on Drugs: a Chronology of Topics and Arguments

Concomitantly with the perusal of drug related articles that the Iranian press published during the three sample years of 1374 (1995-96), 1376 (1997-98), and 1378 (1999-20000) respectively, the author has recorded various details in a FileMaker database that was created specifically for the purpose of analysis. This database contains for each article: the Iranian-Islamic (*heğrī-šamsī*), and the Christian date of appearance; if provided, the specific rubric, page(s) and genre; the title; topical keywords – or codes to speak with the *grounded theory* – allocated by the author; a summary of the important arguments according to their logic sequence; and further details such as the author of the article, or the quoted sources. These details have particularly served to identify the most important topics of the Iranian press discourse on drugs and their changing interrelation over the course of the sample period. That part of the analysis will, however, only follow in the second step. In a first step, the content of the newspaper articles will be described in the chronological order of their appearance.

In a rather descriptive analytical step, a chronological narrative of the development of the contents and arguments of the Iranian press discourse on drugs over the course of the sample period (1995-2000) is given here. This description serves to put the reader of this study in the place of an average newspaper reader in Iran, and allows him to trace the emerging changes of topics and arguments. Since the Iranian newspapers are affiliated to different political factions, each has its own audience; an Iranian newspaper reader thus might not follow the drug related coverage of all newspapers. An habitual reader of the radical newspaper *Kaihān* might at times nevertheless also read the conservative *Resālat* or *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*; as might a reader of *Hamšahrī* do with *Irān* or *Eṭṭelā‘āt*. Iranian newspapers are commonly sold in specific newspaper stands on the street, rather than being distributed to the households. Since all the different newspapers are spread out on the street or even fixed on the wall, an average costumer will first read the headlines of different newspapers before buying one or several. Many passers-by will not even buy a copy, but simply read the most interesting headlines on the spot. Consequently, reader loyalty indeed might be less developed in Iran than elsewhere. This could also explain the often-imaginative titles of drug related newspaper articles, with which the respective newspapers arguably try to attract readers.

### ***V. 2. a. The Iranian press on drugs in 1374 (1995-96)***

In 1374 (1995-96), Iranian newspapers publish fifty-one articles on drug-related issues. Probably one of the first apparent characteristics are series of articles appearing in a newspaper over the course of several days, in which the respective newspaper cover different aspects of the international and national drug problem in depth. Most of these article series appear around June 26, the UN-determined *International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking*. In this first sample year, the press basically already has established the range of the most important topics of the press discourse on drugs, although a few important new topics will be added in later years. Already in this first year, the press writes openly about the situation of drug addiction in Iran, and about *drug supply* and new *drug demand reduction* activities of the Iranian government. Some newspapers express critical opinions towards the official drug policy. Particularly represented in this first year of consideration are the traditional and conservative newspapers of the Islamic Republic, like *Eṭṭelā'āt*, *Kaihān*, *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* and *Resālat*; but also the newspapers of the modern right, *Irān* and *Hamšahrī*; as well as *Salām*, the only newspaper of the Islamic left.

#### ***Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī on the occasion of a Friday prayer in April: Iran is a victim of drug trafficking from Afghanistan***

The first drug-related newspaper article of 1374 (1995-96) appears, as one would probably expect, on the occasion of a religious event, namely a Friday prayer. Yet, this article of the conservative newspaper *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* is in fact very atypical of the Iranian press discourse on drugs, as religion is rarely mentioned in relation to drugs. By emphasizing that Iran suffers as the main transit country from the trafficking of Afghan drugs towards Europe and that it is paying a heavy price for its drug combat, Interior Minister 'Alī-Moḥammad Bašārātī points to a crucial and typical argument of the press discourse on drugs.<sup>938</sup>

#### ***Hamšahrī in April and May: the annual world drug report of the INCB & religion plays no important role in drug prevention & liberal drug laws in the Netherlands***

In the Iranian month *Ordībehešt*, the moderate newspaper *Hamšahrī* of the municipality of Tehrān publishes a series of consecutive articles. The first article covers the international situation of drugs according to the 1994 annual drug report of the

---

<sup>938</sup> *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 14 Farvardīn 1374 (3 April 1995): "The president on the occasion of the ceremony of the Friday prayer of Tehran: the Supreme Leader's emphasis on monetary and economic discipline, and on the prevention of lavishness and dissipation is a constructive recommendation for the Islamic System" (*Ra'īs-e ġomhūr dar marāsem-e namāz-e ġom'ah-ye tehrān: ta'kīd-e rahbarī dar moured-e enzebāt-e mālī va eqtešādī va ġelou-ġirī az esrāf va tabdīr-e yek toušiyeh-ye banā'ī barāye neẓām-e eslāmī ast*).

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD (INCB) (*sāzmān-e bain-ol-melal-e kontrol-e mavādd-e moḥadder*), indicating like most articles of *Hamšahrī* the name of the author. In describing the international drug situation, *Hamšahrī* also introduces Albert Hofmann, the inventor of LSD, namely as a victim of this “hallucinogenic” (*tavahhom-zā*) – at a time, when Hoffmann actually still was in best health.<sup>939</sup> No less questionable are the arguments that nicotine addiction is less dangerous than addiction to other drugs; and that one of the main causes for drug addiction in Europe is the uninhibited freedom and lack of religiosity. In the next articles, *Hamšahrī* is covering the problem of drug addiction in Iran. It is, thus, the first newspaper during the sample period to talk about *drug demand* rather than *drug supply reduction*. The author of the article is Aḥmad Moḥīṭ, a member of the WHO (*sāzmān-e beh-dāšt-e ḡahānī*), who maintains that religion does not play an important role in drug prevention because drug addicts are not religious but considered to be rather immoral persons. While discussing social, economic, cultural and individual causes for drug addiction, Moḥīṭ stresses the more important role of education and research for drug prevention.<sup>940</sup> *Hamšahrī* continues its drug coverage with a translation of a Hungarian police report on the drug trafficking route in the Balkans; and with a translation of a rather critical BBC report on the liberal drug policy in the Netherlands. Such information on the drug policies of European countries arguably would have a big impact on preparing Iranian public opinion to the subsequent liberalization of the Iranian drug policy.<sup>941</sup>

An article of the moderately conservative newspaper *Abrār* on the relation between drugs smuggling and economic crimes could not be identified.<sup>942</sup>

***May and June: a new national plan for addiction treatment and drug prevention & the rehabilitation center of Qarčak Varāmīn***

As has already been pointed out, one of the main local discourse events in 1374 (1995-96) is the workshop on drug prevention and addiction treatment that was organized by the STATE WELFARE ORGANIZATION (SWO) (*sāzmān-e behzīstī-ye kešvar*). Part of this increased state activity in the field of *drug demand reduction* was apparently also the opening of a rehabilitation center of the new generation in Iran in the small town of Qarčak Varāmīn south of Tehran.

<sup>939</sup> Hofmann only deceased in 2008: **Swissinfo** (2008).

<sup>940</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 6 Ordībehešt 1374 (26 April 1995): “The Golden Triangle and the black powder” (*Moṭallāṭ-e ṭalā’ī, gerd-e siyāh*); **Hamšahrī**, 14 Ordībehešt 1374 (4 May 1995): “Clouded brains” (*Maḡz-ha-ye abr-ālūdeh*) – not available; **Hamšahrī**, 19 Ordībehešt 1374 (9 May 1995): “Where should we start – in preventing addiction?” (*Az koḡā āḡāz konīm – barāye pīš-gīrī az e’tiyād?*)

<sup>941</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 23 Ordībehešt 1374 (13 May 1995): “A flood of the entrance of drugs to Europe” (*Sail-e vorūd-e mavādd-e moḥadder beh orūpā*) & **Hamšahrī**, 27 Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995): “Europe’s criticism of Holand’s laws handling with drugs” (*Enteqād-e orūpā az qavānīn-e bar-ḥord bā mavādd-e moḥadder dar holand*).

<sup>942</sup> **Abrār**, 20 Ordībehešt 1374 (10 May 1995): “Economic crime” (*Ġenāyat-e eqtešādī*).

### **Hamšahrī** in May: addiction withdrawal without medication

*Hamšahrī* publishes the first article on the workshop organized by the SWO, in which different public health specialists discussed the need for a comprehensive social plan to address the ever-growing addiction problem in Iran. The participants issued a declaration, according to which Iran should commit itself in increasing and coordinating its efforts on the field of drug “prevention” (*pīš-gīrī*), addiction “treatment” (*darmān*) and “rehabilitation” (*bāz-parvarī*) and in training the required specialists on the field of psychology, sociology and biology. A central role in this new approach was to play the newly created NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST DRUG ABUSE (*komīteh-ye kešvarī-e sū'-mašraf-e mavādd-e moḥadder*) under the supervision of the MINISTRY OF HEALTH, THERAPY AND MEDICAL EDUCATION (*vezārat-e behdāšt, darmān va āmūzeš-e pezeškī*). Despite this emphasis on drug prevention, *Hamšahrī* still warns that information on drugs could also incited people to take drugs. Also still prevalent during the entire year is the handed down logic that withdrawal without medication – referred to in English as “cold turkey” – is better than withdrawal with medication.<sup>943</sup>

### **Īrān** in May: treatment-seeking addicts are still in danger of being imprisoned

The workshop on drug treatment and drug prevention that was held the small town Gačsar, near Šīrāz, led to the governmental newspaper *Īrān* publishing an article in which it accentuates that *drug demand reduction* is not only more effective but also cheaper than *drug supply reduction*. As an example, it describes the new therapy strategies implemented in the rehabilitation center of Qarčak Varāmīn (*markaz-e bāz-parvarī-ye mo'tādān-e qarčak varāmīn*). It mentions, that many drug addicts in this center have started their addictive behavior with cigarette smoking – an argument the press subsequently would often repeat. More significantly, *Īrān* points to the problem that addicts are still in danger of being legally persecuted when referring themselves to rehabilitation centers, while what they really need is “guidance and direction” (*eršād va rāh-nemā'ī*), because they are „human beings in need of help” (*ensān-e niyāz-mand beh komak*). To underline this argument, *Īrān* portrays the personal stories of these clients, which later, too, becomes a regular feature of the Iranian press discourse on drugs.<sup>944</sup>

---

<sup>943</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 27. Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995): “What needs to be done? Summary of the preliminary national programme of addiction prevention and therapy” (*Čeh bāyad kard? Holāseḥ-ye pīš-nevīs-e barnāmeḥ-ye mellī-ye pīš-gīrī va bāz-parvarī-ye e'tiyād*).

<sup>944</sup> **Īrān**, 8. Ḥordād 1374 (29 May 1995): Deliverance from the high fortification of addiction (*Rahā'ī az ḥešār-e boland-e e'tiyād*).

**Kaihan** in a series of articles in June: the world-devouring colonialists vs. the international praise of Qarčak Varāmīn

The radical *Kaihan* is the first newspaper in the sample period to publish a comprehensive series of articles on the Iranian drug problem. Such article series would turn out to be a regular feature of the Iranian press discourse on drugs. On the same occasion of the opening of the rehabilitation center of Qarčak Varāmīn, it first accuses the “world-devouring” (*ḡahān-h’ārān*) “colonialists” (*este’mār-garān*), that is Great Britain and the USA, to aim at the destruction of the Iranian society and particularly its youth; while concomitantly proudly reporting that a visiting INCB delegation praised the rehabilitation center. While still maintaining that drug addiction is not a major problem in Iran, *Kaihan* also emphasizes that addiction is an “illness” (*bīmārī*) not a “crime” (*ḡorm*), thus introducing the most crucial argument of the Iranian press discourse on drugs. It further describes the rehabilitation measures of the center in consisting of religious courses, music classes and reading hours in the library; and mentions that drug addicts are referred to as ‘assistance-seeking’ (*madad-ḡū*) here.<sup>945</sup>

**Īrān** in a series of articles in June: sending 500,000 drug addicts to an island is no solution

*Eṭṭelā’āt* in a series of three articles also covers the visit of the INCB delegation to the rehabilitation center of Qarčak Varāmīn, which is being described as one of a total of eleven rehabilitation centers in Iran, which together have a capacity to treat 2,500 addicts at a time. *Eṭṭelā’āt* sharply refutes the alleged Western claims that Iran kills its drug addicts; but nevertheless accentuates that sending them to a “remote islands” (*ḡazāyer-e dūr-oftādeh*) will not solve the problem. This is clearly an allusion to earlier prevailing drug policy opinions in the Islamic Republic. It further informs the reader that the number of drug addicts in Iran has dropped from two millions before the revolution to actually 500,000. Reproducing the WHO definition of drug addiction, addiction therapy, and drug prevention, it emphasizes that drug addiction never can be rooted completely. And it, too, provides personal addiction stories of individual patients of rehabilitation center of Qarčak Varāmīn.<sup>946</sup>

<sup>945</sup> **Kaihan**, 25 Ḥordād 1374 (15 June 1995): “Growth of the rose of ‘hope’ and ‘life’ in the brackwater of addiction” (*Rūyeš-e gol-e ‘omīd’ va ‘zendeḡī’ dar šūre-zār-e e’tiyād*) & **Kaihan**, 27 Ḥordād 1374 (17 June 1995): “Rehabilitation, emergence of the ‘bright morning’ from the dark evening of addiction” (*Bāzparvarī, damīdan-e ‘sobh-e roušan’ az ‘šām-e tīreh-ye’ e’tiyād*) – both articles are part of a series titled “On the occasion of the formation of the NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST ADDICTION” (*Be monāsebat-e taškīl-e komīteh-ye kešvarī-ye mobārezeh bā e’tiyād*).

<sup>946</sup> **Eṭṭelā’āt**, 27 Ḥordād 1374 (17 June 1995): “Rehabilitation centre of Qarčak. Here, life smiles again for cured addicts” (*Markaz-e bāz-parvarī-ye ‘qarčak’, īnḡā zendeḡī do bāreh beh rūy-ye mo’tādān-e šafā’yāfteh labḡand mīzanad*) & **Eṭṭelā’āt**, 28 Ḥordād 1374 (18 June 1995): “Cooperation between the family and the society – a necessity for a success of the program of the rehabilitation of addicts” (*Ham-*



### **Hamšahrī in June: an interview with Hamid Ghodse, president of the INCB**

An next article in *Hamšahrī* states that ‘Abd ol-Ḥamīd Qods, better known as Hamid Ghodse, the Iranian-born president of the INCB, was part of the delegation that visited the new rehabilitation center of Qarčak Varāmīn. The paper subsequently publishes an interview with him, in which he, however, rather talks about money laundering in Latin America.<sup>947</sup>

#### ***The International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking on 26 June***

The event, on which the Iranian newspapers write most drug related articles in 1374 (1995-96), is the *International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking* (rūz-e ḡahānī-ye mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḥadder), which takes place on June 26. Already the announcement of the creation of the NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST DRUG ABUSE and the visit of the INCB delegation to the rehabilitation center of Qarčak Varāmīn were related to this event. Also on this occasion, the press regularly mentions the annual report of the INCB, or more probably the WORLD DRUG REPORT of the UNDCP, and cites further international sources such as the WHO.

### **Resālat in a series of articles in June: Iran has a religious duty to combat drug trafficking; but benefitting most is the West**

On the *International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking*, the radical conservative newspaper *Resālat*, too, publishes a series of articles. Repeating established patterns, it reports on the situation of drug trafficking in the Golden Triangle (*moṭallat-e ṭalā’ī*) and in Afghanistan and Pakistan, however not labeling it Golden Crescent (*helāl-e ṭalā’ī*); on the malicious role of the colonialists and in particular, of the British “old fox” (*rūbāh-e pīr*) in Iran’s history of drugs. At the same time, it describes the costly *drug supply reduction* efforts of the DRUG CONTROL HEADQUARTER (DCHQ) (*setād-e mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḥadder*) to be a religious duty, from which particularly the European countries would benefit, which in turn only accuse Iran of human rights violations.<sup>948</sup> *Resālat* also emphasizes the official opinion according to which only a drug trafficker is considered a criminal while a drug addict has to be treated as an ill person. Yet, the description of drug addicts as suffering from cultural difficulties (*mo’zelāt-e farhangī*) at least indicates an

---

kārī-ye ḥāne-vādeh va eḡtemā’ – żorūrat-e movaffaqiyyat-ye barnāmeḥ-ye bāz-parvarī-ye mo’tādān) & Eṭṭelā’āt, 29 Ḥordād 1374 (19 June 1995): “Rehabilitation centres – protection of the society and deliverance of the individual from the captivity of addiction” (*Marākez-e bāz-parvarī – şiyānat-e ḡāme’ah va rahā’ī-ye fard az esārat-e e’tiyād*) - the three articles are part of a series titled “On occasion of the visit of UNODC experts to the country’s rehabilitation centres” (*Be angīzeh-ye bāz-dīd-e kār-šenāsān-e kontrol-e mavādd-e moḥadder-e sāzemān-e melal-e mottaḥed az marākez-e bāz-parvarī-ye mo’tādān-e keşvar*).

<sup>947</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 31 Ḥordād 1374 (21 June 1995): “How is the money from drug trafficking laundered?” (*Pūlhā-ye teḡārat-e mavādd-e moḥadder čegūneh taḥīr mīšavad?*).

<sup>948</sup> **Resālat**, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995): ‘Drugs - a weapon against the well-being of humankind’ (*Mavādd-e moḥadder - ḥarbe’ī ‘alai-he salāmat-e başariyyat*).

ongoing moralistic view.<sup>949</sup> This becomes even more apparent, when *Resālat* quotes Āyatollāh Ḥomainī with the opinion that drugs are “yeast for moral corruption” (*māyeh-ye fesād*). Despite also mentioning the number of 500,000 predominantly young drug addicts, *Resālat* still maintains that Iran can face the future with a “calm mind” (*bā ārāmeš-e ḥāṭer*).<sup>950</sup>

#### **Salām** in June: an inter-regional cooperation is needed in the combat against drugs

While an article of *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* could not be identified,<sup>951</sup> the leftist newspaper *Salām* also prints two articles on drugs on the international drugs day. Apparently based on the same source as the other newspapers, it provides a much more detailed anti-imperialist version of the history of drugs in Iran.<sup>952</sup> The second article deals with the international drug situation after the fall of the USSR and calls for a closer cooperation between the regional neighbors Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries to jointly solve the problem of drug cultivation and trafficking in the region.<sup>953</sup>

#### **Īrān** in June: The family as cause and solution for the drug addiction of the youth

*Īrān* for its part publishes another article, in which it concentrates on addiction causes among adolescents, arguably the most central concern of the Iranian press discourse. Based on interviews with young street addicts, it lists different addiction causes, among which in particular drug-addicted family members such as often the father. It consequently discusses appropriate family relationships and educational models to prevent children from turning to drugs, by rather controversially recommending a strict control of their daily routines. At the same time, it emphasizes the crucial role of the schools and the mass media in drug

<sup>949</sup> **Resālat**, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995): “The interior minister has announced on occasion of the international [global] day of drugs combat: a smuggler is a criminal, and an addict an ill person’ (*Vazīr-e kešvar dar āstāneh-ye rūz-e ḡahānī-ye mobārezah bā mavādd-ye moḥadder e’lām kard: qāčaqčī moḡrem ast, va mo’tād bīmār*).

<sup>950</sup> **Resālat**, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995): “The people {say} - the combat of the Islamic state against drugs has guaranteed the well-being of humankind’ (*Mardom - mobārezeh-ye neẓām-e eslāmī ‘alai-he mavādd-e moḥadder salāmat-e bašariyyat-rā taẓmīn karde ast*); another article titled “The judicial organization is the pillar of safeguarding justice’ (*Dasgāh-e qazā’ī rokn-e ta’mīn-e ‘edālat ast*) dated from the same day on the role of the judiciary could not be identified.

<sup>951</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995): “The world’s drug day’ (*Rūz-e mavādd-e moḥadder dar ḡahān*).

<sup>952</sup> **Salām**, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995): “A short history of drugs in the world and in Iran - on the occasion of the world day of the combat against drug addiction and drug trafficking’ (*Tārīḡeh-ye mavādd-e moḥadder dar ḡahān va īrān - be bahāneh-ye rūz-e ḡahānī-ye mobārezah bā e’tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḥadder*).

<sup>953</sup> **Salām**, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995): “The gloomy shadow of the octopus of death over the world’ (*Sāyeh-ye šūm-e oḡtāpūs-e marg bar ḡahān*).

prevention, apparently reflecting opinions of the NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST DRUG ABUSE in this regard.<sup>954</sup>

**Hamšahrī** in July: liberal drug laws in the Europe vs. the need of exacts statistics in Iran

While also publishing an article containing the meanwhile common version of the history of drugs in Iran, *Hamšahrī* explicitly mentions the pre-revolutionary practice of distributing opium tablets to drug addicts as a failure. The introduction of methadone therapy in Iran will, however, soon make this opinion obsolete. It subsequently, nevertheless pays particular attention to the liberal drug policies of European countries such as the Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland, while not forcibly approving of these liberal practices. In contrasting these liberal policies the domestic drug policy, it particularly bemoans the lack of exact statistics on drug addiction, and the insufficiency of the existing therapy facilities in Iran, thus clearly admitting a bleaker reality than the conservative newspapers. *Hamšahrī* mentions that fifty percent of the prison inmates have been convicted for drug felonies; and that seventeen therapy facilities have treated eighty thousand drug addicts so far.<sup>955</sup>

**Eṭṭelā'āt** in another article series in July: the āyatollāhs Gīlānī and Moqtadā'ī have prepared the ground for addiction treatment measures

In a five-part series titled “every day has to be an *international day against addiction and drug trafficking*” (*hameh rūz bāyad “rūz-e ḡahānī-ye mobārezeḥ bā e'tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḥadder” bāšad*), *Eṭṭelā'āt* publishes the so far most comprehensive and realistic report on drugs. While explicitly mentioning a small treatise of the DCHQ as the source for the history of drugs – which all newspaper apparently are using – it adds the new and factually correct detail that the family of Moḥammad-Rezā Šāh was involved in drug trafficking. Estimating the costs of Iran's supply reduction efforts along the Eastern border at 10 million US\$, *Eṭṭelā'āt* requests financial assistance from European countries. Iran is portrayed with not only fighting against drug trafficking with building fortifications along the border, but with also having proposed a crop substitution program in Afghanistan to the UN. Citing a *fatvā* of Āyatollāh Ḥomainī as the reason for the traditional criminalization of drug use in the Islamic Republic, *Eṭṭelā'āt* also mentions that Iran's new health-based policy approach towards addiction treatment was legally prepared *fatāvā* of the āyatollāhs Gīlānī and Moqtadā'ī.

<sup>954</sup> **Īrān**, 8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995): “White powder, black death – reasons for addiction among adolescents” (*Gerd-e Seftd, Marg-e Siyāh – ‘elal-e gerāyeš-e ḡavānān beh e'tiyād*).

<sup>955</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995): “The world in the trap of addiction” (*Ḡahān dar dām-e e'tiyād*).

Less convincing is, however, the claim that the courts meanwhile have renounced the imprisoning of drug addicts if they are willing to undergo treatment. *Eṭṭelā'āt* even mentions twenty existing rehabilitation centers in Iran, whose therapy measures it lists in detail. It also still repeats that detoxification without medication is preferable to withdrawal with pharmaceuticals. But in an interview with the private physician Šāleḥ Šīvā, a US trained acupuncture specialist, it accepts alternative supportive methods such as herbal medicine or acupuncture. Concomitantly it introduces another regular feature of the Iranian press discourse on drugs by warning of deceiving advertisements for dubious private addiction treatment, ironically printing such advertisements next to the very same article. Finally, it mentions for the first time the spread of HIV by ways of needle sharing, although not directly in connection with Iran.<sup>956</sup>

#### **Resālat** on the occasion of a Friday Prayer in July: Iran's police are successful in the drugs combat

In July, more articles touching on the subject of drugs appear in the newspapers *Abrār*, *Eṭṭelā'āt*, and *Kaiḥān*, which either could not be identified or do not add new details to Iranian press discourse on drugs.<sup>957</sup> Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that an unidentified article of *Hamšahrī* was published on tobacco smoking,<sup>958</sup> a focus that will become more important in the sample year 1376 (1997-98). *Resālat* writes a further article on occasion of a Friday prayer speech, in which police commander Reżā Saif-Elāhī emphasized the success of

<sup>956</sup> **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995): "The Western colonialists, criminal circulators of drugs in the world' (*Este 'mār-garān-e ġarbi, ravāḡ-dehandegān-e tabahkār-e mavādd-e moḥadder dar ḡahān*) & **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 11 Tīr 1374 (2 July 1995): "The fight against addiction and drug smuggling is resolutely continued' (*Mobārezah bā e'tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḥadder qāṭe 'āneh edāmeḥ miyābad*) & **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 12 Tīr 1374 (3 July 1995): "Drug trafficking, an inauspicious activity that is more profitable than the oil trade' (*Qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḥadder, fa' 'āliyyatī-ye šūm ke az teḡārat-e naft sūd-āvartar ast*) & **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 13 Tīr 1374 (4 July 1995): "Addiction withdrawal in 6 days, illusion or reality?' (*Tark-e e'tiyād dar 6 rūz, sarāb yā vāqe' iyyat?*) & **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 14 Tīr 1374 (5 July 1995): "The medical treatment with acupuncture has to take place within the framework of good order and legal provisions' (*Modāvā-ye mo'tādān bā ṭebb-e sūzanī bāyad dar čārčūb-e naẓm va moqarrerāt-e qānūnī dar āyad*) – all five articles are part of a serial titled "Every day has to be a Global Day against Addiction and Drug Smuggling' (*Hameh rūz bāyad 'rūz-e ḡahānī-ye mobārezah bā e'tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḥadder' bāšad*).

<sup>957</sup> **Abrār**, 15 Tīr 1374 (6 July 1995): "The Interior Minister in conversation with *Abrār*: The fifth Parliament [says] – we guarantee a healthy election' (*Vazīr-e kešvar dar goft-o-ḡū bā Abrār: maḡles-e pañom – salāmat-e enteḡābāt-rā taẓmīn mikonīm*); **Kaiḥān**, 22 Tīr 1374 (13. July 1995): "Statement[s] of the police commander on the security of the borders, and the combat against the networks of merchandise smuggling, theft and social evils' (*Eẓhārāt-e farmāndeh-ye nīrū-ye enteẓāmī dar bāre-ye amniyat-e marẓhā va mobārezah bā šabake-hā-ye qāčāq-e kālā, serqat va mafāsed-e eḡtemā'ī*); **Abrār**, 24 Tīr 1374 (15 July 1995): "The drug cartels prefer the East' (*Kārtel-hā-ye mavādd-e moḥadder šarq-rā tarḡīḥ mīdehand*); **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 26 Tīr 1374 (17 July 1995): "Biological, psychological and sociological foundations of addiction' (*Bonyād-hā-ye zīst-šenāḡī, ravān-šenāḡī va ḡāme'ah-šenāḡī-ye e'tiyād*) – could not be identified.

<sup>958</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 21 Tīr 1374 (12 July 1995): "Cigarette[s] – a death caravan from the 16<sup>th</sup> century until today' (*Siḡār – kārvān-e marg az sadeh-ye 16 tā emrūz*): could not be identified.

his troops in combatting drug trafficking as proven through the seizure of 135 tons of drugs in the previous year.<sup>959</sup>

### **Īrān** in July: poverty, unemployment and lacking recreational facilities as addiction causes

In a roundtable interview with the two sociology professors Šādeq Farbod and Manšūr Voṭūqī, *Īrān* covers the important topic of the role of the family in preventing drug addiction. Although emphasizing that in combatting drugs, *drug supply* and *drug demand reduction* measures are of equal importance; the following article nevertheless only covers Iran's *drug demand reduction* measures. The two academics are quoted with a revealing argument, namely that the rehabilitation centers in Iran should not resemble prisons, while many in fact arguably still did. In flavoring its articles as usual with interviews with drug addicts, *Īrān* eventually writes critically about addiction causes in Iran, mentioning the problem of lacking recreational facilities for the youth next to the commonly reported poverty, unemployment, or family problems.<sup>960</sup>

### **Abrār** and **Īrān** in August: drug production around the world

As one of only two articles appearing in August, the conservative newspaper *Abrār* writes about the creation of the UNDCP in 1987 while actually criticizing its insufficient activities on the field of *drug supply reduction*. In describing the whole complex of drug cultivation, drug trafficking and money laundering in a rather conspiratorial way, it also points to poverty as the most crucial reason for drug production in the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent.<sup>961</sup> *Īrān* for its part writes an article on the drug situation in Colombia, which, however, could not be identified.<sup>962</sup>

### **Kaihān** in October: drugs from the viewpoint of Islam

While two articles of the newspapers *Īrān* and *Kaihān* on the international situation of drugs could not be identified either;<sup>963</sup> *Kaihān* publishes one of the most interesting articles in

<sup>959</sup> **Resālat**, 24 Tīr 1374 (15 July 1995): "I say it from the heart [tongue] of the people that our nation is not on reconciling terms with America" (*Az zabān-e mardom migūyam, mellat-e mā bā āmrīkā sar-e āštī nīst*).

<sup>960</sup> **Īrān**, 29 Tīr 1374 (20 July 1995): "The role of the family in the salvation and rehabilitation of the addicts – roundtable of [the newspaper] *Īrān* on families and youth addiction" (*Naqš-e ḥāne-vādeh dar naḡāt va bāz-parvarī-ye mo'tādān – mīz-gerd-e 'īrān' dar bāreh-ye ḥāne-vādeh-hā va e'tiyād-e ḡavānān*).

<sup>961</sup> **Abrār**, 19 Mordād 1374 (10 August 1995): "High concern for the combat against an inauspicious global trade" (*Hemmat-e 'ālī barāye mobārezah bā teḡārat-e šūm-e ḡahānī*).

<sup>962</sup> **Īrān**, 3 Šahrīvar 1374 (25 August 1995): "The heavy shadow of the drug smugglers in the Colombian society" (*Sāyeh-ye sangīn-e qāčāqčīyān-e mavādd-e moḡadder dar ḡāme'ah-ye kolombiyā*).

<sup>963</sup> **Īrān**, 26 Mehr 1374 (18 October 1995): "Hungary – a passageway for heroin smugglers" (*Maḡārestān – goḡdar-gāh-e qāčāqčīyān-e herō'īn*); **Kaihān**, 27 Mehr 1374 (19 October 1995): "Confessions of an

1374 (1995-96). This happens to be the only article in which religion and religious laws are in the center of argumentation. Interestingly, none of the cited *fatāwā* of the *āyatollāhs* Ḥomainī, Golpāyegānī or Moṭahharī argues for drug prohibition in analogy to the Koranic alcohol proscription – as is the case in different Sunni countries.<sup>964</sup> Instead, it mentions as reasons for a prohibition of drugs: that drug addiction is causing the commitment of “illegal crime[s]” (*ḡorm-e nā-mašrū*), “physical and psychic illnesses” (*bīmārī-hā-ye ḡesmī va ravānī*), “premature death” (*marg-e zūd-ras*) and “suicide” (*h’od-košt*); and that since the Quran has forbidden “wastefulness” (*esrāf*) and “squandering” (*tabdīr*), and since drug addicts “paralyze” (*falaḡ mī-konand*) the family and national economy by “committing sins and crimes” (*mortakeb-e gonāh-ān va ḡarāyem*), the consumption of opium, *štreh* and morphine has been forbidden in Islam. “Therefore, punishing a producer [...], a supplier [...], and an abuser, and the admonishing of a criminal is necessary like in case of all other crimes for the protection and preservation of the community and for the prevention of evils [...]

(*ladā moḡāzāt kardan-e toulīd-konandeh’ī [...] ‘arḡeh-konandeh va sū’-mašraf-konandeh beh ḡāṭer-e ḡeḡḡ va šiyānat-e eḡtemā’ va ḡelou-gīrī az mafāsedī [...] va tanabboḡ-e moḡrem mānand-e har ḡorm-e dīgarī lāzem bāšad*).<sup>965</sup>

Following a report on the cocaine trade in Europe, which could not be identified either; *Kaiḡān* publishes another interesting article.<sup>966</sup> This article is written by the DCHQ and is in fact an answer to *Kaiḡān’s* previous argumentation. The DCHQ defends its current policy of preferably treating drug addicts and lists its successes so far in having applied a combined strategy of *drug supply* and *drug demand reduction measures*. Reaffirming the official plan of the SWO to enhance the country’s *drug demand* activities, the DCHQ, however, also implicitly admits that concerning *drug prevention* even half a year after the announcement of this plan not much has happened. Concomitantly, it mentions the debate on the appropriate confrontation of drug traffickers that took place in Iran before the passing of the ANTI NARCOTICS LAW in 1988. In this regard, it provides a new detail by mentioning that certain drug traffickers in the East are pardoned when renouncing further trafficking activities instead of being executed as the drug law 1988 demands.<sup>967</sup>

---

American official concerning the crimes of the White House and the reality behind’ (*E’terāfāt-e yek ma’mūr-e āmrīkā’ī dar bāreh-ye ḡenāyat-e kāḡ-e seftd va vāḡe’iyyat-e pošt*).

<sup>964</sup> **Opwis** (1999), 161ff.

<sup>965</sup> **Kaiḡān**, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995): “Drugs from the viewpoint of Islam” (*Mavādd-e moḡadder az dīd-gāh-e eslām*).

<sup>966</sup> **Kaiḡān**, 11 Ābān 1374 (2 November 1995): “Cocaine trafficking in Europe” (*Qāčāq-e kōkā’in dar orūpā*).

<sup>967</sup> **Kaiḡān**, 15 Ābān 1374 (6 November 1995): “Iran’s aims and positions concerning the fight against drugs” (*Ahdāf va dīd-dgāh-hā-ye trān dar mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḡadder*).

**Abrār** on the occasion of an ECO session in Eşfahān in November: an inter-regional cooperation is needed in the drugs combat

On the occasion of a session of the member countries of the ECONOMIC COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (ECO) (*ekō*), comprising Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and the states of Central Asia, which took place in Eşfahān in November 1997, *Abrār* again stresses the need for an inter-regional cooperation in the field of drug supply reduction.<sup>968</sup>

**Īrān** in December: the role of the NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS in relapse prevention

While *Kaihān* in a next article only mentions drugs in passing when explaining the function of the public prosecutor's office,<sup>969</sup> *Īrān* dedicates an entire article to the rehabilitation center Qarčak Varāmīn. Again emphasizing that drug addicts should be referred to as "assistance-seeking" (*madad-ġū-yān*), and reproducing interviews with some of the center's patients, it mentions that only ten per cent of them are there voluntarily, and that the others were sent there by court order. It elaborates in detail on the rehabilitation measures such as sports in the traditional gymnasium (*zūr-hāneh*) or the production of handicraft; and it explains the functions of the various specialists working in Iran's totally eleven rehabilitation centers. Most importantly, however, *Īrān* reveals, that every Wednesday, drug addicts and former addicts meet in a session organized by the NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS (NA) (*mo'tād-ān-e gom-nām*). It describes this private therapeutic community as having been launched by Iranians, who had become addicted in Europe and the USA, and once cured, had returned to Iran. Consequently, it presents the 'twelve steps' (*marāḡel-e davāz-dah-ġāneh*) program of the NA, whose success in Iran certainly can be explained by the fact that the withdrawal occurs without medication.<sup>970</sup>

**Īrān** in January: economic underdevelopment contributes to drug trafficking in Sīstān va Balūčestān

In describing Iran's physical fortification measures along the long and porous border with Afghanistan and Pakistan, *Īrān* mentions that these measures have cost Iran two hundred and fifty million US\$ so far. Apparently, part of this strategy also consisted in the relocation

<sup>968</sup> **Abrār**, 14 Ābān 1374 (5 November 1995): "The policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the field of the inter-regional cooperation in the combat against drugs" (*Siyāsāt-hā-ye ġomhūrī-ye eslāmī-ye īrān dar bo'd-e ham-kārī-hā-ye manṡaqe'ī-ye mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḡadder*).

<sup>969</sup> **Kaihān**, 4 Dey 1374 (26 December 1995): "In a special interview with *Kaihān* it is announced - the public prosecutor in his function as the public plaintiff officially intervenes in public crimes' (*Dar ġoft-o-ġū-ye eḡteşāşī bā Kaihān e'lām šod - dād-setān-e koll-e keşvar dar ġarāyem-e 'omūmī beh 'onvān-e modda'i-ol-'omūm ra'san modāḡeleh mī-konad*).

<sup>970</sup> **Īrān**, 18 Āḡar 1374 (9 December 1995): "Hard days of waiting - a report on the rehabilitation centre for addicts (in Qarčak)' (*Rūz-hā-ye saḡt-e enteżār - gozārešt az markaz-e bāz-parvarī-ye mo'tādān {qarčak}*).

of border villages to the interior. However, instead of blaming local traffickers for bringing havoc on Iranian society, it rather reports on the economic difficulties of the province of Sīstān va Balūčestān, through which the bulk of drug trafficking takes place and consequently asks the government to develop this province by creating employment, developing infrastructure and extending health services and education. In doing so, *Īrān* is one of the few newspapers questioning a mere security-driven approach at the border and pointing to a more complex relationship between poverty and drug trafficking in Iran.<sup>971</sup>

#### ***Abrār in March: only a healthy family life and religious education can help***

After two articles on drug trafficking in Latin America appeared in the newspapers *Aḥbār* and *Eṭṭelā'āt*;<sup>972</sup> the newspaper *Abrār* writes about the situation of drug addiction in Iran. It again blames the “filthy aims of the global colonialism” (*ahdāf-e palīd-e estekbā-e ḡahānī*) for imposing this problem on Iran, and even directly accuses Iran’s “parasitic” (*angālī*) drug addicts of having a bad influence on the Iranian society. As a protective wall against drug addiction, it again promotes healthy families and religious education.<sup>973</sup>

#### ***V. 2. b. The Iranian press on drugs in the year 1376 (1997-98)***

With sixty-nine articles, the Iranian newspapers in 1376 (1997-98) have increased the publication of drug related newspaper articles compared to two years ago. Many of these articles still appear around the *International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking*; equally important is however, president Ḥātāmī’s inauguration in August 1997, and in particular the amendment to the ANTI NARCOTICS LAW of November 1997. In comparison to the year 1374 (1995-96), a few additional newspaper contribute to the Iranian press discourse on drugs, yet these are conservative newspapers like *Qods* and *Āfarīneš* and not yet the new reformist newspapers. The range of topics the newspapers write about largely remains the same. But a few new arguments are introduced: the significant topic of tobacco smoking; and arguably of more importance, women as victims of drug addiction. Additionally, the

<sup>971</sup> *Īrān*, 28 Dey 1374 (19 January 1996): “Improvement of the East from the traders of death – a report on the governmental measures in the fight against drug trafficking at the Eastern borders” (*Beh-sāzī-ye šarq az soudā-garān-e marg – gozārešī az eqdāmāt-e doulāt dar mobārezah bā qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḥadder dar marz-hā-ye šarqī*); an article of *Abrār* appearing in the same month could not be found: *Abrār*, 18 Dey 1374 (9 January 1996): “Golden Triangle” (*Moṭallāṭ-e ṭalā’ī*).

<sup>972</sup> *Aḥbār*, 19 Bahman 1374 (8 February 1996): “The conviction of a president” (*Moḥākemah-ye yek ra’īs-e ḡomhūr*); *Eṭṭelā’āt*, 2 Esfand 1374 (21 February 1996): “Drug traffickers – a threat to democracy in Latin America” (*Soudā-garān-e mavādd-e moḥadder, tahdīdī ‘alai-he demōkrāsī dar āmrīkā lātīn*) – not available.

<sup>973</sup> *Abrār*, 15 Esfand 1374 (5 March 1996): “The addiction phenomenon” (*Padīdeh-ye e’tiyād*) – could not be identified.



importance of the individual newspapers regarding the number of drug related articles and the quality of arguments in the Iranian press discourse is changing as well.

#### **Eṭṭelā‘āt** on the occasion of a Friday prayer in April: addiction vs. habit

The first drug-related newspaper article in 1376 (1998/99) is again written on the occasion of Friday prayer. Yet, unlike two years ago, *Eṭṭelā‘āt* does not write about drug supply reduction, but cites the main speaker Āyatollāh Makārem-e Šīrāzī with a speech on the Iranian youth, sophisticatedly differentiating between ‘addiction’ (*e‘tiyād*) and habits (sg. ‘*ādat*), the latter of which being part of every human being.<sup>974</sup>

#### **Resālat** in April: Germany has legalized drugs

Like *Hamšahrī* two years ago, *Resālat* publishes an article about the liberal drug policy of certain European countries. The article is, however, written or at least prepared by the DCHQ, using as a source the newspaper *algōmnānīyeh (mūreh)*, probably the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. The article considers the – rather distortedly presented – German and Swiss drug policy examples to be a failure: in Switzerland, despite its liberal drug policy that allegedly includes the “free distribution” (*touzī‘-e āzād*) of heroin, there would apparently still be hundreds of drug-related deaths.<sup>975</sup>

#### **The No Tobacco Week in May**

Additionally to the *International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking*, the Iranian press uses another international date to raise the awareness of the Iranian public on drugs: the *world no tobacco day* of the WHO, which takes place on May 31 and which the Iranian newspapers rather call *no tobacco week (haftēh-ye bedūn doḥānīyāt)*. Yet, this day is only mentioned in 1376 (1997-98).

#### **Kaihān** in a series of articles in May: why are you drinking? To forget that I’m drinking

With a series consisting of two articles, *Kaihān* initiates one of the most important topics of the Iranian press discourse in this year, namely the widespread addiction to cigarettes, which it describes as even more addictive than heroin or cocaine. This is remarkable, as two years ago, the newspaper *Hamšahrī* considered tobacco smoking a lesser evil than the consumption of other drugs, although still mentioning it as an important starter drug. *Kaihān* describes the global situation of tobacco smoking according to information of

<sup>974</sup> **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 20 Farvardīn 1376 (9 April 1997): “A serious issue of the adolescents’ (*Mas’ala-ye ḡeddī az masā’el-e ḡavānān*).

<sup>975</sup> **Resālat**, 21 Farvardīn 1376 (10 April 1997): “Did the trade and consumption of drugs in Germany become free!?” (*Ḥarīd, forūš va mašraf-e mavādd-e moḥadder dar ālmān āzād šod!?*).

the WHO and mentions that in Iran there are six million tobacco smokers. Referring to the smoker's stated desire to lower stress, it even cites the famous sentence from Antoine de Saint-Exupéry's *Petit Prince* (*šāh-zadeh-ye kūčūlū*) "pourquoi bois-tu? [...] pour oublier que j'ai honte [...] de boire" albeit slightly altering it to "why do you drink? [...] To forget that I am drinking and always be drunk" (*čērā mašrūb mīnūšī? [...] barāye īn keh farāmūš konam ke mašrūb mīnūšam va dā'em ol-ḥamr hastam!*).<sup>976</sup>

### **Hamšahrī** in May: foreign cigarette brands are more addictive than domestic brands

While an article of *Abrār* highlighting the parents' influence on the behavior of their children could not be identified;<sup>977</sup> *Hamšahrī* also publishes an article during *no tobacco week*. While Iran's Health Minister points to the deplorable fact that in Iran, approximately fifty thousand people die each year due to tobacco smoking or passive smoking, the interviewed director of a local tobacco company rather unconvincingly maintains that foreign cigarette brands are more addictive than domestic cigarettes.<sup>978</sup>

### **Eṭṭelā'āt** in a series of articles in June: smoking leads to social deviations such as illegal relationships

Like its sibling *Kaihān*, the newspaper *Eṭṭelā'āt* also publishes a series of two articles on smoking. The author, Dr. Eḥsān ol-Dīn Našīrzādeh, points to the importance of education in preventing the tendency to start smoking at an early age. Citing the opinion of "most researchers" (*akṭar-e moḥaqqaqīn*), he accentuates an alleged correlation between tobacco smoking and "social deviations" (*enḥerāfāt-e eḡtemā'ī*) such as "illegal relations" (*ravābeṭ-e nāmašrū'*) – that is pre- or extramarital sexual relations – or the consumption of illegal drugs; and bizarrely claims that smokers are more likely to die in an accident or to be infected by HIV.<sup>979</sup>

<sup>976</sup> **Kaihān**, 7 Ḥordād 1376 (28 May 1997): „6 million smokers in Iran – put it out!” (*6 mīliyūn sīgārī dar īrān - ḥāmūš kon*); **Kaihān**, 8 Ḥordād 1376 (29 May 1997): „Smoker are buying poison and thus spread pollution” (*Sīgārī-hā sem mīḥarand tā ālūdegī touzī' mīkonand*) – both articles are part of a series titled „On the occasion of the week without tobacco products / smoking” (*beh monāsebat-e hafte-ye bedūn doḥāniyyāt*)

<sup>977</sup> **Abrār**, 7 Ḥordād 1376 (28 May 1997): „Children are more inspired by the deeds than the words of their parents” (*Kūdakān az raftār-e vāledain bīštar elḥām mīgīrand tā goftārešān*).

<sup>978</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 10 Ḥordād 1376 (31 May 1997): „Cigarettes, a smoke that affects everyone's eyes” (*Sīgār, dūdī ke beh čašm-e hameh mīravad*).

<sup>979</sup> **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 18 & 19 Ḥordād 1376 (8 & 9 June 1997): „Cigarettes, a big menace to the hygiene of schools” (*Sīgār, tahdīdī-ye bozorg barāye behdāšt-e madāres*).

### **Resālat** in June: economic development prevents drug trafficking

Preceding the international drugs day, the newspaper *Resālat* gives a summary of the activities of the Islamic Republic in fighting drug trafficking by emphasizing as usual its success. The entire article is based on information provided by the DCQH. These include statistics on seized drugs (733 tons in the last five years), arrested drug traffickers (146,548), and cured addicts (66,623). *Resālat* still holds the opinion that Iran has less drug addicts than before the revolution. It also states that Iran is not only fortifying its Eastern borders with physical barriers, but indeed also develops the poor border provinces economically in order to prevent the local inhabitants of turning to drug trafficking. Less success is, in contrast, ascribed to the governmental efforts in the field of drug demand reduction, which is particularly explained by often-uncoordinated programs. Among drug prevention measures discussed in official circles, *Resālat* also mentions the forced separation of children from addicted parents, thus again emphasizing the importance of the family in the Iranian press discourse on drugs.<sup>980</sup>

### **Eṭṭelā'āt** in June: smoking must be prohibited in public places

In yet another series of articles on smoking, *Eṭṭelā'āt* again establishes a relation between smoking and specific social phenomena such as for instance “divorce” (*ṭalāq*) or “illiteracy” (*bī-savādī*). Providing new details, it also mentions that there are four governmental and private anti-smoking organizations in Iran, among which it particularly names the SOCIETY AGAINST SMOKING (*ḡam'iyyat-e mobārezeh bā este'māl-e doḡānīyāt*). Conducting interviews with different addiction specialists, it supports a smoking-ban in public spaces, as would allegedly already be the case in seventy per cent of all countries; and requests the EXPEDIENCY COUNCIL, the decisive legal body in drug matters, to obligate tobacco companies to print health warnings on cigarette packages.<sup>981</sup>

---

<sup>980</sup> **Resālat**, 26 Ḥordād 1376 (16 June 1997): „A resumé of some operations of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the combat against drugs’ (*Ḥolāṣah-ye baḡšt az ‘amal-kard-e ḡomhūrī-ye eslāmī-ye īrān dar amr-e mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḡadder*).

<sup>981</sup> **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 1 Tīr 1376 (22 June 1997): „Smoking in public places has to be forbidden: (*Keštān-e sīgār dar maḡāme'-e ‘omūmī bāyad mamnū' šavad*) & **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 2 Tīr 1376 (23 June 1376): “Recommendations of the Society to Fight Smoking to quit smoking’ (*Pīš-nehād-hā-ye ḡam'iyyat-e mobārezeh bā este'māl-e doḡānīyāt barāy-e tark-e sīgār*) – the two article are part of a series titles “A glance at smoking and its unpleasant consequences (*negāhī beh este'māl-e doḡānīyāt va peyāmad-hā-ye nā-govār-e ān*)”, which actually consist of at least four articles, of which, however, only two could be identified.

***Still the International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking of June 26***

Like in 1374 (1995-96), international drugs day still motivates the press to publish many drug-related newspaper articles, although less than two years ago. This might be due to reduced drug-related activities of the government during the transitional period from the Rafsanjānī to the Ḥātāmī administration. This might arguably also have affected the DCHQ, which in turn could why the press publishes more articles on smoking.

**Hamšahrī:** *the problem of addiction relapse*

The press has already partly discussed the relapse risk for treated drug addicts in 1374 (1997-98), when talking about the crucial role of the addicts' families in their rehabilitation. Unsurprisingly, it is again the liberal newspaper *Hamšahrī* that broaches this topic. It reports that eighty per cent of heroin addicts and fifty per cent of other drug addicts relapse within the first three months after their withdrawal in Iran. It therefore demands more scientific programs to prevent former drug addicts from relapsing, requesting such programs to pay particular attention to the interrelationship between drug addiction and other mental disturbances.<sup>982</sup>

**Resālat:** *drug addiction has decreased in Iran; a cultural combat is nevertheless necessary*

In a next article, *Resālat* emphasizes the need for a comprehensive governmental effort in combating the national drug problem, including *drug demand reduction* programs. But it nevertheless rather continues to describe Iran's successful combat against drug trafficking, demonstrating its success through the use charts displaying seizures of opium and morphine by different regional countries. It also claims that heroin is still predominantly produced in Turkey, while the bulk of heroin actually takes place in Afghanistan. Less astonishing is *Resālat's* persisting – albeit increasingly solitary – opinion that drug addiction has decreased since the revolution.<sup>983</sup> In another article, published on the occasion of the *day of the judiciary* (*rūz-e qovveh-ye qaṣā'īyeh*), Āyatollāh Yazdī, the ultra-conservative head of the Judiciary, asks the domestic media to actively contribute to the “cultural aspects” (*masā'el-e farhangī*) of the drugs combat.<sup>984</sup>

<sup>982</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 3 Tīr 1376 (24 June 1997): „The silent chemical war. A study of the effective causes that bring an addict to an afresh drug consumption’ (*Ġang-e šīmīyā'ī-ye ḥāmūš. Bar-rasī-ye 'avāmel-e mo'atter dar dar rūy āvordan-e far-e mo'tād be mašraf-e moğaddad-e mādah-ye moḥadder*).

<sup>983</sup> **Resālat**, 3 Tīr 1376 (24 June 1997): „The combat against drugs needs a comprehensive and harmonious program; the efforts have to be on demand reduction – On occasion of 5 Tīr, the International Day against Drug Addiction and Drug Trafficking’ (*Mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder niyāz beh barnāmeḥ-ye ḡāme' va hāmahang dārad; talāš-hā bāyad baraye kāheš-e taqāṣā bāšad – beh monāsebat-e 5 tīr māh, rūz-e ḡahānī-ye mobārezah bā e'tiyād va qāṣāq-e mavādd-e moḥadder*).

<sup>984</sup> **Resālat**, 4 Tīr 1376 (25 June 1997): We investigate the complaints without regard to the position of the persons’ (*Bedūn tavaḡḡoh beh mouqa'īyyat-e ašḥāš beh šekāyat resīdegī mikonīm*).

Still on the occasion of the international drugs day, *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* and the moderately conservative *Aḥbār*, publish articles on the soaring drug production under the Ṭālibān in Afghanistan, both of which could not be identified.<sup>985</sup> *Aḥbār* also publishes another article on cannabis or marihuana (*mārī ḡovānā*) as a starter drug, yet concerning the USA and without mentioning Iran.<sup>986</sup>

**Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī in July: long summer holidays and lacking recreational facilities as addiction causes**

After writing an article that states that most prisoners in Iran are drug-related convicts, both drug traffickers and drug addicts;<sup>987</sup> the newspaper *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* again talks about the important topic of drug addiction among adolescents. It particularly mentions the long summer holidays as a problem, since the youth have plenty of leisure time, yet no corresponding recreational facilities such as “cultural places” (*amāken-e farhangī*) or sports facilities at their disposal. Other mentioned addiction causes are “crisis of faith” (*boḥrān-e e‘teqādī*) and the “imitation of Western behaviors” (*taqlīd az algū-hā-ye ḡarbi*). As remedy, *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* advises stricter family control and, more pronouncedly than two years ago, religious education and further religious activities for the youth. More astonishingly, it is the first newspaper to mention the problem of HIV/AIDS among intravenous drug users in Iran.<sup>988</sup>

**Kaiḥān in July: self-help groups play a crucial role in the prevention of addiction relapse**

Also writing about „addiction relapse prevention” (*ḡelou-gīrī az bāz-ḡašt beh e‘tiyād*) is *Kaiḥān* in one of its few drug-related articles in this year. As one such relapse cause, it mentions the fact that cured drug addicts often continue to frequent the same places and people; although it rather strangely assumes that they do this in order to prove their

<sup>985</sup> *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 4 Tīr 1376 (25 June 1997): „The Ṭālibān – promoters of drugs inside and outside of Afghanistan’ (*Ṭālebān – moravveḡ-e mavādd-e moḥadder dar dāḥel va ḥāreḡ az afgānestān*) & *Aḥbār*, 6 Tīr 1376 (27 June 1997): „The Ṭālibān – planters [...] of the white death’ (*Ṭālebān – kāšegān-e [...] marg-e sefid*). – both articles could not be identified.

<sup>986</sup> *Aḥbār*, 8 Tīr 1376 (29 June 1997): „The destructive effect of marijuana – this is the first step!’ (*Ātar-e moḥarreb-e „mārī ḡūwānā’ – īn qadam-e avval ast*).

<sup>987</sup> *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 9 Tīr 1376 (30 June 1997): „The president [announces]: the Islamic society wants the Judiciary to be decisive in confronting violators’ (*Ra’īs-e ḡomhūr: ḡāme‘ah-ye eslāmī ḥ‘āḥān-e qāte‘iyyat-e dast-ḡāh-e qaḏā’ī dar bar-ḥord bā motaḥallefān ast*).

<sup>988</sup> *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997): „Caution! The swirl of addiction lies in the ambush of the youth!’ (*Hošdār! Gerdāb-e e‘tiyād dar kamīn-e ḡavānān ast*).

steadfastness. *Kaihān* also emphasizes the importance of ‘self-help groups’ (*gorūh-hā-ye h<sup>v</sup>od-yārī*) as well as the family and friends in providing relapse prevention.<sup>989</sup>

***Eṭṭelā‘āt in July: the ANTI NARCOTICS LAW must be reformed to allow for addiction treatment***

The last newspaper article that appears before the inauguration of Ḥātāmī in August 1997 again covers the legal problem of drug addiction. In stressing the importance of religion as a crucial prevention tool, and by advocating a “cultural revolution” (*enqelāb-e farhangī*) in this regard, *Eṭṭelā‘āt* criticizes that there is still no appropriate prevention plan in Iran. It consequently demands a more scientific approach to – and crucially control over – *drug demand reduction measures*; and requests a revision of the relevant laws, to finally put addiction therapy measures on a clear legal basis.<sup>990</sup> The request would in fact soon be fulfilled, namely by the AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW of November 1997.

***Ḥātāmī’s inauguration in August***

As has been shown in the chapter on discursive events, Ḥātāmī’s inauguration gave the press discourse on drugs a major boost. This impact is, however, not only observable in the number of drug related newspaper articles, but more importantly also in the range of topics and arguments. Ḥātāmī’s new reformist government started to put even more emphasis on the *drug demand reduction* side; and the competent authorities, in particular the DCHQ, the SWO and the Health Ministry, immediately after the inauguration, set about putting this new policy into practice. Still in 1376 (1997-98) they organized a series of events: an exhibitions on drug addiction in Tehran; a workshop on addiction prevention in Qom; but also an interregional session on *drug supply reduction* in Eṣfahān. The most important event in the second half of the year was, however, the AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW, which was passed in November 1997.

***Abrār on the occasion of the exhibition “war without borders”: more scientific addiction research is needed***

The moderately conservative *Abrār* writes the first article after Ḥātāmī’s inauguration, on the occasion of an exhibition with the title “war without borders” (*ḡang bedūn-e marz*) that organized by the DCHQ. Like the newspaper *Eṭṭelā‘āt* has done before, it asks the new government to explain its plans for drug prevention, because addicts not only inflict damage on themselves but on society in general. *Abrār* consequently also demands that the government undertake more scientific studies on addiction causes; and due to the lack of such reports instead reproduces statistics of drug interceptions by the police and the UNDCP

<sup>989</sup> **Kaihān**, 17 Tīr 1376 (8 July 1997): „How can addiction be defeated?’ (*Če-gūneh mītavān bar e’tiyād ḡalbah kard?*).

<sup>990</sup> **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 28 Tīr 1376 (19 July 1997): „Epidemic of addiction’ (*Epīdemī-ye e’tiyād*).

instead. More addiction research by governmental institutions and universities would, however, soon follow. In stressing the importance of addiction prevention, it again focuses on the role of a healthy, affective and religious family environment.<sup>991</sup>

**Hamšahrī** in a series of articles in September: a preview of the AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW & new addiction consultation centers

By September, the newspaper *Hamšahrī* provides its readers with a first impression of the amendments to the ANTI NARCOTICS LAW. In a series of two articles, it explicitly states the reason for the legal revision consisting in finally creating a legal basis for the medical treatment of drug addicts, as they could still be convicted simply on the grounds of being drug-addicted. Yet, despite insisting that drug addiction is an illness, *Hamšahrī* still displays a moralistic view by calling listing addiction as a “social crime” (*bezeh-e eḡtemā’ī*), which would lead to further social crimes such as “theft” (*serqat*) or even “prostitution” (*fahšā*). It further explains that the DCHQ, whose structure it describes concomitantly, helped in drafting the new law, together with the “religious seminary” (*houzeh-ye ‘elmīyeh*) in Qom. At the same time, it introduces newly created “consultation centers” (*marākez-e mošāvereh-ye hožūr*) and “telephone help-lines” (*marākez-e mošāvereh-ye telefonī*) by the SWO. It provides another interesting detail when describing that in certain regions of Iran, still an opium pipe (*vāfūr*) might be offered as part of the traditional hospitality. This is one of the few allusions to the indeed continued existence of more traditional drug consumption patterns in Iran.<sup>992</sup>

**Kaihān** and **Hamšahrī** in September: hints for parents to detect signs of drug addiction among their children

*Kaihān* and *Hamšahrī* affirm the reinvigorated efforts of the new administration on the field of *drug demand reduction* by printing advices for parents on how to detect possible signs of drug addiction among their children, and how to educate them in an attentive way in order to prevent drug addiction. However, it also warns “this parental supervision should not be meddlesome and unfoundedly intrusive” (*īn neẓārat nabāyad ḡanbeh-ye foẓūlī va deḡālat-*

<sup>991</sup> **Abrār**, 12 Šahrīvar 1376 (3 September 1997): „Addiction – what are our prevention policies? An account of the exhibition „A war without border’, organized by the Drug Control Headquarter’ (*E’tiyād – tadābīr-e pīšgīrāneh-ye mā čīst? Gozāreš az nemāyeš-gāh-e ḡang bedūne-e marz be hemmat-e setād-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḡadder*).

<sup>992</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 16 Šahrīvar 1376 (6 September 1997): „Addiction – Prevention or Combat? (*E’tiyād – pīšgīrī yā mobārezah?*) & **Hamšahrī**, 17 Šahrīvar (7 September 1997): „The family – a solid fortification in the confrontation with addiction’ (*Hāne-vādeh - hešār-e moḡkam dar moqābelah bā e’tiyād*) – both articles are part of a series titled „On the margins of the ratification of the law{s} for the combat against drugs in the EXPEDIENCY DISCERNMENT COUNCIL OF THE SYSTEM’ (*Dar ḡāšīyya-ye tašvīb-e qavānīn-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḡadder dar maḡma’-e tašḡīš-e mašlahat-e neẓām*)

*e bī moured paidā konad*). Both articles are interestingly written by the same author, and thus probably have been authored by the Health Ministry or another governmental institution.<sup>993</sup>

*Translations from foreign newspapers and journals*

As *Resālat* writes in an article from April 1997,<sup>994</sup> many translations of foreign articles that are published by the press are in fact prepared and put at the media's disposal by the DCHQ. While this might not always be the case, it is nevertheless striking that some of the articles appearing after Hātāmī's inauguration are either translations of such foreign sources or generally broach the issue of foreign drug policies. This might indeed have been a deliberate strategy of the government to prepare the public to the amendment of THE ANTI NARCOTICS LAW and to more progressive addiction treatment measures respectively.

*Hamšahrī* and *Salām* for instance provide direct translations from foreign articles. While *Hamšahrī* reprints an article on the drug policy of Germany that appeared in the German tabloid *Bild am Sonntag*; *Salām* reprints an article from leftist journal *Le Monde Diplomatique* on the hegemonic role of the US drug policy in Colombia. This is the only drug-related article published in *Salām* in 1376 (1997-98), soon one of the most outspoken reformist newspapers.<sup>995</sup>

**Hamšahrī in September: an accurate and positive report about the liberal Swiss drug policy**

In a next article, *Hamšahrī* describes at length the recent drug policy shift in Switzerland towards distributing medically controlled heroin to long-time addicts. This report is not only the first accurate account on the Swiss drug policy, but proceeds to conclude with the assessment that this approach is more effective in reducing crimes than simply addressing drug-related crimes in a repressive way. At least implicitly, an important space is thus opened for the later discussion of *harm reduction* measures in the Iranian press. *Hamšahrī* explicitly refers to the importance of studying best practices and experiences of different countries.<sup>996</sup> In another article, *Hamšahrī* puts forward an explicit criticism of the conservative judiciary and the security forces, adding that in Iran the widespread issue of tobacco smoking is less

<sup>993</sup> **Kaihān**, 18 Šahrīvar 1376 (8 September 1997): „How should we educate our infants, so that they are not caught by addiction in their young days’ (*Kūdakān-emān-rā čegūneh tarbiyyat konīm tā dar ġavānī gereftār-e e’tiyād našavand?*); **Hamšahrī**, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 (10 September 1997): „How do we keep our children away from drugs? (*Čegūneh farzandān-e ħodrā az mavādd-e moħadder dūr negah-dārim?*).

<sup>994</sup> **Resālat**, 21 Farvardīn 1376 (10 April 1997): „Did the trade and consumption of drugs in Germany become free!?’ (*Ĥarīd, forūš va mašraf-e mavādd-e moħadder dar ālmān āzād šod!?*).

<sup>995</sup> **Salām**, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 (10 September 1997): „Drugs, a pretext to suppress the people’ (*Mavādd-e moħadder – bahāna’ī barāye sar-kūb-e mardom*).

<sup>996</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 24 Šahrīvar 1376 (14 September 1997): „In fighting drugs, prohibition is not sufficient’ (*Dar mobārezah bā mavādd-e moħadder, mamnū’iyyat kāft nīst*) & **Hamšahrī**, 25 Šahrīvar 1376 (15 September 1997): „In fighting drugs, prohibition is not sufficient. What is the solution?’ (*Dar mobārezah bā mavādd-e moħadder, mamnū’iyyat kāft nīst. Rāh-e ħall čīst?*).



discussed than the alleged problem of indecent veiling of women (*bad-heġābī*). This, of course at least in 1376 (1997-98), is hardly true.<sup>997</sup>

### **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī** in September: the CIA's role in the global drug traffic

As if to establish a counterweight to the discussion of the liberal drug policies of foreign countries, *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* reminds its readers that the drug policies of foreign countries often have less noble aims, by highlighting the indeed often dubious role of the CIA in the global drug traffic.<sup>998</sup>

#### *The inter-regional session on combatting drug trafficking in September*

As stated previously, *Ĥātāmī*'s administration not only organized events in the field of *drug demand reduction*, but also continued Rafsanġānī's international efforts in the field of *drug supply reduction* measures. *Ĥātāmī*'s efforts in this regard included the organization of a session on behalf of the ECO, as well as the "interregional session on drugs" (*eġlās-e bain-e manṭaqeh'ī-ye mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḥadder*) convened by Interpol in Eṣfahān.

### **Hamšahrī** in an interview with professor Fīrūz Ġalīlī: the number of drug addicts in Iran is approximately one and a half million

On the occasion of Interpol's "interregional session on drugs" on 28 September 1997, *Hamšahrī* publishes an interview with Fīrūz Ġalīlī-Ĥiyābānī, a professor for addiction psychology from the UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN. Critically assessing Iran's drug policy measures, Ġalīlī not only deplores a lack of scientific research on the situation of drug addiction in Iran, but reproduces an estimation of the WHO, according to which 2.4% of the Iranian population are addicted to drugs. This would amount to one and a half million people, three times as much as the Iranian government has admitted so far. He also questions the prevalent opinion previously expressed by the newspapers, namely that addiction withdrawal should not be done by the help of medication; but rather maintains, that in addition to medication, psychological and social support is also important.<sup>999</sup>

<sup>997</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 25 Šahrīvar 1376 (15 September 1997): „Cigarettes – choice or compulsion?” (*Sīġār, entehāb yā eġbār?*).

<sup>998</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 27 Šahrīvar 1376 (18 September 1997): „Clinton's support for fifty years of conspiracy and crime of America's spy organization 'CIA'” (*Hemāyat-e klīntōn az 50 sāl-e tūṭe'e va ġanāyat-e sāzemān-e ġāsūsī-ye āmrīkā*, 'SIA'); on the past involvement of the CIA in the drug trafficking for instance in Southeast Asia, Central America, Colombia, or in Afghanistan and Pakistan: **McCoy** (2003).

<sup>999</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 2 Mehr 1376 (24 September 1997): „Medicine alone is no remedy for addiction. Causes for a lacking success of the drug combat – in an interview with Professor Fīrūz Ġalīlī” (*Faqat dārū, čāreh-ye e'tiyād nīst*. 'Elal-e 'adam-e movaffaqiyyat-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder dar goft-o-ġū bā prōfesōr Fīrūz Ġalīlī).

### **Eṭṭelā'āt** in a series of articles in October: the international community supports Iran's drug supply reduction efforts

During the interregional session on drugs combat in Eṣfahān, *Eṭṭelā'āt* publishes the most comprehensive series of articles so far, consisting of six articles. The articles cover Iran's *drug supply reduction* efforts, its cooperation with regional countries and the UNDCP, and the drug policies of specific foreign countries. While requesting the international community to financially contribute to Iran's costly drug combat, *Eṭṭelā'āt* also mentions that the DCHQ staff are trained in special courses by the UNDCP, and that some DCHQ specialists have travelled to European countries to study best practices. It further adds that the UNDCP financially supports a common project between Pakistan and Iran.

Contrary to *Hamšahrī*, *Eṭṭelā'āt*, however, still refutes liberal drug policy measures as applied in Switzerland. It even maintains that the Swiss policy of "legalization" (*āzād-sāzī*) resulted in more drug addicts. It emphasizes, in contrast: "the way to the eventual solution has to be searched in the spreading of religion, in the return to religious believes, and in spirituality" (*rāh-e ḥall-e nehāyī-rā bāyad dar gostareš-e madḥab va bāz-gašt beh e'teqād-āt-e dīnī va ma'navīyat gost-o-ḡū kard*). While still maintaining the official estimation of 500,000 drug addicts in Iran, it also promotes marriage as a way to prevent drug addiction, thus voicing an opinion that will soon be challenged by other newspapers.<sup>1000</sup>

### **Resālat** in October: increasing drug addiction in Iran & Islamic remedies

In October, *Resālat* for the first time admits that Iran has a growing addiction problem. Similar to *Eṭṭelā'āt*, it considers following the Islamic rules to be the best drug prevention: "let us strive to [follow] as perfect as possible the examples of the impeccable imams (peace be upon them) and the noblemen of knowledge and religion in order to preserve growth, progression, freshness and succulence" (*rah-nemūdeh-ye a'emmeh-ye ma'sūmīn ('alaihom*

<sup>1000</sup> **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 13 Mehr 1376 (5 October 1997): „Drugs – a supra-national problem and a serious menace to all earth dwellers' (*Mavādd-e moḥadder - moškeltī-ye farā-mellī va tahdīdī-ye ḡeddt barāye ḡahānīyān*) & **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 14 Mehr 1376 (6 October 1997): „Iran is not a safe route for the international drugs smuggling networks anymore' (*Irān dīgar masīr-e amnī barāye šabakeh-hā-ye bain-ol-melalī-ye qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḥadder nīst*) & **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 15 Mehr 1376 (7 October 1997): „The fight against drugs production and distribution needs a global approach (*Mobārezah bā toulīd va touzī'-e mavādd-e moḥadder, niyāz-mand-e ravī-kardī-ye ḡahānī ast*) & **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 16 Mehr 1376 (8 October 1997): „The international drugs trade – a spread of the exceeding breath of the inauspicious deathly shadow of addiction' (*Teḡarat-e ḡahānī-ye mavādd-e moḥadder – gostareš-e dam-e afzūn-e sāyeh-ye šūm-e marg-bār-e e'tiyād*) & **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 17 Mehr 1376 (9 October 1997): „Important background [knowledge] for the visibility of an inclination towards drug consumption" (*Zamīneh-hā-ye momēhh padāī-ye gerāyēš beh mašraf-e mavādd-e moḥadder*) & **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 October 1997): „The young – the first victims of the greediness and criminality of the drug traffickers' (*Ḡavānān, naḡostīn qorbānīyān-e āzmandī va tebeh-kārī-ye qāčāqčīyān-e mavādd-e moḥadder*) – the six articles are part of a series titled „Performance of the inter-regional session on drugs combat' (*Bar-gozārī-ye eḡlās-e bain-e manṭaqe'ī-ye mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder*).

*salām) va bozorgān-e ‘elm va dīn dar rāstā-ye taḥaqqoq-e ārmān-hā-ye moqaddas-e eslāmī va rošd va taraqqī va ṭarāvat va šādābī har če tamāmtar bekūšīm).*<sup>1001</sup>

### **Eṭṭelā‘āt and Hamšahrī in October: the second anniversary of the NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS in Iran**

In October 1997, two newspaper articles describe in depth the aims and activities of the NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS (NA) branch in Iran. *Eṭṭelā‘āt* describes how the Iranian branch of the NA had been launched approximately two years ago; and it cites Moḥammad Fallāḥ, director general of the DCHQ, effusively praising this first private addiction treatment organization in Iran; while also mentioning a booklet of the NA with the title ‘Who is an addict?’ (*mo‘tād kīst?*). *Hamšahrī*’s article bears the title “the addict – ill or criminal?” (*mo‘tād – bīmār yā moğrem?*). It provides some additional information on the NA, namely the addresses of different branches in Tehrān. *Hamšahrī*’s article is written by Hūtan Golsorḥī, an Iranian addiction specialist residing in Canada, who is also cited by *Eṭṭelā‘āt*. He is also the first author in the press discourse on drugs to explicitly compare drugs to alcohol, by slightly misquoting a Koranic verse as “verily, wine belongs to the best handiworks of Satan” (*innama ‘l-ḥamru aḥsanu mi[n?] ‘amali ‘š-šaiṭāni*)<sup>1002</sup>

### **Hamšahrī in a series of two articles in October: half of the addicts are younger than twenty-four**

In a series consisting of two articles, *Hamšahrī* again pays attention to the international drug trafficking, concentrating on Istanbul and Dubai as the most important trafficking hubs in Southwest and West-Asia respectively. *Hamšahrī* makes an important claim by stating that drug trafficking needs a consumer market, thus pointing to the indeed intricate relationship between *drug supply* and *drug demand* and admitting a certain self-responsibility of Iran for the problem of drug addiction. In this article, it again reproduces the official number of 500,000 drug addicts, despite having earlier published the WHO estimation of around 1,5 million drug addicts. Additionally, it maintains that fifty per cent of the drug addicts are under the age of twenty-four. While mentioning prostitution as a common “social

<sup>1001</sup> **Resālat**, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 October 1997): „The use of drugs [is] an alarm bell! On occasion of start of the manoeuvre ‚prognosis’ (*Este‘māl-e mavādd-e moḥadder, zang-e ḥaṭar! Beh monāsebat-e šorū‘-e mānōvr-e „endār*) – the text itself doesn’t refer to this presumably military or police manoeuvre.

<sup>1002</sup> **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 24 Mehr 1376 (14 October 1997): „Addiction, prevention, therapy and follow-up ...” (*E‘tiyād, pīš-gīrī, darmān va pey-gīrī ...*); **Hamšahrī**, 24 Mehr 1376 (16 October 1997): „The addict – an ill or a criminal person?” (*Mo‘tād – bīmār yā moğrem?*); the exact wording of Sūrat 5 (al-Mā‘īdat), Verse 91 is: “wine and the game of hazard and idols and divining arrows are only an abomination of Satan’s handiwork” (*inna-ma ‘l-ḥamru wa-l-masīrū wa-l-anṣābu wa-l-azlāmu riğsun min ‘amali ‘š-šaiṭāni*).

evil” (*mafsad-e eġtemā’ī*) related to drug addiction, it explicitly excludes Iran from this rule. Additionally, it cites different expert opinions holding that Iran’s drug policy is not successful; but subsequently rather concentrates on neglecting duties of the police in confronting “drug dealing” (*harīd va forūš-e mavādd-e moħadder*).<sup>1003</sup>

***The AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW in November***

Certainly the most important discourse event of the second half of the year 1376 (1997-98) is the amendment to the ANTI NARCOTICS LAW of 1988, which the Expediency Council passed in November 1997. This amendment explicitly grants drug addicts the right to addiction treatment and protection from prosecution – at least during the period. The courts in fact merely tolerated the government’s previous addiction treatment measures, and indeed sent many addicts to such centers. But according to the previous law, this practice was illegal. Already in 1374 (1995-96), the newspapers have lamented this inconsistency between law and practice and have pointed to the danger of drug addicts being arrested when referring themselves voluntarily to rehabilitation centers. In 1376 (1997-98), they, consequently, display much interest in the amendment and publish many drug-related articles, albeit not always agreeing in their judgment of these legal changes.

**Resālat in October: drug addiction among the youth is worrisome & prevention is better than therapy**

Sharing *Hamšahrī*’s concern for the widespread drug addiction among Iranian adolescents, *Resālat* mentions drug addiction – or as it quotes the WHO-preferred term “medical dependence” (*vābastegī-ye dārū’ī*) – as “one of the biggest social problems” (*az mohemmtarīn mo’ālat-āt-e eġtemā’ī*). To defend themselves against the “filthy aims” (*ahdāf-e palīd*) of the “death merchants” (*soudā-gar-ān-e marg*), it advises parents to provide their children with a secure and calm environment and asks the government to conduct more scientific addiction research since “prevention has priority over therapy” (*pīš-gīrī moqaddam bar darmān ast*).<sup>1004</sup>

**Resālat: the existing laws are very good; executions, prisons and labor islands are the best prevention**

In November 1997, *Resālat* publishes an extreme criticism of Iran’s current drug policy, contradicting previous and subsequent articles of its own. The article with the ironic title “what does public education even mean?” (*āmūzeš-e ‘omūmī ya ‘nī čeh?!)* is written as a

<sup>1003</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 27 Mehr 1376 (19 October 1997): „From the Golden Triangle of opium to the thousands mazes of the Mafia. A glance at the global drug production centres and market(s)’ (*Az moṭallat-e ṭalā’ī-ye taryāk tā hezār-tū-ye māfiyā. Negāhī beh kānūn-hā-ye toulīd va bāzār-e ġahānī-ye mavādd-e moħadder*) & **Hamšahrī**, 28 Mehr 1376 (20 October 1997): „The necessity for a common contract to put an end to the global drugs networks. A glance at the ways of production, trafficking and markets of drugs’ (*Žorūrat-e peymān-e dast-ġam’ī barāye barčīdarn-e šabakeh-hā-ye ġahānī-ye mavādd-e moħadder. Negāhī beh kam-o-keyf-e toulīd, qāčāq, va bāzār-e mavādd-e moħadder*).

<sup>1004</sup> **Resālat**, 5 Ābān 1376 (27 October 1997): „Addiction – the role of the parents and the supervisory levers of the society’ (*E’tiyād – naqš-e vāledain va aħram-yā-ye nežaratī-ye ġāme’ah*).

reaction to the imminent amendment to the ANTI NARCOTICS LAW, and asks for an active involvement of the Basīḡ in the drug combat. More explicitly, it considers the existing drug laws to be “very good” (*besyār hūb*) and “[completely] codified” (*modavvan*), and does not see a need for more *drug demand reduction* activities. On the contrary, it explicitly states that in confronting drug addiction “you have to close a polluted spring, not teaching not to drink from the polluted water” (*šomā bāyad češmeh-ye ālūdeh-rā kūr konīd, nah īnkeh țarīqeh-ye mașraf nakardan az āb-e ālūdeh-rā āmūzeș dehīd*).<sup>1005</sup>

It took the DCHQ a week to respond to this exceptional attack on the liberal reorientation of the official drug policy. The response is published in a subsequent article of *Resālat*. The DCHQ’s public relations office defends itself by highlighting the mixture of “a cultural and a physical and disciplinary combat” (*mobārezeh-ye farhangī ham zamān bā mobārezeh-ye fīzīkī va entežāmī*) – that is of *drug demand* and *drug supply reduction* – as a specific “third thinking” (*andīșeh-ye sevvom*). It also points to the many difficulties to be faced in achieving success in this “silent war” (*ğang-e hāmūș*) against the addiction enemy who “has a veil over his face” (*neqāb bar čehreh dārad*). It further explicitly expresses its disappointment that the cultural newspaper *Resālat* has published such criticism. *Resālat* subsequently indeed apologizes by accentuating that this article only reflects the personal opinion of the author; however, it immediately even escalates the rhetoric and states: “the best way to prevent an inclination towards drugs would be a determined application of the death penalty, of long prison sentences, and of the expulsion of addicts to labor islands” (*agar moğāzāt-hā-ye e’dām va zandān-hā-ye țavīl ol-moddat beh hamrāh-e e’zām-e mo’tādān beh ġazāyer-e mașșūș-e kār bā qāțe’iyyat eğrā șavad, ħod behtarīn ‘āmel dar pīș-ğīrī az gerāyeș beh mavādd-e moğadder ast*).<sup>1006</sup>

**Āfarīneș** in a series of four articles in November: the craving for drugs is stronger in prisons than outside

Following the publication of an article in *Hamșahrī* on cigarette smoking and the role of the Philipp Morris Company in the global tobacco business,<sup>1007</sup> the moderately conservative newspaper *Āfarīneș* publishes a series of four articles on drug addiction in the world and in Iran. While expressing disapproval with liberal drug policies of foreign countries like the

<sup>1005</sup> **Resālat**, 6 Ābān 1376 (28 October 1997): „What does public education mean?” (*Āmūzeș-e ‘omūmī ya ‘nī čeh?*).

<sup>1006</sup> **Resālat**, 14 Ābān 1376 (5 November 1997): „The answer of the Drug Control Headquarter and explanations of Resālat’ (*Ğavābiyya-ye setād-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e moğadder va toužīhāt-e resālat*).

<sup>1007</sup> **Hamșahrī**, 18 Ābān 1376 (9 November 1997): „The roads of tobacco – the nightmare of cigarettes instead of food (*Ğadde-hā-ye tūtūn – kābūs-e sīğār beh ġā-ye ġadā*).

Netherlands, it concentrates, however, particularly on Iran. It revives the personal stories of drug addicts that were a regular feature of the press discourse on drugs in 1374 (1995-96); yet writes them in a much more dramatized style. It also mentions increased heroin consumption among people who recently have moved from the countryside to the big cities; and more importantly, maintains that in prisons, the temptation to consume drugs is actually bigger than outside. To fight against this “calamity” (*āfat*) it promotes a traditional, religious way of family life, where the *pater familias* (*pedar-e ḥānevādeh*) is still at the center, so that there would be no need of a psychologist or sociologist. Despite this conservative view, *Āfarīneš* nevertheless describes the existing prevention and therapy measures in a positive way. It also quotes ‘Alī-Rezā Ġazāyerī, the new director of the SWO, stating that Iranian drug policy is still in need of more addiction research, therapy facilities, and a closer cooperation between governmental and private addiction treatment centers.’<sup>1008</sup>

**Resālat** in November: despite a low culture and hygiene, Afghan refugees take fewer drugs

While an article of *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* that appeared in November could not be identified,<sup>1009</sup> *Resālat* publishes a further report on drug trafficking and drug addiction in Zāhedān, the capital of the province Sīstān va Balūčesān. Displaying a typical Iranian racist attitude, it wonders why drug addiction is less common amongst Afghan refugees, who “concerning cultural and hygienic standard{s} are one hundred per cent worse off than [even] the people from our remote regions” (*az naẓar-e saṭḥ-e farhang va beh-dāšt ṣad-dar-ṣad az mardom-e manāteq-e dūr-oftādeh-ye mā badtar hastand*), than amongst the local inhabitants. Still promoting a rather repressive understanding of drug policy, it additionally asks the courts to imprison drug-addicted fathers who would force their children to sell drugs on the street.<sup>1010</sup>

**Abrār** in a series of two articles in December: Afghan refugees have contributed to the rise of drug addiction in Iran

In December, the moderately conservative newspaper *Abrār* writes a series of two articles on the history of drugs in Iran. Although emphasizing rather questionably that opium “has no Iranian roots” (*rīšeh-ye trānī nadārad*), it explicitly admits that the Islamic Republic has failed to root out the problem of drug trafficking and drug addiction in Iran from the beginning. It attributes this, admittedly, at least partly to the armed conflict between the

<sup>1008</sup> *Āfarīneš*, 20 & 21 & 22 & 24 Ābān 1376 (11 & 12 & 13 & 15 November 1997): “Addiction – an issue of yesterday, today and tomorrow” (*E’tiyād ... mas’aleh-ye dīrūz ... emrūz ... fardā ...!*).

<sup>1009</sup> *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 21 Ābān 1376 (12 November 1376): Do we know ...? (*Āyā mī-dānīm ...?*).

<sup>1010</sup> *Resālat*, 26 Ābān 1376 (17 November 1197) „The combat [!] against drugs addicts from words to actions’ (*Mobārezah bā mo’tādān-e mavādd-e mohadder az ḥarf tā ‘amal*).

opposition groups directly after the revolution; to the war against Iraq; but also to the Afghan refugees who have fled in high numbers to Iran during the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Yet, it also acknowledges that at least during the first years after the revolution, Iran's government "had not acquired enough experience in this field" (*tağrobeh-ye kāfī dar īn zamāneh kasb nakardeh būd*).<sup>1011</sup>

### **Hamšahrī** in December: progressive addiction therapy measures in Iran

In writing an article about increasingly scientific addiction treatment measures by the SWO, *Hamšahrī* introduces an important argument by claiming that in order to quit a "destroying habit" (*ādat-e moḥarreb*) such as drug addiction and adopt a "good and laudable habit" (*ādat-e ḥub va pasandīdeh*), "his own will" (*ḥāst-e ḥod-e ū*) is the most decisive factor. Based on interviews with different physicians and psychologists, it continues to describe in detail the different stages of addiction therapy consisting of physical withdrawal with the help of mediation or without any. It introduces different types of therapy such as psychological therapy, group therapy, and family therapy, the latter of which for instance concentrating on problems such as the "absence of the father" (*feqdān-e pedar*) or the "dominant behavior of the mother" (*raftār-e solṭeh-ḡuyāneh-ye mādar*).<sup>1012</sup>

Further drug-related articles in December appear in *Āfarīneš*: one on the "satanic plague" (*āfat-e šaiṭānī*) of tobacco smoking,<sup>1013</sup> and the other on the historical and present situation of drug addiction in Iran.<sup>1014</sup> Both do not add new details to the Iranian press discourse on drugs. Based on a report that was aired by *Radio Köln*, *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* further mentions the Ṭālibān as the "largest drug exporter{s}" (*bozorgtarīn šāder-konandeh-ye mavādd-e moḥadder*) in the world, annually producing 2,800 tons of opium.<sup>1015</sup>

### **Qods** in a series of four articles in December: women as victims of drug addicted husbands & a warning to the international community

On the occasion of the recent passing of the amendment to the ANTI NARCOTICS Law in November 1997, *Qods*, the newspaper of the wealthy administration of the shrine of Emām

<sup>1011</sup> **Abbrār**, 10 & 11 Āḍar 1376 (1 & 2 December 1997): „A Short History of drugs in the world and in Iran' (*Tārīḫčeh-ye mavādd-e moḥadder dar ḡahān va īrān*).

<sup>1012</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 11 Āḍar 1376 (2 December 1997): „How do we help the addicts? The role of the family in addiction prevention' (*Čegūneh beh mo'tādīn komak konīm? Naqš-e ḡāne-vādeh dar pīš-ḡīrī az e'tiyād*).

<sup>1013</sup> **Āfarīneš**, 16 Āḍar 1376 (7 December 1997): „The Satanic plague' (*Āfat-e šaiṭānī*).

<sup>1014</sup> **Āfarīneš**, 16 Āḍar 1376 (7 December 1997): „The young and the global black calamity of today' (*Ġavānān va balā-ye siyāh-e donyā-ye emrūz*).

<sup>1015</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 4 Dey 1376 (25 December 1997): „'The Ṭālibān' – the biggest drug exporters' (*„Ṭālebān' – bozorgtarīn šāder-konandeh-ye mavādd-e moḥadder*).

Rezā in Mašhad, publishes a series consisting of four long articles on the situation of drug trafficking and drug addiction in Iran. It concentrates, however, on its home province Ḥorāsān, which like Sīstān va Balūčestān, shares a long border with Afghanistan and, thus, is an important passageway for drug trafficking. It provides a detailed description of opium and heroin production in Afghanistan, and states, that in Ḥorāsān, three quarters of the prison population are imprisoned for drug related crimes. The head of the local DCHQ office is quoted with the opinion that the police seize a “very considerable bulk” (*ḥaḡm-e besyār čašm-gīrī*) of the drugs that are trafficked through the province. He additionally and rather unconvincingly maintains that most of these drugs are trafficked to Europe, and that only “little consumption of opiates” (*mašraf-e kam-e mavādd-e afyūnī*) takes place in Iran; and he warns the European countries that Iran might have to halt its drug combat, if it does not receive more assistance from the international community. He nevertheless assures them that Iran will continue its “holy combat” (*mobārezeh-ye moqaddas*) “according to the aims of the rich religion of Islam” (*bar asās-e ahdāf-e maktab-e ḡanī-ye eslām*).

Also reporting personal stories of drug addicts, *Qods* is the first newspaper in the press discourse on drugs that explicitly mentions women in connection with drug addiction. The female reporter of *Qods* presents women and girls predominantly as victims of drug addicted husbands or fathers respectively, but crucially also as drug addicts themselves. One interviewed woman even admitted that “you give your body for every work” (*va tan beh har kārī bedehī*), thus clearly alluding to prostitution. This is the most obvious reference to prostitution in Iran during the whole sample period. *Qods* also puts forward new arguments concerning addiction causes, when citing the psychologist Šālehpūr with the opinion that poverty is not an all-explaining addiction cause, since drug addiction is also prevalent in more affluent classes; and that a crucial reason for addiction relapses is the social stigmatization of drug addicts.<sup>1016</sup>

<sup>1016</sup> **Qods**, 7 Dey 1376 (28 December 1997): „200 million addicts (are) victims to the death trade in the world’ (200 mīlīyūn mo’tād, qorbānī-ye teḡāra-e marg dar ḡahān) & **Qods**, 8 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997): „Those, who turn health and zeal into smoke’ (*Ānān keh salāmat va ḡairat-rā bā ham dūd mīkonand*) & **Qods**, 9 Dey 1376 (30 December 1997): „The production of 5 thousand tons of opium in Afghanistan; the Ṭalībān are the largest factor for the spread of addiction in the world’ (*Toulīd-e 5 hezār ton-e taryāk dar afḡānestān; ṭālebān bozorgtarīn ‘āmel-e gostareš-e e’tiyād dar ḡahān ast*) & **Qods**, 10 Dey 1376 (31 December 1997): „Iran ist he mose successful country of the world in the area of the drugs combat’ (*Irān dar ‘aršah-ye mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder, movaffaqtarīn kešvar-e ḡahān ast*) – the four articles are part of a series titled „On the occasion of the new passing [of law] of the Expediency Discernment Council of the System’ (*Be angīzeh-ye mošavvabah-ye ḡadīd-e maḡma’-e tašhīš-e mašlahat-e neẓām*).



In the same month, *Hamšahrī* publishes a translated article on “drug mules” (sg. *qāṭer*) or dealers in Colombia, which originally has appeared in the *Miami Herald*.<sup>1017</sup>

**Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī in January: AIDS and trafficking in girls as problems in Iran’s border provinces**

In January 1998, *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* publishes an article following a conference on “addiction and some other crimes” (*e’tiyād ba’zī ġarāyem-e dīgar*) in Qom. In this conference, the different members of the DCHQ together with the missionaries (*moballeġīn*), preachers (*hotabā’*), and clerics (*rūḥāniyūn*) from Qom discussed ways to improve the “cultural combat” (*mobārezeh-ye farhangī*) against drug addiction. The newspaper particularly stresses that the people and institutions involved in drug prevention first need appropriate information on drugs and drug addiction themselves. As further critical aspects that were discussed during the meeting it mentions the existence of AIDS and the “selling of girls” (*forūš-e doḡtar-ān*) in Iran’s border provinces.<sup>1018</sup>

In yet another article appearing in February, *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* again argues along a more traditional line. It presents Iran as a victim of the “global arrogance” (*estekbār-e ġahānī*) and the international drug trafficking; and it repeats the accusation that the UN is not supporting Iran in its drug combat, while annually assisting Pakistan with millions of US. Yet, it presents also a new argument when explaining the increase in heroin addiction in Iran due to the high price of opium, which was indeed a major cause for the development of heroin addiction in the 1960s.<sup>1019</sup>

**Eṭṭelā’āt on a research study in February: women should have the right to seek divorce from addicted husbands**

The last article of the year 1376 (1997-98) again touches on the crucial topic of the role of the family in causing or preventing drug addiction. In this regard, *Eṭṭelā’āt* presents a research study on the influence of addicted fathers on their families, which was conducted

---

<sup>1017</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 9 Dey 1376 (30 December 1997): „The mules don’t even have pity with themselves. The role of the middleman in the distribution and trafficking of drugs’ (*Qāṭerhā beh ġān-e ḡodešan ham raḡm nemīkonand. Naqš-e vāseṭah dar touzī’ va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḡhadder*).

<sup>1018</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 23 Dey 1376 (13 January 1997): „Octopus of addiction. The fight against addiction has to be [undertaken] from all sides’ (*Oḡtāpūs-e marg. Mobārezah bā e’tiyād bāyad hameh-ye ġānebah bāsad*).

<sup>1019</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 19 Bahman 1376 (8 February 1997): „Iran in the siege of the drugs. The Islamic Republic of Iran remains alone on the front of the combat against drugs’ (*Irān dar moḡāšerah-ye mavādd-e moḡhadder. Ġomhūrī-ye eslāmī-ye īrān dar ġebha-ye mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḡhadder tanhā māndeh ast!*).

among drug addicts in the rehabilitation center of Qarčak Varāmīn. However, contradicting its earlier assertion that a marriage can prevent drug addiction, *Eṭṭelā'āt* now vocally supports the right for women to seek a divorce from their drug-addicted husbands, because the women “normally strive to safeguard the family” (*ma'mūlan talāš-e ḥod-rā barāye hefẓ va baqā-ye ḥānevādeh mikonand*). Today, drug addiction is indeed one of the few reasons, for which women can seek a divorce from their husbands.<sup>1020</sup>

### ***V. 2. c. The Iranian press discourse on drugs in the year 1378 (1999-2000)***

With a total of one hundred and twenty-five drug-related articles in 1378 (1999-2000), the last year of the sample period, many more newspapers cover the drugs issue than two years ago. Many traditional conservative newspapers now almost cease to report on drugs, while other conservative and the new reformist newspapers are appearing. Yet popular are article series appearing over the course of several days. The press still writes most of their articles on the occasion of the international drugs day. However, other domestic *discourse events* like conferences or the publication of statistics and research findings become important as well. The range of topics remains the similar to two years ago, with the noticeable exception of HIV/AIDS among intravenous drug addicts, particularly inside prisons. But the newspapers put forward many new arguments and increasingly become critical of the official drug policy.

#### ***Ḥamšahrī in April: LSD, cocaine, amphetamines – not important in Iran***

The newspaper *Hamšahrī* begins the drug coverage of 1378 (1999-2000) with an article listing different drugs like hashish, LSD, cocaine and amphetamines and describing their properties and effects, even though most of these drugs are hardly of concern in Iran, where opiates by far are the drugs of choice.<sup>1021</sup>

#### ***Kār va Kārgar in a series of three articles in April: drug addiction in Iran has doubled within the last four years***

In April, *Kār va Kārgar*, the newspaper of Iran's official workers union, publishes a series of articles, in which it gives a very scientific definition of drug addiction by listing in

<sup>1020</sup> *Eṭṭelā'āt*, 20 Bahman 1376 (9 February 1997): „The influence of a father's addiction on [the outputs of] the family. A glance on the study of the [...]” (*Ātār-e e'tiyād-e pedar bar kār-kard-hā-ye ḥānevādeh. Negāhī beh paẓūhešt-ye [...]*).

<sup>1021</sup> *Ḥamšahrī*, 17 Farvardīn 1378 (6 April 1999): „What are the effects of addiction to hallucinogenic and stimulant drugs?” (*Ātār-e e'tiyād beh mavādd-e tavahhom-zā va moḥarrek čīst?*).

detail different physical, psychological, social, economic, cultural or political causes and effects of drug addiction. It also provides a survey of the official drug policy measures the Islamic Republic has implemented so far; and it prints statistics on the arrests of drug addicts, which ostensibly demonstrate that drug addiction has increased twofold during the last four years in Iran. Based on the official estimation of 500,000 drug addicts in the previous years, *Kār va Kārgar* thus insinuates a number of one million drug addicts in Iran.<sup>1022</sup>

#### **Qods in April: Religious negligence and divorce as important addiction causes**

In the same month, the newspaper *Qods* equally assumes an increase in drug addiction. While also explaining the reasons for drug prohibition in Iran, it discusses possible causes for such an increase. Apart from more commonly accepted reasons such as “depression” (*afsordegī*), “peer pressure” (*gorūh-e dūstān*), or corollaries of “modern civilization” (*tamaddon-e emrūz*), it also mentions “divorce” (*talāq*) and a “pleasure-seeking, material life” (*zendegī-ye leddat-ṭalabāneh-ye mādī*), or in short a loss of religiosity.<sup>1023</sup>

#### **Entehāb on the occasion of an ECO conference in April: 6 million Iranians are affected by drug addiction**

In reporting on the “educational conference for judicial deputies for drug {issues} of the member countries of ECO” (*hemāyeš-e āmūzešt-ye mo‘āvenat-hā-ye qažāyīyeh-ye mavādd-e moḥadder-ye kešvar-hā-ye ‘ożv-e ekō*), the nominally conservative, but factually very progressive *Entehāb*, also mentions a total of one million drug addicts in Iran. However, it also points to the fact, that in reality, six million Iranians are affected by addiction. It furthermore concentrates especially on drug addiction among young people and students, where the increase in addiction seems to be most pronounced. Additionally, it quotes Ġolām-Rezā Anšārī, the new director of the SWO, with the reminder that since the amendment to the ANTI NARCOTICS LAW of 1997, drug addicts should not be looked upon as criminals any more.<sup>1024</sup>

<sup>1022</sup> **Kār va Kārgar**, 21 & 22 & 24 Farvardīn (10 & 11 & 13 April 1999): „A view at the phenomenon of addiction and its causes and effects” (*Negāhī beh padīdeh-ye e’tiyād va ‘elal va ‘avārež-e ān*)

<sup>1023</sup> **Qods**, 28 Farvardīn 1378 (17 April 1999): „Why addiction” (*E’tiyād čerā?*)

<sup>1024</sup> **Entehāb**, 28 Farvardīn 1378 (17 April 1999): „Drugs – youth – addiction. This fire burns wet and dry. 6 Millions are overtaken, 60 Millions are in danger” (*Mavādd-e moḥadder – ġavānān – e’tiyād. In āteš, tar va ḥošk-rā mīsūzānad. 6 mīlyūn dar-ġīrand, 60 mīlyūn dar ḥaṭar*).

*Abrār*, in the same month, also touches the subject of addiction causes among the Iranian youth, however, still refers to a corresponding research study in the USA because similar research would still be lacking in Iran.<sup>1025</sup>

**Ḥordād** in May 1999: a new drug called ‘crack’ & a doubling of drug addicted students

While the reformist newspaper *Āryā* again publishes an article about the drug cultivation under the *Ṭālibān*, based on a translation from *TIME Magazine* article,<sup>1026</sup> the outspoken reformist newspaper *Ḥordād*, published by Ḥātāmī’s first interior minister ‘Abdollah Nūrī, mentions for the first time names the new drug “crack” (*krāk*), which it describes as being a form of heroin in Iran. Explicitly referring to a newspaper article of *Resālat* from 1377 (1998-99), it further accentuates that drug consumption amongst students “has increased 100 per cent” (*100 dar šad afzāyeš yāfteh*), while the starting age has decreased to between fifteen and nineteen years. The interviewed deputy of the DCHQ, Moḥammad-Ġavād Ḥešmatī, blames this trend on an increasing orientation of the adolescents towards the “cultures of the West” (*farhang-hā-ye ġarb*). As a result, he emphasizes the need for increased efforts in the field of drug prevention instead of repressive tactics. In this context he mentions the SUPREME COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH AND PLANNING (*šūrā-ye ‘ālī-ye taḥqīq-āt va barnāmeḥ-rīzī*), which was recently created within the DCHQ in order to coordinate the prevention measures of various involved institutions such as the MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE, the MINISTRY OF EDUCATION. *Ḥordād* furthermore proudly reports that the US has finally withdrawn Iran from its “annual list of countries that support the drug transit” (*līst-e sālyāne-ye kešvar-hā-ye komak-konandeh beh trānzīt-e mavādd-e moḥadder*) or *list of major illicit drug producing, drug-transit, significant source, precursor chemical, and money laundering countries* as it is officially called.<sup>1027</sup>

Next, three articles written on the same day by the newspapers *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, *Ġavān* and *Āryā* report on cigarettes as a starter drug; on Iran’s drug laws; and on the international framework, in which Iran’s drug combat takes place. Even the most radical

<sup>1025</sup> *Abrār*, 9 Ordibehešt 1378 (29 April 1999): „What are the motives of drug use? An investigative study of addiction as a rough social phenomenon’ (*Angīzeh-hā-ye este‘māl-e mavādd-e moḥadder čīst? Bar-rasī-ye taḥqīqī-ye e’tiyād beh ‘onvān-e yek padīdeh-ye nā-hanġār-e eġtemā’ī*).

<sup>1026</sup> *Āryā*, 11 Ordibehešt 1378 (1 May 1999): „Opium, the winner in the war’ (*Taryāk, barandeh-ye ġang*).

<sup>1027</sup> *Ḥordād*, 13 Ordibehešt 1376 (3 May 1999): „The hands that wave a net of death. The adolescents are the main victim of drugs’ (*Dastānī keh dām-e marg mītanand. Ġavānān qorbānīyān-e ašlī-ye mavādd-e moḥadder*).

newspaper *Ġavān* pays equal attention to *drug demand reduction* including addiction therapy as to *drug supply reduction*.<sup>1028</sup>

#### **Resālat in May: Drug prevention can incite drug consumption**

*Resālat*, infamous for its belligerent article against the liberal reorientation of the official drug policy in the year 1376 (1997-98), still seems to be reserved vis-à-vis drug prevention in 1378 (1999-2000). In reporting about an increased drug addiction among Iranian adolescents, it accordingly holds the opinion that information on drugs “incite{s} a sentiment of curiosity in the children and adolescents to try drugs and to earn an income” (*va ḥess-e kanġkāvī-ye aţfāl va ġavānān-rā barāye āzmāyeş-e mavādd-e moḥadder va kasb-e dar-āmad bar mīyangīzad*). As the first newspaper, *Resālat*, however, also correctly compares addiction to (illegal) drugs with addiction to legal pharmaceuticals.<sup>1029</sup>

#### **Abrār-e Eqteşādī in May: Iran has two million drug users, 1,2 million of which are drug addicts**

In May 1999, *Abrār-e Eqteşādī*, the economic journal of the newspapers *Abrār*, for the first time reports a new official estimation of the number of drug addicts: 1,2 million drug addicts and further 800’000 recreational users. These numbers, which are based on the Rapid Situation Assessment (RSA) the SWO has realized in 1377 (1998-99), have become sacrosanct ever since, although they would soon be doubted by other newspapers.<sup>1030</sup>

#### **Salām in May: 100,000 prisoners in Iran are drug addicted**

Following the publication of an article on an obscure Vietnamese medicine to cure drug addiction, the newspaper *Salām* mentions that the “drug-related prison inmates” (*zandāniyān-e mavādd-e moḥadderī*) make up sixty – and not fifty as it was stated two years ago – per cent of the whole prison population of one hundred thousand persons. It furthermore depicts the youth as victims of drug smugglers and dealers, a particularly important argument

<sup>1028</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 16 Ordībeheşt 1378 (6 May 1999): „Drug addiction, a fire that doesn’t know wet or dry” (*E’tiyād beh mavādd-e moḥadder, āteşī keh tar va ḥosk-rā nemīşenāsad*); **Ġavān**, 16 Ordībeheşt 1378 (6 May 1999): „Some reasons and backgrounds for the spread of drug addiction” (*Barḡt dalāyel va zamīneh-hā-ye gostareş-e e’tiyād beh mavādd-e moḥadder*); **Āryā**, 16 Ordībeheşt 1378 (6 May 1999): „Addiction, the virus of the devil” (*E’tiyād, vīrūs-e eblis*).

<sup>1029</sup> **Resālat**, 21 Ordībeheşt 1378 (11 May 1999): „Drugs and the reasons why adolescents turn towards them” (*Mavādd-e moḥadder va ‘elal-e gerayeş-e ġavānān beh ān*).

<sup>1030</sup> **Abrār-e Eqteşādī**, 23 Ordībeheşt 1378 (13 May 1999): „How much cost take the drugs with them” (*Mavādd-e moḥadder çe meqdār arz bā ḥod mibarad?*).

in the year 1378.<sup>1031</sup> In yet another article, *Salām* once again implores the lack of therapy facilities in the country. By citing Hešmatī, the deputy of the DCHQ, it mentions a further problem, namely the fact that even according to the amended ANTI NARCOTICS LAW of 1997, mere drug addicts still can be – and really are – sentenced to “flogging” (*zarbeh-ye šallāq*), “financial fines” (*ğazā-ye naqdī*) and even “imprisonment” (*zendān*) – even though they should be considered as ill persons.<sup>1032</sup>

***Still the International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking on 26 June***

The *International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking* is yet the most important event causing the Iranian press to publish drug-related newspaper articles. In 1378 (1999-2000), however, the press increasingly prints interviews with state officials such as particularly from the DCHQ, and with private addiction specialists, next to the previously more common interviews with representatives of international organizations. It also includes more detailed recent statistics and particularly new addiction research from within Iran.

**Şobh-e Emrūz** in a series of articles based on a field report in June: insufficient therapy facilities & AIDS in prisons

Sa‘īd Ḥağariyān’s reformist newspaper *Şobh-e Emrūz* also publishes a series of two articles on the *International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking*. The author has written the after having spent a week with an expert for addiction prevention, and touches several crucial subjects. *Şobh-e Emrūz* is the first newspaper to mention AIDS in the year 1378 (1999/2000), clearly in an Iranian context: specifically as a problem in Iran’s prisons where many drug addicts are incarcerated and sharing needles. While repeating the need for more therapy facilities, the newspaper also points to the necessity of the national prevention programs to consider cultural peculiarities (*bā tavağğoh beh vīžegī-hā-ye farhangī-ye kešvaremān*), in order to be effective. Like in the year 1376 (1997-98), “prevention” is called “always better than therapy” (*pīš-ğīrī hamīšeh behtar az darmān ast*)<sup>1033</sup>

<sup>1031</sup> **Salām**, 23 Ordībehešt 1378 (13 May 1999): „Heantos, a medicine that causes to abandon addiction? Dan made himself addiction in order to discover a method for curing addicts’ (*Hāntoz, dārūyī keh e’tiyād-rā tark mīdehad? Dān, be-manžūr-e kašf-e yek raveš-e mo’attar dar mo’aleğah-ye mo’tādīn, ĥod-rā beh e’tiyād rūy mī-āvarad*); **Salām**, 1 Ḥordād 1378 (22 May 1999): „A second warning for drug control’ (*Hošdārī-ye dō bāreh barāye kontrol-e mavādd-e moħadder*).

<sup>1032</sup> **Salām**, 13 Ḥordād 1378 (3 June 1999): „Strong and weak points of the national combat against drugs and addiction. A special interview of *Salām* with the deputy secretary of the Drug Control Headquarter’ (*Noqāt-e qovvat va ža’f dar mobārezah bā mavādd-e moħadder va e’tiyād-e kešvar. Dar goft-o-ğū-ye eħtešāšt-ye salām bā ġā-nešīn-e dabīr-e setād-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e moħadder ‘onvān šod*); this article is followed by yet another article: **Salām**, 20 Ḥordād 1378 (10 June 1999): „We’re still worried. Addiction, a ladder to committing crimes’ (*Hanūz negarānīm. E’tiyād, nardebān-e ertekāb-e ġorm*).

<sup>1033</sup> **Şobh-e Emrūz**, 25 & 26 & 27 Ḥordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999): „In search of a die-hard devil / Ahriman. A week with addiction prevention specialists’ (*Dar ġost-o-ğū-ye ahrīmanī-ye ġān-saħt. Yek hafteh bā kāršenāsān-e pīšğīrī az e’tiyād*).

Reflecting on the present state of addiction research in Iran and pointing to increasing drug addiction amongst Iranian youth, the newspapers *Salām* and *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* publish further articles on occasion of the international drugs day. The readers are also informed that more than two thousand law enforcement officials have died in the combat against drug trafficking since the beginning of the Islamic Republic.<sup>1034</sup>

**Īrān** on the occasion of a conference on drug prevention for children in June: changing drug addiction patterns

On the occasion of the congress “immunization of children and adolescents against the appearance of harms” (*mašūn-sāzī-ye koudak-ān va nou-ġavān-ān dar barābar-e āsīb-zāyī*), the governmental newspaper *Īrān* points to an important topic: changing drug consumption patterns in Iran. It urgently calls for the Iranian adolescents to be informed about drugs, which it calls a “time-bomb” (*bomb-e sā‘atī*); and it requests a volte-face in the Iranian therapy models that are “180 degrees opposed to the international rehabilitation principles” (*bā oṣūl-e bāz-parvarī-ye bain-ol-melalī 180 daraġeh tafāvot dārad*).<sup>1035</sup>

**Ĥorāsān** in an interview with UNDCP representative Mazzitelli in June: Iran’s drug combat is a “religious jihad”

Still on occasion of the *International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking*, *Ĥorāsān* publishes an interview with Antonio Mazzitelli, the head of the UNODC office in Tehran at the time. This is however done without mentioning that this office was just opened recently. Interestingly, Mazzitelli reminds the interviewer that the combat against drugs is a “holy jihad” (*ġehād-e moqaddas*). The Iranian press otherwise never uses this term, while *Qods* in January 1998 only used the similar expression “holy combat” (*mobārezeh-ye moqaddas*). It remains, however, unclear which expression was used by Mazzitelli in English.<sup>1036</sup>

<sup>1034</sup> *Salām*, 2 Tīr 1378 (23 June 1999): „The youth and the global abyss of addiction’ (*Ġavānān va varteh-ye ġahānī-ye e‘tiyād*); *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999): “Drug Addiction – a piece of sorrow with an unacceptable ending’ (*E‘tiyād beh mavādd-e moħadder – ġam-nāmeħ-ye pāyān-e nāpađīr*).

<sup>1035</sup> *Īrān*, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999): „The people cannot be defrauded. A report on the scientific and practical ,social health’ congress with the title ,Immunization of the children and adolescents against the appearance of harms” (*Sar-e mardom nemīšavad kolāħ gođāšt! Gozārešt az hemāyeš-e ‘elmī-kārbordī ,selāmat-e eġtemā‘ī’ be-‘onvān-e ,mašūn-sāzī-ye kūdakān va nouġavānān dar barābar-e āsīb-zāyī*).

<sup>1036</sup> *Ĥorāsān*, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999): „The Golden Crescent, drug trafficking towards Europe and the costs only the regional countries pay. A report on the region of the Golden Crescent and drug transit’ (*Helāl-e řalāyī, qāčāq-e mavādd-e moħadder beh orūpā va hażīneh-hāyī keh tanhā kešvar-hā-ye manřaqe mīpardāzand. Gozārešt az manřaqeh-ye helāl-e řalāyī va trānřīt-e mavādd-e moħadder*).

On the very date of the *International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking*, further four newspapers publish articles on drugs. The conservative *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* and the reformist *Horāsān* both report meanwhile well-known facts concerning Iran's situation of drug addiction. *Horāsān*, however, also provides new details when writing about student parties in Kermān, where girls smoke hashish (*hašīš*) and drink alcohol (*alkol*), subsequently becoming one of the few articles that explicitly talk about the consumption of these two certainly widespread drugs in Iran.<sup>1037</sup>

#### **Entehāb** in June: there are no 200,000 addicted students in Iran

Next, *Entehāb* again writes about drug consumption amongst the youth. It cites Ḥamīd Šarāmī, then the DCHQ's director of research and studies, with an explicit refutation of the alleged number of more than two hundred thousand addicted students in Iran. Šarāmī contests this estimation, which he attributes to a French press agency, "because the phenomenon of addiction is a hidden phenomenon, one cannot rely on any statistics" (*az ānğāyī keh padīdeh-ye e'tiyād padīdeh-ye mahfī ast, dar natīğeh ne-mī-tavān beh hīč āmārī estenād kard*). He seems not to have been aware that the same would apply to the statistics of the DCHQ.<sup>1038</sup>

#### **Našāf** in June: income distribution as an addiction cause

Drug addiction causes are the subject of a next article appearing in the outspoken reformist newspaper *Našāf*. The newspaper introduces a few new and important historical and sociological causes: the previous "legality of opium" (*eğāzeh-ye mašraf-e taryāk*) in Iran; the "inequality between the society and the economy" (*nābarābarī-ye eqtešādī-ye eğtemā'ī*), and "unemployment" (*bīkārī*); as well as 'lacking recreational facilities' (*na-būdan-e emkān-āt-e godārān-e ouqāt-e farāğat*). At the same time, however, it still reveals an on-going moral view of drug addiction by counting it among "social deviations" (*enherāf-hā-ye eğtemā'ī*).<sup>1039</sup>

#### **Hamšahrī** in June: the importance of self-help groups like the Narcotics Anonymous

<sup>1037</sup> *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999): „The global profession of drug business' (*Harfeh-ye ġahānī-ye dād-o-setad-e mavādd-e moħadder*); *Horāsān*, 5 Tīr 1376 (26 June 1999): „Addiction from a scientific and psychological viewpoint. The application of scientific methods in addiction withdrawal is necessary' (*E'tiyād az dīd-ğāh-he 'elmī va ravān-šenāsī. Be-kār-ğīrī-ye raveš-hā-ye 'elmī barāye tark-e e'tiyād zorūrī ast*).

<sup>1038</sup> *Entehāb*, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999): „The addict is not a criminal. Why aren't you taking his pain serious?' (*Mo'tād moğrem nīst. Ćerā dardeš-rā ġeddī nemīgīrīd*).

<sup>1039</sup> *Našāf*, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999): „On the occasion of the Global Day of Drugs Combat. The nightmare of addiction casts its shadow in this way' (*Beh angīzeh-ye rūz-e ġahānī-ye mobārezah bā mavādd-e moħadder. Kābūs-e mavādd-e moħadder ham-ĉonān sāyeh mīyafkanad*).



A day later, the newspaper *Hamšahrī* writes according to established pattern about the drug policy of different foreign countries. In particularly highlighting the efficacy of “self-helping and cooperating groups” (*gorūh-hā-ye ḥod-yārī va ham-yārī*) in the rehabilitation of former drug addicts, it also proposes the establishment of more such groups in Iran.<sup>1040</sup>

#### **Eṭṭelā‘āt in June: drug users keep the business running**

*Eṭṭelā‘āt* once again is responsible for the most comprehensive coverage of the Iranian drug problem in 1378 (1999-2000), by publishing – like every year – a series of this time five articles on the international drugs day. These articles naturally cover a wide range of topics and principally depict the same anti-Western and zealous religious tone as in the previous years. The newspaper again more or less openly warns the international community: “we don’t have a duty to prevent the drug transit from a legal viewpoint” (*mā taklīfī barāye ḡelou-gīrī az trānzīt-e mavādd-e moḥadder az naẓar-e šar‘ī nadārīm*); but immediately reassures that Iran will continue the drug combat “according to the order of the Islamic religion” (*beh ḥokm-e maktab-e eslām*). In a short treatise on the history of opium, it mentions for the first time the widespread consumption of opium (*taryāk*) and *kūknār* in Šafavīd times, although it still blames the “colonialists” (*este‘mār-garān*) for their protection of “criminal gangs” (*bānd-hā-ye tabah-kār*).

*Eṭṭelā‘āt*, once again, stresses the importance of drug prevention to be culturally adapted to Iran. It claims this is necessary because of “the insistence of the Westerners to penetrate our culture and to subjugate with the most subtle tricks the brains of our youth” (*eṣrār-e ġarbī-hā barāye sorūḡ dar farhang-e mā keh mī-ḡāhand beh laṭāyef ol-ḡeyal-e maġz-hā-ye ġavānān-e mā-rā tašḡīr konand*).

The newspaper further accuses drug addicts of “keeping running the market of smuggling, dealing and storing of different types of drugs and tranquillizing pills [...] and in addition to ruining their life capital, committing other crimes such as theft, murder, evil, perversion, prostitution, and instances against the moral” (*bāzār-e qāčāq ḡarīd, forūš, ḡaml va negah-dārī-ye anvā‘-e mavādd-e moḥadder va qorṣ-hā-ye ārām-baḡš-rā dāyer negah-dāšteḥ and [...] ‘allāveh bar nābūdī sarmāyeh-ye zendegīyešūn, mortakeb-e ġarāyem-e dīgar čūn serqat, qatl, fesād, faḡšā’ va mavārede ḡalāf-e aḡlāq mī-šavand*). And in an astonishing

<sup>1040</sup> *Hamšahrī*, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999): „Is there a solution for the problem of addiction?” (*Āyā rāh-e ḡall barāye mas‘alah-ye e‘ṭiyād voġūd dārad?*)

twist, it mentions that “former addicts should not be presented in the media” (*az mo‘tād-ān-e behbūd-yāfteh dar resāneh-hā beh hīč vaḡh na-bāyad estefādeh kard*), so as not to trivialize drug addiction. By touching on a central point of the reformist administration, it additionally promotes the active participation of the people in the drug combat by stating: “considering the truth that our government is from the people, we must discuss the problems frankly with the people” (*bā tavaḡḡoh be īn ḥaqīqat keh ḥokūmat-e mā mardomī ast, bāyad šādeqāneh moškelāt-rā bā mardom maṭraḥ konīm*).<sup>1041</sup>

### **Ḥordād in June: substitution and maintenance treatment could work in Iran as well**

While the conservative *Abrār* in a next article identifies drug addiction as a cause for many “crimes” (*ḡarāyem*) and “social ruptures” (*gasīḥtegī-hā-ye eḡtemā‘ī*);<sup>1042</sup> the reformist newspaper *Ḥordād* repeats that *drug demand reduction* is more effective and cheaper than *drug supply reduction*. While refuting the number of five million drug addicts that apparently was already discussed in certain circles, *Ḥordād* nevertheless reports the estimation of the RSA numbering two million drug users. Amīr Hūšang Mehryār, the specialist interviewed in this regard concomitantly states: “with a physical combat, with a suppression of the addicts, with killing, massacring and executing [...] the problem of addiction will not be solved” (*bā mobārezeh-ye fīzīkī va sar-kūb-e mo‘tād-ān va košt va koštār va e‘dām va [...] mo‘zal-e e‘tiyād ḥall ne-mī-šavad*). He instead emphasizes drug therapy by means of medication and points to an ongoing need for new addiction therapy facilities. He even maintains that medication-supported therapy was neglected to a certain degree in 1376 (1997-98) in favor of drug prevention. Even more pronouncedly, he openly propagates substitution treatment – or treatment with “analogous material” (*mavādd-e mošābeh*) – for non-curable addicts, as well as the distribution of clean “syringes” (*serang*).<sup>1043</sup>

In *Šobḥ-e Emrūz*, Šarāmī from the DCHQ, mentions as further new addiction causes: „advertisement” for drugs “on the internet” (*tabliḡ beh rū-ye īnternet*) and the “wrong beliefs” (*bāvar-hā-ye ḡalaṭ*) that drugs are effective painkillers.<sup>1044</sup>

<sup>1041</sup> **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999): „The drugs combat, an encompassing battle that doesn’t know a border’ (*Mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder, nabardī-ye farā-gīr keh marz nemīšenāsad*).

<sup>1042</sup> **Abrār**, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999): „214 Million addicts world wide. The inauspicious owl of addiction, the black shadow of destruction. On the occasion of 26 June, the global day of drugs combat” (*214 mīlīyūn mo‘tād dar saṭḥ-e ḡahān. Ġoḡd-e šūm-e e‘tiyād, sāyeh-ye siyāh-e tabāhī. Beh bahāneh-ye 5 tīr māj, rūz-e ḡahānī-ye mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder*).

<sup>1043</sup> **Ḥordād**, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999): „The average age of addiction has reached 27 years’ (*Miyāngīn-e senn-e e‘tiyād beh 27 sāl resīd*).

<sup>1044</sup> **Šobḥ-e Emrūz**, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999): „Rezā Šarāmī, the general director of research and studies of the Drug Control Headquarter: The war against drugs is a war without borders’ (*Rezā Šarāmī, modīr-e koll-*

*Interviews with Pino Arlacchi, secretary-general of the UNDCP*

One of the peculiarities of the year 1378 is a number of interviews with Pino Arlacchi, the secretary-general of the UNDCP, who apparently visited Iran on the occasion of the international drugs day.

**ḤORĀSĀN, KĀR VA KĀRGAR, and QODS: Europe and the UNDCP finally contribute to Iran's drug combat – but only with dogs and vests**

On the same occasion, the newspaper *Ḥorāsān* reports more generally on the financial contributions by the UN and different European countries to Iran's *drug supply reduction* efforts. While earlier reports were rather complaining about not receiving enough support, Moḥammad Fallāḥ, the secretary general of the DCHQ, this times explicitly appreciates the assistance by listing the specific examples of the UK and France, who contributed with "tracking devices" (*dastgāh-hā-ye radd-yāb*), "sniffing dogs" (*sag-hā-ye kāšef*) and "bulletproof vests" (*ḡalīqeh-ye zedd-e golūleh*). At the same time, however, *Ḥorāsān* also gives a bleak assessment of the Islamic Republic's initial drug combat, by mentioning that the underlying "hypotheses were wrong" (*farzīyāt-e šān eštabāh būd*). It also rather strangely expresses its regret that "we have no direct *fatvā* in declaring drugs illegal" (*mā hīč fatvā-ye mostaqīmī dar ḥarām e'lām kardan-e mavādd-e moḥadder nadārīm*), while already in the first sample year, *Eṭṭelā'āt* and *Kaiḥān* had cited various *fatāvā* in this regard.<sup>1045</sup>

Still on 28 June 1999, the newspaper *Kār va Kārgar* again cites Pino Arlacchi with statement the that the UN indeed financially contributes to Iran's drugs combat, but dismisses this contribution as „very insignificant" (*besyār nāčīz*) compared to the billions – of probably *tūmāns* – Iran so far has spent on its drugs combat.<sup>1046</sup> From an article in *Qods*, the readers are informed that Arlacchi has come to Iran, to sign a contract granting Iran thirteen million US\$, while admitting that Iran annually spends hundreds of millions of US\$ on its drug supply reduction efforts.<sup>1047</sup>

**Entehāb and Īrān in June: polls among the inhabitants of 'Oudlāḡān**

Also on 28 June 1999, the newspaper *Entehāb* provides the most comprehensive description of the domestic situation of drug addiction so far. It gives a vivid description of

---

*e moṭāle'āt va pažūheš-e setād-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder: ḡang bā mavādd-e moḥadder, ḡang bedūn-e marz ast*).

<sup>1045</sup> *Ḥorāsān*, 6 & 7 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 June 1999): „A conversation with the deputy for prevention of the Welfare Organization?" (*Goft-o-gū bā mo'āven-e pīš-gīrī-ye sāzemān-e beh-zīstī*).

<sup>1046</sup> *Kār va Kārgar*, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999): „An interview with Arlacchi" (*Soḡanī bā Ārlākī*).

<sup>1047</sup> *Qods*, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999): „Iran on the frontline" (*Iran, ḡaṭṭ-e moqaddam-e ḡebḡah*).

the poor quarter ‘Oudlāḡān, which is located near the Tehrān *bāzār*. This quarter is described as “one of the important centers of drug distribution in Tehran” (*yekī az marākez-e mohemme touzī‘-e mavādd-e moḥadder dar saṭḥ-e šahr-e tehrān*), where many drug addicts live with their families in overcrowded mud-brick houses. In this regard, *Entehāb*, prints a poll that was conducted among the quarter’s inhabitants, asking them to express their opinion on the extent of the problem.<sup>1048</sup> Apparently also based on this poll, the governmental newspaper *Īrān* makes a similar observation when stating that “in the south of the city the inclination towards drugs is more [pronounced] than in the north” (*dar ḡonūb-e šahr gerāyeš beh mavādd-e moḥadder bīštar az šomāl ast*). It further reports that when the inhabitants were asked whether drug addicts “have to be drowned in the sea” (*bāyad dar daryā qarq šavand*), “only” thirty-five per cent have answered with yes.<sup>1049</sup> The publication of such polls is indeed very exceptional in the Iranian press.

#### **ABRĀR** in July: Iran has three million drug addicts

In July, the conservative newspaper *Abrār* cites the director of the NATIONAL ADIS COMITEE (*komīteh-ye kešvarī-ye mobārezeh bā aidz*), Dr. Bahrām Yegāneh, in saying that there are actually three and not two million addicts in Iran, while otherwise reporting more on the drug supply efforts at the border.<sup>1050</sup>

#### **Entehāb** in an interview with Hešmatī, deputy of the DCHQ in July: drug consumption and HIV/AIDS in prisons!

Not long after, *Entehāb* again reports on the international drugs trade, and in particular on the danger these illegal profits pose for the legal financial market.<sup>1051</sup> In a further series of three articles, it concentrates more on drug therapy and drug prevention measures in Iran. In a long and very critical interview with Hešmatī, the deputy of the DCHQ, it pushes him to admit many shortcomings of Iran’s drug policy. For the first time, he reveals that once the drugs are trafficked from Afghanistan to Iran, local smuggling gangs take over the distribution and the translocation to the Western borders. He eventually also acknowledges

<sup>1048</sup> **Entehāb**, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999): „A poll of ‘Entehāb’ on the occasion of the global day to combat drugs’ (*Nažār-sanḡī-ye „entehāb’ be mosāsebat-e rūz-e ḡahānī-ye mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder*).

<sup>1049</sup> **Īrān**, 8 Tīr 1378 (29 June 1999): „The lungs of enjoyment are full of the oxigene of death. A poll on the issue of drug addiction’ (*Rīyeh-hā-ye ledḡat por az oksīžen-e marg ast*).

<sup>1050</sup> **Abrār**, 14 Tīr 1378 (5 July 1999): „American stingers and drug caravans. A report of the political group of Abrār on the frightening dimensions of the drugs crisis’ (*Eštīnger-hā-ye āmrīkāyī va kārvān-hā-ye mavādd-e moḥadder. Gozāreš-e gorūh-e siyāsī-ye Abrār dar bareh-ye ab’ād-e ḡouf-nāk-e boḡrān-e mavādd-e moḥadder*).

<sup>1051</sup> **Entehāb**, 18 Tīr 1378 (9 July 1999): „Globalization of the drugs trade’ (*ḡahān šodan-e teḡārat-e mavādd-e moḥadder*).

that addiction cannot be rooted out, and explicitly objects to the daily arrests of thousands of addicts. At the same time, he calls the Iranian people to become active themselves and “not to permit that the environment, especially for the drug dealers, is safe” (*eğāzeh nadehand moḥīt barāye hoṣūšan touzī‘-konandegān-e mavādd-e moḥadder amn bāšad*), although certainly not calling for the establishment of vigilante groups. While excusing the shortcomings of the DCHQ by pointing to the fact that the “national plan to combat drugs” (*tarḥ-e mellī-ye mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḥadder*) is still under construction, he nevertheless concedes a lack of addiction therapy facilities; incorrect rehabilitation models; a lack of relapse prevention measures; and a lack of prevention measures by governmental institutions but also by the media.

Even further pressured by *Entehāb*, he eventually also acknowledges that both drug consumption and cases of HIV/AIDS are prevalent in Iranian prisons. While successfully evading the repeated questions for exact numbers in this regard, he nevertheless provides some interesting details on the drug use in prisons. Incarcerated drug addicts accordingly “fabricate their own needles and share them with others (*serang-hā-ye ālūdeh va serang-hā-yī {keh} hodešān dar zandān mīsāzand*) and use “contaminated and non-standard drugs” (*mavādd-e ālūdeh va ġair-e estāndārd*).<sup>1052</sup>

Reflecting current medical research, *Hamšahrī* next proceeds to call “addiction withdrawal” (*tark-e e‘tiyād*) an “illusion” (*tavahhom*), because only the intake of drugs, not addiction itself can be stopped..<sup>1053</sup>

**Ḥorāsān** in series of articles in July: the *ANTI NARCOTICS LAW* unfortunately lacks a provision on drug prevention

At the end of July, the newspaper *Ḥorāsān* prints a series of two articles on the amendment to the drug law of 1997, using this occasion as a reason to report more broadly about the drug problem in Iran. By correctly pointing to the always-difficult “equilibrium between the rights of the society and the rights of the convicted” (*ta‘ādol bain-e hoqūq-e ġame‘eh va hoqūq-e maḥkūm*), it states that the rights of the drug addicts are not yet fully

<sup>1052</sup> **Entehāb**, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999): „Are the smuggling caravans taking shape on this side [too]? Unfortunately, that’s true. In conversation with Moḥammad Ġavād Ḥešmatī, deputy of the Drug Control Headquarter’ (*Kārvān-hā-ye qāčāq īn tarāf taškīl mīšavad? Mota’assefāne dorost ast. Goft-o-ġū bā Moḥammad Ġavād Ḥešmatī, mo’āvenat-e setād-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder*).

<sup>1053</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 27 Tīr 1378 (18 July 1999): „The illusion of ,addiction withdrawal’” (*Tavahhom-e ,tark-e e‘tiyād*).

realized in Iran. It explains this to result from the accurate fact that “in the law that was approved by the EXPEDIENCY DISCERNMENT COUNCIL OF THE SYSTEM, no allusion to prevention or the reduction of the demand of drug consumption is made’ (*dar qānūn-e moṣsavab-e mağma‘-e tašhīṣ-e maṣlaḥat-e neẓām hīč ešāre‘ī beh pīšgīrī va kāheš-e taqāżā-ye maşraf-e mavādd-e moḥadder na-šodeh ast*). Quoting Ġolām-Rezā Anṣārī, the president of SWO, it further states that this organization has reached the limits of its capacity to treat drug addicts.<sup>1054</sup>

### **Āftāb-e Emrūz in August: drug addiction among women**

In August, the outspoken reformist newspaper *Āftāb-e Emrūz* expresses its concern for the “social welfare” (*refāh-e eğtemā‘ī*) of the society due to the growing ‘illnesses caused by addiction such as AIDS or hepatitis B’ (*bīmārī-hā-ye nāštī az e‘tiyād meṭle aidz va hepātīt B*). For the first time it also gives a specific estimation of female drug addicts when stating that ninety per cent of the country’s drug addicts are males. It is the first newspaper to dedicate an entire article on drug addiction among women. It consequently asks – as did other newspapers before – for tailor-made prevention programs for specific social groups, such as women or young people, and for these latter in particular locally available recreational facilities.<sup>1055</sup>

### **Vohūman in August: already the shah has not been successful with a repressive drug policy**

Again publishing a personal story and also reporting on drug addiction among women, the obscure newspaper *Vohūman* recounts the long life history of a drug-addicted, imprisoned woman. It further mentions that already the “previous regime” (*reżīm-e qablī*) of the shah had unsuccessful in rooting out drug addiction with “judicial and disciplinary confrontation” (*bar-ḥord-e qaẓāyī va enteẓāmī*).<sup>1056</sup>

The last article appearing in the month of August is published by *Irān* and gives an overview on the international drug laws and convention.<sup>1057</sup>

<sup>1054</sup> **Horāsān**, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July 1999): „In the conversation with officials and experts it was performed: a study of the National Law of Strengthening the Penalties of the Drug Convicts’ (*Dar goft-o-gū bā mas‘ulān va šāheḥ-e naẓar enğām šod: bar-rasī-ue qānūn-e tašdīd-e moğāẓāt-e maḥkūmīn-e mavādd-e moḥadder*).

<sup>1055</sup> **Āftāb-e Emrūz**, 2 Šahrīvar 1378 (24 August 1999): „Women – pioneers in the fight against addiction. Civil structures and the readiness to fight drugs’ (*Zanān – pīš-gāmān-e mobārezah bā e‘tiyād. Nehād-hā-ye madanī va āmādegī barāye mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder*).

<sup>1056</sup> **Vohūman**, 7 Šahrīvar 1378 (29 August 1999): „Iran is first in the combabt, but the addiction ...’ (*Irān dar mobārezah avval ast, ammā e‘tiyād ...*).

<sup>1057</sup> **Irān**, 9 Šahrīvar 1378 (31 August 1999): „The international laws against the chaos of drugs’ (*Qavānīn-e bain-ol-melalī ‘alai-he hayūlā-ye mavādd-e moḥadder*).

In September, *Resālat* publishes an article on the activities of the EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR THE PREVENTION OF DRUG Abuse (*daftar-e eğrāyī-ye pīš-gīrī az sū'-mašrafe-e mavādd-e moḥadder*), which is a part of the Education Ministry. Revealing the ongoing bleak situation of drug prevention in Iran, it, however, mentions that this office apparently still only was planning textbooks informing the twenty million students under its supervision about the dangers of drug addiction.<sup>1058</sup>

**Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī in September: do not send minor drug addicts to prison!**

Next, *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* publishes a series consisting of two articles on drug addiction treatment by means of medication and therapy. Written by Ḥassan Mūsavī, who has worked for several years in addiction therapy facilities, the familiar problem of addiction relapse (*'oud beh e'tiyād* or *e'tiyād-e moğadded*) is discussed, and self-help groups such as the NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS are mentioned. Mūsavī in particular asks to reconsider the current practice of sending adolescents to prisons, lest they develop even worse addiction patterns.<sup>1059</sup>

A further article of *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* is also dedicated to the topic of youth addiction and once again stresses the importance of the role of a healthy family, where the father acts as “powerful tutor” (*sar-parastī-ye moqtader*), and the mother “can prevent the children from moral deviations” (*mītavānad az enḥerāfāt-e aḥlāqī-ye farzandān ḡelougīrī konad*).<sup>1060</sup>

**Ḥorāsān in an interview with Šadīqī, director of the ĀFTĀB SOCIETY, in September: a shortage of therapy facilities for drug-addicted women**

*Ḥorāsān* next gives a rather progressive description of the situation of female drug addicts in the country. In this report, the director of the private AFTĀB SOCIETY (*ḡam'iyyat-e āftāb*) and Member of Parliament, Marzīyeh Šadīqī, points to the crucial problem that currently women have less access to existing therapy and rehabilitation facilities than men in Iran. She also points out the generally increasing age of marriage as a possible addiction cause, although Ḥossain Dežākām, founder of the CONGRESS 60, later in the article, points to the fact,

<sup>1058</sup> *Resālat*, 18 Šahrīvar 1378 (9 September 1999): „Education, training and the struggle for a combat against drugs” (*Āmūzeš va parvareš vā talāš barāye mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder*).

<sup>1059</sup> *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 24 & 25 Šahrīvar 1378 (15 & 16 September 1999): „One can get out of the well of addiction” (*Az čāh-e e'tiyād mītavān ḥāreḡ šod*).

<sup>1060</sup> *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999): „The youth are the main victim of drugs” (*Ġavānān 'omdah-tarīn qorbāniyān-e mavādd-e moḥadder*).

that “in principle, married women resort more to addiction than single girls” (*oşulan zan-ān-e mota’ahhel bištār az dohtar-ān-e moğarrad beh e’tiyād rūy mī-yāvarand*).<sup>1061</sup>

In September, the reformist newspaper *Aḥbār-e Eqtešādī* reproduces a translation of an article of the *New York Times* on the poppy cultivation in Afghanistan under the supervision of the Ṭālibān,<sup>1062</sup> while *Payām-e Āzādī* repeats the established opinion that “the first persons who propagated opium in the [Iranian] society, were English officials” (*avvalīn kesānī keh taryāk-rā dar ḡāme’eh ravāḡ dādādī ma’mūrān-e englīsī būdand*). For the first time, it also explicitly doubts whether the liberal drug policies of European countries can be an example for Iran, because “this situation is seen differently in all countries” (*īn važ’iyat be ḡūneh-hā-ye moḡtalef dar hameh-ye kešvar-hā dīdeh mī-šavad*).<sup>1063</sup>

A few days later, the newspaper *Hamšahrī* publishes an article that is virtually congruent with an article that appeared on 24 June in the newspaper *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*.<sup>1064</sup> This might indicate that the article was written or at least prepared in its outlines by the DRUG CONTROL HEADQUARTER or another official institution. It might, however, also simply be a reprinted article.

#### **Āzād in September: a need for therapy facilities in prisons**

Also reporting on women’s addiction is the pragmatic reformist newspaper *Āzād*. It quotes Zohreh Zāre’, the advisor for women’s affair of the province of Tehran, with the request for the installation of therapy centers (*marākez-e darmān*) in polluted (*ālūdeh*) prisons, where a lot of inmates are “affected by different types of diseases” (*ebtelā’ beh anvā’-e bīmārī*).<sup>1065</sup> Another article in *Ḥorāsān* also cites Zāre’ with her statement on prisons as places for the spread of HIV and AIDS. Another addiction specialist furthermore mentions for the first time the internationally approved model of *therapeutic communities* (*T.C. yā ḡāme’eh-ye darmānī*), which haven’t been established at the time in Iran.<sup>1066</sup>

<sup>1061</sup> **Ḥorāsān**, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999): „Downfall of the woman in the ashes of addiction” (*Ġorūb-e zan dar ḥākeštār-e e’tiyād*).

<sup>1062</sup> **Aḥbār-e Eqtešādī**, 31 Šahrīvar 1378 (22 September 1999): „Afghanistan – the worlds opium field” (*Afḡānestān, kašt-zār-e taryāk-e ḡahān*).

<sup>1063</sup> **Payām-e Āzādī**, 3 Mehr 1378 (25 September 1999): „Iranian, addiction and family” (*Irānī, e’tiyād va ḥāne-vadeh*).

<sup>1064</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 5 Mehr 1378 (27 September 1999): „Addiction, a piece of sorrow with an unacceptable ending” (*E’tiyād, ḡam-nāmeḥ-ye pāyān-e nāpađīr*).

<sup>1065</sup> **Āzād**, 6 Mehr 1378 (28 September 1999): „The wives of addicted men are suffering from the social harms of addiction” (*Hamsarān-e mardān-e mo’tād az āsīb-hā-ye eḡtemā’ī-ye e’tiyād raḡ mībarand*).

<sup>1066</sup> **Ḥorāsān**, 8 Mehr 1378 (30 September 1999): „2 million addicts and the downfall of the families” (*2 milyūn mo’tād va forū-pāštī-ye ḥāne-vādeh*).



**Īrān** in October: the government has to respect the people's rights!

In October the reformist newspaper *Aḥbār-e Eqtešādī* writes about the development of the international drugs situation by referring to Hamid Ghodse, the president of the INCB, who calls attention to the growing addiction to pharmaceuticals.<sup>1067</sup>

Linking the growing addiction to illegal drugs to the change of the Iranian society “from a traditional stage to a modern stage” (*az marḥaleh-ye sonnatī beh marḥaleh-ye modern*), the newspaper *Īrān* for its part emphasizes that “the government should respect the people's rights” (*doulat hoqūq-e mardom-rā ḡeddī be-gīrad*). Reflecting one of the crucial aspects of the reformist administration, namely people participation, it further proposes that “non-governmental and people's organizations (NGOs) might be able to be a vessel [...] in paying attention to the situation of our society” (*sāz-mān-hā-ye ḡair-e doulatī va mardomī (NGO) {hā} šāyad bā tavaḡḡoh beh važ'iyyat-e ḡāme'eh-ye mā be-tavānand maḥmal [...] bāšand*). And it once again asks the individual state institutions involved in the official drug policy to finally clarify their respective stance towards the question whether addiction is a crime or an illness.<sup>1068</sup>

**Statistics and addiction research findings by the DCHQ**

In October 1997, the DCHQ presented its latest statistics on drug seizures, the arrest of drug traffickers and drug addicts, as the newspaper *Qods* mentions. While the RAPID ASSESSMENT SITUATION STUDY, which established the official estimation of two million drug users in Iran, already was published in 1377 (1998/99), the DCHQ only now puts these findings at the disposal of the press. The presentation of numbers and statistics is generally a strong incentive for the publication of drug-related newspaper articles, as shown by the following examples; even if the press does not limit itself to quoting exclusively official statistics.

**Āfarīneš** in October: 19 million drug addicts in 2014?

Next, however, the newspaper *Āfarīneš* repeats the claim that within ten years after the Islamic revolution the Islamic republic managed to lower the number of drug addicts to 500,000. But it warns, that if the current trend continues there will be nineteen million drug addicts in the year 1400 (2013-14). It once again identifies the cigarettes to be the starter drug par excellence leading to the “world of the wizard of addiction” (*donyā-ye afsūn-gar-e*

<sup>1067</sup> *Aḥbār-e Eqtešādī*, 11 Mehr 1378 (3 October 1999): „The year 2000 will be the year of combatting the spread of drugs in the world” (*Sāl-e 2000, sāl-e mobārezah bā gostareš-e mavādd-e moḥadder dar donyā*).

<sup>1068</sup> *Īrān*, 19 Mehr 1378 (11 October 1999): „The application of experimental and erroneous methods in regard to addiction is wrong!” (*Estefādeh az raveš-e āzemūn va ḥaṭā dar moured-e e'tiyād ḡalaṭ ast!*).

*e'tiyād*), by entailing the smoking of hashish, opium-pipes (sg. *vāfūr*), water pipes (sg. *qalyūn*), or other pipes.<sup>1069</sup>

#### **Entehāb** in October: 95% of all imprisoned women are drug-related convicts

In repeating the standard claim that Europe and the USA are only profiting from Iran's drugs combat while not willing to "have [even] the smallest cooperation with Iran" (*kūčektarīn ham-kārī-rā bā Īrān dāšteḥ bāšad*), the newspaper *Entehāb* also points to an interesting fact by mentioning that seventy five per cent of all male prison inmates are drug related, while in the case of the women this even would amount to ninety five per cent.<sup>1070</sup>

#### **Kār va Kārgar** in October: institutions involved in DDR

Next, the newspaper *Kār va Kārgar* proceeds to inform about state institutions involved in the field of *drug demand reduction*. It lists among others the MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE (*vezārat-e farhang va eršād-e eslāmī*), the EDUCATION MINISTRY (*vezārat-e āmūzeš va parvareš*), the MINISTRY OF CULTURE AND HIGHER EDUCATION (*vezārat-e farhang va āmūzeš-e 'ālī*), the ISLAMIC PROPAGATION ORGANIZATION (*sāz-mān-e tablīg-āt-e eslāmī*), and the religious seminaries (*houzeh-hā-ye 'elmiyyeh*) in Qom. An article of the newspaper *Resālat* of September 9 ostensibly influenced this article, or both might have been influenced by the same sources.<sup>1071</sup>

#### **Ġavān** in October: 76% of all AIDS cases are due to needle sharing

Once again, it is astonishingly the radical newspaper *Ġavān* that gives the first specific numbers of AIDS cases in Iran when mentioning three hundred and fourteen such cases in the province of Fārs, of which seventy six percent were contracted by intravenous drug use (*az tarīq-e tazrīq-e mavādd-e moḥadder*). Against the background of this "ruinous calamity" (*balā-ye ḥānemān-sūz*), it asks for a revision (*tağdīd-naẓar*) of the existing drug policy practices.<sup>1072</sup>

<sup>1069</sup> *Āfarīneš*, 24 Mehr 1378 (16 October 1999): „Tomorrow it will be too late to combat the youth addiction” (*Fardā barāye mobārezah bā e'tiyād-e ḡavānān dīr ast*).

<sup>1070</sup> *Entehāb*, 25 Mehr 1378 (17 October 1999): „Does anyone know the price? Comfort for Europe and America – exorbitant costs for Iran” (*Āyā kasī qadr mīdānad? Āsāyeš-e orūpā va āmrīkā – hazīneh-hā-ye gazāf barāye īrān*).

<sup>1071</sup> *Kār va Kārgar*, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999): „Education, training and the cultural combat against drugs” (*Āmūzeš va parvareš va mobārezah-ye farhangī bā mavādd-e moḥadder*).

<sup>1072</sup> *Ġavān*, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999): „Addiction – a smoke that ruins the family” (*E'tiyād – dūdī ke dūdmān-rā beh bād mīdehad*).

### **Kār va Kārgar** in October: opium, heroin, hashish – the drugs of choice in Iran

Shortly after, *Kār va Kārgar* prints another article, presenting new research studies by the DCHQ, which show that fifty per cent of the consumed drugs consist of opium (*taryāk*), around thirty per cent of heroin (*herō'īn*), and the rest mainly of opium residue (*šīreh-ye taryāk*) and hashish (*ḥašīš*).<sup>1073</sup>

*Āfarīneš* on its part again reports on the growing poppy cultivation in Ṭālibān-controlled Afghanistan and points to the fact that these are supported and recognized especially from Pakistan.<sup>1074</sup>

### **Āzād** and **Payām-e Āzādī** in November: more statistics

In November, the reformist newspapers *Āzād* and *Payām-e Āzādī* both report on the global and regional drugs trade and its consequences for Iran. *Āzād* accuses the mafia of “not caring about God nor his servants” (*nah beh ḥodā negah dārand va nah beh bandeh-ye ḥodā*) and states “their honor is like soap; the more you use it {with water} the less it gets and at the end it [is] a useless bubble” (*šaraf barāye ān-hā čūn šābūn ast dar āb har čeh az ān estefādeh konīd kamtar ast va dar nehāyat ḥobābī bī ḥāsiyyat*). *Payām-e Āzādī*, in contrast, adopts a more conspiratorial stance in articulating the well-known opinion that drugs today “have been turned into a means that is applied to keep back the nations and to colonize them” (*beh vasīle'ī tabdīl gardīdeh ke barāye 'aqab negah-dāštan-e mellat-hā va este'mār-e ānhā beh kār mīravād*).<sup>1075</sup>

Still in November, the newspaper *Kār va Kārgar* for its part mentions drug addiction and drug trafficking as one of the topics that was discussed on the occasion of a UN sponsored conference on socio-economic issues of economically developing countries (*hemāyeš-e masāyel-e eḡtemā'ī-ye eqtešādī-ye kešvar-hā-ye keh marḥaleh-ye goḍar-e (enteqāl-e) eqtešādī-rā ṭayy mīkonand*) in Ashgabat, the capital of Turkmenistan.<sup>1076</sup>

<sup>1073</sup> **Kār va Kārgar**, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999): „Opium smokes the enthusiasm of the young generation!” (*Afyūn ḡairat-e nasl-e ḡavān-rā dūd mīkonad*).

<sup>1074</sup> **Āfarīneš**, 2 Ābān 1378 (24 October 1999): „The Ṭālibān and opium in Afghanistan” (*Ṭālebān va taryāk dar afḡānestān*).

<sup>1075</sup> **Āzād**, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 1999): „Drugs from the viewpoint of statistics and the reality” (*Mavādd-e moḥadder az negāh-e āmār va vāqe'iyyat*); **Payām-e Āzādī**, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 1999): „Opium war” (*Čang-e taryāk*).

<sup>1076</sup> **Kār-o-kārgar**, 24 Ābān 1378 (15 November 1999): „Drugs – the main problem of developing countries” (*Mavādd-e moḥadder – 'omdah-tarīn mo'za'le-ye kešvar-hā-ye dar ḥāl-e gozār*).

### **Qods** in November: cities located on drug trafficking routes have higher addiction rates

The newspaper *Qods* subsequently reveals that there are a large number of drug addicts in the provinces of Ḥorāsān, Sīstān va Balūčestān, Kermān and Kermānšāh. These are all provinces that lie on the main drug trafficking routes running through Iran. It also repeats the findings of a study carried out by the DCHQ that sixty-five per cent of all AIDS cases are due to needle sharing (*estefādeh az serang-hā-ye moštarek-e ālūdeh*).<sup>1077</sup>

### **Āftāb-e Emrūz** in November: security forces involved in drug supply reduction

Citing results of the DCHQ's recent research activities, the newspaper *Āftāb-e Emrūz* dedicates an article to Iran's drug situation through the lens of statistics. On the margins, the readers are informed that drugs are not only seized by the LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES or the police (*nīrū-hā-ye entezāmī*), but also by the IRGC (*sepāh*), by forces of the Intelligence MINISTRY (*vezārat-e eṭṭelā'āt*) and by the BASİĞ. This reformist newspaper, however, not only blames the supply of drugs, but also the "abundant demand of the consumers" (*taqāżā-ye farāvān-e maşraf-konandegān*) for the high addiction rate in Iran. It further states that the practice of drug dealers "to increase the amount of drugs by adding different materials" (*meqdār-e mavādd-e moḥadder-rā bā eżāfeh kardan mavādd-e moḥtalef afzāyeş mīdehand*) is "the main cause of death for a lot of consumers" ('*omdeh-tarīn dalīl-e marg-e besyār az maşraf-konande-gān mī-bāşad*).<sup>1078</sup>

### **Īrān** in November: 3 million drug addicts & the role of the media in drug prevention

Reporting on the increasing addiction amongst Iranian youth is an article of the newspaper *Īrān*.<sup>1079</sup> Two days following the publication of this article, the same newspaper announces that the number of addicts in Iran is three million, of which a lot still are processed through courts, adding that in the last year alone 247,000 new drug-related files were opened. Given the multitude of drug related articles in the press, the complaint of a revolutionary court judge, who asks the rhetorical question "how much activities did [the press] really have in

---

<sup>1077</sup> **Qods**, 25 Ābān 1378 (16 November 1999): „Addiction – a fire, in which all are burnt” (*E'tiyād – āteş ke hameh dar ān mīsūzand*).

<sup>1078</sup> **Āftāb-e Emrūz**, 26 Ābān 1378 (17 November 1999): „Drugs and addiction in the language of statistics” (*Mavādd-e moḥadder va e'tiyād beh zabān-e āmār*).

<sup>1079</sup> **Īrān**, 27 Ābān 1378 (18 November 1999): „'How' do we keep our children away from drugs?” (*Čegūneh' farzandemān-rā az mavādd-e moḥadder dūr negāh dārim?*).

elucidating the people regarding drugs?’ (*vāqə‘an dar roušan-gar-e mardom nesbat beh mavādd-e moḥadder če-qadar fa‘‘āliyyat dāšteḥ*), is at least astonishing.<sup>1080</sup>

**Ḥordād** in November: corruption among prison guards & a proposal to distribute sterile syringes to drug addicted prison inmates!

The next series of two articles appearing in *Ḥordād* are the most critical and outspoken articles of the year 1378 (1999-2000). The articles first reflect the opinion of the president of the revolutionary courts in the province Čahār-Maḥāl va Baḥtiyārī, who claims that illegal Afghan refugees in Sīstān and Balūčestān are involved in drug smuggling. He even blames this on their religious believes: “because according to the *fatvās* of some Sunni ‘*olamā*’, the drugs trade is allowable and only their consumption has a legal prohibition” (*čerā keh ṭebq-e fatāvā-ye ba‘zī az ‘olamā-ye ahl-e sonnat, ḥarīd-o-forūš-e mavādd-e moḥadder mobāḥ būdeḥ va tanḥā mašraf-e ān man‘-e šar‘ī dārad*). Of more importance for the local context is, however, the first explicit demand for the distribution of clean syringes to addicted prison inmates, a practice that until now was only discussed in foreign countries. The proposal was apparently put forward by a deputy of the HEALTH MINISTRY (*vezārat-e behdāšt*) at a meeting of the DCHQ. Other attending officials vehemently refuted the idea by stressing “here is not America” (*īn-ḡā āmrīkā nīst*). The article further refers to recently published research on the extent of AIDS – or rather HIV – among “many incarcerated addicts” (*šomār-e besyārī az mo‘tādān-e maḥbūs*) in the prisons of Kermānšāh and Kahnavāḡ. Even more surprisingly, it also explicitly states that drugs are beings smuggled into prisons by prison guards, “naturally by payment of hefty bribes” (*albatteḥ bā pardāḡt-e rešveh-hā-ye kalān*).<sup>1081</sup>

Social causes for drug addiction are again the subject of two newspaper articles in the month of November.<sup>1082</sup>

**Payām-e Āzādī** in an interview with the MP Ġeloudārzādeḥ in November: the only way out of addiction is divorce, not marriage

The newspaper *Payām-e Āzādī* next quotes the reformist Member of Parliament Sohailā Ġeloudārzādeḥ. While conveying that many families still believe that the solution for

---

<sup>1080</sup> **Īrān**, 29 Ābān 1378 (20 November 1999): „Continuation of the confrontation with the drug traffickers at the Eastern borders of Iran”(*Edāmah-ye dar-ḡīrī dar marz-hā-ye šarqī-ye īrān bā qāčāqčīyān-e mavādd-e moḥadder*).

<sup>1081</sup> **Ḥordād**, 1 & 2 Āḡar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999): „Iran, the smoothest path for the passing of drug caravans”(*Īrān, hamvar-tarīn rāḥ-e ‘obūr-e kārvān-hā-ye mavādd-e moḥadder*).

<sup>1082</sup> **Īrān**, 2 Āḡar 1378 (23 November 1999): „How does the crooked cargo reach the dwelling?! Sugestions of knowing social misbehaviors with an emphasis on the topic of addiction approaches”(*Bār-e kaḡ četour be manzel mīresad?! Nažariyyeh šenāsi eḡtemā‘ī-ye kaḡravī bā ta‘kīd bar maqūlah-ye e‘tiyād*).

an addicted woman is marriage, she stresses that in reality the solution is more often a divorce from the addicted husband. To support her argument, she cites official statistics which „show that 34 per cent of divorces result from addiction’ (*nešān mī-dehad 34 dar šad az ṭalāqhā nāšt az e’tiyād ast*).<sup>1083</sup>

A next article by *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* focuses on occupational and psychological therapy measures; while another article of *Ḥordād* asks for a gradual rethinking of the official drug policy altogether.<sup>1084</sup> One of the few drug-related articles in *Kaihān* in this year, in turn, mentions bromocriptin (*brōmōkrīptīn*) as a one of the first pharmaceuticals used in addiction treatment in Iran.<sup>1085</sup>

### **Ḥorāsān in November: how much is Europe really contributing to Iran’s drug combat?**

Again dedicated to the topic of Western financial and material support is an article in *Ḥorāsān*, which also mentions sniffing dogs and further assistance provided to Iran by France and the UK.<sup>1086</sup>

### **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī and ‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān in December: a common ground in anti-imperialism**

Two more general articles on Iran’s drug situation appear in the beginning of December in *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* and ‘*Aṣr-e Āzādegān*. Although ideologically diametrically opposed, both newspapers discuss causes of drug addiction by mentioning inter alia “exploitation, colonization, despotism, imperialism” (*esteṭmār, este’mār, estebdād, emperyālism*). And both also blame the failure of – general – rehabilitation measures in the Iranian prison system on the exuberant number (*te’dād-e anbūh*) of incarcerated drug addicts. *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* even develops a certain understanding for drug dealers when stating that most people active in the “cultivation, production [...], transport and distribution” (*kešāvarzī,*

<sup>1083</sup> **Payām-e Āzādī**, 2 Āḍar 1378 (23 November 1999): „The world has to know ...”(Donyā bāyad bedānad ...).

<sup>1084</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 4 Āḍar 1378 (25 November 1999): „The role of occupational and psychological therapy in the salvation of the addicts from the swirl of addiction”(Naqš-e kār-darmānī va ravān-darmānī dar nağāt-e mo’tādān az gerd-āb-e e’tiyād); **Ḥordād**, 4 Āḍar 1378 (25 November 1999): „We need a change of the theory in the combat against drugs”(Mā beh tağyīr-e negareš dar mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder niyāz dārīm) – not available.

<sup>1085</sup> **Kaihān**, 8 Āḍar 1378 (29 November 1999): „Implementation of the research plan of addiction withdrawal in the country”(Eğrā-ye tarḥ-e taḥqīqātī-ye tark-e e’tiyād dar kešvar).

<sup>1086</sup> **Ḥorāsān**, 7 Āḍar 1378 (28 November 1999): „Which price do the Western countries pay for the combat against the drugs transit through Iran?”(Kešvar-hā-ye ġarbī čeh bahāyī barāye mobārezah bā trānzīt-e mavādd-e moḥadder az trān mīpardāzand?).

šan‘at [...], ḥaml-o-naql va touzī‘) are victims themselves, while the real criminals are the heads of the smuggling gangs.<sup>1087</sup>

### **Īrān** in December: French sniffing dogs for Iran

Next, the newspaper *Īrān* dedicates an entire article to the thirty “police dogs” (*sag-hā-ye polīs*) or “educated dogs” (*sag-hā-ye tarbiyyat šodeh* or *sag-hā-ye ta‘līm dīdeh*) respectively, that the French government recently supplied to Iran. As dogs are often still considered impure animals in Iran, in particular also by the police, *Īrān* also describes the use of such dogs as guide dogs or rescue dogs in France, thus arguably trying to explain the use of such dogs to the Iranian public.<sup>1088</sup>

Another article in *Ḥorāsān*, in contrast, again cites the secretary general of the DCHQ with the opinion that “the help of the international community for Iran in this regard is very insignificant” (*komak-hā-ye mağāme‘-e bain-ol-melalī beh īrān dar īn amr besyār nāčīz ast*). It further adds, “if we didn’t combat the transit [of drugs], our problem would definitively would be better than it is now” (*agar mā bā trānzīt mobārezeh nakonīm, moškel-e mā qaṭ‘ān tā ḥaddī behtar az īn ḥadd ḥ‘āhad šod*).<sup>1089</sup>

### **Gozāreš-e Rūz** in December: the NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS

The decidedly reformist newspaper *Gozāreš-e Rūz*, next, writes about addiction therapy measures in Iran. It provides a description of group sessions that “even astonish{es} the Iranians as well” (*ḥ‘od-e īrānī-hā-rā nīz šegeft-zadeh mī-konad*), and again instances the NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS (*mo‘tād-ān-e gom-nām*), whose founders apparently were suspected to be CIA agents (*ma‘mūr-ān-e siyā*) in the beginning.<sup>1090</sup>

### **Bayān** in December: 36% of all divorces are the result of a husband’s drug addiction

<sup>1087</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 17 Āḍar 1378 (8 December 1999): „Patterns of the combat against drug smuggling and addiction” (*Rāh-kār-hā-ye mobārezah bā qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḥadder va e‘tiyād*); **‘Ašr-e Āzādegān**, 17 Āḍar 1378 (8 December 1999): „We are not paying 11 billion dollars drug indemnities” (*11 mīliyārd dolār tāvān-e mavādd-e moḥadder-rā na-pardāzīm*).

<sup>1088</sup> **Īrān**, 11 Āḍar 1378 (12 December 1999): „Police dogs are stationed at airports and on roads” (*Sag-hā-ye polīs dar forūd-gāh-hā-ye va ḡāddeh-hā mostaqerr mīšavand*).

<sup>1089</sup> **Ḥorāsān**, 23 Āḍar 1378 (14 December 1999): „400 million square metres of cultivation of drug production [sic] in Afghanistan. Aid for Iran in this combat against the smuggler is an aid for the humankind” (*400 mīliyūn metr-e morabba‘ kašt-e toulīd-e mavādd-e moḥadder dar Afğānestān. Komak beh īrān barāye mobārezah bā qāčāqčīyān komak beh bašariyyat ast*).

<sup>1090</sup> **Gozāreš-e Rūz**, 24 Āḍar 1378 (15 December 1999): „Iran – the combat against the drugs flood” (*Īrān – mobārezah bā sail-e mavādd-e moḥadder*).

Also in December, *Bayān*, which only recently was launched as successor to the banned *Salām*, publishes two articles on drug cultivation in and drug trafficking from Afghanistan, as well as on drug addiction in Iran. The articles follow the established patterns of citing statistics, telling colorful personal stories and discussing addiction causes. New details are, however, given in the second article – a translation from a *Newsweek* article – on the operation mode of heroin laboratories in Afghanistan.<sup>1091</sup>

### **Hamšahrī** in December: the public opinion has to change

Departing from addiction causes, the newspaper *Hamšahrī* emphasizes the importance of prevention and the “necessity of a change in the social viewpoints and a reform in the patterns of the public opinion” (*lozūm-e tağyīr-e dīd-gāh-hā-ye eḡtemā’ī va eṣlāḥ-e šīve-ye tafakkor-e ‘omūmī*).<sup>1092</sup>

*Ğavān*, in a next article, lays the blame for Iran’s drug addiction on „coffee-houses” (*qahveh-ḥāneh-hā*), where the unemployed would spend their time; while at the same accusing the Western “colonialists” (*este’mār-gar-ān*) of pursuing a strategy of “changes in the sexual desire, a decrease of acts of volition, a condition of dream{iness} and somnolence” (*tağyīr-āt-ī dar mail-e ġensī, kāheš-e ḥarak-āt-e erādī, ḥālat-e ro’yā hamrāh bā ḥ’āb-ālūdegī*) against the Iranian society.<sup>1093</sup>

### **Kaihān** on the occasion of a visit of the Mini Dublin group in December: Mr. Fallāḥ, do you think the drug combat is over?

Still in December 1999, the newspaper *Kaihān* openly taunts the DCHQ by asking “does the headquarter think that the combat has ended and that there is no more need for continuing it?” (*āyā setād gomān mī-konad keh mobārezeh beh pāyān resīdeh va dīgar niyāzī beh edāmeḥ-ye ān nīst?*). While subsequently positively mentioning the visit of a delegation of the so-called MINI DUBLIN GROUP that financially contributes to Iran’s drug combat; it continues to accuse the US “global arrogance” (*estekbār-e ġahānī*) to “have started a war full of deceits and secrets against the Islamic ideals and values” (*yek ġang-e tamām-e ‘ayyār va*

<sup>1091</sup> **Bayān**, 27 Āḍar 1378 (18 December 1999): „Addiction – an onesided transaction”(E’tiyād – mo’āmelah-ye yek-savīyyah); **Bayān**, 28 Āḍar 1378 (19 December 1999): „The Golden Territory. Afghanistan was devastated in the war, but in opium production it is extremely flourishing”(*Sar-zamīn-e ṭalāyī. Afġānestān dar ġang vīrān šod ammā dar toulīd-e taryāk ābād ābād ast*).

<sup>1092</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 6 Dey 1378 (28 December 1999): „Necessity of knowing the factors and motives for an inclination towards addiction”(*Zorūrat-e šenāḥt-e ‘avāmel va angīzeh-hā-ye gerāyeš beh e’tiyād*).

<sup>1093</sup> **Ğavān**, 6 Dey 1378 (28 December 1999): „Addiction is an illness, so let’s cure it”(E’tiyād bīmārī ast, ān-rā darmān konīm).



*panhān-rā ‘alai-he ārmān-hā va arzeš-hā-ye eslāmī šorū‘ kardeh)* by being complicit in the international drug trade.<sup>1094</sup>

Apparently inspired by the same article of the *Newsweek* that was earlier explicitly cited by *Bayān*, the newspaper *Abrār* provides a more detailed, albeit also more ideological report of the drug situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It reproaches the Ṭalibān that despite – to a certain degree laudably – aiming at “the destruction of the unbelievers” (*tabāhī-ye koffār*), “before [the drugs] damage the Non-Muslims, they damage the Muslims” (*qabl az ān-keh beh gair-e mosalmān-ān loṭmeh bezanad, beh mosalmān-ān loṭmeh mīzanad*).<sup>1095</sup>

#### **Aḥbār-e Eqtešādī** in January: despair over overcrowded prisons

In a first article appearing in January 2000, *Abrār-e Eqtešādī* again provides statistics of drugs seizures, drug related court cases and prison inmates. Increasingly distraught about the high number of drug-related prison inmates, lamenting: “the prisons quickly become crowded and the judges don’t find the time to investigate” (*zendān-hā ba sor‘at por mī-šavad va qāzī-yān foršat-e resīdegī na-yāband*), it advises the police to rather concentrate its efforts in fighting drug trafficking on the border, instead of wasting its time on arresting drug dealers and drug addicts in the cities.<sup>1096</sup>

*Payām-e Āzādī* and *Šobḥ-e Emrūz*, which publish the two next articles, do not forward any new arguments on drug addiction and drug trafficking.<sup>1097</sup>

#### **Fath** in a series of two articles in February: vulnerable groups need specific drug prevention

A shorter series of two articles appears in January in the reformist newspaper *Fath*, the successor to the recently banned *Hordād*. Against the prevalent arguments of the press, it maintains that poverty and unemployment are not main addiction causes; and it claims that women are less addicted to drugs than men due to “their lack of relation with polluted areas outside the house and due to the exercise of social and family control in regard to female

<sup>1094</sup> **Kaihān**, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999): „Drugs – the war without borders between Iran and the global arrogance” (*Mavādd-e moḥadder – ḡang bedūn-e marz-e īrān bā estekbār-e ḡahānī*).

<sup>1095</sup> **Abrār**, 8 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999): „Afghanistan and the opium dollars” (*Afḡānestān – dolār-hā-ye afyūn*).

<sup>1096</sup> **Abrār-e Eqtešādī**, 14 Dey 1378 (5 January 2000): „The ‘business’ of drugs cannot be scattered by these {kind} of activities” („*Bīznes-e’ mavādd-e moḥadder, bā īn kār-hāa motalāšī nemīšavad*).

<sup>1097</sup> **Payām-e Āzādī**, 7 Bahman 1378 (27 January 2000): „Drugs, a reality of yesterday, today and the future” (*Mavādd-e moḥadder, vāqe’iyyat-hā-ye dīrūz, emrūz va fardā*); **Šobḥ-e Emrūz**, 11 Bahman 1378 (31 January 2000): „Dirty trade. The income from drugs is higher than the income from oil” (*Teḡārat-e kaṭīf. Dar-āmad-e mavādd-e moḥadder az dar-āmad-e naft bālātar ast*).

individuals compared with male individuals” (*‘adam-e ertebāt-e ān-hā bā moḥīt-hā-ye ālūdeh dar ḥāreḡ az manzel va e‘māl-e kontrol-hā-ye eḡtemā‘ī va ḥāne-vādegī nesbat beh afrād-e mo’annaṭ dar moqāyeseh bā afrād-e moḍakkar*).<sup>1098</sup>

*New research findings?*

In February, several newspapers articles present new research findings and conduct interviews with officials of the DCHQ and the UNDCP. It is not entirely clear what caused this cluster of articles; it might have been prompted by the late publication of the UNDCP’s WORLD DRUG REPORT, to which the newspaper *Tarḡomān-e Rūz* (27 February 2000) explicitly refers.

*Āftāb-e Emrūz in February: drug addiction and HIV in prison – is the Health Ministry distributing syringes?*

Following another article on the international drug situation and the UN conventions by the newspaper *Kār va Kārgar*,<sup>1099</sup> *Āftāb-e Emrūz* dedicates an article to the problem of drug addiction and the spread of HIV in prisons. In the interview, the director of the STATE PRISON ORGANIZATION denies that non-addicted people become addicted in Iranian prisons, but inconsistently concedes: “at least I don’t have exact statistics on this instance” (*ḥadd-e aqall man āmār-e daqīqī dar īn moured na-dāram*). When asked whether the WHO recently has provided the government with syringes to be distributed in prisons, he evades an answer, thus arguably confirming the guess of *Āftāb-e Emrūz*.<sup>1100</sup>

*Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī in a series of four articles in February & March: more drug prevention is needed*

Not long after, *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* publishes a detailed series consisting of four articles. Concentrating on the supply side of the drug problem, the newspaper provides some new details concerning patterns of drug trafficking. It states for instance that recently more women are being involved; that heroin is increasingly produced within Afghanistan; but that, somehow confusingly, more opium than heroin is seized in Iran. To a certain degree

<sup>1098</sup> **Fath**, 19 & 20 Bahman (8 & 9 February 2000): „The danger is serious! Addiction menaces the world” (*Ḥaṭar ḡeddī ast! E’tiyād ḡahān-rā tahdīd mīkonad*).

<sup>1099</sup> **Kār va Kārgar**, 25 Bahman 1378 (14 February 2000): „A look at the international drug conventions” (*Negāhī beh konvānsīyūn-hā-ye bain-ol-melalī-ye kontrol-e mavādd-e moḥadder*).

<sup>1100</sup> **Āftāb-e Emrūz**, 27 Bahman 1378 (16 February 2000): „Prisoners, drugs and AIDS” (*Zandānīyān, mavādd-e moḥadder va aidz*).

contradicting the trend of the press discourse in 1378, *Ġomūrī-ye Eslāmī* also requests more efforts in the field of drug prevention instead of drug therapy.<sup>1101</sup>

**Gozāreš-e Rūz** in a series of two articles in February: most treatment methods are insufficient or even wrong

Adopting a strongly critical note towards the past *demand reduction* measures, the student newspaper *Gozāreš-e Rūz* talks of a “failure of the programs of combating [addiction]” (*šekast-e barnāmeḥ-hā-ye mobārezāh{-rā}*) and maintains: “when the social conditions do not change, the programs to fight addiction eventually will not get somewhere” (*agar šarāyeṭ-e ġtemā’ī taġyīr nayābad eḡtemālan barnāmeḥ-hā-ye mobārezeh bā e’tiyād beh ġā’ī ne-mī-resad*).<sup>1102</sup>

**Šobḥ-e Emrūz** in February: Iran still has not ratified the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances

Next, two articles by the newspapers *Irān* and *Ĥorāsān* discuss the topics of youth addiction and advertisements for shady withdrawal centers.<sup>1103</sup>

*Šobḥ-e Emrūz*, in turn informs the reader about the purpose of the recently increased activities of the UNDCP, which consists in building “a security belt around Afghanistan” (*yek kamar-band-e amniyyatī dour-e afgānestān*). Of further interest is the information that – according to a press conference on occasion of the release of the WORLD DRUG REPORT – Iran has not fully ratified the 1971 UN CONVENTION ON PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES and its additional protocols so far.<sup>1104</sup>

**Tarġomān-e Rūz** in February: the opening of the UNDCP office in Tehrān

Three days later, the newspaper *Tarġomān-e Rūz* dedicates an article on the release of the WORLD DRUG REPORT and proudly mentions the international recognition of Iran’s success in combating the drug trafficking. On this occasion, it also explicitly mentions the

<sup>1101</sup> *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 30 Bahman & 1 & 2 & 19 Esfand (19 & 20 & 21 February & 9 March 2000): „A new theory on the increase of drug addiction and drug smuggling in the society” (*Negarešt-e nou bar afzāyeš-e e’tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḡadder dar ġāme’ah*)

<sup>1102</sup> **Gozāreš-e Rūz**, 1 & 11 & ?? Esfand (20 February & 1 & ?? March 2000): „Addiction and a theoretical research” (*E’tiyād va taḡqīq-e te’ōrīk*).

<sup>1103</sup> **Irān**, 2 Esfand 1378 (21 February 2000): „Which is the way of salvation from the deep water of addiction?” (*Rāh-e neġāt az ġarq-āb-e e’tiyād kodām ast?*); **Ĥorāsān**, 5 Esfand 1378 (24 February 2000): „Scientific approaches to fight addiction” (*Rāh-kār-hā-ye ‘elmī barāye mobārezah bā e’tiyād*).

<sup>1104</sup> **Šobḥ-e Emrūz**, 5 Esfand 1378 (24 February 2000): „The representative of the United Nations Drug Control Program office in Iran: 1,5 to 3 percent of Iranian use drugs” (*Nemāyāndeh-ye daftar-e barnāmeḥ-ye kontrol-e mavādd-e moḡadder-e sāzemān-e melal dar īrān: 1/5 tā 3 dar šad-e īrānī-hā az mavādd-e moḡadder estefādeḥ mīkonand*).

recent opening of a UNDCP field office in Tehrān, as the only newspaper during the sample period.<sup>1105</sup>

The newspaper *Kār va Kārgar*, for its part, again publishes an article on the international drugs conventions by accentuating the importance of international “judicial cooperation” (*ham-kārī-hā-ye qazāyī*), including “extradition” (*esterdād*) agreements and “legal mutual aid” (*mo‘āzēdat-e hoqūqī-ye dō-ḡānebeh*). Such provisions are in fact part of the 1988 UN CONVENTION AGAINST ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES.<sup>1106</sup>

### **Fatḥ** in March: why does Turkey have less drug addicts than Iran?

In March 2000, the newspaper *Fatḥ* publishes one of the most exceptional articles on the Iranian drug policy during the sample period. By comparing the situation of drug addiction in Turkey and Iran, ‘Alī Anṣārī, the author of the article, wonders why Turkey has far less drug addicts than Iran, despite also being a main transit country for drugs. As the most probable reasons, he cites the “legality and the sale of alcoholic beverages” (*āzādī va forūš-e mašrūbāt-e alkoli*), although concomitantly pointing to an alleged twenty million alcoholics in Turkey. As another advantage, he mentions Turkey’s more serious drug prevention programs, while complaining that in Iran, even “after years, there has not been undertaken a special education to make our students acquainted with drug consumption in our study books” (*pas az sāl-hā hanūz dar ketāb-hā-ye darsī-ye mā, āmūzeš-e ḥāṣṣī ḡehat-e āšnā sāḥtan-e dāneš-āmūzān bā mašraf-e [mavādd-e] moḥadder šūrat nagerefteh ast*). This is indeed a valid and interesting point.<sup>1107</sup>

A week later, *Fatḥ* publishes an article on drug cultivation and trafficking in Afghanistan, which seems to be equally based on the Newsweek article that has been cited before by *Bayān* and *Abrār*.<sup>1108</sup>

<sup>1105</sup> **Tarḡomān-e Rūz**, 8 Esfand 1378 (27 February 2000): „After the publication of the annul report on drugs: the United Nations expressed their appreciation of Iran” (*Dar pey-y gozāreš-e sālāneh dar bāreh-ye mavādd-e moḥadder: sāzemān-e melal az īrān qadr-dānī kard*).

<sup>1106</sup> **Kār-o-Kārgar**, 9 Esfand 1378 (28 February 2000): „A look at the international drug control conventions” (*Negāhī beh konvānsiyūn-hā-ye bain-ol-melalī-ye kontrol-e mavādd-e moḥadder*).

<sup>1107</sup> **Fatḥ**, 12 Esfand 1378 (2 March 2000): „Turkey – a main drug passage with few addicts” (*Torkiyyeh, godar-gāh-e ‘omdah-ye mavādd-e moḥadder bā mo’tādān-e andak*).

<sup>1108</sup> **Fatḥ**, 18 Esfand 1378 (8 March 2000): „The protection of the exuberant drug production in Afghanistan by the Taliban secures three quarters of the global opium product and 90 percent of the heroin in Europe” (*Hemāyat az toulīd-e anbūb-e mavādd-e moḥadder az sūye ṭālebān seh ḡahārom-e koll-e maḥṣūl-e taryāk-e ḡahān va 90 dar ṣad-e herō’īn-e orūpā-rā ta’mīn mīkonad*).

### **Ham-Mīhan** in March: the SOCIETY AGAINST ADDICTION & the NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS

Subsequently, the newspaper *Ham-Mīhan*, which was recently launched by Karbāsčī, the former mayor of Tehrān, dedicates a series of two articles on drug therapy measures. It particularly highlights dubious press advertisements promising addiction withdrawal within in six days, which are indeed a regular feature of the Iranian press; and continues to describe different therapy and rehabilitation measures applied by governmental institutions and non-governmental organizations such as SOCIETY AGAINST ADDICTION (*ğam‘iyyat-e mobārezeh bā e‘tiyād*) or the NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS (*mo‘tādān-e gom-nām*).<sup>1109</sup>

### **ĞOMHŪRĪ-YE ESLĀMĪ** in March: drug cultivation & credit system in Afghanistan

A next interesting report is published by *Ğomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* on the informal credit system (*e‘tebār-e mālī*) in Afghanistan, which is described as contributing to the ongoing misery of Afghan farmers: often deeply in debt, poppy cultivation is for many farmers the only viable means to pay back their lenders.<sup>1110</sup>

### **Fath** in March: deceiving advertisements for addiction treatment

Like *Ham-Mīhan*, the newspaper *Fath* also warns of suspicious advertisements for drug therapies or strange drug withdrawal medication. This warning is apparently provided by the deputy for drug prevention of the SWO, who holds the lack of legally available pharmaceuticals for drug withdrawal co-responsible for this phenomenon.<sup>1111</sup>

### **Mošārekat** on the occasion of a teachers’ conference on drug prevention in March: 7 million drug addicts in Iran, half of which under the age of 18

While the press did not even embrace unanimously the new official assessment of a total of two million drug users in Iran, *Mošārekat* reports an even higher estimation. On the occasion of the “second conference on addiction prevention among high school students” (*dovvom-īn hemāyeš-e pīš-ğīrī az e‘tiyād-e dāneš-āmūzān*), the newspaper of Ḥātāmī’s ISLAMIC IRAN PARTICIPATION FRONT cites undisclosed research according to which there are actually seven million drug addicts in Iran, fifty per cent of which under the age of eighteen. More astonishing for this reformist newspaper is the appointment of blame to an alleged

<sup>1109</sup> **Ham-Mīhan**, 19 & ?? Esfand (9 & ?? March 2000): „Addiction withdrawal in a week is not addiction withdrawal” (*Tark-e e‘tiyād-e yek hafte’ī nīst tark-e e‘tiyād*).

<sup>1110</sup> **Ğomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 21 Esfand 1378 (11 March 2000): „Opium – the main source of income for the Taliban” (*Taryāk - manba‘-e ašlī-e dar-āmad-e ẗalebān*).

<sup>1111</sup> **Fath**, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000): „An interview with the deputy for prevention of the Welfare Organisation: Advertisements for addiction therapy can be prosecuted legally” (*Goft-o-ğū bā mo‘āvenat-e pīš-ğīrī-ye sāzemān-e beh-zīstī: āgahī-hā-ye darmān-e e‘tiyād qābel-e ta‘qīb-e qānūnī ast*).

“cultural assault” of the West, which for instance can be observed in cartoons, the Iranian children are watching “night and day” (*az šobḥ tā šab*).<sup>1112</sup>

**FATH** *before the Nourūz holidays in March: the NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS*

The last two articles of the year 1378 (1999-2000) are again written by *Fath*, which among many other newspapers would be banned only a month later. Both articles are dedicated to the discussion of the NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS, which are described to be active all over Tehrān as well as in further Iranian cities.<sup>1113</sup>

---

<sup>1112</sup> **Mošārekat**, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000): „In the second Congress for the Prevention of Addiction of Students it was discussed: Half of the country’s addicts are under 18 years” (*Dar dovvomīn hemāyeš-e pīš-gīrī az e’tiyād-e dāneš-āmūzān maṭraḥ šod: Nīmī az mo’tādān-e kešver zīr-e 18 sāl hastand*).

<sup>1113</sup> **Fath**, 25 & 26 Esfand 1378 (16 & 17 March 2000): „We are all clean” (*Mā hameh pāk hastīm*).

### V. 3. The imagery of the Iranian press discourse on drugs – reinforcing and contradicting images

The Persian everyday language is strongly permeated by imaginative expressions that are often taken from Iran's rich poetic tradition. Hence, it is only natural that the Iranian press discourse on drugs, too, reflects a general affection to pictographic metaphors, allegories and symbols. Similar influence on the vernacular of the media has the specific political history of Iran, especially religious and anti-imperialistic discourses, both from before and after the revolution of 1979.

For an unaccustomed or generally non-Iranian reader, these linguistic images might seem more dramatic than for an Iranian audience, which has integrated them into its understanding without constantly bearing in mind their original emphasis. Frequently used examples for such images are the terms “merchants of death” for drug traffickers, “trap of addiction” for drug addiction or “global arrogance” for the USA and Great Britain, which the press normally uses rather mechanically. The more imaginative collocations, however, which are to be found especially in the titles of the drug-related newspaper articles, certainly still draw the attention of the readers. These are expressions like “inauspicious shadow of the octopus of death” or “claws of the evil-minded demon of addiction”, with which drug addiction is described. The newspapers use them exactly because of their sensational character, even though they often continue to write the subsequent article in a factual and somber style. Such hyperbolic expressions are indeed only rarely explicitly doubled down on the level of arguments.

Generally, the specific language rather dramatizes and exaggerates otherwise explicit or at times more implicit arguments, while still corresponding to the same line of arguing. Only when it comes to the moral and legal qualification of addiction, the diction often directly contradicts the argumentation. The language of the Iranian press discourse on drugs thus reveals an underlying, more unconscious and collective attitude of the Iranian society towards drug addiction, which is arguably stronger than the conscious rationale of the respective newspapers. LINK and correspondingly JÄGER have called such expressions *collective symbols*,<sup>1114</sup> because they reveal basic perception patterns of a society, which are deep-rooted and therefore resistant to changes.

---

<sup>1114</sup> Jäger (2004), 133ff.

In the present analysis of the Iranian press discourse on drugs, most of these specific expressions are already present from the beginning of the sample period. Some terms and collocations, however, only appear later in the discourse, and might have been coined by the respective newspaper. As in the case of explicit arguments, it is eventually impossible to determine to what extent the newspapers have influenced each other concerning the language.

The imaginative expressions and linguistic images used by the Iranian press to describe drug-related topics are arranged in a first subchapter according to different topics. A second subchapter then specifically lists the expressions used in discussing the question, whether addiction is a crime or an illness – arguably the central question of the Iranian press discourse on drugs.

### *V. 3. a. The drugs vernacular of the Iranian press discourse*

For every stage of the drugs chain – from the cultivation, manufacture, trafficking, distribution and consumption of drugs – the Iranian press displays a specific vocabulary. While such expressions can be found in all newspapers, the semantic analysis reveals that the conservative newspapers are using them more frequently than the reformist papers.

To describe this chain exemplarily and pointedly, the “Western colonialists” are described as having initiated the “inauspicious, poisonous phenomenon” of drug addiction, and the “global arrogance” continues to be blamed for this “conspiracy”, by supporting the “cultivators of the white death” in the “golden *bāzār*” of Afghanistan and Pakistan. “Merchants of death” are then accused of trafficking this “satanic material” towards and through the Islamic Republic of Iran, which despite leading a “holy defence” against this “dirty trade”, has not been able to “block the flood at its source”. The “nightmare of drugs thus still casts a shadow” on the Iranian society, while the “swirl of addiction lies in the ambush of the youth”. This “alarm bell” seriously calls for “delivering the addicts from the trap of addiction” and for “vaccinating” the Iranian society against the “family-subverting and fatal plague” of drug addiction.



### ***Western colonialist world-devourers as instigators and supporters of the drug problem***

By singling out the “Western colonialists” (*este ‘mār-gar-ān-e ġarbtī*)<sup>1115</sup> or simply the “colonialists” (*este ‘mār-gar-ān*)<sup>1116</sup> in general, and the British “old fox” (*rūbāh-e pīr*) in particular, the Iranian press typically indulges in a rather conspiratorial view of the history of drugs in Iran. These are blamed for having turned drugs into a “fatal weapon against the well-being of humankind” (*ħarbeh-ye mohlek ‘alai-he salāmat-e bašariyyat*)<sup>1117</sup>, “an arrogant weapon against the well-being of humankind” (*ħarbeh-ye estekbārī ‘alai-he salāmat-e bašariyyat*)<sup>1118</sup> or “one of the biggest weapons of the enemies to annihilate the values and to trample down the religious zeal of the young generation” (*az mohemm-tarīn ħarbeh-hā-ye došman-ān barāye az bain bordan arzeš-hā va pāy-māl kardan ġairat-e dīnī-ye nasl-e ġavān*).<sup>1119</sup>

The “global arrogance” (*estekbār-e ġahānī*)<sup>1120</sup> or “the procedures and intrigues of the great Satan” (*tarafand-hā va dasāyes-e šaitān-e bozorg*)<sup>1121</sup> respectively – a reference to the USA – continue to be accused for being an “inhuman, arrogant movement” (*ħarakat-e žedd-e bašarī-ye estekbārī*)<sup>1122</sup>, an “offensive movement of the world-devourers” (*ħarakat-e tahāġomī-ye ġahān-hī ‘ārān*)<sup>1123</sup> or simply “criminal propagators of drugs” (*ravāġ-dehandeg-ān-e tabah-kār-e mavādd-e moħadder*).<sup>1124</sup>

The West is generally reproached for applying a “strategy of the rule of opium” (*estrātežī-ye solteh-ye afyūn*)<sup>1125</sup>, a “destructive policy of spreading opium” (*siyāsāt-e vīrān-gar-e gostareš-e afyūn*)<sup>1126</sup> and an “addicts-creating fascism” (*fāšīsm-e mo ‘tād-sāzī*)<sup>1127</sup>. Its

<sup>1115</sup> **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995).

<sup>1116</sup> **Kaihān**, 27 Ĥordād 1374 (17 June 1995); **Salām**, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I; **Kār va Kārgar**, 21 & 22 & 24 Farvardīn 1378 (10 & 11 & 13 April 1999); as “colonialism” (*este ‘mār*): **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 17 Āḍar 1378 (8 December 1999); for “colonialism” (*este ‘mār*) also the words “exploitation” (*estetmār*), “despotism” (*estebdād*) and “imperialism” (*emperīyālīsm*) are used: **‘Ašr-e Āzādegān**, 17 Āḍar 1378 (8 December 1999); also *este ‘mār-gar* and *estetmār*: **Ġavān**, 6 Dey 1378 (28 December 1999).

<sup>1117</sup> **Resālat**, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995) I.

<sup>1118</sup> **Resālat**, 4 Tīr 1374 (June 1995) I.

<sup>1119</sup> **Kār va Kārgar**, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999).

<sup>1120</sup> Also as “exploiters” (*mostakber-ān*): **Salām**, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I; **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995); **Abrār**, 15 Esfand 1374 (5 March 1996); also as “global exploiters / arrogant persons” (*mostakber-ān-e ġahānī*): **Kaihān**, 25 Ĥordād 1374 (15 June 1995); **‘Afārīneš**, 16 Āḍar 1376 (7 December 1997) I; **Kaihān**, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999).

<sup>1121</sup> **Resālat**, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995).

<sup>1122</sup> **Resālat**, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I.

<sup>1123</sup> **Kaihān**, 27 Ĥordād 1374 (17 June 1995).

<sup>1124</sup> **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995).

<sup>1125</sup> **Resālat**, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995).

<sup>1126</sup> **Abrār**, 10 Āḍar 1376 (1 December 1997).

<sup>1127</sup> **Kaihān**, 27 Ĥordād 1374 (17 June 1995).

“colonial policies” (*siyāsat-hā-ye estekbārī*)<sup>1128</sup>, “colonial and culture-attacking policies” (*siyāsat-hā-ye este‘mārī va tahāğomī-ye farhangī*)<sup>1129</sup> and “poisoned propaganda” (*tablīgāt-e masmūm*)<sup>1130</sup> are described as being especially directed against Iran, and against “the material force of the Muslim community” (*nīrū-ye ġasmānī-ye mellat-e mosalmān*), thus “annihilating the Islamic culture and identity” (*nā-būd sāhtan-e farhang va hovviyat-e eslāmī*).<sup>1131</sup> They are, therefore, a “big conspiracy of the enemy” (*touṭe’eh-ye bozorg-e došman*)<sup>1132</sup> or “a conspiracy, with which the big powers hit us” (*touṭe’eh-ī ast keh qodrat-hā-ye bozorg beh īn vasīleh beh mā žarbeh mī-zanand*)<sup>1133</sup>. According to the Iranian press, these Western strategies are, however, also more generally directed against “the oppressed nations of the world” (*melal-e mostaž‘af-ān-e ġahān*),<sup>1134</sup> with the aim of “creating feebleness and frailty among different societies” (*īğād-e rehvat va sostī dar ġavāme‘-e mohtalef*)<sup>1135</sup> and particularly of “annihilating the Islamic culture and identity” (*nā-būd sāhtan-e farhang va hovviyat-e eslāmī*)<sup>1136</sup>.

According to the semantic analysis, and consistent with the general argumentation, the conservative newspapers *Kayhān*, *Resālat* and *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* are dominating this anti-imperialistic discourse. Their viewpoint is, however, shared to by the moderately conservative newspapers *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, *Āfarīneš* and *Abrār*; as well as notably by *Salām* and *Kār-va-Kārgar*, the established papers of the Islamic left, which traditionally were arguing along this line. Of the new reformist newspapers, in contrast, only *‘Ašr-e Āzādegān* uses this anti-Western discourse.

### *The Taliban, planters of the white death in the black Golden Triangle*

The Iranian press, however, also increasingly blames the increased opium production in Afghanistan on the Taliban. No obvious difference between the reformist and the conservative newspapers can be observed in this regard. While the newspapers describe drug-producing countries in general as a “galaxy of death” (*kah-kešān-e marg*) or “galaxy of opium” (*kah-kešān-e taryāk*)<sup>1137</sup>, they usually specifically write about the “Golden Crescent” (*helāl-e*

<sup>1128</sup> *Resālat*, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I.

<sup>1129</sup> *Kayhān*, 27 Ĥordād 1374 (17 June 1995); simply as *siyāsat-e estekbārī*: *Resālat*, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I.

<sup>1130</sup> *Resālat*, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995) I.

<sup>1131</sup> *Abrār*, 15 Esfand 1374 (5 March 1996).

<sup>1132</sup> *Āryā*, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999); also as “conspiracies of the global arrogance” (*touṭe’eh-hā-ye estekbār-e ġahānī*): *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995).

<sup>1133</sup> *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 30 Bahman & 1 & 2 & 19 Esfand 1387 (19 & 20 & 21 February & 9 March 9 2000).

<sup>1134</sup> *Salām*, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I.

<sup>1135</sup> Here referring to the history of drugs: *Salām*, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I.

<sup>1136</sup> *Abrār*, 15 Esfand 1374 (5 March 1996).

<sup>1137</sup> *Hamšahrī*, 27 Mehr 1376 (19 October 1997).

*ṭalā'ī*) comprising Afghanistan and Pakistan. This region consequently becomes a “golden, black crescent” (*helāl-e siyāh-e ṭalā'ī*)<sup>1138</sup>, a “golden market” (*bāzār-e ṭalā'ī*)<sup>1139</sup> or a “crescent of death” (*helāl-e marg*)<sup>1140</sup>. The poppy cultivators are themselves rarely accused for the availability of drugs in Iran, as shows the sympathetic press coverage on poppy farmers in Afghanistan. Before the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, the Afghan government of then president Rabbānī was described as incapable “fragmented government” (literally: “government of the kings of the territorial divisions”) (*ḥokūmat-e molūk ol-ṭavā'efī*)<sup>1141</sup>. With the increasing power of the Taliban, however, these are directly held responsible for drug supply, and hence called “propagators of drugs” (*moravveḡ-e mavādd-e moḥadder*)<sup>1142</sup> or referring to heroin “planters of the white death” (*kāšegān-e / kāšandegān-e marg-e sefīd*)<sup>1143</sup>.

### ***Ruinous mafia organizations as merchants of death***

Drug “traffickers” (*qāčāqčī-hā*) for their part are described again with vivid expressions as “death merchants” (*sawdā-garān-e marg*)<sup>1144</sup>, “merciless merchants of drugs” (*sawdā-garān-e bī-rahm-e mavādd-e moḥadder*)<sup>1145</sup>, “caravans of opiates smuggling” (*kārvān-hā-ye qāčāq-e mavādd-e afyūnī*)<sup>1146</sup> or “hands that weave the net of death” (*dast-ān-ī keh dām-e marg mītanand*)<sup>1147</sup>. Other, less sensational, descriptions are mafia (*māfiyā*)<sup>1148</sup> gangsters (*gāngster-hā*)<sup>1149</sup> or cartels (*kārtel-hā*)<sup>1150</sup> and gangs (*bānd-hā*)<sup>1151</sup>. They are further

<sup>1138</sup> **Qods**, 10 Dey 1376 (31 December 1997).

<sup>1139</sup> **Šobḥ-e Emrūz**, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999).

<sup>1140</sup> **Šobḥ-e Emrūz**, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999).

<sup>1141</sup> **Īrān**, 28 Dey 1374 (19 January 1996); *mulūk at-ṭavā'if* is an expression, which Arabic historians first applied to the regional sovereigns of the Parthian and Arsacid Persia and later to the fragmented Muslim realms in Andalusia after the fall of the Umayyads: **Morony** (*Mulūk al-Ṭavā'if* – EI).

<sup>1142</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 4 Tīr 1376 (25 June 1997).

<sup>1143</sup> **Aḥbār**, 6 Tīr 1376 (27 June 1997).

<sup>1144</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 27 Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995) II; **Resālat**, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995); **Abrār**, 15 Esfand 1374 (5 March 1996); as “merchants of the black death” (*sawdā-garān-e marg-e siyāh*): **Āfarīneš**, 21 Ābān 1376 (12 November 1997); **Qods**, 7 Dey 1376 (28 December 1997); **Ḥordād**, 13 Ordībehešt 1376 (3 May 1999); **Ġavān**, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999); **Salām**, 1 Ḥordād 1378 (22 May 1999); **Entehāb**, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999); **Našāt**, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999); **Īrān**, 8 Tīr 1378 (29 June 1999); **Ḥorāsān**, 7 & 9 Mordād 1378 (29 & 31 July 1999); **Kaiḥān**, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999).

<sup>1145</sup> **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995).

<sup>1146</sup> **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 16 Mehr 1376 (8 October 1997); or as “drugs caravans” (*kārvān-hā-ye mavādd-e moḥadder*): **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999); also as “death caravan” (*kārvān-e marg*) when referring to the history of cigarettes: **Hamšahrī**, 21 Tīr 1374 (2 July 1995).

<sup>1147</sup> **Ḥordād**, 13 Ordībehešt 1376 (3 May 1999).

<sup>1148</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 31 Ḥordād 1374 (21 June 1995); “octopus of the mafia” (*oḡtapūs-e māfiyā*) is used by: **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 11 Tīr 1374 (2 July 1995); **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 13 Mehr 1376 (5 October 1997); **Resālat**, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 October 1997); **Kār va Kārgar**, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999); **Kaiḥān**, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999).

<sup>1149</sup> The word *gāngster* is used by Dr. Ḥamid Qods, director of the INCB: **Hamšahrī**, 31 Ḥordād 1374 (21 June 1995).

<sup>1150</sup> **Resālat**, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995); **Abrār**, 24 Tīr 1374 (15 July 1995); **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 14 Tīr 1376 (J 5 July 1997); **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 13 Mehr 1376 (5 October 1997); **Qods**, 7 Dey 1376 (28 December 1997).

called “aggressive organization(s)” (*sāzemān-e motağāvez*), “ruinous – lit. family-burning – organization(s)” (*sāzemān-e hānemān-sūz*)<sup>1152</sup>, “fearsome global networks” (*šabakeh-hā-ye moḥavvef-e ḡahānī*)<sup>1153</sup> or “ghoul-like drugs trafficking cartels” (*kārtel-hā-ye ḡawl-āsā-ye qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḥadder*)<sup>1154</sup>. Their activity is described as an “inauspicious trade” (*teḡārat-e šūm*)<sup>1155</sup>, “black trade” (*teḡārat-e siyāh*)<sup>1156</sup>, “toxic trade” (*teḡārat-e masmūm*)<sup>1157</sup>, “deadly trade” (*teḡārat-e marg-bār*)<sup>1158</sup>, “dirty trade” (*teḡārat-e kaṭīf*)<sup>1159</sup> or “death-bringing transaction” (*mo‘āmeleh-ye marg-āvar*)<sup>1160</sup> and they are accused of pursuing “filthy aims” (*ahdāf-e palīd*)<sup>1161</sup>. There are no apparent differences between newspapers of the different ideological camps when it comes to the description of drug traffickers.

### *Drugs, the black death and the white devil*

The trafficked drugs or literally “stupefying materials” (*mavādd-e moḥadder*) are characterized with an litany of imaginative expressions, including “existence-burning, stupefying materials” (*mavādd-e hastī-sūz-e moḥadder*)<sup>1162</sup>, “ruinous, stupefying materials” (*mavādd-e hānemān-sūz-e moḥadder*)<sup>1163</sup>, “family-disturbing materials” (*mavādd-e hānemān-angīz*)<sup>1164</sup>, “satanic materials” (*māddeh-hā-ye šaiṭānī*)<sup>1165</sup> or “cursed materials” (*mavādd-e la‘natī*)<sup>1166</sup>, “perverted cargo” (*bār-e kaḡ*)<sup>1167</sup>, “death-bringing goods” (*matā‘-e marg-bār*)<sup>1168</sup>,

<sup>1151</sup> As „fearsome mafia gangs“ (*bānd-hā-ye moḥavvef-e māfyāyī*): **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 13 Mehr 1376 (5 October 1997); **Ḥorāsān**, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999); **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 17 Āḡar 1378 (8 December 1999); **Kaiḥān**, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999).

<sup>1152</sup> Both words in: **Resālat**, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 October 1997).

<sup>1153</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 9 Tīr 1376 (30 June 1997).

<sup>1154</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 30 Bahman & 1 & 2 & 19 Esfand 1378 (19 & 20 & 21 February & 9 March, 2000).

<sup>1155</sup> **Abrār**, 19 Mordād 1374 (10 August 1995).

<sup>1156</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997).

<sup>1157</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999); **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999).

<sup>1158</sup> Also as „death trade“ (*teḡārat-e marg*): **Qods**, 7 Dey 1376 (28 December 1997); as “death-bringing trade” *teḡārat-e marg-āvar*: **Qods**, 10 Dey 1376 (31 December 1997); **Abrār**, 14 Tīr 1378 (5 July 1999).

<sup>1159</sup> **Šobḥ-e Emrūz**, 11 Bahman 1378 (31 January 2000).

<sup>1160</sup> **Āzād**, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 1999); **Payām-e Āzādī**, 7 Bahman 1378 (27 January 2000).

<sup>1161</sup> **Resālat**, 5 Ābān 1376 (27 October 1997).

<sup>1162</sup> **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 28 Ḥordād 1374 (18 July 1995).

<sup>1163</sup> **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 27 Ḥordād 1374 (17 June 1995); also as “ruinous material” (*māddeh-ye hānemān-sūz*): **Qods**, 28 Farvardīn 1378 (17 April 1999) and **Īrān**, 9 Šahrīvar 1378 (31 August 1999).

<sup>1164</sup> Lit. „family-inciting material“: **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 12 Tīr 1374 (3 July 1995).

<sup>1165</sup> **Āfarīneš**, 20 Ābān 1376 (11 November 1997); **Āfarīneš**, 21 Ābān 1376 (12 November 1997).

<sup>1166</sup> **Resālat**, 6 Ābān 1376 (28 October 1997).

<sup>1167</sup> **Īrān**, 2 Āḡar 1378 (23 November 1999).

<sup>1168</sup> **Salām**, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I; with the same meaning – but referring to tobacco – also as (*kālā-ye marg-āvar*): **Hamšahrī**, 18 Ābān 1376 (9 November 1997); also as *kālā-ye marg-āvar*, but referring to drugs in general: **Resālat**, 21 Ordībehešt 1378 (11 May 1999); also as „death-bringing material“ (*māddeh-ye marg-bār*): **Aḡbār-e Eqtešādī**, 11 Mehr 1378 (3 October 1999); or as “death-bringing and dangerous materials” (*mavādd-e marg-bār va ḡaṭar-nāk*): **Ġavān**, 6 Dey 1378 (28 December 1999).

“death-creating products” (*maḥṣūlāt-e marg-āfarīn*)<sup>1169</sup>, “poison of death” (*samm-e marg*)<sup>1170</sup>; “white death” (*marg-e sefīd*)<sup>1171</sup>, “white satan” (*šaiṭān-e sefīd*)<sup>1172</sup> or simply the “white powder” (*gerd-e sefīd*)<sup>1173</sup> of heroin; but also “black death” (*marg-e siyāh*)<sup>1174</sup> and rarely “black products” (*maḥṣūlāt-e siyāh*)<sup>1175</sup> or “black powder” (*gerd-e siyāh*)<sup>1176</sup>. As shows the semantic analysis, the conservative newspapers use such words most frequently.

***Colorful contrasts: the white powder and the black death***

The above-cited examples point to another popular rhetoric pattern in the Iranian press discourse on drugs: puns with colour contrasts. A first colour is naturally provided by the denomination “Golden Crescent” (*helāl-e ṭalā’ī*), which had obtained its name in analogy to the “Golden Triangle” (*moṭallāt-e ṭalā’ī*) in Southeast-Asia.<sup>1177</sup> The Golden Crescent alternatively is described as “golden market” (*bāzār-e ṭalā’ī*)<sup>1178</sup> or a “black golden crescent” (*helāl-e siyāh-e ṭalā’ī*)<sup>1179</sup>.

A further natural colour contrast is provided by the Iranian drugs of choice: opium and heroin. Raw opium is of a very dark, almost black colour, while the heroin of better quality is known as white heroin, and as such differs from the cheaper brown heroin or brown sugar. The Iranian press accordingly speaks of “black products” (*maḥṣūlāt-e siyāh*);<sup>1180</sup> and of “white powder” (*gerd-e sefīd*)<sup>1181</sup> or alternatively “white death” (*marg-e sefīd*)<sup>1182</sup> or “white satan” (*šaiṭān-e sefīd*).<sup>1183</sup> Two newspapers mention a “black powder” (*gerd-e siyāh*)<sup>1184</sup>, probably referring to brown heroin.

Black and dark are, however, also simply synonymous with the fatal character of drugs. Drug addiction consequently is described as “black death” (*marg-e siyāh*),<sup>1185</sup> “black calamity” (*balā-ye siyāh*)<sup>1186</sup> and “black shadow of destruction” (*sāyeh-ye siyāh-e tabāhī*);<sup>1187</sup> or as “darkness of

<sup>1169</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997); or as “death bringing product” (*maḥṣūl-e marg-āvar*): **Āfarīneš**, 22 Ābān 1376 (13 November 1997) and **Payām-e Āzādī**, 7 Bahman 1378 (27 January 2000).

<sup>1170</sup> **Īrān**, 18 Āḍar 1374 (8 December 1995); or just “poison” (*semm*) when referring to tobacco: **Kaiḥān**, 8 Ḥordād 1376 (29 May 1997).

<sup>1171</sup> **Aḥbār**, 6 Tīr 1376 (27 June 1997).

<sup>1172</sup> **Īrān**, 18 Āḍar 1374 (9 December 1995); **Resālat**, 6 Ābān 1376 (28 October 1997).

<sup>1173</sup> **Kaiḥān**, 25 Ḥordād 1374 (15 June 1995); **Kaiḥān**, 27 Ḥordād 1374 (17 June 1995).

<sup>1174</sup> **Āfarīneš**, 21 Ābān 1376 (12 November 1997).

<sup>1175</sup> **Āzād**, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 1999).

<sup>1176</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 6 Ordībehešt 1374 (26 April 1995); **Āfarīneš**, 21 Ābān 1376 (12 November 1997); for plays on word on drugs and drug addiction using colours cf. the **box below**.

<sup>1177</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 6 Ordībehešt 1374 (26 April 1995).

<sup>1178</sup> **Šobḥ-e Emrūz**, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999).

<sup>1179</sup> **Qods**, 10 Dey 1376 (31 December 1997).

<sup>1180</sup> **Āzād**, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 1999).

<sup>1181</sup> **Kaiḥān**, 25 Ḥordād 1374 (15 June 1995); **Kaiḥān**, 27 Ḥordād 1374 (17 June 1995).

<sup>1182</sup> **Aḥbār**, 6 Tīr 1376 (27 June 1997).

<sup>1183</sup> Here as *šaiṭān-e sefīd*: **Īrān**, 18 Āḍar 1374 (9 December 1995); **Resālat**, 6 Ābān 1376 (28 October 1997).

<sup>1184</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 6 Ordībehešt 1374 (26 April 1995); **Āfarīneš**, 21 Ābān 1376 (12 November 1997).

<sup>1185</sup> **Īrān**, 8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995); **Āfarīneš**, 21 Ābān 1376 (12 November 1997).

<sup>1186</sup> **Āfarīneš**, 16 Āḍar 1376 (7 December 1997) I.

<sup>1187</sup> **Abrār**, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999).

addiction” (*tīregī-ye e’tiyād*)<sup>1188</sup>, “global abyss of addiction” (*varṭeh-ye ḡahānī-ye e’tiyād*)<sup>1189</sup>, “inauspicious shadow of addiction” (*sāyeh-e šūm-e e’tiyād*)<sup>1190</sup>, “ashes of addiction” (*hākestar-e e’tiyād*)<sup>1191</sup>, “well of addiction” (*čāh-e e’tiyād*)<sup>1192</sup> and “deep water of addiction” (*ḡarq-āb-e e’tiyād*)<sup>1193</sup>. Further variants are “dark and sinister soil of death” (*hāk-e tīreh va tār-e marg*)<sup>1194</sup> or “inauspicious shadow of the octopus of death” (*sāyeh-ye šūm-e oḡtāpūs-e marg*)<sup>1195</sup>.

The dark-light contrast is, however, also used for more elaborate play on words. Thus, the newspapers describe addiction rehabilitation as “emergence of the ‘bright morning’ from the ‘dark evening’ of addiction” (*damīdan-e “šobḥ-e rawšan” az “šām-e tīreh-ye e’tiyād*),<sup>1196</sup> and as hope that the addicts “breaks out from the darkness of addiction in order to smile again at the brightness of the health of mind and body” (*az tīregī-ye e’tiyād bīrūn mīyāyad tā beh rawšanī-ye salāmat-e fekr va ḡesm lab-ḥand bezanad*).<sup>1197</sup>

### *The holy defence in a war without borders*

The Iranian press naturally perceives the drugs that are trafficked from Afghanistan and Pakistan into Iran as being a “big threat” (*tahdīdī bozorg*)<sup>1198</sup>, which “menaces the world” (*ḡahān-rā tahdīd mīkonad*)<sup>1199</sup>. They consequently stress the need for a serious “drug combat” (*mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḥadder*). This war is alternatively also described “silent war” (*ḡangī ḥāmūš*)<sup>1200</sup>, “war of all fineness” (*ḡang-e tamām-e ‘ayār*)<sup>1201</sup> and especially as “war without borders” (*ḡang bedūn-e marz*)<sup>1202</sup> or war that “doesn’t know a border for people, culture or economy” (*marz-e mardom, farhang va eqtešād ne-mī-šenāsad*)<sup>1203</sup>. Rather absurd,

<sup>1188</sup> **Kaiḥān**, 27 Ḥordād 1374 (17 June 1995).

<sup>1189</sup> **Salām**, 2 Tīr 1378 (23 June 1999).

<sup>1190</sup> **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 16 Mehr 1376 (8 October 1997).

<sup>1191</sup> **Ḥorāsān**, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999).

<sup>1192</sup> **Gomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 24 & 25 Šahrīvar 1378 (15 & 16 September 1999); only as *čāh*: **Salām**, 1 Ḥordād 1378 (22 May 1999).

<sup>1193</sup> **Īrān**, 2 Esfand 1378 (21 February 2000).

<sup>1194</sup> **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995).

<sup>1195</sup> **Salām**, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) II; **Abrār**, 19 Mordād 1374 (10 August 1995).

<sup>1196</sup> **Kaiḥān**, 27 Ḥordād 1374 (17 June 1995).

<sup>1197</sup> **Kaiḥān**, 27 Ḥordād 1374 (17 June 1995).

<sup>1198</sup> **Abrār**, 8 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999).

<sup>1199</sup> **Fath**, 19 & 20 Bahman 1378 (8 & 9 February 2000).

<sup>1200</sup> **Resālat**, 14 Ābān 1376 (5 November 1997).

<sup>1201</sup> **Īrān**, 11 Āḡar 1378 (12 December 1999).

<sup>1202</sup> **Abrār**, 12 Šahrīvar 1376 (3 September 1997); **Šobḥ-e Emrūz**, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999); **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999); **Ḥorāsān**, 7 & 9 Mordād 1378 (29 & 31 July 1999); **Kaiḥān**, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999); **Mošārekāt**, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000).

<sup>1203</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 2 Mehr 1376 (24 September 1997); also simply as “doesn’t know borders” (*marz ne-mī-šenāsad*); **Abrār**, 19 Mordād 1374 (10 August 1995); “doesn’t know frontiers or borders” (*ḥadd va marz ne-mī-šenāsad*); **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 24 Mehr 1376 (14 October 1997); “doesn’t know politics, borders or cultures” (*siyāsāt va marz va farhang ne-mī-šenāsad*); **Abrār**, 8 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999).

in contrast, is *Kaihān*'s expression "war without borders between Iran and the global arrogance" (*ḡang bedūn-e marz-e īrān bā estekbār-e ḡahānī*).<sup>1204</sup>

The newspapers accordingly describe the bleak situation with "the danger is serious" (*ḥaṭar ḡeddī ast*)<sup>1205</sup> and "the alarm bell has rung" (*zang-e ḥaṭar beh ṣadā dar āmadeh*)<sup>1206</sup>, because "tomorrow, it will be too late for the fight against drugs" (*fardā barā-ye mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḥadder dīr ast*)<sup>1207</sup>. They are, however, also expressing the hope, that Iran's "holy defense" (*defā'-e moqaddas*)<sup>1208</sup> or "holy and fundamental action" (*ḥarakat-e moqaddas va asāsī*)<sup>1209</sup> against the drug traffickers eventually will be successful, before the following title materializes: "opium – the winner of the war" (*taryāk – barandeh-ye ḡang*).

The press consequently describes the Iranian security forces of being "the vanguard of the global combat against drugs" (*pīš-gām-e mobārezeh-ye ḡahānī bā mavādd-e moḥadder*)<sup>1210</sup> and of fighting this war alone "at the frontline" (*ḥaṭṭ-e moqaddam-e ḡebheh*)<sup>1211</sup> – all this for the "salvation of the humankind" (*nagāt-e bašariyyat*)<sup>1212</sup> and in order to "block the flood at the source and prevent the destruction of the cities" (*sail-āb-rā az sar-e čašmeh bebandand va vīrānī-ye šahr-hā ḡelou-gīrī konand*)<sup>1213</sup>.

In principle, all newspapers use the image of war to describe Iran's combat against drugs. Judging from the quotes, it seems, however, that the reformist newspapers understand this war in a broader sense as a defense against drugs, while the conservative newspapers rather perceive it as a physical fight against drug smuggling. All newspapers, however, support the combat of the Iranian security forces against the supply of drugs from the east.

### ***Addiction: the trap of the dangerous demon, the satanic plague or the devil's virus***

The local problem of drug addiction is arguably the main concern for the Iranian press. The most figurative expressions are, thus, logically used to describe addiction. The corresponding expressions can be divided into three groups: a first group consisting of terms

<sup>1204</sup> *Kaihān*, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999).

<sup>1205</sup> *Fath*, 19 & 20 Bahman 1378 (8 & 9 February 2000).

<sup>1206</sup> *Salām*, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I; only as *zang-e ḥaṭar*: *Eṭṭelā'āt*, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995).

<sup>1207</sup> *Āfarīneš*, 24 Mehr 1378 (16 October 1999).

<sup>1208</sup> *Eṭṭelā'āt*, 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999).

<sup>1209</sup> *Qods*, 10 Dey 1376 (31 December 1997).

<sup>1210</sup> *Kaihān*, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999).

<sup>1211</sup> *Qods*, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999); *Eṭṭelā'āt*, 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999);

<sup>1212</sup> *Ḥorāsān*, 23 Āḡar 1378 (14 December 1999).

<sup>1213</sup> *Abrār-e Eqtešādī*, 14 Dey 1378 (5 January 2000).

that describe addiction with limited fantasy as problem or calamity; a second group encompassing more pictographic metaphors, which, however, in certain cases might already have lost their sensational character; and third group consisting of even more dramatic and sophisticated expressions, which arguably still catch the reader's attention.

The newspapers of course also simply use the terms “drug addiction” (*e'tiyād beh mavādd-e moḥadder*) or “addiction” (*e'tiyād*), and even replace it with the scientifically more adept concept of “habit” (*ādat*).<sup>1214</sup>

Yet, commonly, they rather use more evocative terms and expressions. Addiction thus is described as “difficulty / problem” (*mo'żal*), “evident problem” (*mo'żal-e 'ayān*),<sup>1215</sup> “inauspicious problem” (*mo'żal-e šūm*),<sup>1216</sup> “ruinous problem” (*mo'żal-e ḥānemān-sūz*),<sup>1217</sup> or “most evil problem” (*moškel-e por-mafsadeh*);<sup>1218</sup> as “rough social phenomenon” (*padīdeh-ye nā-hanḡār-e eḡtemā'ī*),<sup>1219</sup> “hidden and anti-social phenomenon” (*padīdeh-ye mahfī va žedd-e eḡtemā'ī*),<sup>1220</sup> “inauspicious phenomenon” (*padīdeh-ye šūm*),<sup>1221</sup> “inauspicious, satanic phenomenon” (*padīdeh-ye šūm-e šaiṭānī*),<sup>1222</sup> or “inauspicious, poisoned phenomenon” (*padīdeh-ye šūm-e masāmūm*);<sup>1223</sup> as “plague” (*āfat*) or “ruinous plague” (*āfat-e ḥānemān-sūz*),<sup>1224</sup> “family-overthrowing and fatal plague” (*āfat-e ḥānemān-bar-andāz va mohlek*),<sup>1225</sup> and “satanic plague” (*āfat-e šaiṭānī*);<sup>1226</sup> as “inauspicious calamity” (*balīyyeh-ye šūm*).<sup>1227</sup>

<sup>1214</sup> **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 20 Farvardīn 1376 (9 April 1997); **Salām**, 20 Ḥordād 1378 (10 June 1999).

<sup>1215</sup> **Kaiḥān**, 15 Ābān 1374 (6 November 1995).

<sup>1216</sup> Lit. „one of the inauspicious social problems“ (*yekī az mo'żalāt-e šūm-e eḡtemā'ī*): **Abrār**, 15 Esfand 1374 (5 March 1996); **Āzād**, 6 Mehr 1378 (28 September 1999).

<sup>1217</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 15 Esfand 1374 (5 March 1995); also as “ruinous addiction” (*e'tiyād-e ḥānemān-sūz*): **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997) and **Abrār**, 12 Šahrīvar 1376 (3 September 1997); **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999); **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999); **Ġavān**, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999).

<sup>1218</sup> **Kaiḥān**, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995).

<sup>1219</sup> **Abrār**, 9 Ordībehešt 1378 (29 April 1999).

<sup>1220</sup> **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 29 Ḥordād 1374 (19 June 1995).

<sup>1221</sup> E.g. in: **Resālat**, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995); **Salām**, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) II; **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995); **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997); **Salām**, 1 Ḥordād 1378 (22 May 1999); **Hamšahrī**, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999); **Ḥorāsān**, 7 & 9 Mordād 1378 (29 & 31 July 1999); **Āzād**, 6 Mehr 1378 (28 September 1999); **Kār va Kārgar**, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999).

<sup>1222</sup> **Salām**, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) II.

<sup>1223</sup> **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 13 Tīr 1374 (4 July 1995).

<sup>1224</sup> **Īrān**, 8 Ḥordād 1374 (29 May 1995); **Salām**, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I; as *āfat-e ḥānemān*: **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995).

<sup>1225</sup> **Resālat**, 21 Ordībehešt 1378 (11 May 1999); already KŪHĪ-KERMĀNĪ referred to addiction as “fatal and home-overthrowing poison” (*semm-e mohlek va ḥāneh-bar-andāz*): **KŪHĪ-KERMĀNĪ** (1945/46), 137.

<sup>1226</sup> **Āfarīneš**, 16 Āḡar 1376 (7 December 1997) II.

<sup>1227</sup> **Kaiḥān**, 15 Ābān 1374 (6 November 1995); **Abrār**, 15 Esfand 1374 (5 March 1996).



“ruinous calamity” (*balā-ye ḥānemān-sūz*),<sup>1228</sup> “black calamity” (*balā-ye siyāh*),<sup>1229</sup> or “calamity of the century” (*balā-ye qarn*)<sup>1230</sup>; as “addiction epidemic” (*epīdemī-ye e‘tiyād*),<sup>1231</sup> “ruinous tragedy” (*fāḡe‘eh-ye ḥānemān-sūz*),<sup>1232</sup> “terrible tragedy” (*trāžedī-ye vaḥṣat-nāk*),<sup>1233</sup> “family-dissipating chaos” (*hayūlā-ye ḥānemān bar bād deh*),<sup>1234</sup> “disagreeableness and filthiness of addiction” (*maḍmūmiyyat va palīdī-ye e‘tiyād*),<sup>1235</sup> or simply as a “destructive system” (*sīstem-e moḥarreb*)<sup>1236</sup> or “destruction” (*tabāhī*)<sup>1237</sup>. Especially the terms plague, calamity and tragedy are used interchangeably with problem and thus arguably already might have lost their stronger connotation in the eyes of the readers.

The press displays a richer imagination when describing addiction as “trap of addiction” (*dām-e e‘tiyād*),<sup>1238</sup> “its bitter trap” (*dām-e talḥ-e ḥod*),<sup>1239</sup> “fearsome trap” (*dām-e moḥavvef*),<sup>1240</sup> “trap of this dangerous demon” (*dām-e īn dīv-e ḥaṭar-nāk*),<sup>1241</sup> “world – lit. places where nets are spread – of addiction” (*dām-gāh-e e‘tiyād*),<sup>1242</sup> or simply as “cobweb” (*dām-e ankaḇūtī*).<sup>1243</sup> Further pictographic expressions for addiction are: “captivity of addiction” (*esārat-e e‘tiyād*),<sup>1244</sup> “claws of addiction” (*čangāl-e e‘tiyād*),<sup>1245</sup> “high fortification

- 
- <sup>1228</sup> E.g. in: (in *Salām* only as “family calamity” (*balā-ye ḥānemān*)): **Salām**, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I; **Qods**, 9 Dey 1376 (31 December 1997); **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 23 Dey 1376 (13 January 1998); **Āryā**, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999); **Hamšahrī**, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999); **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999); **Vohūman**, 7 Šahrīvar 1378 (29 August 1999); **Ḥorāsān**, 8 Mehr 1378 (30 September 1999); **Ġavān**, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999); **Kār va Kārgar**, 24 Ābān 1378 (15 November 1999); **Kaiḥān**, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999).
- <sup>1229</sup> **Āfarīneš**, 16 Āḍar 1376 (7 December 1997) I.
- <sup>1230</sup> **Fath**, 19 & 20 Bahman 1378 (8 & 9 February 2000).
- <sup>1231</sup> **Īrān**, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999).
- <sup>1232</sup> **Abrār**, 12 Šahrīvar 1376 (3 September 1997); only as *fāḡe‘eh*: **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 24 Mehr 1376 (14 October 1997).
- <sup>1233</sup> **Salām**, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) II.
- <sup>1234</sup> **Āryā**, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999).
- <sup>1235</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 30 Bahman & 1 & 2 & 19 Esfand 1378 (19 & 20 & 21 February & 9 March 2000).
- <sup>1236</sup> **Āftāb-e Emrūz**, 2 Šahrīvar 1378 (24 August 1999).
- <sup>1237</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997).
- <sup>1238</sup> E.g. in: **Īrān**, 8 Ḥordād 1374 (29 May 1995); **Kaiḥān**, 25 Ḥordād 1374 (5 June 1995); **Īrān**, 29 Tīr 1374 (20 July 1995); **Qods**, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997); **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 30 Bahman & 1 & 2 & 19 Esfand 1378 (19 & 20 & 21 February & 9 March 2000); **Gozāreš-e Rūz**, 1 & 11 & ?? Esfand 1378 (20 February & 1 March 2000).
- <sup>1239</sup> **Īrān**, 8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995).
- <sup>1240</sup> **Āfarīneš**, 16 Āḍar 1376 (7 December 1997) I.
- <sup>1241</sup> **Resālat**, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 October 1997).
- <sup>1242</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 27 Mehr 1376 (19 October 1997).
- <sup>1243</sup> **Qods**, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997).
- <sup>1244</sup> **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 29 Ḥordād 1374 (19 June 1995); as „captives of addiction“ (*asīrān-e e‘tiyād*): **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 1 Tīr 1374 (5 July 1995); as “in the captivity of this illness” (*dar esārat-e īn bīmārī*): **Hamšahrī**, 27 Tīr 1378 (18 July 1999).
- <sup>1245</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 19 Bahman 1376 (8 February 1998); **Entehāb**, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999); **Īrān**, 29 Ābān 1378 (20 November 1999); as „merciless claws“ (*čangāl-e bī-raḥm*): **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 30 Bahman & 1 & 2 & 19 Esfand 1378 (19 & 20 & 21 February & 9 March 2000).

of addiction” (*heṣār-e boland-e e‘tiyād*),<sup>1246</sup> “darkness of addiction” (*tīregī-ye e‘tiyād*),<sup>1247</sup> “engorged breath of the inauspicious shadow of addiction” (*dam-e afzūn-e sāyeh-ye šūm-e e‘tiyād*),<sup>1248</sup> “black shadow of destruction” (*sāyeh-ye siyāh-e tabāhī*),<sup>1249</sup> “well of addiction” (*čāh-e e‘tiyād*),<sup>1250</sup> “deep water of addiction” (*garq-āb-e e‘tiyād*),<sup>1251</sup> “ashes of addiction” (*hākestar-e e‘tiyād*),<sup>1252</sup> or “inauspicious chain” (*zanğīr-e šūm*)<sup>1253</sup>. Especially the picture of trap or web is being used so often that it has become almost an automatic extension of the word addiction.

The expressions of the third group are even more graphic and arguably still keep a sensational meaning for the Iranian audience. Vivid examples for such descriptions of addiction are: “octopus of addiction” (*ohtāpūs-e e‘tiyād*),<sup>1254</sup> “merciless octopus” (*ohtāpūs-e bī-rahm*),<sup>1255</sup> and “inauspicious shadow of the octopus of death” (*sāyeh-ye šūm-e ohtāpūs-e marg*)<sup>1256</sup>; “terrible nightmare of addiction” (*kābūs-e vaḥṣat-nāk-e e‘tiyād*),<sup>1257</sup> “global abyss of addiction” (*varṭeh-ye ḡahānī-ye e‘tiyād*),<sup>1258</sup> and “cancerous gland of addiction” (*goddeh-ye saraṭānī-ye e‘tiyād*);<sup>1259</sup> “deep and dirty ulcer” (*zaḥm-e ‘amīq va čertūn*),<sup>1260</sup> or “inauspicious owl of addiction” (*ḡoḡd-e šūm-e e‘tiyād*);<sup>1261</sup> More somber expressions are “ghoul of addiction” (*ḡawl-e e‘tiyād*),<sup>1262</sup> “devil’s virus” (*vīrūs-e eblīs*),<sup>1263</sup> “die-hard evil spirit” (*ahrīman-e ḡān-saḡt*),<sup>1264</sup> or “claws of the evil-minded demon of addiction” (*čangāl-e*

<sup>1246</sup> **Īrān**, 8 Ḥordād 1374 (29 May 1995); in the plural *heṣār-hā-ye boland*: **Kaihān**, 27 Ḥordād 1374 (17 June 1995).

<sup>1247</sup> **Kaihān**, 27 Ḥordād 1374 (17 June 1995).

<sup>1248</sup> **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 16 Mehr 1376 (8 October 1997); also as “the nightmare of drugs still casts a shadow” (*kābūs-e māvādd-e moḡadder ham-čonān sāyeh mī-afkanad*): **Našāṭ**, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999).

<sup>1249</sup> **Abrār**, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999).

<sup>1250</sup> Also as “deep well” (*omq-e čāh*): **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 24 & 25 Šahrīvar 1378 (15 & 16 September 1999); only as *čāh*: **Salām**, 1 Ḥordād 1378 (22 May 1999).

<sup>1251</sup> **Īrān**, 2 Esfand 1378 (21 February 2000).

<sup>1252</sup> **Ḥorāsān**, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999).

<sup>1253</sup> **Qods**, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997).

<sup>1254</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 23 Dey 1376 (13 January 1998).

<sup>1255</sup> **Salām**, 1 Ḥordād 1378 (22 May 1999).

<sup>1256</sup> **Salām**, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) II; **Abrār**, 19 Mordād 1374 (10 August 1995).

<sup>1257</sup> Written *dahṣatnāk* instead of *vaḥṣatnāk*: **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 28 Ḥordād 1374 (18 June 1995); also as “nightmare of cigarettes” (*kābūs-e sīḡār*): **Hamšahrī**, 18 Ābān 1376 (9 November 1997); as “nightmare of drugs” (*kābūs-e māvādd-e moḡadder*): **Našāṭ**, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999).

<sup>1258</sup> **Salām**, 2 Tīr 1378 (23 June 1999).

<sup>1259</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997); as *ḡaddeh-ye saraṭānī*: **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 19 Bahman 1376 (8 February 1998).

<sup>1260</sup> **Ḥorāsān**, 23 Āḡar 1378 (14 December 1999).

<sup>1261</sup> **Abrār**, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999).

<sup>1262</sup> **Qods**, 9 Dey 1376 (30 December 1997); **Āfarīneš**, 24 Mehr 1378 (16 October 1999); **Payām-e Āzādī**, 2 Āḡar 1378 (23 November 1999).

<sup>1263</sup> **Āryā**, 11 Ordībehešt 1378 (1 May 1999).

<sup>1264</sup> **Šobḡ-e Emrūz**, 25 & 26 & 27 Ḥordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999).

*dīv-e bad-sīrat-e e'tiyād*).<sup>1265</sup> Further used are “the world of the enchanter of addiction” (*donyā-ye afsūn-gar-e e'tiyād*),<sup>1266</sup> “desert of the enchanter of opium” (*ṣaḥrā-ye afsūn-gar-e afyūn*),<sup>1267</sup> “death-bringing marshes” (*mordāb-e marg-āvar*)<sup>1268</sup>, “dark and sinister soil of death” (*ḥāk-e tīreh va tār-e marg*),<sup>1269</sup> “dreadful storm” (*tūfān-e sahm-gīn*),<sup>1270</sup> “final weapon” (*aṣṭaḥeh-ye nehā'ī*)<sup>1271</sup>, “gradual death” (*marg-e tadrīḡī*) or “the most dangerous and fatal virus” (*ḥaṭar-nāk-tarīn va mohlek-tarīn vīrūsī*)<sup>1272</sup>. The newspapers have also produced some more complex descriptions for the phenomenon of addiction, such as: “addiction comes calmly and without a noise and spreads quietly” (*e'tiyād ārām va bī-sar-o-ṣadā mī-āyad va bī-ṣadā gostareš paidā mī-konad*),<sup>1273</sup> “a fire that doesn't know dry or wet” (*ātešī keh tar-o-ḥošk-rā ne-mī-šenāsad*),<sup>1274</sup> or a “fire, in which all burn” (*āteš-ī keh hamēh dar ān mī-sūzand*)<sup>1275</sup>. Youth addiction is called a “time-bomb” (*bomb-e sā'atī*),<sup>1276</sup> and an “elephant in the darkness” (*fīl-rā dar tārikī*),<sup>1277</sup> and tobacco smoking described as “a smoke that goes into everyone's eye{s}” (*dūdī keh be čašmeh-ye hamēh mī-ravad*).<sup>1278</sup> But even some of these pictographic expressions – in particular “octopus of death” – are used so frequently that they might have lost their sensational meaning to the reader.

While all newspapers use a whole range of such graphic expressions for addiction, it seems that the conservative, and especially the “religious” newspapers – both *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, *Resālat* and *Qods* on the conservative side and *Salām* and *Ḥorāsān* on the reformist side – are using them more frequently.

### ***Destroyed families & the Iranian youth under the siege of the cursed material***

The newspapers, however, also have specific terms to describe the victims (*qorbānī-yān*) of drugs, especially the youth. Iran is generally depicted as being “under the siege of

<sup>1265</sup> **Resālat**, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995).

<sup>1266</sup> **Āfarīneš**, 24 Mehr 1378 (16 October 1999).

<sup>1267</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 27 Mehr 1376 (19 October 1997).

<sup>1268</sup> **Īrān**, 8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995).

<sup>1269</sup> **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995).

<sup>1270</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 19 Bahman 1376 (8 February 1998).

<sup>1271</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 24 Mehr 1376 (16 October 1997).

<sup>1272</sup> **Āryā**, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999).

<sup>1273</sup> **Īrān**, 8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995).

<sup>1274</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999); also as “this fire burns dry and wet” (*īn āteš tar-o-ḥošk-rā mī-sūzānad*): **Entehāb**, 28 Farvardīn 1378 (17 April 1999).

<sup>1275</sup> **Qods**, 25 Ābān 1378 (16 November 1999).

<sup>1276</sup> **Īrān**, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999).

<sup>1277</sup> **Īrān**, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999).

<sup>1278</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 10 Ḥordād 1376 (31 May 1997).

drugs” (*dar moḥāṣereh-ye mavādd-e moḥadder*),<sup>1279</sup> or in the “fort of the Mafia’s ruses” (*dar ḥeṣār-e nīrang-e māfiyā*).<sup>1280</sup> Drugs are described as “cursed materials” (*mavādd-e la‘natī*) that “brought down the roof of the house of all of us” (*sar az ḥāneh-ye hameh-ye mārā dar āvord*),<sup>1281</sup> or “a smoke that ruins the family” (*dūd-ī ke dūdmān-rā beh bād mī-dehad*),<sup>1282</sup> and as leading to the “gradual ruin of the man, the destruction of the family foundation, and the annihilation of the body and soul of the children and adolescents” (*taḥrīb-e tadrīḡī-ye mard va enhedām-e asās-e ḥāne-vādeh, va nā-būdī-ye ḡasam va ḡān-e kawdak-ān va naw-ḡavān-ān*),<sup>1283</sup> or the “breakup of the family” (*forū-pāštī-ye ḥāne-vādeh*).<sup>1284</sup> Heroin is described as being “the enemy of the soul, wealth, spirit and zeal” (*došman-e ḡān va māl va rūḥ va ḡairat*);<sup>1285</sup> while “opium smokes the zeal of the young generation” (*afyūn ḡairat-e nasl-e ḡavān-rā dūd mī-konad*).<sup>1286</sup>

The newspapers express a specific concern for the Iranian youth, by stating that “the swirl of addiction lies in the ambush of the youth” (*gerdāb-e e‘tiyād dar kamīn-e ḡavānān ast*),<sup>1287</sup> and that drugs “contaminate the young generation” (*nasl-e ḡavān-rā ālūdeh mī-sāzad*)<sup>1288</sup>; and by emphasizing that the colonialists “have delivered a large number of the young of this country to the maw of the addiction to heroin and its derivatives” (*te‘dād-e ziyādi az ḡavān-ān-e īn marz-o-būm-rā dar kām-e e‘tiyād beh herō’īn va taba‘āt-e ān qarār dādand*).<sup>1289</sup>

The drug addict itself is generally rather depicted as a victim than a criminal. The newspapers accordingly call addicts, a “captive of the white devil” (*asīr-e šaiṭān-e sefid*),<sup>1290</sup> or a “captive of the grey prisons of this terrestrial evil spirit” (*asīr-e zandān-hā-ye ḥākestarī-ye īn ahrīman-e zamīnī*),<sup>1291</sup> who has “fallen into the trap” (*dām-ofṭāde{ḡān}*).<sup>1292</sup> They are

<sup>1279</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 19 Bahman 1376 (8 February 1998).

<sup>1280</sup> **Kār va Kārgar**, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999).

<sup>1281</sup> **Resālat**, 6 Ābān 1376 (28 October 1997).

<sup>1282</sup> **Ġavān**, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999).

<sup>1283</sup> **Āfarīneš**, 20 Ābān 1376 (11 November 1997).

<sup>1284</sup> **Horāsān**, 8 Mehr 1378 (30 September 1999); also as “scattering of the familiy system” (*forū-pāštī-ye neẓām-e ḥāne-vādeh*): **Ġavān**, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999).

<sup>1285</sup> **Āfarīneš**, 22 Ābān 1376 (13 November 1997); also as “the enemy of the people’s soul and also of its spirit and zeal” (*došman-e ḡān-e mardom va ham došman-e rūḥ va ḡayrat*): **Āzād**, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 1999).

<sup>1286</sup> **Kār va Kārgar**, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999).

<sup>1287</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997).

<sup>1288</sup> **Īrān**, 8 Tīr 1378 (29 June 1999).

<sup>1289</sup> **Salām**, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I.

<sup>1290</sup> **Īrān**, 8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995).

<sup>1291</sup> **Āfarīneš**, 24 Mehr 1378 (16 October 1999).

<sup>1292</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 27 Mehr 1376 (19 October 1997).

further described as “dry sapling” (*nahāl-e hošk*)<sup>1293</sup> in the “dark and sinister soil of death” (*hāk-e tīreh va tār-e marg*),<sup>1294</sup> or as “flowers in a storm” (*gol-hā dar tūfān*);<sup>1295</sup> as “clouded brains” (*mağz-hā-ye abr-ālūdeh*)<sup>1296</sup> who “fall into a well” (*dar čāhī mī-oftand*),<sup>1297</sup> or “fall into a trap” (*beh dām mī-oftand*);<sup>1298</sup> and as being seduced by “the temptations of drugs” (*vas-vaseh-ye mavādd-e moħadder*),<sup>1299</sup> “the temptations of Satan” (*vas-vaseh-ye šaiṭān*),<sup>1300</sup> or simply by “temptations” (*vasvaseh*).<sup>1301</sup> Especially drug addiction of women is described as “fall of the woman in the ashes of addiction” (*gorūb-e zan dar hākestar-e e’tiyād*)<sup>1302</sup>.

The fatal habit of the drug consumption is furthermore compared to a “gradual death” (*marg-e tadrīḡī*),<sup>1303</sup> a “gradual and abating death” (*marg-e tadrīḡī va hammūdī*),<sup>1304</sup> or a “gradual suicide” (*hod-košt-ye tadrīḡī*).<sup>1305</sup> Drug users are described as “those who turn health and zeal into smoke” (*ānān keh salāmat va ġairat-rā bā ham dūd mīkonand*),<sup>1306</sup> and whose “lungs of enjoyment are full of the oxygen of death” (*riyeh-hā-ye leddat por az oksīžen-e marg ast*)<sup>1307</sup>. Interestingly, especially the traditional and conservative newspapers use such terms for drug addicts.

### *A piece of sorrow with an unacceptable ending?*

In order to save the victims of drug addiction, the newspapers particularly place their hope on addiction therapy. Therapy accordingly is described as “deliverance from the high fortification of addiction” (*rahā’ī az heṣār-e boland-e e’tiyād*),<sup>1308</sup> “deliverance of the individual from the captivity of addiction” (*rahāyī-ye fard az esārat-e e’tiyād*),<sup>1309</sup>

<sup>1293</sup> **Īrān**, 8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995).

<sup>1294</sup> **Eṭṭelā’āt**, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995).

<sup>1295</sup> **Šobḡ-e Emrūz**, 25 & 26 & 27 Ḥordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999).

<sup>1296</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 14 Ordībehešt 1374 (4 May 1995).

<sup>1297</sup> **Salām**, 1 Ḥordād 1378 (22 May 1999).

<sup>1298</sup> **Salām**, 13 Ḥordād 1378 (3 June 1999); “he falls into the trap of opium” (*be-dām-e taryāk mī-oftad*) is already an expression used by: **Ādaraḡš** (1955/56), 415.

<sup>1299</sup> **Kaihān**, 17 Tīr 1376 (8 July 1997).

<sup>1300</sup> **Eṭṭelā’āt**, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995); **Eṭṭelā’āt**, 14 Tīr 1374 (5 July 1995); as *vas-vaseh-hā-ye šayṭānī*: **Āryā**, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999).

<sup>1301</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 25 Šahrīvar 1376 (15 September 1997); **Salām**, 13 Ḥordād 1378 (3 June 1999).

<sup>1302</sup> **Ḥorāsān**, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999).

<sup>1303</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 10 Tīr, 1374 (1 July 1995); **Kaihān**, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995); **Eṭṭelā’āt**, 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999).

<sup>1304</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997).

<sup>1305</sup> **Kaihān**, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995); **Eṭṭelā’āt**, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995).

<sup>1306</sup> **Qods**, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997).

<sup>1307</sup> **Īrān**, 8 Tīr 1378 (29 June 1999).

<sup>1308</sup> **Īrān**, 8 Ḥordād 1374 (29 May 1995) and **Resālat**, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 October 1997)

<sup>1309</sup> **Eṭṭelā’āt**, 29 Ḥordād 1374 (19 June 1995).

“deliverance of the trap of addiction” (*rahāyī az dām-e e‘tiyād*),<sup>1310</sup> or “salvation of the addict” (*nağāt-e mo‘tād*)<sup>1311</sup>. The language is even more illustrative in the first year of the sample period, when the newspapers describe the rehabilitation center of Qarčak Varāmīn with sentences like “growth of the rose of ‘hope’ and ‘life’ in the brackwater of addiction” (*rūyeš-e gol-e “omīd” va “zendeḡī” dar šūreh-zār-e e‘tiyād*),<sup>1312</sup> “rehabilitation – emergence of the ‘bright morning’ from the ‘dark evening’ of addiction” (*bāz-parvarī, damīdan-e “šobh-e rawšan” az “šām-e tīreh-ye” e‘tiyād*),<sup>1313</sup> or “here, life smiles again for the cured addicts” (*īnḡā zendeḡī do bāreh beh rū-ye mo‘tādān-e šafā-yāfteh lab-ḡand mī-zanad*).<sup>1314</sup> Later, the descriptions become more neutral, and to a certain degree more disillusioned. The newspapers maintain, “one can get out of the well of addiction” (*az čāh-e e‘tiyād mī-tavān ḡareḡ šod*),<sup>1315</sup> or “one has to escape from the well of addiction” (*bāyad az čāh-e e‘tiyād bīrūn biyābad*), but also ask more tentatively “what is the way of salvation from the deep water of addiction?” (*rāh-e neḡāt az ḡarq-āb-e e‘tiyād kodām ast?*).<sup>1316</sup> They now describe addiction as “a piece of sorrow with an unacceptable ending” (*ḡam-nāmeḡ-ye pāyān-e nā-paḡīr*)<sup>1317</sup>, when talking about the many young addicts, who “are not [yet] delivered from the trap of those [drugs]” (*az dām-e ān rahā na-yāfteh*).<sup>1318</sup>

More hope is consequently placed in the families of the drug addicts as a supportive forum. They are described as a “firm fortification” (*heṡār-e moḡkam*),<sup>1319</sup> or “an impenetrable dam against the entrance of drugs” (*sad-e nofūd-nā-paḡīr-e vorūd-e mavādd-e moḡadder*),<sup>1320</sup> “so that our children don’t fall into the net/trap of addiction” (*barāye īn-keh farzandān-e mā beh dām-e e‘tiyād na-y-oftand*)<sup>1321</sup>. And the Iranian society is generally described as being in need of a “social vaccination” (*vāksīnāsiyōn-e eḡtemā‘ī*),<sup>1322</sup> and a “cultural combat” (*mobarezeh-ye farhangī*)<sup>1323</sup> against the problem of drug addiction.

<sup>1310</sup> **Īrān**, 8. Ḥordād 1374 (29 May 1995); slightly different as “that they deliver themselves from the trap of addiction” (*hod-rā az dām-e e‘tiyād rahānīdand*): **Kaiḡān**, 25 Ḥordād 1374 (15 June 1995).

<sup>1311</sup> **ḡomḡūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 24 & 25 Šahrīvar 1378 (15 & 16 September 1999).

<sup>1312</sup> **Kaiḡān**, 25 Ḥordād 1374 (15 June 1995).

<sup>1313</sup> **Kaiḡān**, 27 Ḥordād 1374 (17 June 1995).

<sup>1314</sup> **Eṡṡelā‘āt**, 27 Ḥordād 1374 (17 June 1995).

<sup>1315</sup> **ḡomḡūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 24 & 25 Šahrīvar 1378 (15 & 16 September 1999).

<sup>1316</sup> **Īrān**, 2 Eṡṡand 1378 (21 February 2000).

<sup>1317</sup> **ḡomḡūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999); **Hamšahrī**, 5 Mehr 1378 (27 September 1999).

<sup>1318</sup> **Āfarīneš**, 16 Āḡar 1376 (7 December 1997) I.

<sup>1319</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 17 Šahrīvar (7 September 1997).

<sup>1320</sup> **Payām-e Āzādī**, 7 Bahman 1378 (27 January 2000).

<sup>1321</sup> **Gožāreš-e Rūz**, 1 & 11 & ?? Eṡṡand 1378 (20 February & 1 & ??, March 2000).

<sup>1322</sup> **Eṡṡelā‘āt**, 20 Bahman 1376 (9 February 1998).

<sup>1323</sup> **Ḥordād**, 13 Ordībeḡšt 1376 (3 May 1999); **Kār va Kārḡar**, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999).

### V. 3. b. *Drug Addiction, a Crime or an Illness?*

Arguably the most crucial question of the Iranian press discourse on drugs is the question whether “the addict is a criminal or a sick person” (*mo‘tād – bīmār yā moğrem?*).<sup>1324</sup> Following the amended drug law of 1997, according to which “*all addicts are permitted to go to legal centers [...] and use such centers for their treatment and rehabilitation*”, the newspapers almost unanimously describe drug addicts as sick persons in need of medical support – at least on the level of explicit argumentation. The notable exceptions are two articles by the newspapers *Kaihān* and *Resālat*,<sup>1325</sup> which otherwise agree with the prevalent tenor. And indeed, this question has not really been solved in Iran. In fact, even the amendment of 1997 still maintained that “drug addiction is a crime” (*e‘tiyād ġorm ast*). And as *Hamšahrī* correctly points out, there are still “officials who consider this phenomenon as an illness and other officials who count it as a crime” (*mas‘ulān-ī keh īn padīdeh-rā yek bīmār mī-dānand, yā dīgar mas‘ulān keh ān-rā ġorm mī-šomārand*) in Iran.<sup>1326</sup> This continuing contradiction is mainly due to the fact, that the decision, whether to send a drug-addicted person to prison or rehabilitation, is incumbent upon the courts. Since drug addicts often commit acquisitive crimes such as theft, robbery or prostitution – which is considered a crime in Iran – such a distinction is admittedly not always easy feasible.

It is not astonishing, then, that the newspapers, too, display the same ambiguity between a criminological and a medical notion of drug addiction. This discrepancy is not primarily observable between the different newspapers, for instance between the conservative and the reformist press. It rather permeates the press discourse as a whole. While the newspapers explicitly argue that drug addiction is an illness; they continue to use expressions for drug addicts that still reveal a deep-rooted moral perception of drug addiction. Thus, only exceptional newspapers call drug addicts “committer of sins and crimes” (*mortakeb-e gonāh-ān va ġarāyem*); but many still make a connection between addiction and misdemeanor, for instance by calling addiction a “deviation” (*enḡerāf*) from assumed social and moral norms.

Instances of newspapers calling addiction an “illness” (*bīmārī*) or drug addicts “sick persons” (*bīmār-ān*) are numerous and cannot be listed here. The same applies for the more

<sup>1324</sup> This is e.g. the title of: *Hamšahrī*, 24 Mehr 1376 (16 October 1997).

<sup>1325</sup> *Kaihān*, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995); *Resālat*, 6 Ābān 1376 (28 October 1997).

<sup>1326</sup> This statement even might suggest that more officials still called it a crime: *Hamšahrī*, 16 Šahrīvar 1376 (6 September 1997),

neutral term “help-seeking person” (*madad-ğū*). More emotional expressions used by the newspapers for addiction are “mortal illness” (*bīmārī-ye košandeh*)<sup>1327</sup> or “terrible illness” (*bīmārī-ye vaḥṣat-nāk*).<sup>1328</sup>

Stronger value judgments become apparent, when addiction is counted among “social harms” (*āsīb-hā-ye eğtemā‘ī*);<sup>1329</sup> when “the ghoul of addiction” is described “as one of the most important social deviations” (*ğawl-e e‘tiyād {emrūz} beh ‘onvāne-e yekī az mohemmtarīn enḥerāf-āt-e eğtemā‘ī*);<sup>1330</sup> or when a newspaper talks about “drug consumption or every other deviation” (*maşraf-e mavādd {-e moḥadder} yā har enḥerāf-e dīgar*).<sup>1331</sup> Drug addiction, consequently, is made responsible for “social deviations” (*enḥerāfāt-e eğtemā‘ī*);<sup>1332</sup> “social aberrations” (*kağravī-hā-ye eğtemā‘ī*);<sup>1333</sup> “moral deviations” (*enḥerāfāt-e ahlāqī*);<sup>1334</sup> “social ruptures like divorce, sexual and moral deviations and family quarrels” (*az-ham-gasīḥteğī-hā-ye eğtemā‘ī mānand-e ṭalāq, enḥerāf-āt-e ġensī, ahlāqī, va nezā‘-hā-ye ḥāne-vādegī*);<sup>1335</sup> or the “appearance of abnormalities, scuffles in families and groups [...] and the endangering of the social security and stability” (*borūz-e nā-hanğārī-hā, keşmakeş-hā-ye ḥāne-vādegī va gorūhī [...] va beh ḥaṭar ofiādan-e amniyyat va tobat-e eğtemā‘ī*).<sup>1336</sup> *İrān* even explicitly states that “they [the drug addicts] are in their soul / essence not criminal, but bad factors and social abnormalities cause their deviation” (*fī nafse-he moğrem nīstand, balkeh ‘avāmel-e sū’ va nā-hanğārī-hā-ye eğtemā‘ī mawğeb-e enḥerāf-e ānhā mī-şavad*).<sup>1337</sup> And *Āzād* maintains that “the various social harms resulting from addiction [...] bring as a gift moral deviations and numerous social disorders for the children of those [wives of drug addicts]” (*āsīb-hā-ye moḥtalef-e eğtemā‘ī nāşt az e‘tiyād [...] enḥerāf-āt-e ahlāqī va nā-besāmānī-hā-ye mota‘addedī-rā barāye farzandān-e ānān beh armağān mī-āvord*)<sup>1338</sup>.

<sup>1327</sup> **Hamşahrī**, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999).

<sup>1328</sup> **Payām-e Āzādī**, 7 Bahman 1378 (27 January 2000).

<sup>1329</sup> **İrān**, 8 Ḥordād 1374 (29 May 1995).

<sup>1330</sup> **Āfarīneş**, 24 Mehr 1378 (16 October 1999).

<sup>1331</sup> **Ḥorāsān**, 6 & 7 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 June 1999).

<sup>1332</sup> **Hamşahrī**, 19 Ordībeheşt 1374 (9 May 1995); **Salām**, 20 Ḥordād 1378 (10 June 1999).

<sup>1333</sup> **Abrār**, 15 Esfand 1374 (5 March 1996).

<sup>1334</sup> **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 28 Tīr 1376 (19 July 1997); **Ğomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 27 Şahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999).

<sup>1335</sup> **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 17 Mehr 1376 (9 October 1997); **Ğavān**, 16 Ordībeheşt 1378 (6 May 1999).

<sup>1336</sup> **Resālat**, 5 Ābān 1376 (27 October 1997); also as “causes the growth and appearance of social deviations and aberrations” (*mouğeb-e roşđ va borūz-e enḥerāf-hā va nā-hanğārī-hā-ye eğtemā‘ī mī-şavad*): **Ğavān**, 6 Dey 1378 (28 December 1999).

<sup>1337</sup> **İrān**, 8 Ḥordād 1374 (29 May 1995).

<sup>1338</sup> **Āzād**, 6 Mehr 1378 (28 September 1999).



More explicitly linked to criminal behavior are statements calling addiction “a ladder to the commitment of crimes” (*nardebān-e ertekāb-e ġorm*);<sup>1339</sup> or maintaining that “many crimes like murder, rape or theft [...] result from drug addiction” (*besyārī az ġarāyem mānand-e qatl, taġāvoz, dozdi [...] nāštī az e’tiyād beh mavādd-e moħadder ast*);<sup>1340</sup> that “a society that approaches [its] decline with addiction [...] entails many crimes like murder, rape, theft, felony, the disintegration of the family [sic] and many more” (*ġāme’eh’ī keh bā e’tiyād beh samt-e enġetāt mīravād [...] keh voqū’-e besyārī az ġarāyem nazīr-e qatl, taġāvoz, serqat, bezeh-kārī, motalāštī šodan-e ħāne-vādeh va besyārī dīgar-rā nīz bā ħod ham-rāh mī-āvarad*);<sup>1341</sup> or that “in the bosom [lit. belly] of every social crime other felonies are hidden” (*dar baṭan-e har bezeh-e eġtemā’ī bezeh-kārī-hā-ye dīgarī nīz nahofteh ast*) by explicitly connecting addiction to theft and prostitution.<sup>1342</sup> The newspapers even directly call addiction a crime, by saying that “one of the reasons for the addiction and most crimes and felonies of the youth and the adolescents” (*yekī az ‘elal-e mohemm-e e’tiyād va akṭar-e ġorm-hā va bezeh-hā-ye ġavān-ān va naw-ġavān-ān*);<sup>1343</sup> or noticing “a regrettable, increasing trend of crimes and contraventions including addiction among pupils” (*ravand-e mota’assef-āneh-ye šo’udī-ye ġarāyem va taħallof-āt az ġomleh e’tiyād dar bain-e dāneš-āmūz-ān*).<sup>1344</sup>

In even stronger, religiously inspired terms, the newspapers maintain that “addiction, like a reel, paves the way for other moral evils” (*e’tiyād mānand-e yek čarġeh, zamīneh-sāz-e mafāsed-e ahlāqī-ye dīgar mī-šavad*)<sup>1345</sup>, and that drug addiction is in short the “mother of {all} evils” (*omm-ol-mafāsed*)<sup>1346</sup>, the “mother of {all} vices” (*omm-ol-ħebāsat*)<sup>1347</sup> or the “mother of {all} corruption” (*omm-ol-fesād*)<sup>1348</sup>. The “combat against drugs” consequently is described as “a combat against social evils” (*mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moħadder, mobārezeh bā mafāsed-e eġtemā’ī*)<sup>1349</sup>. And while drug addicts are never explicitly called “corrupt” (*mofsed*), they are still called “anti-social individuals” (*afrādī zedd-e eġtemā’ī*),<sup>1350</sup> and their

<sup>1339</sup> **Salām**, 20 Ĥordād 1378 (10 June 1999).

<sup>1340</sup> **Abrār**, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999).

<sup>1341</sup> **Āryā**, 16 Ordibehešt 1378 (6 May 1999).

<sup>1342</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 17 Šahrīvar 1376 (7 September 1997).

<sup>1343</sup> **Kār va Kārgar**, 21 & 22 & 24 Farvardīn 1378 (10 & 11 & 13 April 1999).

<sup>1344</sup> **Kār va Kārgar**, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999).

<sup>1345</sup> **Ĥorāsān**, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999).

<sup>1346</sup> **Eṭṭelā’āt**, 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999).

<sup>1347</sup> **Eṭṭelā’āt**, 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 4 1999).

<sup>1348</sup> **Payām-e Āzādī**, 2 Āḍar 1378 (23 November 1999).

<sup>1349</sup> **Kaiḥān**, 22 Tīr 1374 (13 July 1995).

<sup>1350</sup> **Kaiḥān**, 27 Ĥordād 1374 (17 June 1995).

lifestyle is depicted as a “parasitic life” (*zendegī-ye angalī*)<sup>1351</sup>. As a result, the newspapers warn them that “harms to the soul are religiously forbidden” (*ažrār beh nafs ḥarām ast*).<sup>1352</sup>

Even though ambiguous language on drug addiction and drug addicts is observable in press as a whole, it is especially the more traditional and often the conservative and religious newspapers that are applying morally judging expressions. The conservative newspapers in general rather tend to condemn drug addicts and call it a “moral deviation”, while their reformist colleagues rather call it a “social deviation”. In the conservative camp, next to the traditional *Kaihān*, *Resālat* and *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, in particular *Ġavān* stands out. The new reformist newspapers almost never use such language, while the newspapers of the religious left *Salām* and *Ḥorāsān*, as well as *Īrān*, *Hamšahrī* and *Kār-va-Kārgar*, still display a moral tone at times.

---

<sup>1351</sup> **Qods**, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997); **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999); also as “their life changes to a parasitic form” (*zendegī-ye ān-hā beh form-e angalī mī-yābad*): **Abṛār**, 15 Esfand 1374 (5 March 1996).

<sup>1352</sup> **Kaihān**, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995).

## **VI. Synthesis & Interpretation: the Iranian Press Discourse on Drugs & Power Struggles**

Based on the fact that drug policy issues are hotly discussed political and social topics throughout the world; and against the background of increasingly factional disputes between conservatives and reformists in Iran since mid 1980s, the present study initially assumed that the Iranian press displays such contradictory opinions on drug policy issues. It could be expected that this applies all the more so, since in the absence of political parties in Iran, Iranian newspapers have an even more pronounced role as important forums for the political and ideological positions of the competing factions. Additionally, the present study initially assumed the overall Iranian press discourse on drugs to express relatively repressive and reactionary positions in the beginning, and to forward more liberal and progressive opinions over the course of the of the sample period – thus reflecting both the change of the official Iranian drug policy, and the development of an increasingly liberal press, especially during the Ḥātāmī administration.

The analysis of the Iranian press discourse on drugs, however, shows a more complex picture. From the beginning of the sample period, Iranian newspapers openly discuss the problem of drug addiction by highlighting the need for a modern and effective drug policy. Consequently, they already advance progressive policy positions such as in particular the need for scientific addiction therapy. Astonishingly, factional disputes are largely absent, throughout the whole sample period. Admittedly, there are a few exceptions to this general rule. But the press nevertheless displays a relatively uniform, and an increasingly critical coverage of the national drug policy – eventually including controversial topics like prostitution, the spread of HIV, and adequate *harm reduction* measures.

### ***Homogenizing and heterogenizing powers in the Iranian press discourse on drugs***

The subsequent synthesis and interpretation of the Iranian press discourse on drugs takes a closer look at the likely reasons for this overall uniformity and progressiveness. The general observation of such a consistency, is in fact not as surprising as it might seem at first sight. It rather follows the general postulation of *discourse analysis*, according to which discourses develop specific *discourse orders*, setting the rules and regulations of what can be said in a society on a specific topic, and how it can be said. Factional differences thus can be

expected to be restrained to a certain degree by homogenizing *discourse orders*, which contribute to a relative uniformity of the drug discourse. Such underlying forces will be addressed as ***homogenizing power*** of the Iranian press discourse on drugs in the following section. *Discourse analysis* in the tradition of Foucault, however, not only analyses the overall homogeneous and continuous power of discourses, but also concentrates on heterogeneous and discontinuous aspects. Such heterogeneous aspects do not forcibly or exclusively reflect inter-factional disputes, but are innate to the discourse as a whole, often irrespective of the factional alignment of a single group. Individual participants of a discourse can, however, strategically use individual heterogeneous, differing *discourse positions* or *strategies* in order to advance their own agenda. By doing so, they can influence and eventually transform the discourse. These underlying forces will be addressed as ***heterogenizing power*** of the Iranian press discourse on drugs in the following. Such transformations, however, often rather happen as a result of the interaction of all participants, and, thus, again might represent an aspect of the *homogenizing power* of discourses. Both, *homogenizing* and *heterogenizing* forces of the discourse wield power on the discourse and its individual participants, the specific newspapers in this case.

To make matters even more complicated, critical discourse analysis further differentiates between different *discourse levels*, which together form a discourse. In everyday speech, such *discourse levels* are, however, often simply called *discourses*. *Discourse levels* correspond to functionally different settings, where the same topic is being discussed, such as for instance the levels of international politics, domestic politics, media, academia or religion. Various discourse levels are naturally closely interwoven and have a mutual influence on each other. Since the press is part of the *discourse level* of media, other discourse levels also have an impact on the press discourse.

Within the Iranian press discourse on drugs, the *homogenizing power* of discourse becomes evident in the overall *orders of discourse*, which cause the newspapers to write about the same topics, use the same arguments and often compose their texts in a similar style with the use of similar expressions. The *heterogenizing power*, in contrast, is manifest in various inconsistencies, contradictions and disagreements, but also in new topics and arguments within the discourse. Such heterogeneities are not only present between individual newspapers, but often within the press discourse as a whole, and as such also within individual newspapers. The individual newspaper can strategically use them to formulate their

own *discourse positions* and *discourse strategies*. Homogenizing *discourse orders* therefore already contain heterogeneous elements, which are never entirely dissolved; but by influencing *discourse orders*, such heterogeneous elements can themselves be the origin for new homogenizing *discourse orders*.

Since the Iranian press discourse on drugs only constitutes the *discourse level* of media, other discourse levels within the overall drugs discourse are also seen to be influencing it. The same is true for entirely different discourses. Here, such influences are called *extrinsic factors*. These can, in turn, exert both homogenizing and heterogenizing power on the Iranian press discourse on drugs. In the present case, these *extrinsic forces* are specifically the official Iranian drug policy as manifest in the official Iranian drug discourse; and the official press policy, which is, in turn, manifest in the official press discourse. Iranian drug policy and press policy, thus, exert both homogenizing and heterogenizing power on the Iranian press discourse on drugs. The same is true for other extrinsic discourse levels such as the international drug discourse, the religious drug discourse or the medical drug discourse. Since these are closely intertwined with the official drug discourse, they will be subsumed under the official drugs discourse. As a result, the Iranian press discourse on drugs is influenced by both extrinsic homogenizing and heterogenizing power factors, and by intrinsic homogenizing and heterogenizing power factors.

To summarize, the Iranian press discourse on drugs is primarily influenced by the *discourse level* of the official drug discourse or simply by the official drug policy. The official drug discourse, in turn, is itself influenced by other *discourse levels*, namely the international drug discourse and the medical drug discourse; but also for instance by the religious and historical drug discourse. The international drug discourse, as embodied in institutions like the UNDCP, the INCB or the WHO, has a major influence on both the official drug discourse and the press discourse on drugs, especially during the first year of the sample period. It provides them with basic information on the situation of drug cultivation, drug trafficking, and drug consumption around the world as well as with general information about the phenomenology of drugs, scientific addiction therapy and drug prevention approaches. The medical drug discourse, as embodied in the WHO but also domestically in the Health Ministry, the SWO, medical universities and individual researchers, too, has a strong and increasing influence on both during the sample period. It provides them with information in the field of addiction therapy, drug prevention, and harm reduction measures.

While the international and medical discourse levels do influence the Iranian press directly, this occurs indirectly first by having an influence on the official drug discourse, which in turn influences the press discourse. The official Iranian drug discourse, thus, arguably exerts most power on the Iranian press discourse on drugs. This is particularly true for the first two years of the sample period. While its influence continues, other, extrinsic power factors gain in importance in the last year of the sample period. As a result, Iranian press discourse becomes increasingly independent from, and critical towards the official Iranian drug policy.

These various homogenizing and heterogenizing extrinsic and intrinsic power factors will be addressed separately just below. It will begin with a discussion of the homogenizing power: specifically by the extrinsic official drug policy (or discourse) including the international and medical discourse; by the extrinsic official press policy, and by the intrinsic dynamics of the press. This will be followed by a discussion of the heterogenizing power of the same discourses.

## **VI. 1. Homogenizing powers**

### ***VI. 1. a. The homogenizing power of the official Iranian drug policy***

The official Iranian drug policy or the official drug policy discourse respectively arguably has the most direct and most important *extrinsic homogenizing power* on the press discourse. Even though the press becomes increasingly critical towards the government during the sample period, it still fulfills the basic function of serving the Iranian government and as an extension the Islamic Republic and the Iranian society in general, as explicitly requested by press law of 1986 (**chapter III**). Since the newspapers typically function as surrogates to, or at least as mouthpieces of the political factions in Iran, they are naturally intertwined with the political decision-making. It is, therefore, not surprising that the press discourse on drugs closely mirrors the official political discourse. This influence of the official Iranian drug policy discourse already has proved true in the analysis of the discourse events. There, it was shown that clusters of drug-related newspaper articles usually appear around events organized by the Iranian government (**chapter V. 1**).

As the chapter on the history of drugs (**chapter III**) has shown, the transformation of the Iranian drug policy from a mere security-based, repressive approach to a strategy that more evenly balances between *drug supply* and *drug demand reduction* measures started during the Rafsanjānī administration. Although certainly driven by the administration, the general reorientation of the domestic drug policy eventually represents a decision of the entire political establishment, including particularly the Supreme Leader. Possible differences between the political factions, albeit still existing to a certain degree, are thus already minimized on the level of the official drug policy discourse.

The official drug policy discourse is itself, however, also influenced and shaped by various discourses or *discourse levels*. As the analysis of the press discourse shows, it is strongly influenced by international drug policy discourses, especially at the beginning of the sample period; but also increasingly by academic, medical and psychological discourses on addiction therapy and drug prevention. Further influencing discourses that can be observed in the press discourse on drugs are for instance the religious discourse and the historical discourse. While the former seems to be rather negligible, the latter is arguably still strongly present, especially on the level of the language.

These extrinsic *discourse levels* all shape the official drug policy discourse in Iran, and as a result also the press discourse. As they become increasingly integrated in the official discourse over the sample period, it is eventually not always possible to distinguish these separate external *discourse levels* from the level of the official drug policy. Additionally, it is often not clear to what extent they directly shape the *discourse level* of the media, without the intermediary of the official drug policy. Ultimately, all these different *discourse levels* are closely intertwined.

The following analysis of the influence of the official drug policy thus basically subsumes all these different *discourse levels* under the official drug policy; but differentiates them wherever possible. The topical order will be as follows: the international drug discourse; the domestic drug discourse, consisting of various main sub-topics; the religious drug discourse and the medical drug discourse. The enumeration of these homogeneous topics serves concomitantly as a synthesis of the analysis of the Iranian press discourse on drugs, as presented in the previous chapter (**chapter V. 2**)

## The international drug discourse

The Iranian press discourse on drugs displays a strong influence by the *discourse level* of international drug policies, or more precisely international organizations involved in drug policy and international media sources. This is especially true for the first year of the sample period, when the newspapers often refer to international sources in describing the situation of drugs in the world and in Iran. Later, the press relies more on domestically provided information, but references to international sources continue throughout the sample period. This is particularly explainable by the fact that Rafsanjānī again had established contacts with the international community, especially with the INCB, the UNDCP and the WHO. As a result, the UNDCP opened a field office in Tehrān in 1999, and further intensified its cooperation with the Iranian government. The influence of the UNDCP is particularly visible in the *International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking*, which serves as the single most important *discourse event* for the press discourse on drugs (**chapter V. 1**). As has been shown, in each year of the sample period, most newspaper articles appear around 26 June. As a result, this day has in fact become a truly national *discourse event* that is indeed more “celebrated” in Iran than in most other countries.

Certainly with the blessing of the Iranian government, these international bodies, however, also directly provide the press with information on the international drug situation and on international drug legislation; on the phenomenology of drugs and drug addiction; on addiction treatment and on drug prevention.

The press consequently often cites material provided by the UNDCP: for instance the annual *World Drug Report*; a study on drug cultivation in Afghanistan;<sup>1353</sup> statistics on Iran’s combat against drug trafficking,<sup>1354</sup> or on the situation of drug addiction in Iran.<sup>1355</sup> Additionally, the newspapers also report on UNDCP delegations, visiting for example the rehabilitation center of Qarčak Varāmīn in 1995,<sup>1356</sup> or the Eastern border in 1999.<sup>1357</sup> The opening of the UNDCP field office in Tehrān, in contrast, is surprisingly only explicitly mentioned by a single newspaper.<sup>1358</sup> But the press subsequently often quotes UNDCP

---

<sup>1353</sup> **Aḥbār-e Eqtešādī**, 31 Šahrīvar 1378 (22 September 1999).

<sup>1354</sup> **Resālat**, 3 Tīr 1376 (24 June 1997); **Kaiḥān**, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999); **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 30 Bahman & 1 & 2 & 19 Esfand (19 & 20 & 21 February & 9 March 2000).

<sup>1355</sup> **Āfarīneš**, 22 Ābān 1376 (13 November 1997); **Āzād**, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 1999); **Payām-e Āzādī**, 7 Bahman 1378 (27 January 2000).

<sup>1356</sup> **Kaiḥān**, 25 Ḥordād 1374 (15 June 1995); **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 28 Ḥordād 1374 (18 June 1995).

<sup>1357</sup> **Entehāb**, Tīr 5, 1378 (June 26, 1999); **Qods**, Tīr 7, 1378 (June 28, 1999).

<sup>1358</sup> **Tarġomān-e Rūz**, 8 Esfand 1378 (27 February 2000).



officials like its first representative of the field office in Tehrān, Antonio Mazzitelli; or then UNDCP director general Pino Arlacchi;<sup>1359</sup> and it repeatedly reports on meetings between Iranian officials, especially of the DCHQ, with UNDCP representatives. While often complaining about insufficient help contributed by the international community to Iran's drug combat, the press nevertheless repeatedly mentions specific instances of assistance by the UNDCP or individual Western countries, like financial contributions, tracking devices, sniffing dogs, bullet-proof vests or night vision devices.<sup>1360</sup>

Further international bodies that are regularly mentioned are for instance the INCB and the WHO. Aḥmad Moḥīṭ, an Iranian member of the WHO, even authors an article on addiction causes in the newspaper *Hamšahrī*;<sup>1361</sup> and then president of the INCB, Iranian-born Hamid Ghodse, is repeatedly interviewed.<sup>1362</sup> Another international event triggering drug-related newspapers articles is for instance Interpol's "inter-regional session on drugs" (*eḡlās-e bayn-e manṭaqeh-ye mavādd-e moḥadder*), which the Iranian government had hosted in Eṣfahān.<sup>1363</sup>

Other international sources for drug-related information are in particular foreign newspapers and magazines. The Iranian press often even translates entire articles. As *Resālat* informs in an article, such translations are apparently often put at the press' disposal by the DCHQ.<sup>1364</sup> Specifically quoted are for instance the *The New York Times*, *The Times*, *Newsweek Magazine*, *The Christian Science Monitor*, *The Reader's Digest*, the *BBC*, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *die Zeit*, *Bild am Sonntag*, or *Radio Köln*. These articles mostly deal with the situation of drugs and drug policy in foreign countries, including in particular the liberal drug policies of the Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Switzerland.<sup>1365</sup> Further international sources the newspapers mention are for

<sup>1359</sup> **Ḥorāsān**, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999); **Kār va Kārgar** 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999); **Vohūman**, 7 Šahrīvar 1378 (29 August 1999)..

<sup>1360</sup> **Entehāb**, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999); **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 13 & 14 & 15 & 16 & 17 & 19 Mehr 1376 (5 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 11 October 1997); **Ḥorāsān**, 6 & 7 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 June 1999); **Ḥorāsān**, 7 Āḍar 1378 (28 November 1999); **Kayhān**, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999).

<sup>1361</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 19 Ordībehešt 1374 (9 May 1995).

<sup>1362</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 31 Ḥordād 1374 (21 June 1995); Hamid Ghodse is again interviewed in the third year by: **Aḥbār-e Eqtešādī**, 11 Mehr 1378 (3 October 1999).

<sup>1363</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 2 Mehr 1376 (24 September 1997); or: **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 13 Mehr 1376 (5 October 1997).

<sup>1364</sup> **Resālat**, 21 Farvardīn 1376 (10 April 1997).

<sup>1365</sup> *The BBC*: **Hamšahrī**, 27 Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995); *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*: **Resālat**, 21 Farvardīn 1376 (10 April 1997); *Bild am Sonntag* and *the Reader's Digest*: **Hamšahrī**, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 (10 September 1997); *the Times*: **Ḥorāsān**, 7 Āḍar 1378 (28 November 1999); *Radio Köln*: **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 4 Dey 1376 (25 December 1997); *die Zeit*: **Hamšahrī**, 24 & 25 Šahrīvar 1376 (14 & 15 September 1997); *New York Times*: **Aḥbār-e Eqtešādī**, 31 Šahrīvar 1378 (22 September 1999); *the Christian Science*

instance Fīrūz Ġalīlī-Ĥiyābānī, an Iranian-born addiction psychiatrist of the UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN;<sup>1366</sup> the CANCER RESEARCH CENTRE in Oxford UK;<sup>1367</sup> and many other research studies and statistics.<sup>1368</sup>

## The domestic drug discourse

### *The history of drugs in Iran*

The history of drugs in Iran is a regular feature in the Iranian press discourse on drugs. This is particularly true for the first year of the sample period. The newspapers base their information on a small treatise – most probably the *Political History of Opium in Iran (tārīḥ-e siyāsī-ye mavādd-e moḥadder dar īrān)*<sup>1369</sup> – provided by the DCHQ, as *Eṭṭelā‘āt* discloses.<sup>1370</sup> The history usually starts with the earliest appearance of drugs among the Sumerians, Egyptians and the Greek. During Islamic times, particularly the great medical scholars of Persian descent, Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī, are mentioned, who prescribed opium as a medicine. Typically, the newspaper set the beginning of veritable opium curse in Iran to the Qāḡār times, by particularly blaming the British “old fox” (*rūbāh-e pīr*) for having actively encouraged opium consumption in Iran. They often also talk about „colonialists“ (*este‘mār-garān*) in general. The British opium policy in Iran is also regularly compared to the indeed infamous British opium policy in China.<sup>1371</sup>

In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the newspapers put the blame for the ongoing addiction problem in Iran particularly on the Pahlavī shahs, who are portrayed as stooges of the colonialist powers. *Eṭṭelā‘āt* further mentions that even the family of Moḥammad-Rezā Šāh was actively involved in the drug business.<sup>1372</sup> More commonly, however, and already for the times of the shah, the newspapers blame the international mafia gangs for the domestic addiction problem.

---

*Monitor: Gozāreš-e Rūz*, 24 Āḡar 1378 (15 December 1999); *Newsweek: Bayān*, 27 & 28 Āḡar 1378 (18 & 19 December 1999); *Abrār*, 8 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999); *Fath*, 18 Esfand 1378 (8 March 2000); *New York Times: Aḥbār-e Eqtešādī* XXX, 31 Šahrīvar 1378 (22 September 1999); *le Monde Diplomatique: Salām*, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 (10 September 1997).

<sup>1366</sup> *Hamšahrī*, 2 Mehr 1376 (24 September 1997).

<sup>1367</sup> *Kaihan*, 8 Ḥordād 1376 (29 May 1997).

<sup>1368</sup> A report and statistics on drug addiction in Germany: *Resālat*, 21 Farvardīn 1376 (10 April 1997); research on marihuana in the USA: *Aḥbār*, 8 Tīr 1376 (29 June 1997); research on the efficiency of drug prevention by media in Europe: research on causes and effects of drug addiction: *Hamšahrī*, 3 Tīr 1376 (24 June 1997); *Hamšahrī*, 16 Šahrīvar 1376 (6 September 1997); research of the Brazilian police on money laundering by drug trafficking cartels: *Qods*, 10 Dey 1376 (31 December 1997); research on the role of the family in preventing drug addiction, or in rehabilitating drug addicted family members: *Āzād*, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 1999); European research in increasing drug consumption in Afghanistan: *Abrār*, 8 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999).

<sup>1369</sup> DCHQ (N.A.)

<sup>1370</sup> *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995).

<sup>1371</sup> E.g. in: *Hamšahrī*, 6 Ordībehešt 1374 (26 April 1995); *Salām*, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995).

<sup>1372</sup> *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995).

Additionally, they often portray them of being backed by the West, now clearly pointing to the USA: the CIA is even directly accused of being involved in drug trafficking.<sup>1373</sup>

In contrast to the pre-revolutionary times, the press initially paints a rosy picture of the situation of drugs in the Islamic Republic, by presenting the drug supply efforts of the Islamic Republic as the first serious and successful drug combat in the Iranian history.<sup>1374</sup> This is at true for the first two years of the sample period. *Āfarīneš* provides the most comprehensive overview on Iran's drug policy of these early years.<sup>1375</sup>

### ***Drug trafficking***

The Iranian press almost unanimously shares the view of the Iranian government that Iran is a victim of the international drug business. The domestic addiction problem is, thus, primarily blamed on the availability of drugs originating from the producer countries Afghanistan and Pakistan in the *Golden Crescent* (*helāl-e talā'ī*).<sup>1376</sup> Based on statistics of the DCHQ, and on interviews with state officials, the press reports in detail about Iran's costly combat against drug traffickers, both in terms of financial costs and the cost of the lives of thousands of killed security officers, who are typically called martyrs (sg. *šahīd*).<sup>1377</sup> The press initially also assumes the official line of arguing, that even though Iran is conducting its combat against drug trafficking mainly for the sake of Europe, it does not obtain financial support by the international community.<sup>1378</sup> Particularly in 1378 (1999-2000), however, officials of the DCHQ are increasingly cited with specific examples of financial and logistic support provided to Iran by European countries like Great Britain and France, as shown above.<sup>1379</sup> The same officials also start to admit that the traffickers are not only foreign

<sup>1373</sup> *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 27 Šahrīvar 1376 (18 September 1997).

<sup>1374</sup> *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999).

<sup>1375</sup> *Āfarīneš I*, 16 Āḍar 1376 (7 December 1997).

<sup>1376</sup> *Eṭṭelā'āt*, 12 Tīr 1374 (3 July 1995); *Abrār*, 14 Ābān 1374 (5 November 1995); *Kaihān*, 15 Ābān 1374 (6 November 1995); *Īrān*, 28 Dey 1374 (19 January 1996); *Hamšahrī*, 17 Šahrīvar (7 September 1997); *Qods*, 10 Dey 1376 (31 December 1997); *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 19 Bahman 1376 (8 February 1998); *Kaihān*, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999).

<sup>1377</sup> E.g. in: *Resālat*, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995); *Eṭṭelā'āt*, 12 Tīr 1374 (3 July 1995); *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 19 Bahman 1376 (8 February 1997); *Qods*, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999); *Entehāb*, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999); *Payām-e Āzādī*, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 1999); *Ĥordād*, 1 & 2 Āḍar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999); *Ĥorāsān*, 7 Āḍar 1378 (28 November 1999); *Ĥorāsān*, 23 Āḍar 1378 (14 December 1999); *Kaihān*, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999).

<sup>1378</sup> E.g. in: *Eṭṭelā'āt*, 10 & 11 & 12 & 13 & 14 Tīr 1374 (1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 July 1995); *Qods*, 10 Dey 1376 (31 December 1997); *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 19 Bahman 1376 (8 February 1998).

<sup>1379</sup> *Entehāb*, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999); *Eṭṭelā'āt*, 13 & 14 & 15 & 16 & 17 & 19 Mehr 1376 (5 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 11 October 1997); *Ĥorāsān*, 6 & 7 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 June 1999); *Ĥorāsān*, 7 Āḍar 1378 (28 November 1999); *Kayhān*, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999).

nationals but also Iranians.<sup>1380</sup> The Iranian press never questions the official drug policy to execute drug traffickers; but in 1376 (1998/99), it cites officials from the DCHQ and the STATE PRISONS ORGANIZATION (SPO), that this, too, puts a high financial burden upon the country's courts and prisons.<sup>1381</sup>

### **Addiction – crime or illness?**

From the beginning of the sample period, the press is almost unanimous in describing drug addiction as an illness in need of rehabilitation and therapy. The rhetorical question “*the drug addict - an ill or a sick person*” (*mo'tād – bīmār yā moğrem*) is arguably the most crucial message of the entire press discourse on drugs (**chapter V. 3**). Particularly when discussing the AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW of 1997 in 1376 (1997-98), the newspapers echo the officially stated opinion, that from now on, addiction treatment will be legally available to all drug addicts willing to undergo treatment.<sup>1382</sup> The newspaper *Hamšahrī* concomitantly alludes to the high costs caused by the prevalent practice of incarcerating drug addicts and petty dealers,<sup>1383</sup> an argument that is later repeated by *Resālat* and *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*.<sup>1384</sup> But in 1378 (1999-2000), even DCHQ officials openly admit that drug addicts are still being sentenced to “flogging” (*zarbeh-ye šallāq*), “financial fines” (*ğazā-ye naqdī*) and even “imprisonment” (*zendān*).<sup>1385</sup>

### **Drug addiction**

Concerning the domestic situation of drug addiction, the Iranian press usually refers to official estimations provided by the DCHQ and further governmental agencies. As will be shown below, however, already the government did not agree on the exact number of addicts in Iran. Nevertheless, initially the press unanimously reproduces the official estimation of 500,000 drug addicts, while concomitantly referring to an increasing addiction rate, particularly among the youth.<sup>1386</sup> From 1376 (1995-96) the newspapers start to cite new

<sup>1380</sup> E.g. in: **Qods**, 7 & 8 & 9 & 10 Dey 1376 (28 & 29 & 30 & 31 December 1997); **Entehāb**, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999).

<sup>1381</sup> **Qods**, 9 Dey 1376 (30 December 1997); **Entehāb**, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999).

<sup>1382</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 16 Šahrīvar 1376 (6 September 1997); **Hamšahrī**, 17 Šahrīvar (7 September 1997); **Qods**, 7 Dey 1376 (28 December 1997); **Qods**, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997); **Qods**, 9 Dey 1376 (30 December 1997); **Qods**, 10 Dey 1376 (31 December 1997); more implicitly: **Resālat**, 6 Ābān 1376 (28 October 1997).

<sup>1383</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 27 Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995); repeated in: **Īrān**, 8. Ĥordād 1374 (29 May 1995); while *Kaihān* in contrast points to the high costs of therapy for the families of drug addicts: **Kaihān**, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995).

<sup>1384</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 23 Dey 1376 (13 January 1998).

<sup>1385</sup> **Salām**, 13 Ĥordād 1378 (3 June 1999); **Entehāb**, 18 Tīr 1378 (9 July 1999).

<sup>1386</sup> E.g. in: **Hamšahrī**, 19 Ordībehešt 1374 (9 May 1995); **Hamšahrī**, 27 Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995); **Īrān**, 8. Ĥordād 1374 (29 May 1995); **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 27 & 28 Ĥordād 1374 (17 & 18 June 1995); **Resālat**, 5 Tīr

statistics provided by the DCHQ and the police, such as for instance on seized drugs or cured addicts.<sup>1387</sup> Concomitantly, however, they continue to highlight the need for more exact statistics.<sup>1388</sup> In 1378 (1999-2000), the press quotes many more official statistics. Interestingly, only the newspaper *Abrār-e Eqtešādī* and *Kār va Kārgar* explicitly refer to the recently published *Rapid Situation Assessment* (RSA) of the SWO, and thus mentions the new official estimation of two million drug users in Iran – 1.2 million drug addicts and another 800,000 recreational drug users.<sup>1389</sup> Other newspapers, in contrast, still repeat the previous estimation of 500,000 addicts.<sup>1390</sup> In the same year, *Kār va Kārgar* based on research of the DCHQ also mentions opium, heroin and cannabis as the drugs of choice in Iran;<sup>1391</sup> and *Entehāb* quotes the director of the DCHQ that there are certainly not 200,000 drug-addicted students in Iran.<sup>1392</sup> Finally, *Qods* mentions research carried out by the DCHQ, according to which sixty-five per cent of all HIV/AIDS cases in Iran are due to needle sharing among intravenous drug users.<sup>1393</sup>

### **Addiction causes**

A particular field of addiction phenomenology consists of addiction causes. The Iranian press often writes about such causes, not limited to medical causes. It often mentions poverty, unemployment and family problems, especially other drug-addicted family members, thus arguably reflecting the official drug discourse in Iran. As this topic is often discussed by psychologists and in relation to drug prevention, it will be discussed in further detail below, together with either drug prevention or the academic and medical discourse.

### **Addiction therapy**

With a few notable exceptions, the press unanimously endorses the new official *drug demand reduction* measures of the Iranian government. An often-cited reason for this support is the official viewpoint that *drug demand reduction* is in effect cheaper and more effective

---

1374 (26 June 1995); **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 13 & 14 & 15 & 16 & 17 & 19 Mehr 1376 (5 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 11 October 1997); **Hamšahrī**, 27 & 28 Mehr 1376 (19 & 20 October 1997); **Āfarīneš**, 24 Mehr 1378 (16 October 1999).

<sup>1387</sup> E.g. in: **Resālat**, 26 Ḥordād 1376 (16 June 1997); **Kār va Kārgar**, 21 & 22 & 24 Farvardīn (10 & 11 & 13 April 1999); **Entehāb**, 28 Farvardīn 1378 (17 April 1999); **Abrār**, 9 Ordībehešt 1378 (29 April 1999); or: **Salām**, 1 Ḥordād 1378 (22 May 1999); and later in the year: **Qods**, 25 Ābān 1378 (16 November 1999); **Ḥordād**, 1 & 2 Āḍar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999); or: **‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān**, 17 Āḍar 1378 (8 December 1999).

<sup>1388</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995).

<sup>1389</sup> **Abrār-e Eqtešādī**, 23 Ordībehešt 1378 (13 May 1999); **Kār va Kārgar**, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999).

<sup>1390</sup> E.g.: **Āfarīneš**, 24 Mehr 1378 (16 October 1999).

<sup>1391</sup> **Kār va Kārgar**, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999).

<sup>1392</sup> **Entehāb**, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999).

<sup>1393</sup> **Qods**, 25 Ābān 1378 (16 November 1999).

than *drug supply reduction*.<sup>1394</sup> In practice, of course, the official drug policy in Iran consists of a combination of both, which the DCHQ calls Iran's "third thinking" (*andīšeh-ye sevvom*), thus rather strangely highlighting this as a unique Iranian feature.<sup>1395</sup>

Frequently, the introduction of governmental addiction therapy centers and the coverage of governmental-organized workshops and conferences serve the newspapers as an incentive to explain various addiction therapy measures. The earliest such example during the sample period is the organization of a workshop on drug prevention and addiction treatment, organized by the SWO. On this occasion, the government presented a draft of its "national program of addiction prevention and therapy" (*barnāmeḥ-ye mellī-ye pīš-gīrī va bāz-parvarī-ye e'tiyād*) to the present medical researchers and the press. Apparently on the same occasion, the SWO also presented the rehabilitation center of Qarčak Varāmīn. This center was apparently one of the earliest governmental centers of the new medical type, even though the description often still rather resembles the traditional rehabilitation camps of the Islamic Republic.<sup>1396</sup> In this context, also the private NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS (*mo'tādān-e gom-nām*) are mentioned for the first time as an organization that closely cooperates with the rehabilitation center of Qarčak Varāmīn.<sup>1397</sup> Apparently as part of the national plan, the government further announced the creation of the NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST DRUG ABUSE (*komīteh-ye kešvarī-e sū'-mašraf-e mavādd-e moḥadder*) as part of the HEALTH MINISTRY.<sup>1398</sup>

Further events and conferences, like the exhibition "war without borders" (*ḡang bedūn-e marz*) in Tehrān, or the conference on "addiction and some other crimes" (*e'tiyād va ba'zī ḡarāyem-e dīgar*) in Qom, were organized by the DCHQ shortly after Ḥātāmī's inauguration.<sup>1399</sup> Also frequently quoted are new research findings by the DCHQ and the

<sup>1394</sup> E.g.: **Īrān**, 8. Ḥordād 1374 (29 May 1995); **Ḥordād**, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999).

<sup>1395</sup> On the conference in Qom: **Hamšahrī**, 16 Šahrīvar 1376 (6 September 1997); on the exhibition: **Abrār**, 12 Šahrīvar 1376 (3 September 1997); **Resālat**, 14 Ābān 1376 (5 November 1997).

<sup>1396</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 27. Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995); **Kaiḥān**, 25 Ḥordād 1374 (15 June 1995) **Kaiḥān**, 27 Ḥordād 1374 (17 June 1995); **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 28 Ḥordād 1374 (18 June 1995); **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 29 Ḥordād 1374 (19 June 1995); or: **Fath**, 25 & 26 Esfand 1378 (16 & 17 March 2000).

<sup>1397</sup> **Īrān**, 18 Āḡar 1374 (9 December 1995).

<sup>1398</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 27. Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995); in *Kaiḥān* as NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST ADDICTION (*kōmīteh-ye kešvarī-ye mobārezeḥ bā e'tiyād*): **Kaiḥān**, 25 & 27 Ḥordād 1374 (15 & 17 June 1995); **Īrān**, 8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995).

<sup>1399</sup> **Abrār**, 12 Šahrīvar 1376 (3 September 1997).

SWO; as are DCHQ officials like the director-general Moḥammad Fallāḥ and the director general for research Gōlām-Rezā Šarāmī; or SWO officials like ‘Alī Anšārī.<sup>1400</sup>

### *Drug prevention*

Drug prevention is the perhaps weakest aspect in the official Iranian drug policy. Exactly due to this reason, the newspapers repeat the official mantra that “prevention is the best therapy” (*behtar-īn darmān pīš-gīrī ast*).<sup>1401</sup> During the first sample year, the government organized as mentioned a workshop on drug prevention and addiction treatment in Gačsar near Šīrāz, which brought together different health specialists. On this occasion, *Hamšahrī* interestingly issues an warning claiming that the provision of information on drugs would only further incite people to take drugs – a claim repeated in later articles.<sup>1402</sup> The NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST DRUG ABUSE, which apparently was assigned a central role in the development of specific prevention programs, subsequently highlighted the crucial role the schools and mass media play herein.<sup>1403</sup>

Yet, *Kaihān* later cites a DCHQ official, who admits that even half a year after the announcement of the “national program of addiction prevention and therapy” not much has happened in this regard.<sup>1404</sup> In 1997, there was still no such prevention plan according to *Eṭṭelā‘āt*,<sup>1405</sup> and even in 1999, the deputy of the DCHQ continued to deplore the lack of governmental prevention programs.<sup>1406</sup> He specifically criticized the inactivity of the MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE and the IRIB in this regard.<sup>1407</sup> Against this background, the newspapers throughout the years repeat the question: “what has to be done” (*čeh bāyad kard?*).<sup>1408</sup>

<sup>1400</sup> **Resālat II**, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995); with Moḥammad Fallāḥ, secretary general of the DCHQ: **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999); with Fallāḥ and ‘Alī Anšārī, head of the SWO: **Entehāb**, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999); with Āfarīn Raḥīmī-Movaqqar, a senior expert of the SWO: **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999); **Entehāb**, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999); **Šobḥ-e Emrūz**, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999).

<sup>1401</sup> E.g. in: **Āfarīneš**, 24 Ābān 1376 (15 November 1997); **Hamšahrī**, 16 Šahrīvar 1376 (6 September 1997); **Šobḥ-e Emrūz**, 25 & 26 & 27 Ḥordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999).

<sup>1402</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 27. Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995); **Resālat**, 21 Ordībehešt 1378 (11 May 1999).

<sup>1403</sup> **Īrān**, 8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995).

<sup>1404</sup> **Kaihān**, 15 Ābān 1374 (6 November 1995).

<sup>1405</sup> **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 28 Tīr 1376 (19 July 1997).

<sup>1406</sup> **Ḥordād**, 13 Ordībehešt 1376 (3 May 1999); **Entehāb**, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999).

<sup>1407</sup> Such as for instance the IRIB or the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance: **Entehāb**, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999).

<sup>1408</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 27. Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995); **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999); **Entehāb**, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999); **Āfarīneš**, 20 Ābān 1376 (11 November 1997); **Āzād**, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 1999).

In the same year, however, the government apparently organized a congress on the “immunization of children and adolescents against the appearance of harms” (*maṣūn-sāzī-ye koudak-ān va nou-ḡavān-ān dar barābar-e āsīb-ẓāyī*).<sup>1409</sup> This took probably place under the supervision of the EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR THE PREVENTION OF DRUG Abuse (*daftar-e eḡrāyī-ye pīš-ḡīrī az sū'-maṣrafe-e mavādd-e moḥadder*), the relevant department within the EDUCATION MINISTRY. *Resālāt* accuses this department of only planning to develop corresponding prevention programs for students. In 2000, finally, *Mošārekāt* reports about a “second conference on addiction prevention among high school students”.<sup>1410</sup>

### The religious drug discourse

To a large degree absent from the Iranian press discourse on drugs is the religious *discourse level*. Given the permeating role of religion in the official politics in Iran, this is indeed an astonishing finding. Since the passing of the ANTI NARCOTICS LAW of 1988, drug traffickers and drug addicts were not any more judged by individual clerical judges, as was the case during the first years after the revolution. The competent courts were now the revolutionary courts, which, however, admittedly continued to judge traffickers on the basis of the religious accusations “combatant against God” (*moḥāreb bā ḥodā*) or “corrupt on earth” (*mofsed fe ‘l-arḡ*) (cf. **chapter II**).

Since the legal basis for the conviction of drug traffickers and drug addicts, thus was clarified, the press generally does not delve on this topic. Individual newspapers do, however, still report on earlier *fatāwā* of different *ayatollahs* against drug consumption.<sup>1411</sup> But since the religious ban on drug consumption has become unanimous, the clerics apparently did not issue further such edicts, as the newspaper *Horāsān* insinuates.<sup>1412</sup> However, as *Eṭṭelā‘āt* and *Kaiḥān* both mention, some of the country’s most outstanding clerics, among them the *āyatollāhs* Gīlānī and Moqtadā‘ī, gave their consent to the re-orientation of the official drug policy towards addiction therapy.<sup>1413</sup> And the clerics in Qom apparently were consulted during the draft of the AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW of 1997.<sup>1414</sup>

<sup>1409</sup> *Īrān*, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999).

<sup>1410</sup> *Mošārekāt*, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000):

<sup>1411</sup> *Kaiḥān*, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995).

<sup>1412</sup> *Horāsān*, 6 & 7 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 June 1999).

<sup>1413</sup> *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995); *Kaiḥān*, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995).

<sup>1414</sup> *Hamšahrī*, 16 Šahrīvar 1376 (6 September 1997); *Hamšahrī*, 17 Šahrīvar (7 September 1997).



Otherwise, the religious seminaries in Qom – as well as the religion in general – were rather assigned a role in drug prevention. In January 1998, the DCHQ convened a conference on “addiction and some other crimes” (*e’tiyād ba’zī ġarāyem-e dīgar*) in Qom, in order to discuss matters of drug prevention with the “missionaries” (*moballegīn*), “preachers” (*hoṭabā’*) and “clerics” (*rūhāniyūn*) of the religious seminaries.<sup>1415</sup> And particularly the conservative newspapers ascribe religion a preventive role against drug addiction;<sup>1416</sup> while only Aḥmad Moḥīṭ from the WHO has denied the place of religion as playing a useful role in drug prevention assuming that drug addicts would not be receptive to such instructions.<sup>1417</sup>

### The medical drug discourse

In Iran too, academic research on addiction is especially done in the fields of medicine and psychology. The relevant institutions such as the medical universities, which are under the supervision of the HEALTH MINISTRY, but also apparently the DCHQ and the SWO are naturally governmental institutions. The researchers the newspapers quote, nevertheless, often voice opinions that are more critical than the official drug policy positions.

During the first year of the sample period, most information on scientific addiction therapy is still provided by international institutions. This is exemplarily shown by the fact that one of the earliest article during the sample period is authored by Moḥīṭ from the WHO, who informs about various aspects of drug addiction, addiction therapy and drug prevention.<sup>1418</sup> The WHO is arguably also responsible for sensitizing the press to problematic language concerning drug addiction; and in proposing more neutral, scientific expressions. Explicitly mentioned as being proposed by the WHO is the term “medical dependence” (*vābastegī-ye dārū’ī*) instead of “addiction” (*e’tiyād*).<sup>1419</sup> The same might, however, also apply to further terms, to which the press refers throughout the sample period, such as in particular the basic concepts of “drug demand reduction” (*kāheš-e taqāzā-ye mavādd-e moḥadder*), “rehabilitation” (*bāz-parvarī*), “therapy” (*darmān*), “prevention” (*pīš-ġīrī*), and “harm reduction” (*kāheš-e āsīb-hā*). The terms “assistance-seeking” (*madad-ġū-yān*) instead

<sup>1415</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 23 Dey 1376 (13 January 1997).

<sup>1416</sup> **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997); **Eṭṭelā’āt**, 28 Tīr 1376 (19 July 1997); **Eṭṭelā’āt**, 13 & 14 & 15 & 16 & 17 & 19 Mehr 1376 (5 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 11 October 1997); **Resālat**, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 October 1997).

<sup>1417</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 6 Ordībehešt 1374 (26 April 1995); **Hamšahrī**, 14 Ordībehešt 1374 (4 May 1995); **Hamšahrī**, 19 Ordībehešt 1374 (9 May 1995).

<sup>1418</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 19 Ordībehešt 1374 (9 May 1995); also based on WHO information are relevant information provided by: **Eṭṭelā’āt**, 27 Ḥordād 1374 (17 June 1995).

<sup>1419</sup> **Resālat**, 5 Ābān 1376 (27 October 1997).

of “drug addict” (*mo‘tād-e mavādd-e moḥadder*),<sup>1420</sup> and “therapy centers” (*marākez-e darmānī*) instead of “rehabilitation centers” (*marākez-e bāz-parvarī*), are, in contrast, suggested by Iranian researchers.<sup>1421</sup>

Already under Rafsanjānī, the Iranian government has actively encouraged the consideration of new scientific and medical addiction therapy measures. Given the scantiness of addiction research in Iran during the first two years of the sample period, the press initially often refers to international medical experts, some of them like Moḥīṭ born in Iran. Further examples are the professor for addiction psychology, Ġalīlī-Ḥiyābānī, from the UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN,<sup>1422</sup> or Robert Martin, a sociologist from the USA.<sup>1423</sup>

A gradual change is reflected in articles from 1376 (1997-98), when addiction withdrawal by means of medication started to be introduced to Iran. As a logical consequence, more domestic medical professionals and psychologists started to specialize on addiction therapy and drug prevention, while often having done parts of their studies abroad and remaining in close contact with the international research community. They consequently started to conduct their own research, both within academic and official institutions such as the DCHQ and the SWO, as a result of which the press starts to refer much more frequently to local expert sources. Their recommendations for the development of more adequate addiction therapy and drug prevention measures generally follow the line of the official drug policy, since they were often advising the government in this regard in the first place. Specific examples of domestic addiction research include the LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES (NAJA),<sup>1424</sup> the DCHQ,<sup>1425</sup> the SWO,<sup>1426</sup> the EDUCATION MINISTRY,<sup>1427</sup> and various universities.<sup>1428</sup> While

<sup>1420</sup> The term *madad-ḡū-yān* is for the first time mentioned on the occasion of the SWO workshop on drug prevention and addiction treatment in Gačsar: **Kaiḥān**, 25 Ḥordād 1374 (15 June 1995); for further instances: **Hamšahrī**, 27. Ordibehešt 1374 (17 May 1995); **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 28 Ḥordād 1374 (18 June 1995); **Īrān**, 18 Āḍar 1374 (9 December 1995); **Hamšahrī**, 25 Šahrīvar 1376 (15 September 1997); **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 24 & 25 Šahrīvar 1378 (15 & 16 September 1999).

<sup>1421</sup> According to sociology professor Maṣṣūr Voṭūqī: **Īrān**, 29 Tīr 1374 (20 July 1995).

<sup>1422</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 2 Mehr 1376 (24 September 1997).

<sup>1423</sup> **Abrār**, 9 Ordibehešt 1378 (29 April 1999).

<sup>1424</sup> **Kaiḥān**, 27 Ḥordād 1374 (17 June 1995).

<sup>1425</sup> E.g. in: **Qods**, 25 Ābān 1378 (16 November 1999); **Āftāb-e Emrūz**, 26 Ābān 1378 (17 November 1999); Ḥordād also mentions that in 1376 (1997-98) the DCHQ has created a SUPREME COUNCIL OF RESEARCH AND PLANNING (*šūrā-ye ‘ālī-ye taḥqīqāt va barnāmeḥ-rīzī*): **Ḥordād**, 13 Ordibehešt 1376 (3 May 1999). **Šobḥ-e Emrūz**, 25 & 26 & 27 Ḥordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999).

<sup>1426</sup> **Īrān**, 8 Tīr 1378 (29 June 1999).

<sup>1427</sup> Sociology professors Šādeq Farbod and Maṣṣūr Voṭūqī: **Īrān**, 29 Tīr 1374 (20 July 1995); **Kār va Kārgar**, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999); the clinical psychologist Mehdī Esmā‘īl of the Azād University in Fasā: **Resālat**, 5 Ābān 1376 (27 October 1997); the SWO University: **Ḥorāsān**, 5 Tīr 1376 (26 June 1999); the Medical University of Šīrāz: **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 October 1997); Hedāyat Saḥrāyī from the Medical University Baqiyyat-Āllāh in Tehran: **Kaiḥān**, 8 Āḍar 1378 (29 November 1999).

at the beginning of the sample period, the press rather generally points to the importance of addiction research; they later report in detail about specific addiction therapy measures,<sup>1429</sup> addiction causes,<sup>1430</sup> drug prevention<sup>1431</sup> and *harm reduction* measures.<sup>1432</sup> Concerning addiction therapy, the press usually describes methods combining different physical, psychological and occupational therapies as being most successful. In the prescription of drug prevention, the press follows the WHO-inspired national model consisting of three levels: primary prevention concentrating on awareness-raising among the general population; and secondary and tertiary prevention targeting drug consumers and addicts in order to prevent harmful consumption and lifestyle patterns. Concomitantly, however, they continue to emphasize that still more research is needed. But the press not only quotes theoretical addiction research. It also conducts interviews with practitioners, such as physicians (sg. *pezešk*), psychologists (sg. *ravān-šenās*), psychiatrists (sg. *ravān-pezešk*), and sociologists (sg. *ğāme‘eh-šenās*), who all accentuate the importance of a health-based approach to *drug demand reduction*.<sup>1433</sup>

These same experts, at times, also criticize the existing governmental addiction therapy and – mostly lacking – drug prevention programs. Instead, they propose occasionally astonishingly progressive new treatment methods, and particularly *harm reduction* programs. Since during the sample period, such *harm reduction* measures were not yet officially introduced to Iran, they will be addressed below. The government, nevertheless, already seems to have started to implement first harm reduction measures in different pilot programs. The reason for this was particularly the realization of a spread of HIV/AIDS among drug

<sup>1429</sup> **Ĥorāsān**, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July 1999); **Kaihān**, 8 Āḍar 1378 (29 November 1999).

<sup>1430</sup> **Īrān**, 8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995); deceiving advertisements for private addiction therapy: **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 13 Tīr 1374 (4 July 1995); **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 14 Tīr 1374 (5 July 1995); **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997); **Hamšahrī**, 27 Tīr 1378 (18 July 1999); **Kaihān**, 18 Šahrīvar 1376 (8 September 1997); too much leisure time: **Hamšahrī**, 16 Šahrīvar 1376 (6 September 1997); **Hamšahrī**, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 (10 September 1997); social causes for addiction and relapse: **Āfarīneš I**, 16 Āḍar 1376 (7 December 1997); **Qods**, 7 Dey 1376 (28 December 1997); **Kār va Kārgar**, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999).

<sup>1431</sup> **‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān**, 17 Āḍar 1378 (8 December 1999).

<sup>1432</sup> **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 October 1997); **Ĥorāsān**, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July 1999); **Vohūman**, 7 Šahrīvar 1378 (29 August 1999); **Ĥordād**, 1 & 2 Āḍar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999); **Āftāb-e Emrūz**, 27 Bahman 1378 (16 February 2000); **Ĥordād**, 1 & 2 Āḍar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999)

<sup>1433</sup> The psychiatrist Farah-Saif Behzād: **Īrān**, 8. Ĥordād 1374 (29 May 1995); the two brothers and clinical psychologists Nāšer and Maṣšūr Eskandarī: **Kaihān**, 27 Ĥordād 1374 (17 June 1995); Dr. Šāleḥ Šīvā, an US-trained acupuncture specialists: **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 13 Tīr 1374 (4 July 1995); **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 14 Tīr 1374 (5 July 1995); sociology professors Šādeq Farbod and Maṣšūr Voṭūqī: **Īrān**, 29 Tīr 1374 (20 July 1995); Ĥūtan Gol-Sorḥī, a biologist and drug specialist living in Canada, and the author of the article in: **Hamšahrī**, 24 Mehr 1376 (16 October 1997); addiction specialists and psychiatrist Āḍarāḥš Mokrī and others: **Āftāb-e Emrūz**, 2 Šahrīvar 1378 (24 August 1999); specialist for neuropathy Mīnū Moḥarrez: **Ĥordād**, 1 & 2 Āḍar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999); psychiatrist Šāḥāb Šāleḥpūr of the INDEPENDENT REHABILITATION CENTRE of Mašhad: **Qods**, 7 Dey 1376 (28 December 1997); **Qods**, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997); **Ĥorāsān**, 5 Tīr 1376 (26 June 1999); **Ĥorāsān**, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July 1999).

injecting users. While in the Islamic Republic, AIDS originally was rather portrayed as being the result of a sexually permissive lifestyle; the topic appears for the first time in the press discourse on drugs on the occasion of the congress on “addiction and some other crimes” in Qom, where officials of the DCQH apparently already discussed it with the clerics.<sup>1434</sup> Later it is mentioned as a problem in Iran’s border provinces, without a clear reference to drug use, and thus is rather portrayed as a foreign phenomenon.<sup>1435</sup> Even though the interviewed officials, initially, rather try to avoid the topic,<sup>1436</sup> the press repeatedly mentions HIV and AIDS among injecting heroin users in 1378 (1999-2000), as will be shown below.

### ***VI. 1. b. The homogenizing power of the official Iranian press policy***

The power exerted by the official Iranian press policy has been defined above as a non-drug-related extrinsic force. This chapter will address homogenizing influences of Iran’s media policy on the Iranian press, as exemplified in the press discourse on drugs. It is, admittedly, not always possible to differentiate between homogenizing effects produced by the official press policy, and homogenizing effects produced by a more automatic, intrinsic dynamic of the press.

Iranian press policy nevertheless clearly has an effect on the Iranian press and, thus, arguably also on the press discourse on drugs. This is due to the following aspects: by virtue of the existing strict press laws, which provide the press with a general legal framework; by the respective policies of the MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE, which is tasked with putting these laws into practice, and which for instance organized seminars on media topics during the sample period; by the PRESS SUPERVISORY BOARD, which is responsible for issuing media licenses and for providing further specific regulations; and last but not least by the judiciary, which is tasked with taking legal proceedings against violations of the press law. This constellation, however, already contains in itself a major conflict of interests, due to different ideological affiliation of the specific institutions. This naturally has an overall heterogenizing effect on the press and in extension on the press discourse on drugs, which will be addressed further below. Yet, individual policies of the separate institutions arguably still exercise a certain homogenizing effect.

---

<sup>1434</sup> *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 23 Dey 1376 (13 January 1997).

<sup>1435</sup> *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 23 Dey 1376 (13 January 1997).

<sup>1436</sup> Such as particularly Hešmatī, the deputy of the DCHQ: *Entehāb*, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999).

First, as has been shown, article 2 of the restrictive press law of 1986, contains a provision that generally puts the Iranian press at the service of the Islamic Republic, by requesting that the *media* “fight against the manifestations of the colonialist culture [ ] and the promotion and propagation of the noble Islamic culture” (**chapter III**). This vaguely worded stipulation certainly remains open to various interpretative differences, and in reality more often than not has served the conservatively controlled courts to shut down reformist newspapers. But the Iranian press nevertheless accomplishes a primary role of serving the Iranian nation, or more precisely society. It fulfills this role primarily by its duty to inform the public, without foregoing their right to criticism.

Arguably a less homogenizing effect on the Iranian press and the press discourse on drugs has the judiciary – at least during the sample period. By gradually banning critical reformist newspapers, it certainly aspired to a homogenized media landscape. But the phenomenon of the so-called “serial newspapers”, where publishers of banned newspapers simply launched new ones, already shows that it failed. Professedly, the judiciary eventually succeeded in shutting down most reformist newspapers between May and August 2000. However, some reformist newspapers survived and the press continued to be a forum for the expression of critical voices, albeit admittedly to a lesser degree. Yet, this development took place after the sample period of the current analysis, and is, thus, of secondary importance to the present context.

Both the press law and the judiciary, however have a further homogenizing effect, which might be more indirect at times. By sanctioning libel and defamation of vaguely defined concepts like Islam or the revolution, the judiciary of course has the legal means to prosecute and thus censor disliked newspapers. Such ambiguous provisions, however, also encourage self-censorship, a topic that the reformist administration explicitly addressed in the first press seminary (**chapter III**). In the press discourse on drugs, this self-censorship might primarily become visible in topics that are not being addressed by the newspapers and thus, apparently, are taboo subjects. It is, however, not always possible to trace back the origin of these taboos; they might just as well date back further and thus be social taboos. Still, some taboos are clearly characteristic for the Islamic Republic and often based on respective laws. A natural taboo is the overt criticism of the Supreme Leader, an anathema in Iran, which is only rarely violated. Further taboo subjects are for instance corruption among officials; (ethnic) minority policies of the state; or prostitution among drug-addicted women. Within the

Iranian press discourse on drugs, these taboos are largely respected; yet some newspapers nevertheless dared to break them, as will be shown below.

The MINISTRY FOR ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE, arguably, had a bigger homogenizing influence. From the beginning of the sample period, this ministry was led by liberal-minded and reformist individuals: first during the administration of the modern right Rafsanjānī by Moḥammad Ḥātāmī, a representative of the former Islamic left; and eventually under the reformist administration of Ḥātāmī by ‘Aṭā’ollāh Mohāğherānī, an outspoken representative of the former Islamic left. Both have been responsible for the emergence of a reinvigorated press, especially but not exclusively of reformist newspapers (**chapter III**). This might arguably rather have had a heterogenizing effect on the press. But both of them also strived at introducing a more accountable and professional journalism to Iran. This is for instance demonstrated by the organization of the first press seminary in 1991, still under the auspices of then culture minister Ḥātāmī, where topics like state censorship, self-censorship or the lack of professional staff was discussed. When he assumed the function of culture minister in 1997, Mohāğherānī declared: *"I disagree with almost all of the present practices in the culture ministry"*,<sup>1437</sup> and consequently encouraged the press to adopt more critical reporting. This is again shown by the organization of the "second seminary for the discussion of the problems of the press" in summer 1998. Such progressive media policies not only led to more press freedom, from which all newspapers would profit; but arguably also to a more critical understanding of journalism and a more factual reporting in general.

The new cultural freedoms conceded by the government also signaled that both the Rafsanjānī and Ḥātāmī administrations were more open towards criticism and accountability. This reflects a new reformist understanding of politics, where the governing elite – at least in the executive – sees its duty rather in serving the public than ruling over it. Concerning Iranian press discourse on drugs, this can, arguably be observed by the fact that the various governmental institutions active in the field of drug policy, such as in particular the DCHQ and the SWO, increasingly provided the press with drug-related information.

It is argued here, that the analysis of the Iranian press discourse on drugs indeed shows this trend towards an increasingly factual, well-investigated, balanced and critical coverage of the drug problem in Iran. This even includes the most radical conservative newspapers, such

---

<sup>1437</sup> Samii (2001), 2.

as *Kaihān*, *Resālat* or *Ġavān*, even though certain exceptions exist. In the first year of the sample period, in 1374 (1995/96), the press still maintains a rather didactic and moralizing style when reporting on drug-related topics, although it already reports predominantly in a factual and accurate style. In 1376 (1997-98), and parallel to the political development, the press becomes more critical in its reporting and cites a broader and more varied range of sources. In 1378 (1999-2000), finally, the press becomes increasingly independent from the political parameters, by referring to more non-governmental sources, and by increasing its criticism of the official drug policy.

This assessment is primarily based on an analysis of the sources and interviews that are cited by the newspapers; as well as on an analysis of further details such as the disclosure of authorship. In 1374 (1995-96), for instance, only 21% of the articles reveal the name of the author or explicitly mention the sources; this percentage increases to 43% in 1376 (1997-98) and 46% (1999-2000) respectively. Male journalists wrote most of the articles that disclose the authorship, but women also become increasingly active, including in conservative newspapers like *Kaihān* or *Āfarīneš*.<sup>1438</sup>

Regarding sources, these are disclosed from the beginning of the sample period, especially the foreign sources: *the BBC*, *Bild am Sonntag*, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, *Radio Köln*, *the Times*, *Newsweek*, *the New York Times*, *the Reader's Digest* and *the Christian Science Monitor*.<sup>1439</sup> But only from 1376 (1997-98) do the newspapers usually also indicate the name of the translator of such articles; while *Resālat* for instance explicitly mentions that the public relation office of the DCHQ often provides the press with these articles.<sup>1440</sup> International sources like the UNDCP or the INCB are quoted throughout the sample period;<sup>1441</sup> but the press increasingly cites other foreign specialists.<sup>1442</sup> And while the

<sup>1438</sup> A female journalist regularly contributing to *Kaihān* is e.g. Mīnū Badī'ī: **Kaihān**, 25 Ĥordād 1374 (15 June 1995); **Kaihān**, 27 Ĥordād 1374 (17 June 1995); **Kaihān**, 7 Ĥordād 1376 (28 May 1997); contributing to *Āfarīneš* is Fātemeh Sādāt-Ma'sūmī: **Āfarīneš II**, 16 Āḍar 1376 (7 December 1997).

<sup>1439</sup> *The BBC*: **Hamšahrī**, 27 Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995); *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*: **Resālat**, 21 Farvardīn 1376 (10 April 1997); *Bild am Sonntag* and *the Reader's Digest*: **Hamšahrī**, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 (10 September 1997); *the Times*: **Ĥorāsān**, 7 Āḍar 1378 (28 November 1999); *Radio Köln*: **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 4 Dey 1376 (25 December 1997); *die Zeit*: **Hamšahrī**, 24 & 25 Šahrīvar 1376 (14 & 15 September 1997); *New York Times*: **Aḥbār-e Eqtešādī**, 31 Šahrīvar 1378 (22 September 1999); *the Christian Science Monitor*: **Gozāreš-e Rūz**, 24 Āḍar 1378 (15 December 1999); *Newsweek*: **Bayān**, 27 & 28 Āḍar 1378 (18 & 19 December 1999); *Abrār*, 8 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999); **Fath**, 18 Esfand 1378 (8 March 2000); *New York Times*: **Aḥbār-e Eqtešādī XXX**, 31 Šahrīvar 1378 (22 September 1999); *le Monde Diplomatique*: **Salām**, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 (10 September 1997).

<sup>1440</sup> Explicitly mentioned by: **Resālat**, 21 Farvardīn 1376 (10 April 1997).

<sup>1441</sup> UNDCP and INCB in general: **Hamšahrī**, 31 Ĥordād 1374 (21 June 1995); Pino Arlacchi: **Qods**, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999); **Kār-o-Kārgar**, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999); **Abrār**, 14 Tīr 1378 (5 July 1999)

newspapers initially most often refer to state institutions like the DCHQ, the SWO, the police and the judiciary, or the HEALTH MINISTRY; the National AIDS Committee and the Education Ministry;<sup>1443</sup> they increasingly diversify their domestic sources from 1376 (1997-98), including Iranian universities; academic addiction researchers and practical addiction specialists, such as particularly from private addiction organizations like the ĀFTAB SOCIETY or the CONGRESS 60; and members of parliament.<sup>1444</sup>

#### ***VI. 1. c. The homogenizing power of the Iranian press discourse on drugs***

The intrinsic homogenizing power within the Iranian press discourse on drugs is naturally less easily demonstrable. This intrinsic power often overlaps with the extrinsic powers exerted both by the official drug policy and the press policy. It is nevertheless argued here, that such an intrinsic power exists, corresponding to the postulations of *discourse analysis*. This is particularly visible in the large absence of factional disputes in the Iranian press discourse on drugs; but also in *orders of discourse* that are different from the official discourses.

This already becomes visible in the *discourse events*, which provide the discourse with a basic structure, as shown by the quantitative distribution of newspaper articles over the course of the sample period. As has been shown, these articles often appear in clusters around important events. While most discourse events, admittedly, are induced by international or domestic events such as the *International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking* or the AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW of 1997, this is not the case for others. Particularly in the 1378 (1999-2000), the newspapers published a series of drug-related newspaper articles in the months of September, October, and March. While no specific external event can be identified for this phenomenon, this could be explained by an inherent mutual influence of the press.

Such mutual influences are, however, especially observable when newspapers introduce new topics and arguments. As this commonly first happens by individual newspapers, these dynamics only become effective later. In the case of the Iranian press

---

<sup>1442</sup> For instance the psychiatrist Fīrūz Ġalīlī-Ĥiyābānī from the university of Michigan: **Hamšahrī**, 2 Mehr 1376 (24 September 1997); Robert Martin, a sociologist from the USA: **Abrār**, 9 Ordībehešt 1378 (29 April 1999); or the French dog instructor: **Īrān**, 11 Āḍar 1378 (12 December 1999).

<sup>1443</sup> **Abrār**, 14 Tīr 1378 (5 July 1999).

<sup>1444</sup> In particular MP Sohailā Ġeloudārzādeh, director of the SOCIETY AGAINST ADDICTION: **Šobḥ-e Emrūz**, 25 & 26 & 27 Ḥordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999); **Payām-e Āzādī**, 2 Āḍar 1378 (23 November 1999); or MP Marziyyeh Šadiqi: **Ḥorāsān**, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July 1999); **Ḥorāsān**, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999); or a member of parliament from Zāhedān: **Ḥorāsān**, 23 Āḍar 1378 (14 December 1999).



discourse on drugs, such new arguments and topics often express a dissenting opinion before the become commonplace arguments; therefore, they will be discussed below.

Such mutual influences, however, also become visible in two specific formal features of the Iranian press discourse on drugs: the publication of a series of consecutive articles over the course of several days; and personal stories of individual drug addicts. In 1374 (1995-96), only the newspaper *Kaihān* and *Eṭṭelā'āt* use the format of article series, specifically on the occasion of the presentation of the rehabilitation center Qarčak Varāmīn and on the *International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking*.<sup>1445</sup> In 1376 (1997-98), *Eṭṭelā'āt* again publishes most of these serial articles;<sup>1446</sup> but so do now the newspapers *Hamšahrī*, *Āfarīneš*, and *Qods*.<sup>1447</sup> In 1378, finally, this feature has definitively become an established feature of the press, including again in *Eṭṭelā'āt* but also in many reformist newspapers.<sup>1448</sup>

<sup>1445</sup> Consisting of two articles: **Kaihān**, 25 Ḥordād 1374 (15 June 1995) and **Kaihān**, 27 Ḥordād 1374 (17 June 1995); consisting of three articles: **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 27 Ḥordād 1374 (17 June 1995), **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 28 Ḥordād 1374 (18 June 1995) and **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 29 Ḥordād 1374 (19 June 1995); consisting of five articles: **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995), **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 11 Tīr 1374 (2 July 1995), **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 12 Tīr 1374 (3 July 1995), **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 13 Tīr 1374 (4 July 1995), and **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 14 Tīr 1374 (5 July 1995).

<sup>1446</sup> On the occasion of the *No Tobacco Week*, a series consisting of two articles: **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 18 Ḥordād 1376 (8 June 1997); **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 19 Ḥordād 1376 (9 June 1997); and another series consisting of two articles: **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 1 Tīr 1376 (22 June 1997); **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 2 Tīr 1376 (23 June 1997); and on occasion of the AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW a series again consisting of six articles: **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 13 Mehr 1376 (5 October 1997), **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 14 Mehr 1376 (6 October 1997), **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 15 Mehr 1376 (7 October 1997), **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 16 Mehr 1376 (8 October 1997), **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 17 Mehr 1376 (9 October 1997), and **Eṭṭelā'āt**, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 October 1997).

<sup>1447</sup> Also on the occasion of the *No Tobacco Week* are for instance the series consisting of two articles in: **Kaihān**, 7 Ḥordād 1376 (28 May 1997) and **Kaihān**, 8 Ḥordād 1376 (29 May 1997); on the occasion of the AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW a series consisting of two articles in: **Hamšahrī**, 16 Šahrīvar 1376 (6 September 1997) and **Hamšahrī**, 17 Šahrīvar (7 September 1997); a series consisting of two articles: **Hamšahrī**, 24 Šahrīvar 1376 (14 September 1997) and **Hamšahrī**, 25 Šahrīvar 1376 (15 September 1997); and yet another series consisting of two articles: **Hamšahrī**, 27 Mehr 1376 (19 October 1997) and **Hamšahrī**, 28 Mehr 1376 (20 October 1997); a series consisting of four articles: **Āfarīneš**, 20 Ābān 1376 (11 November 1997), **Āfarīneš**, Ābān 1376 (12 November 1997), **Āfarīneš**, 22 Ābān 1376 (13 November 1997), and **Āfarīneš**, 24 Ābān 1376 (15 November 1997); a series consisting of two articles on the history of drugs: **Abrār**, 10 Āḍar 1376 (1 December 1997) and **Abrār**, 11 Āḍar 1376 (2 December 1997); and finally again on the occasion of the AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW a series consisting of four articles: **Qods**, 7 Dey 1376 (28 December 1997), **Qods**, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997), **Qods**, 9 Dey 1376 (30 December 1997), **Qods**, 10 Dey 1376 (31 December 1997).

<sup>1448</sup> Not all instances for the publication of such series are evident; on the occasion of an interview a series consisting of three articles: **Kār va Kārgar**, 21 & 22 & 24 Farvardīn (10 & 11 & 13 April 1999); on the occasion of the *international drugs day* a series consisting of three articles: **Šobḥ-e Emrūz**, 25 & 26 & 27 Ḥordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999); on the same occasion a series consisting of two articles: **Horāsān**, 6 & 7 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 June 1999); on the occasion of an interview a series consisting of three articles: **Entehāb**, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999); on the occasion of a research study a series consisting of two articles: **Horāsān**, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July 1999); without evident occasion a series consisting of two articles: **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 24 & 25 Šahrīvar 1378 (15 & 16 September 1999); without evident occasion a series consisting of two articles: **Ḥordād**, 1 & 2 Āḍar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999); a series consisting of two articles: **Fath**, 19 & 20 Bahman (8 & 9 February 2000); on the occasion of a new research study a series consisting of three articles: **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 30 Bahman & 1 & 2 & 19 Esfand (19 & 20 & 21 February & 9 March 2000); on the same occasion a series consisting of two (or more?) articles: **Gozāreš-e Rūz**, 1 & 11 & ?? Esfand (20 February & 1 & ?? March 2000); and finally again

Again in 1374 (1995-96), especially the moderate newspapers produce personal life stories of predominantly young drug addicts interviewed in the rehabilitation center of Qarčak Varāmīn. They use these stories to explain the dangers of drug addiction, but also to display a certain understanding for the problems of the addicts and their difficulties in quitting drug addiction.<sup>1449</sup> In 1376 (1997-98), only the conservative newspapers *Āfarīneš* and *Qods* report such personal stories; now, however, in an almost caricature-like style, depicting an overtly gloomy and negative image of drug addicts, arguably primarily to serve as a deterrent.<sup>1450</sup> In 1378 (1999-2000), such stories only appear again towards the end of the year, now in the reformist press and again depicting a more realistic and sympathetic image of the drug addicts.<sup>1451</sup>

Other similarities in the Iranian press discourse might date back further, and thus rather reflect *collective symbols* of the Iranian society, as the *critical discourse analysis* calls them. Such similarities are particularly present in the language (**chapter V. 3**). The language can thus be seen as another homogenizing factor, even though language rather serves as a carrier of discourses. Yet, congruent with the postulations of the *discourse analysis*, homogeneous orders of discourse only develop over time and thus usually have their origin in the historical past of a society. This is not only observable on the level of language but also on the level of the historical drugs discourse in Iran. Many arguments put forward in the history of drugs in Iran, are not specific to the drugs discourse of the Islamic Republic, but actually date further back. This is particularly true for the anti-imperialist view, which blames the introduction, or at least the further spread of opium consumption on the “colonialist” British Empire (**chapter II**). The same might of course be true for the specific language of the Iranian press discourse on drugs.

---

without evident occasion a series consisting of two articles: **Fath**, 25 & 26 Esfand 1378 (16 & 17 March 2000).

<sup>1449</sup> **Īrān**, 8. Ḥordād 1374 (29 May 1995); other stories are described by: **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 28 Ḥordād 1374 (18 June 1995); **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 13 Tīr 1374 (4 July 1995); **Īrān**, 18 Āḍar 1374 (9 December 1995); *Īrān* also interviews young drug addicts living in the streets of Tehras: **Īrān**, 8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995); even in the prison Qezel Hešār: **Īrān**, 29 Tīr 1374 (20 July 1995).

<sup>1450</sup> **Āfarīneš**, 20 Ābān 1376 (11 November 1997); **Āfarīneš**, Ābān 1376 (12 November 1997); **Āfarīneš**, 22 Ābān 1376 (13 November 1997); **Qods**, 7 Dey 1376 (28 December 1997); **Qods**, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997); **Qods**, 9 Dey 1376 (30 December 1997).

<sup>1451</sup> **Gozāreš-e Rūz**, 24 Āḍar 1378 (15 December 1999); **Bayān**, 27 Āḍar 1378 (18 December 1999); **Payām-e Āzādī**, 7 Bahman 1378 (27 January 2000); **Fath**, 19 & 20 Bahman (8 & 9 February 2000); **Īrān**, 2 Esfand 1378 (21 February 2000).

## VI. 2. Heterogenizing powers

Just like various homogenizing factors influence the Iranian press discourse on drugs, so do various heterogenizing factors. These heterogeneities appear in the form of inconsistencies, contradictions and disagreements concerning the topics and arguments, the used styles and quoted sources in the discourse. They can equally be further divided into drug-related and non-drug related extrinsic factors, as exemplified by the *discourse levels* of the official drug policy and the official press policy; as well as intrinsic factors that are present within the press discourse on drugs.

A prime example for heterogenizing forces from the field of drug policy are competing interests between different authorities involved in drug policies, particularly between those responsible for *drug supply reduction* and those responsible for *drug demand reduction* policies. This relates to the security- and legal-based approach of the security forces and the courts and the health-based approach of institutions active in the fields of addiction treatment and drug prevention.

In the field of the press policies, too, such heterogenizing forces originate in diverging interests of different institutions, whose ideological affiliation is of more importance in this regard. Such a factional division line particularly divides the conservatively controlled judiciary and the reformist MINISTRY FOR ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE.

Finally, intrinsic heterogenizing forces are also present within the press. This is not astonishing, since the press was the arguably most crucial site for the airing of factional disputes between the conservatives and reformists. More surprising is the fact, that such factional disputes are not more pronounced in the press discourse on drugs.

### VI. 2. a. *The heterogenizing power of the official Iranian drug policy*

The heterogenizing forces of Iran's official drug policy have, arguably, less an influence on the press discourse on drugs than its homogenizing forces. Inconsistencies and contradictions in the official drug policy nevertheless are felt as well in the press discourse. This is not primarily due to inter-factional disputes between the conservatives and the reformists, even though this also plays a certain role. Such contradictions are rather the result of the competing interests and approaches of the various institutions active in the drug policy field. Such inconsistencies are particularly felt between the security-based approach of the

security forces and the courts, which are directly controlled by the Supreme Leader and his conservative allies; and the health-based approach of the institutions active in the fields of addiction treatment and drug prevention, which are predominantly subordinate to the reformist administration during the sample period.

Such contradictions are characteristic for the drug policies of practically all countries around the world. They originate in a fundamental contradiction of the law: on the one hand, drug consumption is prohibited by law; and on the other, drug addicts are usually allowed to undergo medical treatment instead of being sent into prison. In Iran, this dilemma is exemplified in the most crucial question of the press discourse on drugs, namely whether the “addict is an ill or a criminal person” (*mo‘tād – bīmār yā moğrem*). In reality, the problem is, admittedly, more complex, since acquisitive crimes often accompany drug addiction. Drug addicts are thus often sentenced to prison not because of their addiction but because of the concomitant crimes they commit. Particularly in Western countries, the judicial system has developed a specific penal framework for such cases, as exemplified in the drug courts. Instead of being imprisoned, drug addicts are often sentenced to community service, electronically monitored, and regularly have to report to medical centers and to the police or the drug courts. The declared goal of this pragmatic approach is a successful rehabilitation and subsequent reintegration of drug addicts into society, by not removing them from the society in the first place. Similar solutions have been discussed in Iran, but have not been implemented yet.

As a result of this ongoing prohibition and criminalization of drug consumption, the problem of drug addiction is not only treated as a health issue, but also as a criminal matter. In most countries, therefore, a whole range of institutions are involved in drug policy, particularly the law enforcement and judicial system on the one side; and the sectors of health care, social work and drug prevention on the other. In these countries, including Iran, these bodies cooperate and complement each other; but certain conflicts of interest may remain. Often, their institutional approach in dealing with people differs. Security agencies and courts tend to have a more paternalistic, controlling approach, while the health and social institutions rather approach people as service and assistance providers. In the absence of pragmatic solutions like drug courts, such inconsistencies will arguably persist.

This difference in mentalities and approaches certainly applies to the relevant Iranian bodies involved in drug policy. Responsible for outlining and coordinating the overall national drug policy is the DCHQ. Since the successive secretary-generals of the DCHQ always come from Iran's security forces, a certain tendency towards a more repressive drug policy might be innate to the DCHQ. This is all the more true, since the general outlines of all security-related policies in Iran, including the drug policy, are defined by the SUPREME NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. The DCHQ is, however, formally only a cooperative body comprising all institutions active in the field of drug policy (**chapter II**).

These institutions include on the security-related side: the MINISTRY OF INTERIOR and the LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCE or simply police; the MINISTRY OF INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY; the BASİĞ; the OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL; and the REVOLUTIONARY COURT OF TEHRAN.<sup>1452</sup> Additionally, the EXPEDIENCY COUNCIL and the JUDICIARY also have an influence on the national drug policy. The EXPEDIENCY COUNCIL functions as a legislative body that passed the existing drug laws and the JUDICIARY, particularly the competent revolutionary courts, as the prosecution authority, and as supervisor of the SPO, which administers the thousands of imprisoned drug traffickers and drug addicts. All these institutions are aligned with the conservatives and form part and parcel of the repressive apparatus of the Islamic Republic, which was particularly used against the reformists during the sample period.

On the health- and prevention-related side, the institutions include: the MINISTRY OF HEALTH, which at the time also supervised the SWO; the MINISTRY OF EDUCATION; the MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE, but also the IRIB. Since these institutions are controlled by the administration, they were aligned with the reformists during the sample period. The only exception is IRIB, whose director is directly appointed by the Supreme Leader. Thus, an ideological line of division additionally runs through the institutions responsible for developing adequate drug prevention programs, all the more since the religious seminaries in Qom apparently were also involved, as the newspapers disclose.

Apart from traditional institutional differences, and concurrently with their ideological alignment, these two groups of institution further differ in respect to their governance

---

<sup>1452</sup> On the member institutions of the DCHQ before and after the amendment to the Anti Narcotics Law: DCHQ (1997), 16f.; also on the initially eight institutions being represented in the DCHQ: **Ettelā'āt**, 12 Tīr 1374 (3 July 1995); **Kaihān**, 15 Ābān 1374 (6 November 1995).

approach during the sample period. The conservatively controlled institutions continued the traditional top-down principle of governance of the Islamic Republic; while the institutions of the reformist administration, in line with Ḥātāmī's slogan of (democratic) participation, followed, or at least propagated, a participatory bottom-up principle. Thus, during the sample period, various overlapping fracture lines characterized the national drug policy. But the probably biggest problem was arguably not even their ideological and procedural differences; but as some newspapers emphasize, simply a lack of cooperation, for which *Entehāb* also explicitly blames the DCHQ.<sup>1453</sup> Against this background, it is rather astonishing, that the Iranian state nonetheless succeeded in reforming the overall drug policy nonetheless. This certainly was mainly due to the sheer extent of drug addiction in the country, which required cooperation and swift action.

#### ***VI. 2. b. The heterogenizing power of the official Iranian press policy***

While the heterogenizing effect of the Iranian drug policy on the press discourse on drugs is rather due to institutional differences, the heterogenizing effect of Iran's press policy is foremost a result of factional disputes, which, at the same time, however, also overlap with different institutions. As mentioned, the MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE can be ascribed with a certain homogenizing effect on the press, namely by promoting professional and accountable journalism. Concomitantly, however, the ministry also had a heterogenizing effect, insofar as it played a crucial role in the factional dispute between the conservatives and reformists, which primarily took place in the field of media. Although the ministry was not responsible for licensing newspapers, it was still encouraging the emergence of a liberal, reformist-oriented press – with the culture minister Mohāğērānī even publishing his own newspapers. The body responsible for issuing new media licenses is rather the PRESS SUPERVISORY BOARD, whose board members include a judge appointed by the head of the judiciary; a member of parliament; the culture minister or a representative appointed by him; a university professor appointed by the MINISTRY OF EDUCATION; and a representative chosen by press editors. The PRESS SUPERVISORY BOARD, thus, also exhibits a factional divide, even if during the sample period it was rather controlled by the government.<sup>1454</sup> It assumed responsibility for issuing dozens of licenses for the reformist newspapers, even though some new conservative or radical newspapers appeared as well; and as a result might be seen as having contributed to the polarization of the press.

<sup>1453</sup> *Entehāb*, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999).

<sup>1454</sup> *Shahidi* (2007), 69.

The courts, which the conservatives used to gradually ban practically all outspoken reformist and critical newspapers, had a stronger heterogenizing power effect on the press. Involved in this process were many further conservatively controlled entities, which usually served as plaintiffs against specific reformist newspapers (**chapter III**). It could be argued that this was a certain corrective to the imbalance in the press landscape that was dominated – at least numerically – by the reformist press. But the conservatives were in control of all television and radio stations and of practically all other relevant political bodies, and thus eventually had the upper hand in the press policy. The passing of the new press law of 1999, which only came into effect on 14<sup>th</sup> April 2000, shortly after the end of the sample period, eventually formed the basis for the closure of the reformist press in 2000 and 2001. It could be argued that this closure of practically all reformist newspapers eventually had a certain homogenizing factor, by basically only leaving moderate and conservative newspapers over. Since this only happened after the sample period, this action was at most felt afterwards.

The aggressive procedure of the courts against the reformist newspapers, nevertheless, had a certain disruptive effect on the press. This heterogenizing effect on the drugs discourse is, admittedly, less felt on a content-related level and at least only marginally on the more existential level, since the publishers of the banned newspapers simply published new ones during the sample period. The reformist newspapers were, nevertheless naturally impeded in their reporting, since time gaps between successive publications as well as personal and organizational disruptions still had an inhibiting effect. While the popular reformist newspapers *Ġāme‘eh* and its successor *Tūs* already were shut down in 1998 (**chapter III**); the SPECIAL COURT FOR CLERICS banned the equally important reformist papers *Salām* and *Našāt* in August and September 1999.<sup>1455</sup> It might be a mere coincidence, but it is nevertheless noticeable that almost none of the new reformist newspapers publishes any drug-related articles between August and October, although other newspapers close to the reformist administration such as the *Hamšahrī*, *Irān*, *Ĥorāsān*, or *Payām-e Āzādī* and *Āzād* still did.<sup>1456</sup>

<sup>1455</sup> The SPECIAL COURT FOR CLERICS actually already had ruled to ban the publication of *Salām* on 8<sup>th</sup> June 1999, yet the definitive closure only occurred on 5<sup>th</sup> August: **Karimian & Bahrapour** (1999), 39; **Samii** (1999), 2; **Buchta** (2000), 191; **Tarrock** (2001), 590f.; **Samii** (2001), 3; after the court order in June, *Salām* indeed published another two drug-related articles: *Salām*, 20 Ĥordād 1378 (10 June 1999); *Salām*, 2 Tīr 1378 (23 June 1999); concerning *Našāt*: **Samii** (1999), 3f.; **Buchta** (2000), 193f.

<sup>1456</sup> The only exceptions are: **Āftāb-e Emrūz**, 2 Šahrīvar 1378 (24 August 1999); and: **Aḥbār-e Eqtešādī**, 31 Šahrīvar 1378 (22 September 1999); **Aḥbār-e Eqtešādī**, 11 Mehr 1378 (3 October 1999); on the appearance of drug related articles in the other, often more moderate reformist newspapers: **Vohūman**, 7 Šahrīvar 1378 (29 August 1999); **Irān**, 9 Šahrīvar 1378 (31 August 1999); **Ĥorāsān**, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999); **Payām-e Āzādī**, 3 Mehr 1378 (25 September 1999); **Hamšahrī**, 5 Mehr 1378 (27

Only from November onwards, did the most famous reformist newspapers write again about drug-related issues,<sup>1457</sup> with *Hordād* managing to publish two articles before its final closure<sup>1458</sup>

### ***VI. 2. c. The heterogenizing power of the Iranian press discourse on drugs: power struggles within***

Even though the Iranian press discourse on drugs displays a large overall homogeneity, it still contains heterogeneities that cannot be explained by heterogeneities within the official drug or press policies alone. The strongest heterogenizing influence on the Iranian press discourse on drugs is, arguably, exerted intrinsically within the press. Such heterogeneities appear as contradictions, inconsistencies, and disagreements in the discourse, concerning specific contents, but also in more formal aspects such as specifically the use of language and the quotation of sources. They are observable between individual newspapers, and thus might indeed stem from ideological differences between newspapers. Given the general function of newspapers as organs for political factions in Iran, such different opinions are not surprising. On the contrary, more astonishing is the fact that such differences are not more pronounced in the Iranian press discourse on drugs. Other heterogeneities are observable between the press in general and the official drug policy, without always consciously contradicting the latter. Individual newspapers nevertheless introduce new opinions and ideas, often by non-governmental sources. In doing so, they might, admittedly still voice disagreement with existing drug policy patterns and advance their own ideas of adequate drug policy measures. More crucially, however, by expressing such diverging opinions, the newspapers also influence each other. In this manner, they collectively contribute to a constant renegotiation of the Iranian press discourse on drugs, and probably the official drug policy. As a result, heterogeneous *discourse positions* can establish new *discourse orders*, which in turn have a

---

September 1999); *Āzād*, 6 Mehr 1378 (28 September 1999); *Horāsān*, 8 Mehr 1378 (30 September 1999); *Īrān*, 19 Mehr 1378 (11 October 1999); *Kār va Kārgar*, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999); *Kār va Kārgar*, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999).

<sup>1457</sup> *Hordād* still published drug-related articles shortly before its closure: *Hordād*, 1 & 2 Āḍar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999); *Hordād*, 4 Āḍar 1378 (25 November 1999); further drug-related articles were published by the reformist newspapers: *Āftāb-e Emrūz*, 26 Ābān 1378 (17 November 1999); *Āftāb-e Emrūz*, 27 Bahman 1378 (16 February 2000); *Šobh-e Emrūz*, 5 Esfand 1378 (25 February 2000); *‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān*, 17 Āḍar 1378 (8 December 1999); *Bayān*, 27 Āḍar 1378 (18 December 1999); *Bayān*, 28 Āḍar 1378 (19 December 1999); *Fath*, 19 & 20 Bahman (8 & 9 February 2000); *Fath*, 12 Esfand 1378 (2 March 2000); *Fath*, 18 Esfand 1378 (8 March 2000); *Fath*, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000); *Fath*, 25 & 26 Esfand 1378 (16 & 17 March 2000); two further articles appeared in the reformist newspapers: *Ham-Mīhan*, 19 & ?? Esfand (9 & ?? March 2000); *Mošārekāt*, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000).

<sup>1458</sup> *Hordād*, 1 & 2 Āḍar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999); *Hordād*, 4 Āḍar 1378 (25 November 1999).



homogenizing effect. Such renegotiations, however, it must be noted, takes place in the discussion of other political and social topics.

### **The international drug policy**

As has been the case for the homogenizing influence, international drug policy discourses also have certain heterogenizing impact on the Iranian press discourse on drugs. This becomes for instance visible in the reporting on the liberal drug policy of foreign countries. While many newspapers, at least initially, refute the application of similar policies in Iran; *Hamšahrī* in 1376 (1997-98) nevertheless explicitly estimates *harm reduction* measures as those applied in Switzerland to be effective in reducing drug-related crimes, thus at least implicating a potential practicability in Iran.<sup>1459</sup> Certainly the most critical comparison, however, comes from the reformist newspaper *Fath*. By comparing the drug policies of Turkey and Iran, it not only explicitly criticizes insufficient prevention measures in Iran, but at least implicitly, also critically questions the existing laws banning alcohol in Iran, since the legality of alcohol is mentioned as a reason for the lower addiction rate in Turkey.<sup>1460</sup>

Some other dissenting, critical or new positions that are also influenced by international drug discourses, originate rather from the medical *discourse level*, and thus are discussed below.

### **The domestic drugs discourse**

#### ***The history of drugs in Iran***

While generally following the officially approved history of drugs in Iran as provided by the DCHQ treatise, some newspapers start to provide additional information. These are not always forcibly opposing the official narrative, but nevertheless provide a more nuanced understanding. Interestingly, the moderately conservative newspapers provide such additional information. *Eṭṭelā'āt* for instance points to the fact that drugs have existed since earliest time in Iran, since they are already mentioned in the *Avesta*;<sup>1461</sup> and later mentions the widespread opium consumption during Šafavīd times.<sup>1462</sup> Drugs are, thus, at least implicitly presented as a traditional and integral part of the Iranian society, and not as the result of a “colonialist” conspiracy against Iran. *Abrār* for its part insists that opium “has no Iranian roots”,<sup>1463</sup> but that

---

<sup>1459</sup> *Hamšahrī*, 24 Šahrīvar 1376 (14 September 1997).

<sup>1460</sup> *Fath*, 12 Esfand 1378 (2 March 2000).

<sup>1461</sup> *Eṭṭelā'āt*, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995).

<sup>1462</sup> *Eṭṭelā'āt*, 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999).

<sup>1463</sup> *Abrār*, 10 & 11 Āḍar 1376 (1 & 2 December 1997).

it was introduced to Iran during the Arab conquests.<sup>1464</sup> This argument is later repeated by *Hamšahrī* and *Āfarīneš*, which explicitly refer to Ādaraḥš's history of drugs in Iran.<sup>1465</sup> This, however, too rather deviates from the official narrative in Iran, as exemplified by the treatise on the history of drugs of Malek-Moḥammādī (**chapter II**). *Abrār* additionally even questions the Islamic Republic's alleged initial success in combating drug trafficking by pointing to the general inexperience of the new authorities in this regard.<sup>1466</sup> This opinion is later repeated by *Horāsān*.<sup>1467</sup>

### ***Drug trafficking***

Another dissenting voice is clearly directed at the government. The radical *Kaiḥān* explicitly opposes the judiciary's apparent leniency towards local drug traffickers in the province of Sīstān va Balūčestān, as an article reveals, in which the DCHQ defends this practice.<sup>1468</sup> Two years later, *Resālat* also requests an intensification of the security efforts against drug traffickers at the Eastern border, by specifically demanding to include the BASİĞ. It even accuses the police of putting released drug dealers on the statistics of cured addicts without paying attention as to whether they continue to deal with drugs.<sup>1469</sup> And again two years later, *Kaiḥān* accuses the DCHQ of spending money on the acquisition of "buildings for the dialogue of civilizations" (*sāḥtemān-e goft-o-gū-ye tamaddon-hā*) instead of leading a serious combat against drug trafficking, in a clear attack against the Ḥātāmī administration.<sup>1470</sup> The governmental newspaper *Irān*, in turn, identifies the economic underdevelopment in this province for the involvement of the local inhabitants in drug trafficking, thus at least implicitly also blaming the Iranian government.<sup>1471</sup> *Entehāb*, in contrast, rather criticizes the DCHQ of not publishing statistics on executed drug traffickers,<sup>1472</sup> while *Āftāb-e Emrūz* maintains that the official statistics of intercepted drugs merely proves that a much more extended drug trafficking is taking place.<sup>1473</sup>

<sup>1464</sup> *Abrār*, 10 Āḍar 1376 (1 December 1997); *Abrār*, 11 Āḍar 1376 (2 December 1997).

<sup>1465</sup> Also mentioning this detail are: *Hamšahrī*, 11 Āḍar 1376 (2 December 1997); and: *Āfarīneš I*, 16 Āḍar 1376 (7 December 1997).

<sup>1466</sup> *Abrār*, 10 & 11 Āḍar 1376 (1 & 2 December 1997).

<sup>1467</sup> *Āfarīneš I*, 16 Āḍar 1376 (7 December 1997); *Horāsān*, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July 1999); *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, in contrast, still defends the official version of a decrease in the addiction rate, in the first years after 1979: *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 16 Ordibehesht 1378 (6 May 1999).

<sup>1468</sup> *Kaiḥān*, 15 Ābān 1374 (6 November 1995).

<sup>1469</sup> *Resālat*, 26 Ābān 1376 (17 November 1997).

<sup>1470</sup> *Kaiḥān*, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999).

<sup>1471</sup> *Irān*, 28 Dey 1374 (19 January 1996).

<sup>1472</sup> *Entehāb*, 18 Tīr 1378 (9 July 1999).

<sup>1473</sup> *Āftāb-e Emrūz*, 26 Ābān 1378 (17 November 1999).

### *Addiction – crime or illness?*

Arguably the most scathing attack on the official drug policy comes from the newspapers *Resālat* and *Kaihān*, before the passing of the AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW in November 1997. Citing various *fatāwā* of famous clerics, *Kaihān* emphasizes that drug consumption is still religiously forbidden and that “as a consequence, the sentencing of [...] a drug misuser and the admonishing of a criminal is necessary like in case of all other crimes for the protection and preservation of the community and for the prevention of evils” (*laḏā moğāzāt kardan-e [...] sū’-maşraf-konandeh beh ḥāṭer-e ḥefẓ va şiyānat-e eğtemā’ va ḡelou-gīrī az mafāsedī [...] va tanabboḥ-e moğrem mānand-e har ḡorm-e dīgarī lāzem bāşad*).<sup>1474</sup> *Resālat* also defends the previous repressive drug policy, which in practice has been re-orientated towards a more health-based approach even before this law. It explicitly supports a continuing criminalization of drug addiction by calling the existing law of 1988 as “very good” (*besyār ḥūb*) and advocating a determined application of “the death penalty, of long prison sentences, and of the expulsion of addicts to labor islands” (*moğāzāt-hā-ye e’ dām va zandān-hā-ye ṭavīl-ol-moddat beh hamrāh-e e’zām-e mo’tādān beh ḡazāyer-e maḥşūş-e kār*).<sup>1475</sup> Such radical positions are admittedly exceptional, even for these two newspapers.

After the passing of the AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW, the governmental newspaper *Īrān* is the first to point out that drug addicts are still being imprisoned, even if they are willing to undergo treatment,<sup>1476</sup> a criticism that is repeated by other newspapers.<sup>1477</sup> Later, even Heşmatī, the deputy of the DCQH, admits in an interview with *Enteḥāb*: “we do not want to arrest thousands of people per day” (*nemīḥvāhīm maṭalan rūzī hezār nafar dast-gīr konīm*).<sup>1478</sup> *Enteḥāb* also points to a worse consequence of the widespread incarcerations, namely the spread of AIDS by way of needle sharing.<sup>1479</sup> *Īrān*, in contrast, sees the basic problem not only in the law, but essentially also in inconsistent approaches of the different institutions involved in the official drug policy.<sup>1480</sup>

<sup>1474</sup> *Kaihān*, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995).

<sup>1475</sup> *Resālat*, 6 Ābān 1376 (28 October 1997); *Resālat*, 14 Ābān 1376 (5 November 1997).

<sup>1476</sup> *Īrān*, 8. Ḥordād 1374 (29 May 1995); *Īrān*, 29 Tīr 1374 (20 July 1995).

<sup>1477</sup> *Şobḥ-e Emrūz*, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999); *Ḥordād*, 1 & 2 Āḡar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999).

<sup>1478</sup> *Enteḥāb*, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999).

<sup>1479</sup> *Enteḥāb*, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999).

<sup>1480</sup> *Īrān*, 19 Mehr 1378 (11 October 1999).

## Drug addiction

In the last year, the newspapers start to report about new drugs in Iran. *Ĥordād* for instance mentions crack (*krāk*), which it correctly describes as variety of heroin (in Iran);<sup>1481</sup> while *Ĥorāsān*, provides new details about student parties in Kermān, where girls smoke hashish (*ḥašīš*) and drink alcohol (*alkol*), thus being one of the few articles that explicitly talk about the consumption of these two certainly widespread drugs in Iran.<sup>1482</sup> More importantly, the newspapers start to increasingly question the official addiction statistics. Initially, *Hamšahrī* complains about the lack of exact statistics on drug addiction in Iran,<sup>1483</sup> while the official estimation of 500,000 drug addicts is repeated throughout the years (cf. above). In 1378 (1999-2000), some newspapers start to refer to the new official estimation of two million drug users – 1.2 million addicts and another 800,000 recreational drug users – of the RSA study, which is only once explicitly mentioned by name in the newspaper *Kār va Kārgar*.<sup>1484</sup> Yet, *Abrār* and *Īrān* reveal that the NATIONAL AIDS COMMITTEE actually assumes a number of three million drug addicts.<sup>1485</sup> In reporting about the “second conference on addiction prevention among high school students” (*dovvomīn hemāyeš-e pīš-gīrī az e‘tiyād-e dāneš-āmūzān*), *Mošārekāt* even mentions seven million drug addicts in the country, of which approximately half would be under the age of eighteen;<sup>1486</sup> while *Resālat* rather alarmingly warns of twenty million drug users until the year 2014.<sup>1487</sup>

From 1376 (1997-98), the newspapers also increasingly start to write about drug addiction among women. In the beginning, women are rather portrayed as victims of drug-addicted husbands.<sup>1488</sup> The first articles on drug addiction among Iranian women only appear in 1378 (1999-2000). *Āftāb-e Emrūz*’s dedicates an entire article to this topic, and reproduces the official estimation that ten percent of the country’s drug addicts are female.<sup>1489</sup> *Entehāb* later publishes a report about drug addicted women prison,<sup>1490</sup> which is followed by an article

<sup>1481</sup> *Ĥordād*, 13 Ordibehešt 1376 (3 May 1999).

<sup>1482</sup> *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999); *Ĥorāsān*, 5 Tīr 1376 (26 June 1999).

<sup>1483</sup> *Hamšahrī*, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995).

<sup>1484</sup> The study is explicitly mentioned by *Kār va Kārgar*: *Kār va Kārgar*, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999); *Mošārekāt*, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000).

<sup>1485</sup> *Abrār*, 14 Tīr 1378 (5 July 1999); *Īrān*, 29 Ābān 1378 (20 November 1999).

<sup>1486</sup> *Mošārekāt*, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000); *Hamšahrī*, 27 Mehr 1376 (19 October 1997).

<sup>1487</sup> *Resālat*, 18 Šahrīvar 1378 (9 September 1999).

<sup>1488</sup> *Hamšahrī*, 24 Mehr 1376 (16 October 1997); *Qods*, 7 Dey 1376 (28 December 1997); *Qods*, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997).

<sup>1489</sup> *Āftāb-e Emrūz*, 2 Šahrīvar 1378 (24 August 1999).

<sup>1490</sup> Also, 95% of all prison sentences for women are drug-related, while the same is only the case for 75% of men: *Entehāb*, 25 Mehr 1378 (17 October 1999).

of *Fath*, which mentions a female addiction rate of five per cent of all drug addicts;<sup>1491</sup> and of *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, the latter of which introduces women as drug traffickers.<sup>1492</sup> The most critical statement, however, is found in *Ĥorāsān*, where Marżiyyeh Şadiqī, the director of the ĀFTAB SOCIETY and a member of parliament, maintains that the lack of addiction therapy centers is particularly felt by the women.<sup>1493</sup>

*Salām* has, admittedly, already earlier mentioned prostitution, but as a drug-related phenomenon in the international context.<sup>1494</sup> *Hamšahrī* also rather generally names prostitution as a “social crime” usually related to drug addiction, but in an article that is otherwise covering the situation of drug addiction in Iran.<sup>1495</sup> In a later article of *Qods*, however, an interviewed woman tells her personal experience with addiction, stating: “you give your body for every work” (*va tan beh har kārī bedehī*), thus clearly alluding to prostitution in Iran.<sup>1496</sup> And in the same year, *Eṭṭelā‘āt* also talks about prostitution in relation to drug addiction.<sup>1497</sup>

### Addiction causes

Next to poverty and unemployment, which all newspapers cite as important addiction causes, individual newspapers also mention further probable addiction causes. Particularly the conservative newspapers – yet, including *Hamšahrī* – also mention the lack of religiosity as a cause for drug addiction.<sup>1498</sup> The reformist and governmental newspapers, in contrast, rather identify factors such as lacking recreational facilities for the youth,<sup>1499</sup> or in general lacking individual rights<sup>1500</sup> as important addiction causes. Concerning women, most newspapers mention addicted family members – especially the husband – as an important addiction cause. *Eṭṭelā‘āt* even advocates an easing of divorce rules for women married to a drug-addicted husband.<sup>1501</sup> *Payām-e Āzādī* further quotes Member of Parliament Sohailā Ġeloudārzādeh

<sup>1491</sup> *Fath*, 19 & 20 Bahman (8 & 9 February 2000).

<sup>1492</sup> *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 30 Bahman & 1 & 2 & 19 Esfand (19 & 20 & 21 February & 9 March 2000).

<sup>1493</sup> *Ĥorāsān*, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999).

<sup>1494</sup> *Salām II*, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995).

<sup>1495</sup> *Hamšahrī*, 17 Šahrīvar (7 September 1997); again in an international context: *Hamšahrī*, 28 Mehr 1376 (20 October 1997).

<sup>1496</sup> *Qods*, 7 & 8 & 9 & 10 Dey 1376 (28 & 29 & 30 & 31 December 1997).

<sup>1497</sup> *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999)

<sup>1498</sup> *Hamšahrī*, 19 Ordībehešt 1374 (9 May 1995); but also in: *Kaihān*, 4 Ĥordād 1374 (17 June 1995).

*Eṭṭelā‘āt*, 11 Tīr 1374 (2 July 1995); in particular in: *Kaihān*, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995).

<sup>1499</sup> *Hamšahrī*, 19 Ordībehešt 1374 (9 May 1995); *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, 29 Ĥordād 1374 (19 June 1995); *Īrān*, 29 Tīr 1374 (20 July 1995); *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997); *Resālat*, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 October 1997); *Qods*, 9 Dey 1376 (30 December 1997).

<sup>1500</sup> *Īrān*, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999); *Īrān*, 19 Mehr 1378 (11 October 1999);

<sup>1501</sup> *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, 20 Bahman 1376 (9 February 1997).

with a statement that in reality thirty-four per cent of all marriages are divorced due to the drug addiction of the husband; and that in such a case “divorce ... is [indeed] the best form of combat” (*ṭalāq [...] behtarīn šekl-e mobārezeh [...]*).<sup>1502</sup> A further interesting, though rather rhetorical question is asked by *Resālat*, which wonders why there is less addiction among Afghan refugees than among the inhabitants of Zahedan / Baluchestan.<sup>1503</sup>

### **Addiction therapy & drug prevention**

From the beginning (1997-98), the newspapers point to the insufficiencies and inconsistencies of the official drug demand reduction measures. An obvious confusion already exists concerning the number of official rehabilitation centers.<sup>1504</sup> *Eṭṭelā‘āt* further criticizes the official treatment period of two months in the rehabilitation center Qarčak Varāmīn of being too short.<sup>1505</sup> And *Īrān* quotes the sociology professor Šādeq Farbod, who criticizes that the HEALTH MINISTRY is still only planning to implement new medicinal and prevention measures.<sup>1506</sup> This argument is later often repeated again.<sup>1507</sup>

Some newspapers even express a more fundamental criticism. While *Ḥorāsān* dates the beginning of serious addiction therapy and prevention programs to 1374 (1995-96),<sup>1508</sup> *Kār va Kārgar* assumes serious addiction therapy only started under Ḥātāmī.<sup>1509</sup> In 1378 (1999-2000), the reformist newspapers criticize the lack of therapy facilities for the many domestic drug addicts,<sup>1510</sup> as well as the lack of treatment medication.<sup>1511</sup> *Īrān* even claims that the therapy measures applied in Iran differ diametrically from international models;<sup>1512</sup> while *Ḥorāsān* quotes ‘Emrān-Moḥammad Razzāgāi, the author of recently published RSA, with the opinion that in the official *drug demand reduction* programs, many mistakes have been

<sup>1502</sup> **Payām-e Āzādī**, 2 Āḍar 1378 (23 November 1999).

<sup>1503</sup> **Resālat**, 26 Ābān 1376 (17 November 1197).

<sup>1504</sup> 11 centers: **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 27 & 28 & 29 Ḥordād 1374 (17 & 18 & 19 June 1995); **Īrān**, 18 Āḍar 1374 (9 December 1995); 17 centers: **Hamšahrī**, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995); 20 centers: **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 10 & 11 & 12 & 13 & 14 Tīr 1374 (1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 July 1995).

<sup>1505</sup> **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 28 Ḥordād 1374 (18 June 1995).

<sup>1506</sup> **Īrān**, 29 Tīr 1374 (20 July 1995).

<sup>1507</sup> Cf. for instance: **Hamšahrī**, 3 Tīr 1376 (24 June 1997)

<sup>1508</sup> **Ḥorāsān**, 6 & 7 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 June 1999).

<sup>1509</sup> **Kār va Kārgar**, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999).

<sup>1510</sup> **Āfarīneš**, 24 Ābān 1376 (15 November 1997); **Šobḥ-e Emrūz**, 25 & 26 & 27 Ḥordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999); **Entehāb**, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999); **Ḥorāsān**, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999); **Fath**, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000).

<sup>1511</sup> **Šobḥ-e Emrūz**, 25 & 26 & 27 Ḥordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999); **Fath**, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000).

<sup>1512</sup> **Īrān**, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999); **Hamšahrī**, 3 Tīr 1376 (24 June 1997); **Hamšahrī**, 2 Mehr 1376 (24 September 1997) **Āfarīneš**, 22 Ābān 1376 (13 November 1997); **Qods**, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997).

made so far.<sup>1513</sup> To yet another problem points the newspaper *Āfarīneš*, which deplores a lacking cooperation between governmental and private therapy centers.<sup>1514</sup> *Horāsān*, in contrast, emphasizes the higher success rate of private centers in treating drug addicts,<sup>1515</sup> and in a later article points to the fact that such private centers are still not allowed to legally treat their patients with certain medication.<sup>1516</sup> *Qods*, additionally, points to the ongoing social stigmatization as a reason for the high relapse rates.<sup>1517</sup> Yet, the most progressive article in this regard is published by *Ḥordād*. In an interview with the clinical psychologist Amīr Hūšang Mehryār, it mentions substitution treatment by methadone and even maintenance treatment by opioids, as well as the distribution of syringes for drug addicts in Iran. Mehryār also complains that medication-supported therapy was neglected to a certain degree in 1376 (1997-98) in favor of drug prevention.<sup>1518</sup> A little later, *Āftāb-e Emrūz* conveys the rumor that the HEALTH MINISTRY in fact already has provided the SPO with syringes to be distributed among addicted inmates,<sup>1519</sup> while *Āzād* even earlier has requested the development of addiction therapy in prisons.<sup>1520</sup> While the discussion of such harm reduction measures might not have influenced Iranian drug policy directly, some of these measures, nevertheless, would be made legally available in Iran soon afterwards (**chapter III**).

### *Drug prevention*

Concerning specific drug prevention measures, *Hamšahrī* initially publishes an article by Moḥīt from the WHO, who states that religion plays no decisive role in drug prevention. While not forcibly sharing his opinion, it is nevertheless astonishing that it publishes his statement.<sup>1521</sup> The more conservative newspapers continue to cite religious institutions and particularly religious families as important for drug prevention throughout the years.<sup>1522</sup> This emphasis of the preventive character of religion later even has an influence on some reformist

<sup>1513</sup> *Horāsān*, 6 & 7 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 June 1999).

<sup>1514</sup> *Āfarīneš*, 24 Ābān 1376 (15 November 1997).

<sup>1515</sup> *Horāsān*, 8 Mehr 1378 (30 September 1999).

<sup>1516</sup> *Horāsān*, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July 1999).

<sup>1517</sup> *Qods*, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997).

<sup>1518</sup> *Ḥordād*, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999); also in: *Ḥordād*, 1 & 2 Āḍar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999).

<sup>1519</sup> *Āftāb-e Emrūz*, 27 Bahman 1378 (16 February 2000).

<sup>1520</sup> *Āzād*, 6 Mehr 1378 (28 September 1999).

<sup>1521</sup> *Hamšahrī*, 19 Ordībehešt 1374 (9 May 1995); similar in: *Resālat I*, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995); *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, 11 Tīr 1374 (2 July 1995).

<sup>1522</sup> *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, 29 Ḥordād 1374 (19 June 1995); *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, 11 Tīr 1374 (2 July 1995); emphasizing the repressive character of religion: *Kaiḥān*, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995); *Abrār*, 15 Esfand 1374 (5 March 1996); *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997); *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, 28 Tīr 1376 (19 July 1997); *Abrār*, 12 Šahrīvar 1376 (3 September 1997); *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, 17 Mehr 1376 (9 October 1997); *Āfarīneš*, 22 Ābān 1376 (13 November 1997); *Āfarīneš*, 24 Ābān 1376 (15 November 1997); or: *Qods*, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997); *Qods*, 28 Farvardīn 1378 (17 April 1999); *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999); *Entehāb*, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999); *Resālat*, 18 Šahrīvar 1378 (9 September 1999); *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999).

newspapers.<sup>1523</sup> The reformist newspapers, however, rather tend to emphasize other prevention measures. *Īrān* for instance advises the Iranian government to take more inspiration from foreign countries.<sup>1524</sup>

The press further especially criticizes that the prevention measures applied so far have failed.<sup>1525</sup> *Horāsān* particularly blames this on the fact that drug prevention is not addressed by the AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW of 1997.<sup>1526</sup> Others directly accuse the DCHQ and the EDUCATION MINISTRY of being inactive in this regard.<sup>1527</sup> This even leads to a veritable exchange of mutual recriminations. The deputy of the DCQH in turn accuses the MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE, as well as the IRIB and the media in general, of not doing enough; while *Entehāb* defends the media by insisting that the press extensively covers drug-related topics, but that they are indeed not always provided with correct information by state institutions such as the DCHQ.<sup>1528</sup>

### ***Harm reduction measures***

The reason for the introduction of specific harm reduction measures in Iran has in particular been the spread of HIV/AIDS among injecting drug users. During the sample period, however, only few newspapers refer to this illness. The first newspaper to mention AIDS – as all newspapers indiscriminately refer to – is *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, by mentioning it as a particular problem in Iran's border provinces, thus insinuating a foreign impact.<sup>1529</sup> It is, however, astonishingly, also the first to explicitly mention it as a specific problem among intravenous drug users in Iran.<sup>1530</sup> In 1378 (1999-2000) the reformist newspapers continue to write about HIV/AIDS as a consequence of needle sharing practices. *Šobh-e Emrūz* and *Entehāb* now both mention it as a problem in Iranian prisons;<sup>1531</sup> while *Ĥordād* provides more detailed information on the transmission of HIV by citing governmental research on HIV in

<sup>1523</sup> *Kār va Kārgar*, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999); *Āzād*, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 1999); *Payām-e Āzādī*, 7 Bahman 1378 (27 January 2000).

<sup>1524</sup> *Īrān*, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999).

<sup>1525</sup> *Horāsān*, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July 1999); *Gozāreš-e Rūz*, 1 & 11 & ?? Esfand (20 February & 1 & ?? March 2000).

<sup>1526</sup> *Horāsān*, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July 1999).

<sup>1527</sup> *Ĥordād* for instance accuses the DCHQ of paying only attention to treatment: *Ĥordād*, 13 Ordībehešt 1376 (3 May 1999); *Kār va Kārgar* cites a study of the DCHQ which has shown that school books still only contain few information on drug addiction: *Kār va Kārgar*, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999); *Fath* deplores that 'after years' (*pas az sāl-hā*) such information in schoolbooks are still lacking: *Fath*, 12 Esfand 1378 (2 March 2000).

<sup>1528</sup> *Entehāb*, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999).

<sup>1529</sup> *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 19 Bahman 1376 (8 February 1997).

<sup>1530</sup> *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997).

<sup>1531</sup> *Šobh-e Emrūz*, 25 & 26 & 27 Ĥordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999); *Entehāb*, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999).



the prisons of Kermānšāh and Kahnavāč.<sup>1532</sup> That drugs are also being consumed within the Iranian prisons, is stated by the newspaper *Abrār*: „the craving for drugs is stronger in prisons than outside”.<sup>1533</sup> The newspaper *Ḥordād* later claims that this is only possible because drugs are obviously smuggled into prisons by corrupt prison officials.<sup>1534</sup> *Entehāb*, finally, even insinuates that the DCHQ is not publishing correct statistics on the real extent of this disease among drug users.<sup>1535</sup>

### *Heterogeneities in the citation of interviews in the Iranian drug discourse*

Further differences between conservative and reformist newspapers can be observed in the domestic sources they are quoting, both concerning the number of interviews as well as the institutional affiliation of the interviewed specialists. These differences do, however, not coherently run along factional lines.

The differences are most pronounced in 1374 (1995-96). In this year, the conservative newspapers are referring more often to security-related officials, such as for instance then interior minister ‘Alī-Moḥammad Bašārātī, the top police commander Reżā Sayf-Elāhī, or Yūsef Reżā Abo ‘l-Fathī, the police commander of greater Tehran.<sup>1536</sup> The newspapers of the moderate right, including *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, in contrast, rather quote specialists from health-related institutions such as ‘Alī-Reżā Ġazāyerī, director of the SWO, and Emrān-Moḥammad Rezzāġī, deputy for cultural affairs of the SWO; the sociology professors Šādeq Farbod and Manšūr Voṭūqī; the independent acupuncture specialist Šāleḥ Šīvā,<sup>1537</sup> and many more health professionals.<sup>1538</sup> In 1376 (1997-98), the differences between the newspapers are rather negligible, since all newspapers now conduct interviews with health care specialists. In 1378 (1999-2000), in contrast, the reformist newspaper<sup>1539</sup> – yet including the religious-

<sup>1532</sup> *Ḥordād*, 1 & 2 Āḍar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999).

<sup>1533</sup> *Āfarīneš*, 20 & 21 & 22 & 24 Ābān 1376 (11 & 12 & 13 & 15 November 1997):

<sup>1534</sup> *Ḥordād*, 1 & 2 Āḍar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999).

<sup>1535</sup> *Entehāb*, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999).

<sup>1536</sup> For Bašārātī: *Resālat II*, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995); *Abrār*, 15 Tīr 1374 (6 July 1995); for Saif-Elāhī: *Kaiḥān*, 22 Tīr 1374 (13 July 1995); for Abo ‘l-Fathī: *Resālat I*, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995); also XXX Hossanī, head of the REVOLUTIONARY COURTS: *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, 13 Tīr 1374 (4 July 1995); ‘Alī Šafī‘ī, the head of the ANTI NARCOTICS UNIT of the police: *Īrān*, 8. *Ḥordād* 1374 (29 May 1995).

<sup>1537</sup> For Ġazāyerī: *Īrān*, 8. *Ḥordād* 1374 (29 May 1995); for Razzāġī: *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, 29 *Ḥordād* 1374 (19 June 1995); for Farbod and Voṭūqī: *Īrān*, 29 Tīr 1374 (20 July 1995); for Šīvā: *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, 14 Tīr 1374 (5 July 1995); again for Šīvā: *Abrār*, 15 Tīr 1374 (6 July 1995).

<sup>1538</sup> Particularly in: *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, 28 *Ḥordād* 1374 (18 June 1995); *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, 29 *Ḥordād* 1374 (19 June 1995); *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, 13 Tīr 1374 (4 July 1995); many interviews: *Īrān*, 8. *Ḥordād* 1374 (29 May 1995); *Resālat*, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995).

<sup>1539</sup> Most experts were interviewed by: *Entehāb*, 28 Farvardīn 1378 (17 April 1999); *Abrār*, 9 Ordībehešt 1378 (29 April 1999); *Āryā*, 11 Ordībehešt 1378 (1 May 1999); *Šobḥ-e Emrūz*, 25 & 26 & 27 *Ḥordād* 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999); *Ḥorāsān*, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July 1999); *Āftāb-e Emrūz*, 2

conservative newspapers *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* and *Qods* – are starting to cite an increasingly diverse range of sources.<sup>1540</sup> The reformist newspapers also more often cite female addiction specialists such as Āfarīn Raḥīmī-Movaqqar from SWO, Member of Parliament Sohaylā Ġeloudārzādeh, or Marziyyeh Šadiqī, director of the ĀFTĀB SOCIETY.<sup>1541</sup>

### VI. 3. Summary: Professional journalism

#### VI. 3. 1. Summary: the newspaper dominating the Iranian press discourse on drugs

In 1374 (1995-96), the newspaper that report most critically about the situation of drugs and drug policy in Iran, are *Hamšahrī* and *Īrān*. Both are already reporting in a factual and critical style on increasing drug addiction in Iran, for instance by pointing to a lack of exact addiction statistics, or to the dire economic situation Sīstān va Balūčestān that turns the local inhabitants to drug trafficking. They also particularly promote the new *drug demand reduction* measures of the Iranian government.<sup>1542</sup> This is not astonishing, since both were close to the modern right administration of Rafsanḡānī, which was responsible for introducing these first liberal drug policies. Equally accurate is the nominally conservative newspaper *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, which throughout its history has always been a serious and moderate newspaper. Quite different is the radical newspaper *Kaiḥān*, which directly attacks the judiciary and the

---

Šahrīvar 1378 (24 August 1999); **Ĥorāsān**, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999); and: **Kār va Kārgar**, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999).

<sup>1540</sup> E.g. Ġolām-Rezā Anšārī, the new director of the SWO: **Entehāb**, 28 Farvardīn 1378 (17 April 1999); **Ĥorāsān**, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July 1999); Bahrām Yegāneh, director of the NATIONAL AIDS COMMITTEE: **Abrār**, 14 Tīr 1378 (5 July 1999); ‘Emrān-Moḥammad Razzāḡī, the author of the RSA, and later director of INCAS: **Ĥorāsān**, 6 & 7 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 June 1999); **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 30 Bahman & 1 & 2 & 19 Esfand (19 & 20 & 21 February & 9 March 2000); the researchers Moḥtār Mūsavī and Farḥād Tāremīyān of the SWO: **Kār va Kārgar**, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999); sociology professor Farḡād: **Kār va Kārgar**, 21 & 22 & 24 Farvardīn (10 & 11 & 13 April 1999); **Entehāb**, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999); **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 4 Āḡar 1378 (25 November 1999); medical specialist Saif-Elāḥī: **Kār va Kārgar**, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999); **Ĥorāsān**, 5 Esfand 1378 (24 February 2000); addiction specialist Šāleḡpūr: **Ĥorāsān**, 5 Tīr 1376 (26 June 1999); **Ĥorāsān**, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July 1999); clinical psychologist Mehryār: **Ĥordād**, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999); psychiatrist Āḡarahš Mokrī, later the director of INCAS: **Āftāb-e Emrūz**, 2 Šahrīvar 1378 (24 August 1999); **Ĥorāsān**, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999); prevention specialist Sūfivandī: **Šobḡ-e Emrūz**, 25 & 26 & 27 Ĥordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999); **Āftāb-e Emrūz**, 2 Šahrīvar 1378 (24 August 1999); or Ḥossain Dežākām, the founder of Congress 60: **Ĥorāsān**, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999).

<sup>1541</sup> On Ġeloudārzādeh, director of the SOCIETY AGAINST ADDICTION: **Šobḡ-e Emrūz**, 25 & 26 & 27 Ĥordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999); **Payām-e Āzādī**, 2 Āḡar 1378 (23 November 1999); on Šadiqī: **Ĥorāsān**, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July 1999); **Ĥorāsān**, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999); addiction withdrawal specialist Našrīn Qodrat-Namā: **Salām**, 2 Tīr 1378 (23 June 1999); Mīnū Moḡarrez, a specialist for neuropathology: **Ĥordād**, 1 & 2 Āḡar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999); Ms. Zamanī, the head of the Council of the Youth, and Ms. Tehrānī, an education specialist in the Society Against Drugs **Āftāb-e Emrūz**, 2 Šahrīvar 1378 (24 August 1999); or Zohreh Zāre‘, a consultant for the province of Tehran: **Āzād**, 6 Mehr 1378 (28 September 1999).

<sup>1542</sup> **Hamšahrī**, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995); **Īrān**, 28 Dey 1374 (19 January 1996).

DCHQ of being too lenient towards drug traffickers at the Eastern border.<sup>1543</sup> *Salām* in contrast, propagates an ideological, anti-imperialist reading of Iran's drug history, and, thus, reveals an ongoing ideological affiliation with the Islamic left.<sup>1544</sup>

In 1376 (1997-98), the moderate newspapers *Hamšahrī* and *Eṭṭelā'āt* initially continue to lead in factual and critical reporting. For undisclosed reasons, the governmental newspaper *Irān*, publishes no drug-related articles throughout the year. After Ḥātāmī's inauguration, the two newspapers defend their positions. *Hamšahrī* positively assesses the *harm reduction* measures of Switzerland, and refers to women as victims of drug addicted husband;<sup>1545</sup> while *Eṭṭelā'āt* even advocates the easing of the restrictive rights to divorce for such women.<sup>1546</sup> *Salām*, soon the most outspoken reformist newspaper, is still largely absent from the discourse. Ostensibly on the occasion of the Amended Anti Narcotics Law, but arguably also due to the inauguration of the Ḥātāmī administration, which now supervised the DCHQ, *Kaihān* and *Resālat* publish their scathing attack against the new law, defending the old, repressive drug policy. On the other hand, however, the moderately conservative newspaper *Āfarīneš*, and even more astonishingly the strictly conservative newspaper *Qods* also start to write openly and outspokenly about the local drug problem. *Āfarīneš* criticizes the lack of treatment facilities in Iran and, in particular, a lacking cooperation between governmental and private clinics in this regard;<sup>1547</sup> while *Qods* now, too, presents women as victims of male drug-addicted family members and points to the problem of social stigmatization of drug addicts as a reason for addiction relapse.<sup>1548</sup> The traditionally conservative *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, for the first time, even mentions AIDS as a drug-related problem in Iran.<sup>1549</sup>

In 1378 (1999-2000), the new reformist newspapers clearly take the lead in critical reporting. They address the hitherto most sensitive aspects of drug addiction and drug policy, and often even criticize the reformist administration. *Šobḥ-e Emrūz* and *Ḥordād* bring up the topic of HIV/AIDS among drug-addicted inmates in Iran's overcrowded prisons;<sup>1550</sup> while *Ḥordād* asks the SPO to distribute sterile syringes among drug addicted prisoners. *Āftāb-e Emrūz* even reports that this *harm reduction* measure is apparently already being applied in

<sup>1543</sup> *Kaihān*, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995).

<sup>1544</sup> *Salām*, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995).

<sup>1545</sup> *Hamšahrī*, 24 Mehr 1376 (16 October 1997).

<sup>1546</sup> *Eṭṭelā'āt*, 20 Bahman 1376 (9 February 1998).

<sup>1547</sup> *Āfarīneš*, 24 Ābān 1376 (15 November 1997).

<sup>1548</sup> *Qods*, 7 Dey 1376 (28 December 1997); *Qods*, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997).

<sup>1549</sup> *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī*, 23 Dey 1376 (13 January 1998).

<sup>1550</sup> *Šobḥ-e Emrūz*, 25 & 26 & 27 Ḥordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999); *Ḥordād*, 1 & 2 Ādār 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999).

certain prisons.<sup>1551</sup> *Hordād* generally advocates the introduction of more comprehensive *harm reduction* measures such as substitution and maintenance treatment in Iran,<sup>1552</sup> and *Fath* publishes its challenging article, in which it compares the drug policies of Turkey and Iran.<sup>1553</sup> The moderate *Īrān* blames the contradictions and inconsistencies between different state institutions for the inefficiency of Iran's drug policy,<sup>1554</sup> and *Kār va Kārgar* accuses the EDUCATION MINISTRY of still not having prepared prevention material for schools.<sup>1555</sup>

But, the reformist newspapers are not the only newspapers writing critically about the drug problem in Iran. *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* for instance publishes by far the most drug related articles this year. *Abrār* reports that according the National AIDS Committee, there are three million drug addicts in Iran,<sup>1556</sup> only to be topped by the estimation of seven million by *Mošārekāt*.<sup>1557</sup> One of the most critical articles comes from the nominally conservative *Entehāb*, which broaches upon many controversial issues, such as the spread of HIV in prisons, wrong statistics on AIDS/HIV cases and executed drug traffickers.<sup>1558</sup> The radical *Ġavān*, also reports about HIV/AIDS among injecting drug users.<sup>1559</sup> All these newspapers furthermore now include a wide range of sources and interviews including many private addiction specialists and in particular many female addictions specialists. Finally, a criticism of the DCHQ's official drug policy again comes from the radical *Kaihān*, again rather directed against the reformist administration.<sup>1560</sup> In general, however, *Kaihān* like *Resālat* almost cease reporting on drugs in this last sample year.

### VI. 3. 1. Discussion: the Iranian press as a fourth estate?

The literature on the press during the reformist era of Ḥātāmī has in length discussed the relationship between the state, civil society and the press. This discussion particularly centers on the question as to what extent the reformist press has been independent from the reformist government, and thus truly a part of the civil society.<sup>1561</sup> Without aiming at

<sup>1551</sup> *Āftāb-e Emrūz*, 27 Bahman 1378 (16 February 2000).

<sup>1552</sup> *Hordād*, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999).

<sup>1553</sup> *Fath*, 12 Esfand 1378 (2 March 2000).

<sup>1554</sup> *Īrān*, 19 Mehr 1378 (11 October 1999).

<sup>1555</sup> *Kār va Kārgar*, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999).

<sup>1556</sup> *Abrār*, 14 Tīr 1378 (5 July 1999).

<sup>1557</sup> *Mošārekāt*, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000).

<sup>1558</sup> Particularly in: *Entehāb*, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999).

<sup>1559</sup> *Ġavān*, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999).

<sup>1560</sup> *Kaihān*, 8 Āḍar 1378 (29 November 1999).

<sup>1561</sup> Tazmini assumes an increasing independence of the reformist press from the reformist government: *Tazmini* (2009); *Tazmini* (2009); Khiabany sees the reformist press still primarily in the service of the reformist government: *Khiabany* (2010), 128.

expanding on this complex general relationship, it is nevertheless argued here, that at least in the press discourse on drugs, a tendency towards a more independent reporting and a stronger self-consciousness of the press as an independent entity, possibly even a fourth estate (*rokhn-e čahārom*), might be observable. In the present analysis, this seems, however, rather to apply to the press as a whole, not only to the reformist press. Admittedly, individual newspapers continue to serve as organs for the respective political and ideological factions. But at least concerning less contentious issues, yet including the issue of drug policy, an increasingly factual, accurate and critical reporting becomes visible.

As was discussed in this chapter, various factors might be responsible for this. First, the MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE actively encouraged more professional criticism, as exemplified in the topics of the press seminars.<sup>1562</sup> It can also be observed in the Iranian press discourse on drugs that newspapers became more factual, more investigative, more balanced, and more transparent in their reporting.

Second, the intrinsic dynamics, or homogenizing factors within the press and the press discourse also clearly had an influence on the individual newspapers. This becomes clear not only in the range of quoted sources, but also in positions that started as heterogeneous, individual positions, but eventually were adopted by the press as a whole, or at least by other newspapers. This can, for instance, be seen in the introduction of new sensitive topics like HIV/AIDS or corresponding *harm reduction* measures. But it is also observable in criticism directed towards the government. Concerning the latter aspect, one might argue, that the reformist press was generally more inclined to include the reformist government in its criticism, while the conservative press was naturally inclined to criticize the reformist government. But most criticism expressed by the newspapers in the present analysis is not specifically directed against the reformist government, but rather against the DCHQ and the lacking cooperation between different state institutions. It seems, that in this process, the press as a whole has become more critical, and generally more inclined to hold the state accountable for its policies.

Whether this really demonstrates a continual development towards a new self-consciousness of the press remains open to discussion. The fact, nevertheless remains, that

---

<sup>1562</sup> Khiabany correctly points to the crucial interests of the reformists in a more liberal press policy, because they only could communicate their ideas and policies through the press, while the conservatives – of course among other institutions – controlled in particular all television and radio channels: **Khiabany** (2000), 134.

even after the mass closure of the reformist newspapers, Iranian press discourse on drugs remained factual, accurate, accountable, balanced and critical, often including the most radical newspapers. As has been shown, certain newspapers were, admittedly, more decisive in this process: initially particularly the newspapers of the modern right, subsequently the reformist newspapers; but many conservative newspapers, too, followed suit. Since the newspapers concomitantly continued to serve as political organs, this conclusion might sound contradictory and confusing. But such confusing contradictions are often typical for the Islamic Republic.

## VII. Conclusion and Outlook

The present study set out to investigate Iranian press discourse on drugs as it changed during the transitional period from the moderate Rafsanjānī administration to the reformist administration of Ḥātāmī (1995-2000). This period is distinguished by an increasing power struggle between the different factions that shaped the Islamic Republic. The conflict between the conservatives and the reformists has been primarily about power, but also, and more crucially, about the interpretation and implementation of governance. The power struggle between the different political factions in Iran, was essentially about the press, and therefore particularly visible in the press. In the absence of legal political parties, the press has a fundamental political role in Iran. As a rule, Iranian newspapers serve the political factions as organs and the press consequently emerged as a political battleground. This power struggle was observable in the press discourse on drugs, particularly, since the Islamic Republic had recently reoriented its drug policy towards a more liberal and progressive approach. In analyzing this discourse, the study reveals that such ideological differences concerning Iranian drug policy does exist, but to a much lesser degree than expected. It describes a more complex picture, in which both homogeneous and heterogeneous aspects characterize the discourse, but not merely along factional lines.

### *Iran's drug policy in a historical perspective*

The chapter on the history of drugs demonstrated how subsequent Iranian governments have developed and changed their approaches to drug consumption, by constantly adapting their policies. Yet, none of the governments have been successful in stemming the rising consumption and addiction rates, with some willingly or unwillingly contributing to its growth. Drug consumption had been unregulated in Iran for many centuries. Neither the Šafavīds, nor the Qāğārs attempted to address the growing problem of drug addiction. The Qāğārs, and later Reżā Šāh, further contributed to this trend by encouraging the local opium industry as a source of income. Although concomitantly passing first anti drug laws, these remained largely ineffective. The flow of petrodollars soon decreased the importance of the local opium production but addiction rates remained high. Under Moḥammad Reżā Šāh, a first serious repressive drug law was implemented from 1955, arguably under pressure from the USA. But Iranians continued to consume opium, and increasingly heroin, which was trafficked from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Iran. This unintended consequence caused the Iranian government to (re-)introduce a, more liberal law in 1969, allowing for a limited maintenance program.

The new authorities of the Islamic Republic, however, opposed such liberal measures and eventually shut down all therapy facilities. Drug traffickers and drug dealers were put into prisons and prison like rehabilitation camps, and initially were even executed. While such sentences were based on religious law during the initial years, the first explicit ANTI NARCOTICS LAW was passed in 1988, which continued this repressive practice. However, like the law of 1955, it did not succeed in curbing drug addiction, which seems to have become more widespread during the war years. From the mid 1990s, the Rafsanjānī administration, therefore, shifted its drug policy towards a more liberal approach, including medical addiction treatment. The legal basis for this re-orientation was, however, only created by the amended law of 1997. Ḥātāmī expanded these *drug demand reduction* measures, including progressive *harm reduction* measures such as the distribution of syringes and methadone, even within prisons. However, drug consumption and addiction remained criminalized by the law.

### ***Iran's press policy in the Islamic Republic***

The chapter on the history of the press in the Islamic Republic revealed similar repeating patterns. During the fall of Moḥammad-Reżā Šāh, Iran experienced a fourth and last truly free period of press freedom. Not long after, the authorities of the Islamic Republic started to control the press in a strict manner as before. The few existing newspapers became increasingly aligned to the competing political factions during the 1980s. But they only again gained more freedom under Ḥātāmī, first as Rafsanjānī's culture minister and later as president. His election ushered in a fifth „press spring“, which led to the appearance of dozens of newspapers, especially reformist publications. This period was, however, never really free, as the conservative courts started to proceed against the critical and reformist press. By 2000, they practically banned all outspoken reformist newspapers, and the spring came to an end.

### ***The Iranian press discourse on drugs: topics & arguments, homogeneities & heterogeneities***

Unlike in the beginning of the Islamic Republic, when the press had presented drug addicts as homosexuals, pimps, or prostitutes, newspapers began to report more factually and sympathetically on drug addiction and drug addicts during the sample period (1995-2000). This was, arguably, also the result of the changing drug policy and press policy respectively.



The analysis has shown that the official drug policy (discourse) provides Iranian press discourse on drugs with most information. Institutions like the DCHQ, the SWO or the HEALTH MINISTRY, organized events introducing its drug policy, which in turn triggered drug-related newspaper articles; but they also provided the press with much information on the situation of drug addiction, addiction therapy, drug prevention and even first harm reduction measures. Particularly in the beginning, but continuing throughout the years, both the government and the press, takes inspiration from the international drug policy, especially from UN bodies like the UNDCP and the WHO and also from foreign newspaper articles and from foreign addiction experts. Further inspirations come from the religious and the medical drugs discourse. This, nevertheless often takes place through the intermediary of the government.

The government, together with these other sources, thus provides a basic, relatively homogeneous structure of topics and arguments of the Iranian press discourse on drugs; and it determines the general direction towards the discussion of ever more liberal addiction treatment and prevention methods. The analysis has shown that the most important topics and arguments, as presented in the press discourse are: an anti-imperialist history of drugs in Iran; Iran's fierce and successful combat against drug trafficking from Afghanistan; a phenomenology of drugs and drug addiction, together with increasingly precise research findings on the extent, causes, and patterns of addiction, such as for among women, or a drug-related HIV/AIDS; growing medical addiction treatment in governmental and private centers; legislative measures such as especially the AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW of 1997, which was designed to clarify whether "an addict is an ill or a criminal" person; and ever more sophisticated plans for drug prevention; and last but not least drug prevention, which even the government assess critically.

Concomitantly, Iranian press discourse on drugs, however, also displays more heterogeneous patterns. As has been shown, such inconsistencies might also originate from contradictory governmental policies. More often, they originate either from new ideas presented by non-governmental sources, or from individual newspapers. Such new positions do not often appear critical of the official or predominant drug discourse(s). The criticism takes places simply by virtue of expressing new ideas. Such heterogeneities often develop their own dynamic: new opinions or criticism can influence other newspapers in expressing

similar positions, and eventually become a homogeneous factor influencing the entire press (discourse).

As demonstrated, *Kayhān* and *Resālat* lead the most direct attack against the liberal re-orientation. Other newspapers, too, criticized governmental policies or simply introduce new drug policy propositions. Examples for this are *Hamšahrī*'s positive estimation of progressive harm reduction measures in Switzerland; *Eṭṭelā'āt*'s advocacy for an easing of divorce rules for women of addicted husbands; *Entehāb*'s criticism of inexact statistics on HIV in prisons and on executed drug trafficker; *Abrār*'s and *Mošārekāt*'s challenge of the official number of two million drug addicts; *Āfarīneš*' lamentation of an insufficient cooperation between governmental and private therapy centres; or *Hordād*'s proposal to distribute sterile syringe's among imprisoned addicts.

### ***The Iranian press discourse on drugs: extrinsic & intrinsic influences***

The analysis has further revealed that Iranian drug policy, the press policy and the press discourse on drugs on itself have a homogenizing effect on the press as a whole, namely concerning factual and accurate journalism. As argued, such topics were for instance discussed in the press seminars organized by the MINISTRY FOR ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE. But a similar effect can be ascribed to the mutual influence between the newspapers. In the first year of the sample period, the moderate newspapers like *Hamšahrī*, *Irān*, and *Eṭṭelā'āt* are responsible for critical, factual and well-investigated reports. In the second year, this style seems to have influenced the conservative newspapers like *Āfarīneš* and *Qods*. In the last year of consideration, the reformist newspapers set new standards for critical reporting with the conservative *Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī* and particularly *Entehāb* writing according to critical and professional journalistic standards. As a result, the press as a whole might have increasingly developed more professional standards, maybe even a certain self-consciousness as a fourth estate – even though the individual newspapers continued to serve as organs for the competing political factions. This is observable in the Iranian press discourse on drugs, in fact even after the mass closure of the reformist newspapers in 2000. The newspapers from both sides continue to critically question official statistics and drug policy measures, and to introduce increasingly progressive concepts of harm reduction.

### ***Implications for future research and outlook***

This analysis of Iranian press discourse is one of the few existing content analysis that has been undertaken of Iranian media. Further analyses are recommended here, since they can contribute to a more material-based and accurate interpretation of the functioning of Iranian media. Much recent research has concentrated on the new social media in Iran, including online news portals, web logs, or twitter feeds. While such research is certainly important and informative, it nevertheless runs the risk of overrating their importance in the Iranian society. The press in general still remains important in influencing and forming public opinion in Iran – at least at the time of the writing of this study (not its publication).

## VIII. Appendix I: Drug-Related Newspaper Articles in the Iranian Daily Press (1995-2000)

### A) Drug-Related Newspaper Articles in 1374 (1995/96)

- 1) **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 14 Farvardīn 1374 (3 April 1995): “The president [said] in the ceremony of the Friday prayer in Iran: the emphasis of the Supreme Leader on monetary and economical discipline and on the prevention of lavishness and dissipation is a constructive recommendation for the Islamic state” (*Ra’īs-e ġomhūr dar marāsem-e namāz-e ġom’ah-ye tehrān: ta’kīd-e rahbarī dar mawred-e enžebā’-e mālī va eqtešādī va ġelaw-ġīrī az esrāf va tabdīr-e yek tawšīyah-ye banā’ī barāye nežām-e eslāmī ast*).
- 2) **Hamšahrī**, 6 Ordībehešt 1374 (26 April 1995): “The Golden Triangle and the black powder” (*Moṭallaq-e ṭalā’ī, gerd-e siyāh*).
- 3) **Hamšahrī**, 14 Ordībehešt 1374 (4 May 1995): “Clouded brains” (*Maġz-ha-ye abr-ālūdeh*) – not available.
- 4) **Hamšahrī**, 19 Ordībehešt 1374 (9 May 1995): “Where should we start – in preventing addiction?” (*Az koġā āġāz konīm – barāye pīš-ġīrī az e’tiyād?*).
- 5) **Abrār**, 20 Ordībehešt 1374 (10 May 1995): “Economical crime” (*Ġenāyat-e eqtešādī*).
- 6) **Hamšahrī**, 23 Ordībehešt 1374 (13 May 1995): “A flood of the entrance of drugs to Europe” (*Sayl-e vorūd-e mavādd-e moḡadder beh orūpā*).
- 7) **Hamšahrī I**, 27 Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995): “Europe’s criticism of Holand’s laws handling with drugs” (*Enteqād-e orūpā az qavānīn-e bar-ḡord bā mavādd-e moḡadder dar holand*).
- 8) **Hamšahrī II**, 27. Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995): “What needs to be done? Summary of the preliminary national programme of addiction prevention and therapy” (*Ĉeh bāyad kard? Ḥolāšah-ye pīš-nevīs-e barnāmeḡ-ye mellī-ye pīš-ġīrī va bāz-parvarī-ye e’tiyād*).

9) **Īrān**, 8. Hordād 1374 (29 May 1995): “Deliverance from the high fortification of addiction” (*Rahā’ī az heṣār-e boland-e e’tiyād*).

10) **Kayhān**, 25 Hordād 1374 (15 June 1995): “Growth of the rose of “hope” and “life” in the brackwater of addiction. On the occasion of the formation of the NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO FIGHT ADDICTION 1” (*Rūyeš-e gol-e "omīd" va "zendegī" dar šūre-zār-e e’tiyād. Be monāsebat-e taškīl-e komīteh-ye kešvarī-ye mobārezeh bā e’tiyād 1*).

11) **Kayhān**, 27 Hordād 1374 (17 June 1995): “Rehabilitation, emergence of the "bright morning" from the dark evening of addiction. On the occasion of the formation of the NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO FIGHT ADDICTION 2” (*Bāzparvarī, damīdan-e "šobh-e rawšan" az "šām-e tīreh-ye" e’tiyād. Be monāsebat-e taškīl-e komīteh-ye kešvarī-ye mobārezeh bā e’tiyād 2*).

12) **Eṭṭelā’āt**, 27 Hordād 1374 (17 June 1995): Rehabilitation centre of Qarčak. Here, life smiles again for cured addicts. On the occasion of the visit of UNODC experts to the country’s rehabilitation centres 1” (*Markaz-e bāz-parvarī-ye "qarčak", īnḡā zendegī do bāreh beh rū-ye mo’tādān-e šafā’yāfteh labḡand mīzanad. Be angīzeh-ye bāz-dīd-e kār-šenāsān-e kontrol-e mavadd-e moḡadder-e sāzemān-e melal-e mottaḡed az marākez-e bāz-parvarī-ye mo’tādān-e kešvar 1*).

13) **Eṭṭelā’āt**, 28 Hordād 1374 (18 June 1995): “Cooperation between the family and the society – a necessity for a success of the program of the rehabilitation of addicts. On the occasion of the visit of UNODC experts to the country’s rehabilitation centres 2” (*Ham-kārī-ye ḡāne-vādeh va eḡtemā’ – zorūrat-e movaffaqiyyat-ye barnāmeḡ-ye bāz-parvarī-ye mo’tādān. Be angīzeh-ye bāz-dīd-e kār-šenāsān-e kontrol-e mavadd-e moḡadder-e sāzemān-e melal-e mottaḡed az marākez-e bāz-parvarī-ye mo’tādān-e kešvar 2*).

14) **Eṭṭelā’āt**, 29 Hordād 1374 (19 June 1995): “Rehabilitation centres – protection of the society and deliverance of the individual from the captivity of addiction. On the occasion of the visit of UNODC experts to the country’s rehabilitation centres 3” (*Marākez-e bāz-parvarī – šiyānat-e ḡāme’ah va rahā’ī-ye fard az esārat-e e’tiyād. Be angīzeh-ye bāz-dīd-e kār-šenāsān-e kontrol-e mavadd-e moḡadder-e sāzemān-e melal-e mottaḡed az marākez-e bāz-parvarī-ye mo’tādān-e kešvar 3*).

15) **Hamšahrī**, 31 Hordād 1374 (21 June 1995): “How is the money from drug trafficking laundered?” (*Pūlhā-ye teğārat-e mavādd-e moḥadder čegūneh taḥtīr mīšavad?*).

16) **Resālat**, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995) I: “Drugs - a weapon against the well-being of humankind” (*Mavādd-e moḥadder - ḥarbe’ī ‘alay-he salāmat-e bašariyyat*).

17) **Resālat**, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995) II: “The interior minister has announced on occasion of the international [global] day of drugs combat: a smuggler is a criminal, and an addict an ill person” (*Vazīr-e kešvar dar āstāneh-ye rūz-e ḡahānī-ye mobārezah bā mavādd-ye moḥadder e’lām kard: qāčaqčī moğrem ast, va mo’tād bīmār*).

18) **Resālat**, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I: “The people [say] - the combat of the Islamic state against drugs has guaranteed the well-being of humankind” (*Mardom - mobārezeh-ye nezām-e eslāmī ‘alay-he mavādd-e moḥadder salāmat-e bašariyyat-rā taẓmīn karde ast*).

19) **Resālat**, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) II: “The judicial organization is the pillar of safeguarding justice” (*Dastgāh-e qazā’ī rokn-e ta’mīn-e ‘edālat ast*) – not available.

20) **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995): “The world's drug day” (*Rūz-e mavādd-e moḥadder dar ḡahān*).

21) **Salām**, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I: “A short history of drugs in the world and in Iran - on the occasion of the world day of the combat against drug addiction and drug trafficking” (*Tārīḫčeh-ye mavādd-e moḥadder dar ḡahān va īrān - be bahāneh-ye rūz-e ḡahānī-ye mobārezah bā e’tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḥadder*).

22) **Salām**, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) II: “The gloomy shadow of the octopus of death over the world” (*Sāyeh-ye šūm-e oḡtāpūs-e marg bar ḡahān*).

23) **Īrān**, 8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995): “White powder, black death – reasons for addiction among adolescents” (*Gerd-e Sefīd, Marg-e Siyāh – ‘elal-e gerāyeš-e ḡavānān beh e’tiyād*).

- 24) **Hamšahrī**, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995): “The world in the trap of addiction” (*Ġahān dar dām-e e‘tiyād*).
- 25) **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995): “The Western colonialists, criminal propagators of drugs in the world. Every day has to be a Global Day against Addiction and Drug Smuggling 1” (*Este‘mār-garān-e ġarbī, ravāġ-dehandegān-e tabahkār-e mavādd-e moḥadder dar ġahān. Hamēh rūz bāyad "rūz-e ġahānī-ye mobārezah bā e‘tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḥadder" bāšad 1*).
- 26) **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 11 Tīr 1374 (2 July 1995): “The fight against addiction and drug smuggling is resolutely continued. Every day has to be a Global Day against Addiction and Drug Smuggling 2” (*Mobārezah bā e‘tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḥadder qāṭe‘āneh edāmeḥ miyābad. Hamēh rūz bāyad "rūz-e ġahānī-ye mobārezah bā e‘tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḥadder" bāšad 2*).
- 27) **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 12 Tīr 1374 (3 July 1995): “Drug trafficking, an inauspicious activity that is more profitable than the oil trade. Every day has to be a Global Day against Addiction and Drug Smuggling 3” (*Qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḥadder, fa‘‘āliyyatī-ye šūm ke az teġarat-e naft sūd-āvartar ast. Hamēh rūz bāyad "rūz-e ġahānī-ye mobārezah bā e‘tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḥadder" bāšad 3*).
- 28) **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 13 Tīr 1374 (4 July 1995): “Addiction withdrawal in 6 days, illusion or reality? Every day has to be a Global Day against Addiction and Drug Smuggling 4” (*Tark-e e‘tiyād dar 6 rūz, sarāb yā vāqe‘iyyat? Hamēh rūz bāyad "rūz-e ġahānī-ye mobārezah bā e‘tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḥadder" bāšad 4*).
- 29) **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 14 Tīr 1374 (5 July 1995): “The medical treatment with acupuncture has to take place within the framework of good order and legal provisions. Every day has to be a Global Day against Addiction and Drug Smuggling 5” (*Modāvā-ye mo‘tādān bā ṭebb-e sūzanī bāyad dar čārčūb-e naẓm va moqarrerāt-e qānūnī dar āyad. Hamēh rūz bāyad "rūz-e ġahānī-ye mobārezah bā e‘tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḥadder" bāšad 5*).

30) **Abrār**, 15 Tīr 1374 (6 July 1995) “The Interior Minister in conversation with Abrār: The fifth Parliament [says] – we are guaranteeing the health of the election.” (*Vazīr-e kešvar dar goft-o-gū bā Abrār: mağles-e pančom – salāmat-e enteḥābāt-rā taẓmīn mīkonīm*).

31) **Hamšahrī**, 21 Tīr 1374 (12 July 1995): “Cigarette[s] – the death caravan from the 16<sup>th</sup> century until today” (*Sīgār – kārvān-e marg az sadeh-ye 16 tā emrūz*).

32) **Kayhān**, 22 Tīr 1374 (13 July 1995): “Statement[s] of the police commander on the security of the borders, and the combat against the networks of merchandise smuggling, theft and social evils” (*Eẓhārāt-e farmāndeh-ye nīrū-ye enteẓāmī dar bāre-ye amniyat-e marzhā va mobārezah bā šabake-hā-ye qāčāq-e kālā, serqat va mafāsed-e eğtemā‘ī*).

33) **Abrār**, 24 Tīr 1374 (15 July 1995): “The drug cartels prefer the East” (*Kārtel-hā-ye mavādd-e moḥadder šarq-rā tarğīḥ mīdehand*).

34) **Resālat**, 24 Tīr 1374 (15 July 1995): “I say it from the heart [tongue] of the people that our nation is not on reconciliating terms with America” (*Az zabān-e mardom migūyam, mellat-e mā bā āmrīkā sar-e āštī nīst*).

35) **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 26 Tīr 1374 (17 July 1995): “Biological, psychological and sociological foundations of addiction” (*Bonyād-hā-ye zīst-šenāḥtī, ravān-šenāḥtī va ġāme‘ah-šenāḥtī-ye e‘tiyād*) – not available.

36) **Īrān**, 29 Tīr 1374 (20 July 1995): “The role of the family in the salvation and rehabilitation of the addicts – roundtable of [the newspaper] *Īrān* on families and youth addiction” (*Naqš-e ḥāne-vādeh dar nağāt va bāz-parvarī-ye mo‘tādān – mīz-gerd-e “īrān” dar bāreh-ye ḥāne-vādeh-hā va e‘tiyād-e ġavānān*).

37) **Abrār**, 19 Mordād 1374 (10 August 1995): “High concern for the combat against an inauspicious global trade” (*Hemmat-e ‘ālī barāye mobārezah bā teğārat-e šūm-e ġahānī*).

38) **Īrān**, 3 Šahrīvar 1374 (25 August 1995): The heavy shadow of the drug smugglers in the Colombian society” (*Sāyeh-ye sangīn-e qāčāqčīyān-e mavādd-e moḥadder dar ġāme‘ah-ye kolombiyā*).



- 39) **Īrān**, 26 Mehr 1374 (18 October 1995): “Hungary – the crossing for heroin smugglers” (*Mağārestān – godār-gāh-e qāčāqčīyān-e herō’īn*).
- 40) **Kayhān**, 27 Mehr 1374 (19 October 1995): “Confessions of an American official on the crimes of the White House and the reality behind” (*E’terāfāt-e yek ma’mūr-e āmrīkā’ī dar bāreh-ye ġenāyat-e kāh-e sefīd va vāqe’īyyat-e pošt*).
- 41) **Kayhān**, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995): “Drugs from the viewpoint of Islam” (*Mavādd-e moḥadder az dīdgāh-e eslām*).
- 42) **Kayhān**, 11 Ābān 1374 (2 November 1995): “Cocaine trafficking in Europe” (*Qāčāq-e kōkā’īn dar orūpā*).
- 43) **Abbrār**, 14 Ābān 1374 (5 November 1995): “The policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the field of the inter-regional cooperation in the combat against drugs” (*Siyāsāt-hā-ye ġomhūrī-ye eslāmī-ye īrān dar bo’d-e ham-kārī-hā-ye manṭaqe’ī-ye mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḥadder*).
- 44) **Kayhān**, 15 Ābān 1374 (6 November 1995): “Aims and positions of Iran concerning the fight against drugs” (*Ahdāf va dīdgāh-hā-ye īrān dar mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder*).
- 45) **Īrān**, 18 Āḍar 1374 (9 December 1995): “Hard days of waiting – a report on the rehabilitation centre for addicts (in Qarčak)” (*Rūz-hā-ye saḥt-e enteẓār – gozārešt az markaz-e bāz-parvarī-ye mo’tādān {qarčak}*).
- 46) **Kayhān**, 4 Dey 1374 (26 December 1995): “In a special interview with *Kayhān* it is announced - the public prosecutor officially intervenes in public crimes in his function as the public plaintiff” (*Dar goft-o-ġū-ye eḥtešāšt bā kayhān e’lām šod - dādsetān-e koll-e kešvar dar ġarāyem-e ‘omūmī beh ‘onvān-e modda’i-ol-‘omūm ra’san modāḥelah mikonad*).
- 47) **Abbrār**, 18 Dey 1374 (9 January 1996): “Golden Triangle” (*Moṭallāt-e ṭalā’ī*).

48) **Īrān**, 28 Dey 1374 (19 January 1996): “Improvement of the East from the traders of death – a report on the governmental measures in the fight against drug trafficking at the Eastern borders” (*Beh-sāzī-ye šarq az sawdā-garān-e marg – gozārešī az eqdāmāt-e dawlat dar mobārezah bā qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḥadder dar marz-hā-ye šarqī*).

49) **Aḥbār**, 19 Bahman 1374 (8 February 1996): “The conviction of a president” (*Moḥākemah-ye yek ra’īs-e ḡomhūr*).

50) **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 2 Esfand 1374 (21 February 1996): “Drug traffickers – a threat to democracy in Latin America” (*Sawdā-garān-e mavādd-e moḥadder, tahdīdī ‘alay-he demōkrāsī dar āmrīkā lātīn*) – not available.

51) **Abṛār**, 15 Esfand 1374 (5 March 1996): “The addiction phenomenon” (*Padīde-ye e‘tiyād*).

#### ***B) Drug-Related Newspaper Articles in 1376 (1997/98)***

1) **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 20 Farvardīn 1376 (9 April 1997): „One of the serious issues of adolescents“ (*Mas’ala-ye ḡeddī az masā’el-e ḡavānān*)

2) **Resālat**, 21 Farvardīn 1376 (10 April 1997): „Did the trade and consumption of drugs in Germany become free“ (*Ḥarīd, forūš va mašraf-e mavādd-e moḥadder dar ālmān āzād šod?*).

3) **Abṛār**, 13 Ordībehešt 1376 (3 May 1997): “The vigilance and wakefulness of the Iranian nation and not being negligent of the enemy [is a ...] necessity” (*Hūšyārī va bīdārī-ye mellat-e īrān va ‘āfel nabūdan az došman yek zaṛūrat [ast]*).

4) **Kayhān**, 7 Ḥordād 1376 (28 May 1997): „6 million smokers in Iran – put it out!“ (*6 mīliyūn sīgārī dar īrān - ḥāmūš kon*)

5) **Kayhān**, 8 Ḥordād 1376 (29 May 1997): “Smokers are buying poison and thus spread the pollution” (*Sīgārī-hā sem mīḥarand tā ālūdegī tawzī‘ mīkonand*)

6) **Abrār**, 7 Hordād 1376 (28 May 1997): „Children are more inspired by the deeds than the words of their parents“ (*Kawdakān az raftār-e vāledayn bištar elhām miġīrand tā goftārešān*)

7) **Hamšahrī**, 10 Hordād 1376 (31 May 1997): „Cigarette[s], a smoke that affects everyone’s eyes“ (*Sīgār, dūdī ke beh čāšm-e hameh mīravad*).

8) **Ettelā’āt**, 18 Hordād 1376 (8 June 1997): „Cigarettes, a big menace to the hygiene of school“ (*Sīgār, tahdīdī-ye bozorg barāye behdāšt-e madāres*)

9) **Ettelā’āt**, 19 Hordād 1376 (9 June 1997): „Cigarettes, a big menace to the hygiene of schools“ (*Sīgār, tahdīdī-ye bozorg barāye behdāšt-e madāres*)

10) **Resālat**, 26 Hordād 1376 (16 June 1997): „A resumé of some operations of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the combat against drugs“ (*Holāšah-ye baḡšt az ‘amal-kard-e ġomhūrī-ye eslāmī-ye īrān dar amr-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḡadder*).

11) **Ettelā’āt**, 1 Tīr 1376 (22 June 1997): „Smoking in public places has to be forbidden. A glance at smoking and its unpleasant consequences (*Keštīdan-e sīgār dar maġāme’-e ‘omūmī bāyad mamnū’ šavad. negāhī beh este’māl-e doḡāniyāt va peyāmad-hā-ye nā-govār-e ān*)

12) **Ettelā’āt**, 2 Tīr 1376 (23 June 1376): “Recommendations of the Society to Fight Smoking to quit smoking. A glance at smoking and its unpleasant consequences “ (*Pīš-nehād-hā-ye ġam’iyyat-e mobārezah bā este’māl-e doḡāniyyāt barāy-e tark-e sīgār. negāhī beh este’māl-e doḡāniyāt va peyāmad-hā-ye nā-govār-e ān*)

13) **Hamšahrī**, 3 Tīr 1376 (24 June 1997): „The silent chemical war. A study of the effective causes that bring an addict to an afresh drug consumption“ (*Ġang-e šīmīyā’ī-ye ḡāmūš. Bar-rasī-ye ‘avāmel-e mo’at̤ter dar dar rūy āvordan-e far-e mo’tād be mašraf-e moġaddad-e mādдах-ye moḡadder*)

14) **Resālat**, 3 Tīr 1376 (24 June 1997): „The combat against drugs needs a comprehensive and harmonious program – On occasion of 5 Tīr, the International Day against Drug Addiction and Drug Trafficking“ (*Mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḡadder niyāz beh barnāmeḡ-ye*

ğāme‘ va hāmahang dārad – beh monāsebat-e 5 tīr māh, rūz-e ġahānī-ye mobārezah bā e‘tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moħadder)

15) **Resālat**, 4 Tīr 1376 (25 June 1997): We investigate the complaints without regard to the position of the persons“ (*Bedūn tavaġġoh beh mawqa‘ ‘iyyat-e ašħāš beh šekāyat resīdegī mīkonīm*)

16) **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 4 Tīr 1376 (25 June 1997): „The Taliban – promoters of drugs inside and outside of Afghanistan“ (*Tālebān – moravveġ-e mavādd-e moħadder dar dāħel va ħāreġ az afgānestān*)

17) **Aħbār**, 6 Tīr 1376 (27 June 1997): „The Taliban – planters [...] of the white death“ (*Tālebān – kāšegān-e [...] marg-e sefid*) – not available.

18) **Aħbār**, 8 Tīr 1376 (29 June 1997): „The destructive effect of marijuana – this is the first step!“ (*Aṭar-e moħarrebe-e „mārī ġūwānā“ – īn qadam-e avval ast*)

19) **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 9 Tīr 1376 (30 June 1997): „The president [announces]: the Islamic society wants the Judiciary to be decisive in confronting violators“ (*Ra‘īs-e ġomhūr: ġāme‘ah-ye eslāmī ħvāhān-e qāte‘iyyat-e dast-gāh-e qożā‘ī dar bar-ħord bā motaħallefān ast*).

20) **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997): „Caution! The swirl of addiction lies in the ambush of the youth!“ (*Hošdār! Gerdāb-e e‘tiyād dar kamīn-e ġavānān ast*).

21) **Kayhān**, 17 Tīr 1376 (8 July 1997): „How can addiction be defeated?“ (*Če-ġūneh mītavān bar e‘tiyād ġalbeh kard?*).

22) **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 28 Tīr 1376 (19 July 1997): „Epidemic of addiction“ (*Epidemī-ye e‘tiyād*)

23) **Abrār**, 12 Šahrīvar 1376 (3 September 1997): „Addiction – what are our prevention policies? An account of the exhibition „A war without border“, organized by the Drug Control Headquarter“ (*E‘tiyād – tadābīr-e pīšġīrāneh-ye mā čīst? Gozāreš az nemāyeš-gāh-e ġang bedūne-e marz be hemmat-e setād-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e moħadder*).

24) **Hamšahrī**, 16 Šahrīvar 1376 (6 September 1997): „Addiction – Prevention or Combat? On the margins of the ratification of the law{s} for the combat against drugs in the EXPEDIENCY DISCERNMENT COUNCIL OF THE SYSTEM” (*E’tiyād – pīšgīrī yā mobārezah? Dar ḥāšiyya-ye taṣvīb-e qavānīn-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder dar maḡma‘-e tašhīṣ-e mašlahat-e neẓām*).

25) **Hamšahrī**, 17 Šahrīvar (7 September 1997): „The family – a solid fortification in the confrontation with addiction“ (*Ḥāne-vādeh - heṣār-e moḥkam dar moqābelah bā e’tiyād*. „On the margins of the ratification of the law{s} for the combat against drugs in the EXPEDIENCY DISCERNMENT COUNCIL OF THE SYSTEM” (*Dar ḥāšiyya-ye taṣvīb-e qavānīn-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder dar maḡma‘-e tašhīṣ-e mašlahat-e neẓām*

26) **Kayhān**, 18 Šahrīvar 1376 (8 September 1997): „How should we educate our infants, so that they are not caught by addiction in their young days“ (*Kūdakān-emān-rā čegūneh tarbiyyat konīm tā dar ḡavānī gereftār-e e’tiyād našavand?*);

27) **Hamšahrī**, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 (10 September 1997): „How do we keep our children away from drugs? (*Čegūneh farzandān-e ḥodrā az mavādd-e moḥadder dūr negah-dārīm?*)

28) **Hamšahrī**, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 (10 September 1997): „The number of people in Germany that take drugs for the first time, is increasing remarkably“ (*Te’dād-e aḡrādī ke barāy-e naḥostīn bār dar ālmān mavādd-e moḥadder estefāde mīkonand, beh šeddat afzāyeš mīyābad*)

29) **Salām**, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 (10 September 1997): „Drugs, a pretext to suppress the people“ (*Mavādd-e moḥadder – bahāna’ī barāye sar-kūb-e mardom*).

30) **Hamšahrī**, 24 Šahrīvar 1376 (14 September 1997): „In fighting drugs, prohibition is not sufficient“ (*Dar mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder, mamnū’iyyat kāfī nīst*).

31) **Hamšahrī**, 25 Šahrīvar 1376 (15 September 1997): „In fighting drugs, prohibition is not sufficient. What is the solution?“ (*Dar mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder, mamnū’iyyat kāfī nīst. Rāh-e ḥall čīst?*).

- 32) **Hamšahrī**, 25 Šahrīvar 1376 (15 September 1997): „Cigarettes – choice or compulsion?“ (*Sīgār, entehāb yā eġbār?*).
- 33) **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 27 Šahrīvar 1376 (18 September 1997): „Clinton’s support for fifty years of conspiracy and crime of America’s spy organization ‘CIA’“ (*Hemāyat-e klīntūn az 50 sāl-e tūte’e va ġanāyat-e sāzemān-e ġāsūsī-ye āmrīkā, “sia”*).
- 34) **Hamšahrī**, 2 Mehr 1376 (24 September 1997): „Medicine alone is no remedy for addiction. Causes for a lacking success of the drug combat – in an interview with Professor Fīrūz Ġalīlī“ (*Faqat dārū, čāreh-ye e’tiyād nīst. ‘Elal-e ‘adam-e movaffaqiyyat-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e moħadder dar goft-o-ġū bā prōfesōr Fīrūz Ġalīlī*).
- 35) **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 13 Mehr 1376 (5 October 1997): „Drugs – a supra-national problem and a serious menace to all earth dwellers“ (*Mavādd-e moħadder - moškelī-ye farā-mellī va tahdīdī-ye ġeddī barāye ġahāniyān*).
- 36) **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 14 Mehr 1376 (6 October 1997): „Iran is not a safe route for the international drugs smuggling networks anymore“ (*Irān dīgar masīr-e amnī barāye šabakeh-hā-ye bayn-ol-melalī-ye qāčāq-e mavādd-e moħadder nīst*).
- 37) **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 15 Mehr 1376 (7 October 1997): „The fight against drugs production and distribution needs a global approach“ (*Mobārezah bā tawlīd va tawzī‘-e mavādd-e moħadder, niyāz-mand-e ravī-kardī-ye ġahānī ast*).
- 38) **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 16 Mehr 1376 (8 October 1997): „The international drugs trade – a spread of the exceeding breath of the inauspicious deathly shadow of addiction“ (*Teġārat-e ġahānī-ye mavādd-e moħadder – gostareš-e dam-e afzūn-e sāyeh-ye šūm-e marg-bār-e e’tiyād*).
- 39) **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 17 Mehr 1376 (9 October 1997): „Important background [knowledge] for the visibility of an inclination towards drug consumption “ (*Zamīneh-hā-ye momehh padāt-ye gerāyeš beh mašraf-e mavādd-e moħadder*).

- 40) **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 October 1997): „The young – the first victims of the greediness and criminality of the drug traffickers“ (*Ġavānān, naḥostīn qorbāniyān-e āzmandī va tebeh-kārī-ye qāčāqčīyān-e mavādd-e moḥadder*)
- 41) **Resālat**, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 October 1997): „The use of drugs [is] an alarm bell! On occasion of start of the manoeuvre ‚prognosis‘“ (*Este‘māl-e mavādd-e moḥadder, zang-e ḥaṭar! Beh monāsebat-e šorū‘-e mānovr-e „endār“*)
- 42) **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 24 Mehr 1376 (16 October 1997): „Addiction, prevention, therapy and follow-up ...“ (*E‘tiyād, pīš-gīrī, darmān va pey-gīrī ...*)
- 43) **Hamšahrī**, 24 Mehr 1376 (16 October 1997): „The addict – an ill or a criminal person?“ (*Mo‘tād – bīmār yā moğrem?*).
- 44) **Hamšahrī**, 27 Mehr 1376 (19 October 1997): „From the Golden Triangle of opium to the thousands mazes of the Mafia. A glance at the global drug production centres and market(s)“ (*Az moṭallat-e ṭalā‘ī-ye taryāk tā hezār-tū-ye māfiyā. Negāhī beh kānūn-hā-ye tawlīd va bāzār-e ġahānī-ye mavādd-e moḥadder*)
- 45) **Hamšahrī**, 28 Mehr 1376 (20 October 1997): „The necessity for a common contract to put an end to the global drugs networks. A glance at the ways of production, trafficking and markets of drugs“ (*Žorūrat-e peymān-e dast-ğam‘ī barāye barčīdarn-e šabakeh-hā-ye ġahānī-ye mavādd-e moḥadder. Negāhī beh kam-o-keyf-e tawlīd, qāčāq, va bāzār-e mavādd-e moḥadder*).
- 46) **Resālat**, 5 Ābān 1376 (27 October 1997): „Addiction – the role of the parents and the supervisory levers of the society“ (*E‘tiyād – naqš-e vāledayn va ahram-yā-ye nezāratī-ye ġāme‘ah*).
- 47) **Resālat**, 6 Ābān 1376 (28 October 1997): „What does public education mean?“ (*Āmūzeš-e ‘omūmī ya‘nī čeh?*).

- 48) **Resālat**, 14 Ābān 1376 (5 November 1997): „The answer of the Drug Control Headquarter and explanations of Resālat“ (*Ġavābiyya-ye setād-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder va tawẓīḥāt-e resālat*)
- 49) **Hamšahrī**, 18 Ābān 1376 (9 November 1997): „The roads of tobacco – the nightmare of cigarettes instead of food (*Ġādde-hā-ye tūtūn – kābūs-e sīgār beh ġā-ye ġadā*).
- 50) **Āfarīneš**, 20 Ābān 1376 (11 November 1997): “Addiction – an issue of yesterday, today and tomorrow“ (*E’tiyād ... mas’alah-ye dīrūz ... emrūz ... fardā ...!*).
- 51) **Āfarīneš**, Ābān 1376 (12 November 1997): “Addiction – an issue of yesterday, today and tomorrow“ (*E’tiyād ... mas’alah-ye dīrūz ... emrūz ... fardā ...!*).
- 52) **Āfarīneš**, 22 Ābān 1376 (13 November 1997): “Addiction – an issue of yesterday, today and tomorrow“ (*E’tiyād ... mas’alah-ye dīrūz ... emrūz ... fardā ...!*).
- 53) **Āfarīneš**, 24 Ābān 1376 (15 November 1997): “Addiction – an issue of yesterday, today and tomorrow“ (*E’tiyād ... mas’alah-ye dīrūz ... emrūz ... fardā ...!*).
- 54) **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 21 Ābān 1376 (12 November 1376): „Do we know ...?“ (*Āyā mīdānīm ...?*).
- 55) **Resālat**, 26 Ābān 1376 (17 November 1997): „The combat [!] against drugs addicts from words to actions“ (*Mobārezah bā mo’tādān-e mavādd-e moḥadder az ḥarf tā ‘amal*).
- 56) **Abrār**, 10 Āḍar 1376 (1 December 1997): „A Short History of drugs in the world and in Iran“ (*Tārīḥčeh-ye mavādd-e moḥadder dar ġahān va īrān*).
- 57) **Abrār**, 11 Āḍar 1376 (2 December 1997): „A Short History of drugs in the world and in Iran“ (*Tārīḥčeh-ye mavādd-e moḥadder dar ġahān va īrān*).
- 58) **Hamšahrī**, 11 Āḍar 1376 (2 December 1997): „How do we help the addicts? The role of the family in addiction prevention“ (*Ġegūneh beh mo’tādīn komak konīm? Naqš-e ḥāne-vādeh dar pīš-ġīrī az e’tiyād*).



59) **Āfarīneš**, 16 Āḍar 1376 (7 December 1997) I: „The young and the global black calamity of today“ (*Ġavānān va balā-ye siyāh-e donyā-ye emrūz*).

60) **Āfarīneš**, 16 Āḍar 1376 (7 December 1997) II: “The satanic plague“ (*Āfat-e šayṭānī*).

61) **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 4 Dey 1376 (25 December 1997): „’The Taliban’ – the biggest drug exporters“ (*„Tālebān“ – bozorgtarīn šāder-konandeh-ye mavādd-e moḥadder*)

62) **Qods**, 7 Dey 1376 (28 December 1997): „200 million addicts (are) victims to the death trade in the world. On the occasion of the new ratified law by the EXPEDIENCY DISCERNMENT COUNCIL OF THE System “ (*200 mīlīyūn mo’tād, qorbānī-ye teġāra-e marg dar ġahān. Beh angīzeh-ye mošavvabeh-ye ġadīd-e maġma‘-e tašhīš-e mašlahat-e nezām*)

63) **Qods**, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997): „Those, who turn health and zeal into smoke. On the occasion of the new ratified law by the EXPEDIENCY DISCERNMENT COUNCIL OF THE System“ (*Ānān keh salāmat va ġayrat-rā bā ham dūd mīkonand. Beh angīzeh-ye mošavvabeh-ye ġadīd-e maġma‘-e tašhīš-e mašlahat-e nezām*)

64) **Qods**, 9 Dey 1376 (30 December 1997): „The production of 5 thousand tons of opium in Afghanistan; the Taliban are the largest factor for the spread of addiction in the world. On the occasion of the new ratified law by the EXPEDIENCY DISCERNMENT COUNCIL OF THE System “ (*Tawlīd-e 5 hezār ton-e taryāk dar afgānestān; tālebān bozorgtarīn ‘āmel-e gostareš-e e’tiyād dar ġahān ast. Discernment Council of the System“* (*Ānān keh salāmat va ġayrat-rā bā ham dūd mīkonand. Beh angīzeh-ye mošavvabeh-ye ġadīd-e maġma‘-e tašhīš-e mašlahat-e nezām*)

65) **Qods**, 10 Dey 1376 (31 December 1997): „Iran is the most successful country of the world in the area of the drugs combat. On the occasion of the new ratified law by the EXPEDIENCY DISCERNMENT COUNCIL OF THE System “ (*Irān dar ‘aršah-ye mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder, movaffaqtarīn kešvar-e ġahān ast“* (*Ānān keh salāmat va ġayrat-rā bā ham dūd mīkonand. Beh angīzeh-ye mošavvabeh-ye ġadīd-e maġma‘-e tašhīš-e mašlahat-e nezām*)

66) **Hamšahrī**, 9 Dey 1376 (30 December 1997): „The mules don't even have pity with themselves. The role of the middleman in the distribution and trafficking of drugs“ (*Qāterhā beh ḡān-e ḡodešān ham raḡm nemīkonand. Naqš-e vāseḡah dar tawzī‘ va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḡhadder*).

67) **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 23 Dey 1376 (13 January 1998): „“Octopus of addiction. The fight against addiction has to be [undertaken] from all sides“ (*Oḡtāpūs-e marg. Mobārezah bā e'tiyād bāyad hameh-ye ḡānebah bāsad*).

68) **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 19 Bahman 1376 (8 February 1998): „Iran in the siege of the drugs. The Islamic Republic of Iran remains alone on the front of the combat against drugs“ (*Īrān dar moḡāšerah-ye mavādd-e moḡhadder. Ġomhūrī-ye eslāmī-ye īrān dar ḡebha-ye mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḡhadder tanhā māndeh ast!*).

69) **Eṡṡelā‘āt**, 20 Bahman 1376 (9 February 1998): „The influence of a father's addiction on [the outputs of] the family“ (*Ātār-e e'tiyād-e pedar bar kār-kard-hā-ye ḡānevādeh*).

### ***C) Drug-Related Newspaper Articles in 1374 (1995/96)***

1) **Hamšahrī**, 17 Farvardīn 1378 (6 April 1999): „What are the effects of addiction to hallucinogenic and stimulant drugs?“ (*Ātār-e e'tiyād beh mavādd-e tavahhom-zā va moḡharrek čīst?*)

2-4) **Kār-o-Kārgar**, 21 & 22 & 24 Farvardīn (10 & 11 & 13 April 1999): „A view at the phenomenon of addiction and its causes and effects“ (*Negāhī beh padīdeh-ye e'tiyād va ‘elal va ‘avārež-e ān*)

5) **Qods**, 28 Farvardīn 1378 (17 April 1999): „Why addiction“ (*E'tiyād čerā?*)

6) **Entehāb**, 28 Farvardīn 1378 (17 April 1999): „Drugs – youth – addiction. This fire burns wet and dry. 6 Millions are overtaken, 60 Millions are in danger“ (*Mavādd-e moḡhadder – ḡavānān – e'tiyād. Īn āteš, tar va ḡošk-rā mīsūzānad. 6 mīlīyūm dar-gīrand, 60 mīlīyūn dar ḡaṡar*)

7) **Abrār**, 9 Ordībehešt 1378 (29 April 1999): „What are the motives of drug use? An investigative study of addiction as a rough social phenomenon“ (*Angīze-hā-ye este‘māl-e mavādd-e moħadder čīst? Bar-rasī-ye taħqīqī-ye e‘tiyād beh ‘onvān-e yek padīdeh-ye nā-hanġār-e eġtemā’ī*).

8) **Āryā**, 11 Ordībehešt 1378 (1 May 1999): „Opium, the winner in the war“ (*Taryāk, barandeh-ye ġang*).

**Ĥordād**, 13 Ordībehešt 1376 (3 May 1999): „The hands that wave a net of death. The adolescents are the main victim of drugs“ (*Dastānī keh dām-e marg mītanand. Ģavānān qorbānīyān-e ašlī-ye mavādd-e moħadder*).

10) **Ģomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999): „Drug addiction, a fire that doesn’t know wet or dry“ (*E‘tiyād beh mavādd-e moħadder, ātešī keh tar va ĥosk-rā nemīšenāsad*)

11) **Ģavān**, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999): „Some reasons and backgrounds for the spread of drug addiction“ (*Barĥī dalāyel va zamīneh-hā-ye gostareš-e e‘tiyād beh mavādd-e moħadder*)

12) **Āryā**, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999): „Addiction, the virus of the devil“ (*E‘tiyād, vīrūs-e eblis*).

13) **Resālat**, 21 Ordībehešt 1378 (11 May 1999): „Drugs and the reasons why adolescents turn towards them“ (*Mavādd-e moħadder va ‘elal-e gerayeš-e ġavānān beh ān*).

14) **Abrār-e Eqtešādī**, 23 Ordībehešt 1378 (13 May 1999): „How much cost take the drugs with them“ (*Mavādd-e moħadder če meqdār arz bā ĥod mibarad?*).

15) **Salām**, 23 Ordībehešt 1378 (13 May 1999): „Heantos, a medicine that causes to abandon addiction? Dan made himself addiction in order to discover a method for curing addicts“ (*Hāntoz, dārūyī keh e‘tiyād-rā tark mīdehad? Dān, be-manžūr-e kašf-e yek raveš-e mo‘attar dar mo‘aleġah-ye mo‘tādīn, ĥod-rā beh e‘tiyād rūy mi-āvarad*).

16) **Salām**, 1 Hordād 1378 (22 May 1999): „A second warning for drug control“ (*Hošdārī-ye dō bāreh barāye kontrol-e mavādd-e moḥadder*).

17) **Salām**, 13 Hordād 1378 (3 June 1999): „Strong and weak points of the national combat against drugs and addiction. A special interview of Salām with the deputy secretary of the Drug Contro Headquarter“ (*Noqāṭ-e qovvat va ʔaʔdar mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder va eʔtiyād-e kešvar. Dar goft-o-gū-ye eḥtešāšī-ye salām bā ḡā-nešīn-e dabīr-e setād-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder ʔonvān šod*).

18) **Salām**, 20 Hordād 1378 (10 June 1999): „We’re still worried. Addiction, a ladder to committing crimes“ (*Hanūz negarānīm. Eʔiyād, nardebān-e ertekāb-e ḡorm*).

19-21) **Šobḥ-e Emrūz**, 25 & 26 & 27 Hordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999): „In search of a die-hard devil / Ahriman. A week with addiction prevention specialists“ (*Dar ḡost-o-ḡū-ye ahrīmanī-ye ḡān-saḥt. Yek hafteh bā kāršenāsān-e pīšḡīrī az eʔtiyād*).

22) **Salām**, 2 Tīr 1378 (23 June 1999): „The youth and the global abyss of addiction“ (*Ḡavānān va varṭeh-ye ḡahānī-ye eʔtiyād*).

23) **Ḡomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999): “Drug Addiction – a piece of sorrow with an unacceptable ending” (*Eʔtiyād beh mavādd-e moḥadder – ḡam-nāmeḥ-ye pāyān-e nāpaḏīr*).

24) **Īrān**, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999): „The people cannot be defrauded. A report on the scientific and practical ,social health’ congress with the title ,Immunization of the children and adolescents against the appearance of harms “ (*Sar-e mardom nemīšavad kolāḥ godāšt! Gozāreštī az hemāyeš-e ʔelmī-kārbordī „selāmat-e eḡtemāʔī“ be-ʔonvān-e „mašūn-sāzī-ye kūdakān va nawḡavānān dar barābar-e āsīb-zāyī*).

25) **Ḥorāsān**, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999): „The Golden Crescent, drug trafficking towards Europe and the costs only the regional countries pay. A report on the region of the Golden Crescent and drug transit“ (*Helāl-e ṭalāyī, qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḥadder beh orūpā va hazīneh-hāyī keh tanhā kešvar-hā-ye maṇṭaqe mīpardāzand. Gozāreštī az maṇṭaqeh-ye helāl-e ṭalāyī va trānzīt-e mavādd-e moḥadder*).

26) **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999): „The global profession of drug business“ (*Harfeh-ye ġahānī-ye dād-o-setad-e mavādd-e moħadder*).

27) **Ĥorāsān**, 5 Tīr 1376 (26 June 1999): „Addiction from a scientific and psychological viewpoint. The application of scientific methods in addiction withdrawal is necessary“ (*E‘tiyād az dīd-ġāh-he ‘elmī va ravān-šenāsī. Be-kār-ġīrī-ye raveš-hā-ye ‘elmī barāye tark-e e‘tiyād žorūrī ast*).

28) **Entehāb**, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999): „The addict is not a criminal. Why aren’t you taking his pain serious?“ (*Mo’tād moġrem nīst. Ćerā dardeš-rā ġeddī nemīġīrīd*).

29) **Našāt**, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999): „On the occasion of the Global Day of Drugs Combat. The nightmare of drugs still casts a shadow“ (*Beh angīzeh-ye rūz-e ġahānī-ye mobārezah bā mavādd-e moħadder. Kābūs-e mavādd-e moħadder ham-ĉonān sāyeh mīyafkanad*).

30) **Hamšahrī**, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999): „Is there a solution for the problem of addiction?“ (*Āyā rāh-e ħall barāye mas’alah-ye e‘tiyād voġūd dārad?*)

31-35) **Ettelā‘āt**, 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999): „The drugs combat, an encompassing battle that doesn’t know a border“ (*Mobārezah bā mavādd-e moħadder, nabardī-ye farā-ġīr keh marz nemīšenāsad*).

36) **Abrār**, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999): „214 Million addicts world wide. The inauspicious owl of addiction, the black shadow of destruction. On the occasion of 26 June, the global day of drugs combat “ (*214 mīlīyūn mo’tād dar saṭḥ-e ġahān. Ġoġd-e šūm-e e‘tiyād, sāyeh-ye siyāh-e tabāhī. Beh bahāneh-ye 5 tīr māh, rūz-e ġahānī-ye mobārezah bā mavādd-e moħadder*).

37) **Ĥordād**, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999): „The average age of addiction has reached 27 years“ (*Miyāngīn-e senn-e e‘tiyād beh 27 sāl resīd*).

38) **Šobḥ-e Emrūz**, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999): „Rezā Šarāmī, the general director of research and studies of the Drug Control Headquarter: The war against drugs is a war without

borders“ (*Reżā Şarāmī, modīr-e koll-e moṭāle’āt va pażūheş-e setād-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder: ġang bā mavādd-e moḥadder, ġang bedūn-e marz ast*)

39-40) **Horāsān**, 6 & 7 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 June 1999): „A conversation with the deputy for prevention of the Welfare Organization?“ (*Goft-o-gū bā mo’āven-e pīş-gīrī-ye sāzemān-e beh-ẓīstī*).

41) **Kār-o-Kārgar**, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999): „An interview with Arlacchi“ (*Soḥanī bā Ārlākī*).

42) **Qods**, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999): „Iran on the frontline“ (*Iran, ḥaṭṭ-e moqaddam-e ġebḥah*).

43) **Entehāb**, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999): „A poll of ‚Entehāb’ on the occasion of the global day to combat drugs“ (*Nażar-sanġī-ye „entehāb“ be mosāsebat-e rūz-e ġahānī-ye mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder*).

44) **Īrān**, 8 Tīr 1378 (29 June 1999): „The lungs of enjoyment are full of the oxigen of death. A poll on the issue of drug addiction“ (*Riyeh-hā-ye ledḍat por az oksīžen-e marg ast*).

45) **Abrār**, 14 Tīr 1378 (5 July 1999): „American stingers and drug caravans. A report of the political group of Abrār on the frightening dimensions of the drugs crisis“ (*Estīngtheder-hā-ye āmrīkāyī va kārvān-hā-ye mavādd-e moḥadder. Gozāreş-e gorūh-e siyāsī-ye Abrār dar bareh-ye ab’ād-e ḥawf-nāk-e boḥrān-e mavādd-e moḥadder*).

46) **Entehāb**, 18 Tīr 1378 (9 July 1999): „Globalization of the drugs trade“ (*Ġahān şodan-e teġārat-e mavādd-e moḥadder*).

47-49) **Entehāb**, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999): „Are the smuggling caravans taking shape on this side [too]? Unfortunately, that’s true. In conversation with Moḥammad Ġavād Heşmatī, deputy of the Drug Control Headquarter“ (*Kārvān-hā-ye qāčāq īn ṭaraf taşkīl mīşavad? Mota’assefāne dorost ast. Goft-o-gū bā Moḥammad Ġavād Heşmatī, mo’āvenat-e setād-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder*).

- 50) **Hamšahrī**, 27 Tīr 1378 (18 July 1999): „The illusion of ,addiction withdrawal‘“ (*Tavahhom-e „tark-e e‘tiyād*).
- 51) **Horāsān**, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July 1999): „In the conversation with officials and experts it was performed: a study of the National Law of Strengthening the Penalties of the Drug Convicts“ (*Dar goft-o-gū bā mas‘ūlān va šāḥeb-e naẓar enḡām šod: bar-rasī-ue qānūn-e tašdīd-e moḡāzāt-e maḥkūmīn-e mavādd-e moḥadder*).
- 52) **Āftāb-e Emrūz**, 2 Šahrīvar 1378 (24 August 1999): „Women – pioneers in the fight against addiction. Civil structures and the readiness to fight drugs“ (*Zanān – pīš-gāmān-e mobārezah bā e‘tiyād. Nehād-hā-ye madanī va āmādegī barāye mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder*).
- 53) **Vohūman**, 7 Šahrīvar 1378 (29 August 1999): „Iran is first in the combabt, but the addiction ...“ (*Īrān dar mobārezah avval ast, ammā e‘tiyād ...*).
- 54) **Īrān**, 9 Šahrīvar 1378 (31 August 1999): „The international laws against the chaos of drugs“ (*Qavānīn-e bayn-ol-melalī ‘alay-he hayūlā-ye mavādd-e moḥadder*).
- 55) **Resālat**, 18 Šahrīvar 1378 (9 September 1999): „Education, training and the struggle for a combat against drugs“ (*Āmūzeš va parvareš vā talāš barāye mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder*).
- 56-57) **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 24 & 25 Šahrīvar 1378 (15 & 16 September 1999): „One can get out of the well of addiction“ (*Az čāh-e e‘tiyād mītavān ḥāreḡ šod*).
- 58) **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999): „The youth are the main victim of drugs“ (*Ġavānān ‘omdah-tarīn qorbāniyān-e mavādd-e moḥadder*).
- 59) **Horāsān**, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999): „Downfall of the woman in the ashes of addiction“ (*Ġorūb-e zan dar ḥākestar-e e‘tiyād*).
- 60) **Aḥbār-e Eqtešādī**, 31 Šahrīvar 1378 (22 September 1999): „Afghanistan – the worlds opium field“ (*Afḡānestān, kašt-zār-e taryāk-e ḡahān*).

- 61) **Payām-e Āzādī**, 3 Mehr 1378 (25 September 1999): „Iranian, addiction and family“ (*Īrānī, e'tiyād va ḥāne-vadeh*).
- 62) **Hamšahrī**, 5 Mehr 1378 (27 September 1999): „Addiction, a piece of sorrow with an unacceptable ending“ (*E'tiyād, ḡam-nāmeḥ-ye pāyān-e nāpaḍīr*).
- 63) **Āzād**, 6 Mehr 1378 (28 September 1999): „The wives of addicted men are suffering from the social harms of addiction“ (*Hamsarān-e mardān-e mo'tād az āstb-hā-ye eḡtemā't-ye e'tiyād raṅḡ mībarand*).
- 64) **Ḥorāsān**, 8 Mehr 1378 (30 September 1999): „2 million addicts and the downfall of the families“ (*2 mīlīyūn mo'tād va forū-pāštī-ye ḥāne-vādeh*).
- 65) **Aḥbār-e Eqtešādī**, 11 Mehr 1378 (3 October 1999): „The year 2000 will be the year of combatting the spread of drugs in the world“ (*Sāl-e 2000, sāl-e mobārezah bā gostareš-e mavādd-e moḥadder dar donyā*).
- 66) **Īrān**, 19 Mehr 1378 (11 October 1999): „The application of experimental and erroneous methods in regard to addiction is wrong!“ (*Estefādeh az raveš-e āzemūn va ḥaṭā dar mawred-e e'tiyād ḡalaṭ ast!*).
- 67) **Āfarīneš**, 24 Mehr 1378 (16 October 1999): „Tomorrow it will be too late to combat the youth addiction“ (*Fardā barāye mobārezah bā e'tiyād-e ḡavānān dīr ast*).
- 68) **Entehāb**, 25 Mehr 1378 (17 October 1999): „Does anyone know the price? Comfort for Europe and America – exorbitant costs for Iran“ (*Āyā kasī qadr mīdānad? Āsāyeš-e orūpā va āmrīkā – hazīneh-hā-ye gazāf barāye īrān*).
- 69) **Kār-o-Kārgar**, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999): „Education, training and the cultural combat aganst drugs“ (*Āmūzeš va parvareš va mobārezah-ye farhangī bā mavādd-e moḥadder*).



- 70) **Ġavān**, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999): „Addiction – a smoke that ruins the family“ (*E'tiyād – dūdī ke dūdmān-rā beh bād mīdehad*).
- 71) **Kār-o-Kārgar**, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999): „Opium smokes the enthusiasm of the young generation!“ (*Afyūn ġayrat-e nasl-e ġavān-rā dūd mīkonad*).
- 72) **Āfārīneš**, 2 Ābān 1378 (24 October 1999): „The Taliban and opium in Afghanistan“ (*Ṭālebān va taryāk dar afġānestān*).
- 73) **Āzād**, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 1999): „Drugs from the viewpoint of statistics and the reality“ (*Mavādd-e moħadder az negāh-e āmār va vāqe'īyyat*).
- 74) **Payām-e Āzādī**, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 1999): „Opium war“ (*Ġang-e taryāk*).
- 75) **Kār-o-Kārgar**, 24 Ābān 1378 (15 November 1999): „Drugs – the main problem of developing countries“ (*Mavādd-e moħadder – 'omdah-tarīn mo'żal-e kešvar-hā-ye dar ḡāl-e gozār*).
- 76) **Qods**, 25 Ābān 1378 (16 November 1999): „Addiction – a fire, in which all burn“ (*E'tiyād – ātešt ke hamah dar ān mīsūzand*).
- 77) **Āftāb-e Emrūz**, 26 Ābān 1378 (17 November 1999): „Drugs and addiction in the language of statistics“ (*Mavādd-e moħadder va e'tiyād beh zabān-e āmār*).
- 78) **Īrān**, 27 Ābān 1378 (18 November 1999): „'How' do we keep our children away from drugs?“ (*„Čegūneh“ farzandemān-rā az mavādd-e moħadder dūr negāh dārīm?*).
- 79) **Īran**, 29 Ābān 1378 (20 November 1999): „Continuation of the confrontation with the drug traffickers at the Eastern borders of Iran“ (*Edāmāh-ye dar-ġirī dar marz-hā-ye šarqī-ye īran bā qāčāqčīyān-e mavādd-e moħadder*).
- 80-81) **Ḥordād**, 1 & 2 Āḡar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999): „Iran, the smoothest path for the passing of drug caravans“ (*Īrān, hamvar-tarīn rāh-e 'obūr-e kārvān-hā-ye mavādd-e moħadder*).

- 82) **Īrān**, 2 Āḍar 1378 (23 November 1999): „How does the perverted cargo reach the dwelling?! Suggestions of knowing social misbehaviours with an emphasis on the topic of addiction“ (*Bār-e kağ četawr be manzel mīresad?! Naẓariyyeh šenāsī eğtemā’ī-ye kağravī bā ta’kīd bar maqūlah-ye e’tiyād*).
- 83) **Payām-e Āzādī**, 2 Āḍar 1378 (23 November 1999): „The world has to know ...“ (*Donyā bāyad bedānad ...*).
- 84) **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 4 Āḍar 1378 (25 November 1999): „The role of occupational and psychological therapy in the salvation of the addicts from the swirl of addiction“ (*Naqš-e kār-darmānī va ravān-darmānī dar nağāt-e mo’tādān az gerd-āb-e e’tiyād*).
- 85) **Ḥordād**, 4 Āḍar 1378 (25 November 1999): „We need a change of the theory in the combat against drugs“ (*Mā beh tağyīr-e negareš dar mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḥadder niyāz dārīm*) – not available.
- 86) **Ḥorāsān**, 7 Āḍar 1378 (28 November 1999): „Which price do the Western countries pay for the combat against the drugs transit through Iran?“ (*Kešvar-hā-ye ġarbī čeh bahāyī barāye mobārezah bā trānzīt-e mavādd-e moḥadder az īrān mīpardāzand?*).
- 87) **Kayhān**, 8 Āḍar 1378 (29 November 1999): „Implementation of the research plan of addiction withdrawal in the country“ (*Eğrā-ye tarḥ-e taḥqīqātī-ye tark-e e’tiyād dar kešvar*).
- 88) **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 17 Āḍar 1378 (8 December 1999): „Pattern of the combat against drug smuggling and addiction“ (*Rāh-kār-hā-ye mobārezah bā qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḥadder va e’tiyād*).
- 89) **‘Ašr-e Āzādegān**, 17 Āḍar 1378 (8 December 1999): „We are not paying 11 billion dollars drug indemnities“ (*11 mīliyārd dolār tāvān-e mavādd-e moḥadder-rā na-pardāzīm*).
- 90) **Īrān**, 11 Āḍar 1378 (12 December 1999): „Police dogs are stationed at airports and on roads“ (*Sag-hā-ye polīs dar forūd-ğāh-hā-ye va ġāddeh-hā mostaqerr mīšavand*).

91) **Ḥorāsān**, 23 Āḍar 1378 (14 December 1999): „400 million square metres of cultivation of drug production [sic] in Afghanistan. Aid for Iran in this combat against the smuggler is an aid for the humankind“ (*400 mīlīyūn metr-e morabba‘ kašt-e tawlīd-e mavādd-e moḥadder dar Afġānestān. Komak beh īrān barāye mobārezah bā qāčāqčiyān komak beh bašariyyat ast*).

92) **Gozāreš-e Rūz**, 24 Āḍar 1378 (15 December 1999): „Iran – the combat against the drugs flood“ (*Irān – mobārezah bā sayl-e mavādd-e moḥadder*).

93) **Bayān**, 27 Āḍar 1378 (18 December 1999): „Addiction – an onesided transaction“ (*E‘tiyād – mo‘āmelah-ye yek-savīyyah*).

94) **Bayān**, 28 Āḍar 1378 (19 December 1999): „The Golden Territory. Afghanistan was devastated in the war, but in opium production it is extremely flourishing“ (*Sar-zamīn-e ṭalāyī. Afġānestān dar ġang vīrān šod ammā dar tawlīd-e taryāk ābād ābād ast*).

95) **Hamšahrī**, 6 Dey 1378 (28 December 1999): „Necessity of knowing the factors and motives for an inclination towards addiction“ (*Žorūrat-e šenāht-e ‘avāmel va angīzeh-hā-ye gerāyeš beh e‘tiyād*).

96) **Ġavān**, 6 Dey 1378 (28 December 1999): „Addiction is an illness, so let’s cure it“ (*E‘tiyād bīmārī ast, ān-rā darmān konīm*).

97) **Kayhān**, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999): „Drugs – the war without borders between Iran and the global arrogance“ (*Mavādd-e moḥadder – ġang bedūn-e marz-e īrān bā estekbār-e ġahānī*).

98) **Abrār**, 8 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999): „Afghanistan and the opium dollars“ (*Afġānestān – dolār-hā-ye afyūn*).

99) **Abrār-e Eqtešādī**, 14 Dey 1378 (5 January 2000): „The ‚business‘ of drugs cannot be scattered by these {kind} of activities“ (*„Bīznes-e“ mavādd-e moḥadder, bā īn kār-hāa motalāšī nemīšavad*).

100) **Payām-e Āzādī**, 7 Bahman 1378 (27 January 2000): „Drugs, a reality of yesterday, today and the future“ (*Mavādd-e moḥadder, vāqe'īyyat-hā-ye dīrūz, emrūz va fardā*).

101) **Šobḥ-e Emrūz**, 11 Bahman 1378 (31 January 2000): „Dirty trade. The income from drugs is higher than the income from oil“ (*Teğārat-e kaṭīf. Dar-āmad-e mavādd-e moḥadder az dar-āmad-e naft bālātar ast*).

102-103) **Fath**, 19 & 20 Bahman (8 & 9 February 2000): „The danger is serious! Addiction menaces the world“ (*Ḥaṭar ḡeddī ast! E'tiyād ḡahān-rā tahdīd mīkonad*).

104) **Kār-o-Kārgar**, 25 Bahman 1378 (14 February 2000): „A look at the international drug conventions“ (*Negāhī beh konvānsīyūn-hā-ye bayn-ol-melalī-ye kontrol-e mavādd-e moḥadder*).

105) **Āftāb-e Emrūz**, 27 Bahman 1378 (16 February 2000): „Prisoners, drugs and AIDS“ (*Zandānīyān, mavādd-e moḥadder va aydz*).

106-109) **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 30 Bahman & 1 & 2 & 19 Esfand (19 & 20 & 21 February & 9 March 2000): „A new theory on the increase of drug addiction and drug smuggling in the society“ (*Negarešt-e naw bar afzāyeš-e e'tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḥadder dar ḡāme'ah*).

110-111) **Gozāreš-e Rūz**, 1 & 11 & ?? Esfand (20 February & 1 & ?? March 2000): „Addiction and a theoretical research“ (*E'tiyād va taḥqīq-e te'orīk*).

112) **Īrān**, 2 Esfand 1378 (21 February 2000): „Which is the way of salvation from the deep water of addiction?“ (*Rāh-e neḡāt az ḡarq-āb-e e'tiyād kodām ast?*).

113) **Ḥorāsān**, 5 Esfand 1378 (24 February 2000): „Scientific approaches to fight addiction“ (*Rāh-kār-hā-ye 'elmī barāye mobārezah bā e'tiyād*).

114) **Šobḥ-e Emrūz**, 5 Esfand 1378 (25 February 2000): „The representative of the United Nations Drug Control Program office in Iran: 1,5 to 3 percent of Iranian use drugs“ (*Nemāyandeh-ye daftār-e barnāmeḥ-ye kontrol-e mavādd-e moḥadder-e sāzemān-e melal dar īran: 1/5 tā 3 dar šad-e īrānī-hā az mavādd-e moḥadder estefādeḥ mīkonand*).

115) **Tarğomān-e Rūz**, 8 Esfand 1378 (27 February 2000): „After the publication of the annual report on drugs: the United Nations expressed their appreciation of Iran“ (*Dar pey-y gozāreš-e sālāneh dar bāreh-ye mavādd-e moḥadder: sāzemān-e melal az īrān qadr-dānī kard*).

116) **Kār-o-Kārgar**, 9 Esfand 1378 (28 February 2000): „A look at the international drug control conventions“ (*Negāhī beh konvānsiyūn-hā-ye bayn-ol-melalī-ye kontrol-e mavādd-e moḥadder*).

117) **Fath**, 12 Esfand 1378 (2 March 2000): „Turkey – a main drug passage with few addicts“ (*Torkiyyeh, goḍar-gāh-e ‘omdah-ye mavādd-e moḥadder bā mo’tādān-e andak*).

118) **Fath**, 18 Esfand 1378 (8 March 2000): „The protection of the exuberant drug production in Afghanistan by the Taliban secures three quarters of the global opium product and 90 percent of the heroin in Europe“ (*Hemāyat az tawlīd-e anbūb-e mavādd-e moḥadder az sūye tālebān seh ḥahārom-e koll-e maḥṣūl-e taryāk-e ḡahān va 90 dar ṣad-e herō’īn-e orūpā-rā ta’mīn mīkonad*).

119-120) **Ham-Mīhan**, 19 & ?? Esfand (9 & ?? March 2000): „Addiction withdrawal in a week is not addiction withdrawal“ (*Tark-e e’tiyād-e yek hafte’ī nīst tark-e e’tiyād*).

121) **Ġomhūrī-ye Eslāmī**, 21 Esfand 1378 (11 March 2000): „Opium – the main source of income for the Taliban“ (*Taryāk - manba’-e aṣlī-e dar-āmad-e tālebān*).

122) **Fath**, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000): „An interview with the deputy for prevention of the Welfare Organisation: Advertisements for addiction therapy can be prosecuted legally“ (*Goft-o-gū bā mo’āvenat-e pīš-gīrī-ye sāzemān-e beh-zīstī: āgahī-hā-ye darmān-e e’tiyād qābel-e ta’qīb-e qānūnī ast*).

123) **Mošārekāt**, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000): „In the second Congress for the Prevention of Addiction of Students it was discussed: Half of the country’s addicts are under 18 years“ (*Dar dovvomīn hemāyeš-e pīš-gīrī az e’tiyād-e dāneš-āmūzān maṭraḥ ṣod: Nīmī az mo’tādān-e kešver zīr-e 18 sāl hastand*).

124-125) **Fath**, 25 & 26 Esfand 1378 (16 & 17 March 2000): „We are all clean“ (*Mā hameh pāk hastīm*).

**D) Additionally Considered Drug-Related Newspaper Article in 1377 (1998/99)**

1) **Eṭṭelā‘āt**, 21 & 22 Šahrīvar 1377 (12 & 13 September 1998). „Report of the United Nations on the situation of the drugs combat in Iran (*gozāreš-e sāz-mān-e melal dar važ‘-e mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḥadder dar īrān*)

## IX. Bibliography

- Abrahamian, Ervand (1973): Kasravi: the Integrative Nationalist of Iran. In: Middle Eastern Studies 9:3, 271-295.
- Abrahmian, Ervand (October 1978): Iran: The Political Crisis Intensifies. In: MERIP Reports 71.
- Abrahamian, Ervand (March-April 1979): Iran in Revolution: the Opposition Forces. In: MERIP Reports 75/76.
- Abrahamian, Ervand (1982): Iran Between Two Revolutions. Princeton: Princeton Studies on the Near East).
- Abrahamian, Ervand & Alavi, Bozorg (1986): *Arānī, Taqī*. In: Encyclopaedia Iranica.
- Ādaraḥš, Ḥosein ‘Alī (1334 HŠ – 1955/1956 AD): *Āfat-e Zendegī* (Calamity of Life). Tehrān: n.p.
- Adibi, Peyman & Rezailashkajani, Mohammadreza & Roshandel, Delnaz & Behrouz, Negar & Ansari, Shahin & Somi, Mohammad Hossein & Shahraz, Saeed & Zalli, Mohammad Reza (2004): An Economic Analysis of Premarriage Prevention of Hepatitis B Transmission in Iran. In: BMC Infectious Diseases 4:31 (2004).
- AEGD* → cf. *Association d'Études Géopolitiques des Drogues*
- Afkhami, Gholam Reza (2009): The Life and Times of the Shah. Berkeley LA & London: University of California Press.
- AFP* → *Agence France Press*
- Agahi, Cyrus & Spencer, Christopher (1981): Drug Abuse in Pre- and Post-Revolutionary Iran. In: Journal of Psychoactive Drugs 13, 39-46.
- Agahi, Cyurs & Spencer, Christopher (1982a): Patterns of drug use among secondary school children in post-revolutionary Iran. In: Drug and Alcohol Dependence 9 (1982), 235-242.
- Agahi, Cyrus & Spencer, Christopher (1982b): Social background, personal relationships and self-description as predictor of drug users status. A study of adolescent in post revolutionary Iran. In: Drug and Alcohol Dependence 10, 77-84.
- Agahi, Cyrus & Spencer, Christopher (1982c): Beliefs and opinions about drugs and their users as predictors of drug user status of adolescents in post revolutionary Iran. In: Drug and Alcohol Dependence 10, 99-110.
- Agahi, Cyrus & Spencer, Christopher (1990-1991): Drugs and Iran after the Islamic Revolution. Prophesying the next quarter century. In: The International Journal of the Addictions 25:2A, 171-179.

- Agence France Press (23 May 2007): Iran has quarter-million intravenous drug users [sic]. (<http://www.aegis.com/news/afp/2007/af070519.html>, accessed 24 September 2010).
- Ahmadi, Jamshid (2002): Buprenorphine Maintenance Treatment of Heroin Dependence. The first Experience from Iran. In: *Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment* 22 (2002), 157-1599.
- Ahmadi, Jamshid & Ghanizadeh. Ahmad (2000): Motivations For Use of Opiates Among Addicts Seeking Treatment in Shiraz. In: *Psychological Reports* 87: 3 II, 1158-1164.
- Ahmadi, Jamshid & Hasani, Mahsa (2003): Prevalence of Substance Use Among Iranian High School Students. (Short Communication). In: *Addictive Behaviors* 28 (2003), 375-379.
- Ahmadi, Jamshid & Babaee-Beigi, Mohammadali & Alishahi, Mohammadjavad & Maany, Iraj & Hidari, Taghi (2004): Twelve-Month Maintenance Treatment of Opium-Dependent Patients. In: *Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment* 26 (2004), 61-64.
  - Ahmadi, Jamshid & Pridmore, Saxby & Alimi, Abbas & Cheraghi, Ahmad & Arad, Ahmad & Pasaeyan, Hamid & Mogagheghzadeh, Mohammad Sadegh & Kianpour, Mohsen (2007): Epidemiology of Opium Use in the General Population. In: *The American Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse* 33 (2007), 483-491.
  - Akasheh, Bahram & Eshghi, Iraj (1980): The Tabas (Iran) Earthquake of 16 September 1978. In: *Pure and Applied Geophysics* 119, 207-211.
  - Akhavi, Shahrough (1987a): Elite Factionalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In: *Middle East Journal* 41:2, 181-201.
  - Akhavi, Shahrough (February 1987b): Institutionalizing the New Order in Iran. In: *Current History* 86:517, 56-83f.
  - Alaei, Kamiar & Alaei, Arash (2010): HIV/AIDS Reform in Iran. From a Long Denial to Breaking Silence.
  - Alavian, S.M. & Fallahian, F. (October 2009): Epidemiology of Hepatitis C in Iran and the World. In: *Shiraz Electronic Medical Journal* 10:4, 162-172.
  - Ambühl, Annemarie (2010): *Galene*. In: Cancik, Hubert & Schneider, Helmuth (eds.): *Brill's New Pauly*.
  - Amin, Camron Michael (2001): Selling and Saving „Mother Iran“. Gender and the Iranian Press in the 1940s. In: *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33:3 (2001), 335-361.
  - As'adī, Ḥasan (1384 – 2005/06): *Pīš-gīrī az e'tiyād. Mavādd-e moḥadder, āsīb-hā va rāh-bord-hā*. (Drug Prevention. Drugs, Harms, and Strategies). Tehrān: Anḡoman-e Awliyā'va Morabbīyān.



- As'adī, Ḥasan (1384 – 2005/06): *Gozīdeh-ye ātār-e maktūb-e felsefī, hoqūqī, eḡtemā'ī, va ....* (selected Philosophical, legal, social, and ... papers). Qom: Čāphāneh-ye 'Emrān.
- 'Aṣr-e Naw (19 Bahman 1387 – 8 February 2009): *Raḥmān hātefī, rūz-nāmeḥ-negār-e rūz-nāmeḥ-negār-ān-e īrān*. (Raḥmān Hātefī, the journalist of all journalists in Iran).  
(<http://asre-nou.net/php/view.php?objnr=2148>, accessed 25 September 2010)
- Association d'Études Géopolitiques des Drogues (December 2001): Axes of Afghan Drug Trade. Northern Itineraries. (1/3). In: AEGD Geopolitical Drug Newsletter 3, 6f.
- Association d'Études Géopolitiques des Drogues (January 2002): Axes of Afghan Drug Trade. Southern Routes Through Pakistan (2/3). In: AEGD Geopolitical Drug Newsletter 4, 6f.
- Association d'Études Géopolitiques des Drogues (February 2002): Axes of Afghan Drug Trade. The Western Routes. (3/3). In: AEGD Geopolitical Drug Newsletter 5, 6f.
- Azarkar, Zohreh & Sharifzadeh, Gholamreza (2010): Evaluation of the Prevalence of Hepatitis B, Hepatitis C, and HIV in Inmates with Drug-Related Convictions in Birjand, Iran in 2008. In: Hepatitis Monthly 10:1, 26-30.
- Azimi, Fakhreddin (2004): Unseating Mosaddeq. The Configuration and Role of Domestic Forces. In: Gasiorowski, Mark J. & Byrne, Malcolm (eds.): Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Cou in Iran. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 27-101.
- Badrīyān, Faḥr ol-Dīn (1385 – 2006/07): *Maḡmū'eh-ye kāmel-e qavānīn va moqarrer-āt-e mavādd-e moḥadder moštamel bar qavānīn qalb va ba'd az enqelāb*. (Complete Collection of Drug Laws and Regulations Containing the Laws before and After the Revolution. Tehrān: Enteshārāt-e Dānešvar.
- Bahar, Sarvenaz & Silberberg, Sophie Fellow & Brown, Cynthia G. (1993): Guardians of Thought. Limits on Freedom of Expression in Iran. A Middle East Watch Report. Human Rights Watch.
- Bāḡhtar, Aḥmad & Ra'īsī, Mas'ūd (1383 – 2004/05): *Ġadāval-e hoqūqī dar qavānīn va moqarrer-āt-e mawżū'e*. (Legal Tables on Arranged Laws and Regulations). Tehrān: Nāšer-e Ḥaṭṭ-e Sevvom.
- Balaghi, Shiva (1997): The Viceroy as Spectacle. Newspapers and power in Nineteenth Century Iran. In: Culture & History 16, 127-135.
- Bāqerī, Bahrām (Farvardīn 1383 – 2004/05): *Bar-rasī-ye lozūm-e zandān-ī kardan-e mo'tād-ān*. (A Study on the Necessity of Imprisoning Addicts). In: Eṣlāḥ va Tarbiyyat. 25, 36-40.

- Beeman, W.O. (1984): The Cultural Role of the Media in Iran. The Revolution of 1978-79 and After. In: Arno, Andrew & Dissanayake, Wimal (eds.): The News Media in National and International Conflict. Boulder: Westview & Epping & Bowker, 147-165.
- Bélanger, Charles (1838): Voyage aux Indes-Orientales. Volume II. Paris: Arthus Bertrand.
- Bidokhti, Nahaleh Moshtagh & Yazdandoost, Rokhsareh Yeke & Behrooz, Birashk & Shottenfeld, Richard S. (March 2006): Family Environment of Detoxified Opiate Addicts in Iran and its Relationship with Symptoms of Anxiety and Depression. In: Contemporary Family Therapy 28:1, 153-164.
- Böhm, Andreas (2004): Theoretisches Codieren. Textanalyse in der Grounded Theory. In: Flick, Uwe & von Kardorff, Ernst & Steinke, Ines (eds.): Qualitative Forschung. Ein Handbuch. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag. (1<sup>st</sup> Edition 2000), 475-485.
- Boilot, D.J. (2010): *al-Bīrūnī (Bērūnī), Abu 'l-Rayḥān Muḥammad b. Aḥmad*. In: Bearman, P. & Bianquis, Th. & Bosworth, C.E. & van Donzel, E. & Heinrichs, W.P. (eds.): Encyclopaedia of Islam. Leyden: Brill. Second Edition.
- Bolhari, Ğa'far (2002): *Arz-yābī-ye sū'-maṣraf-e mavādd-e moḥadder dar zandān-hā-ye īrān*. (Assessment of Substance Abuse Situation in Iran's Prisons). Unpublished.
- Booth, Martin (1996): Opium. A History. New York: St. Martin's Griffin.
- Boyce, Mary (2003): *Haoma II: The Rituals*. In: Encyclopedia of Iran.
- Brownstein, Michael J. (1993): A Brief History of Opiates, Opioid Peptids, and Opioid Receptors. In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA 90:12, 5391-5393.
- Buchta, Wilfried (2000): Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic. Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
- CACI → Central Asia Caucasus Institute
- Calabrese, John (2007): Iran's War on Drugs: Holding the Line? In: The Middle East Institute, Policy Brief 3 (December 2007). Washington DC: Middle East Institute, 1-18.
- Calmard, Jean (2009): Shi'i Rituals and Power II. The Consolidation of Safavid Shi'ism: Folklore and Popular Religion. In: Melville, Charles (ed.): Safavid Persia. London & New York: I.B. Tauris. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (1<sup>st</sup> edition 1996), 139-190.
- Catania, Holly (Fall 2004): Progressive Harm Reduction in Iran's Prisons. In: Harm Reduction News 5:3, 17-18.

- Central Asia Caucasus Institute. Silk Road Studies Program (2004): Country Factsheets, Eurasian Narcotics. Iran.  
([http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/research/narcotics\\_crime/FactSheet/2004/Iran.pdf](http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/research/narcotics_crime/FactSheet/2004/Iran.pdf), accessed 22 September 2010).
- Chahkar, Mohamed (1936): *Le Problème de l'Opium en Iran*. Paris: Maisonneuve.
- Chardin, Jean (1811): *Voyages de Chevalier Chardin, en Perse, et autres lieux de l'orient*. Volume IV. Paris: le Normant.
- Chardin, Jean (1811): *Voyages de Chevalier Chardin, en Perse, et autres lieux de l'orient*. Volume VIII. Paris: le Normant.
- Corstange, Daniel M. (2000): *IRAN: The Party System from 1963 to 2000*. International Comparative Political Parties Project (ICPP), ICPP 2000. Evanston/Chicago: Northwestern University.
- Country Studies (2010): Islamic Republican Party.  
(<http://www.country-studies.com/iran/islamic-republican-party.html>, accessed 25 September 2010)
- *Culture Ministry* → *Vezārat-e Farhang va Eršād-e Eslāmī*
- Curzon, George Nathaniel (1966): *Persia and the Persian Question*. London: Cass. Reprint of 1<sup>st</sup> edition of 1892).
- Dalvand, S. & Agahi, C. & Spencer CP. (1984): Drug addicts seeking treatment after the Iranian revolutionary Iran. A clinic-based study. In: *Drug and Alcohol Dependence* 14, 87-92.
- Dāneš, Tāğ-Zamān (2006/07): *Mo'tād kīst? mavādd-e moḥadder čīst?* (Who is an Addict? What are Drugs?) Tehrān: Enteshārāt-e Kayhān. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition (1<sup>st</sup> Edition 1379 – 2000/01).
- Darley-Doran, R.: *Šafawids*. In: Bearman, P. & Bianquis, Th. & Bosworth, C.E. & van Donzel, E. & Heinrichs, W.P. (eds.): *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Leyden: Brill. Second Edition.
- DCHQ → Drug Control Headquarter
- Destrée, Annette (1969): L'opium en Iran. In: *Correspondance d'Orient, Etudes* 15-16, 81-103.
- *Deutsche Welle* (online) (8 August 2009): *Rawnaq-e 'šīšeh' dar īrān*. (Thriving of 'glass' in Iran).  
(<http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4544079,00.html>, accessed 4 November 2019)
- *Deutsche Welle* (online) (9 November 2009): *Taryāk, krāk va šīšeh, qātel-ān-e ḥāmūš-e mardom-e īrān*. (Opium, crack and glass. Silent killers of the Iranian people).

- (<http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4874986,00.html>, accessed 4 November 2019).
- Dežākām, Hosayn (1998/99): *‘Obūr az manṭaqeh-ye 60 daraḡeh zīr-e šefr*. (Passage through a zone of minus 60 degrees). Seventh Edition. Tehrān: Paraškūh.
  - Dikötter, Frank (2004): *Narcotic Culture. A History of Drugs in China*. Chicago: University of Chicago.
  - Dodson, G. Everard (1927): The Opium Habit in Persia. In: *Moslem World* 17 (1927), 261-265.
  - Drug Control Headquarter (November 1997): *The Anti-Narcotics Law of the Islamic Republic of Iran*. Teheran: Drug Control Headquarter of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
  - Drug Control Headquarter (N.A.): *The Political History of Opium in Iran*. Tehran: Anti-Drugs Campaign Headquarters.
  - Drug Control Headquarter (2010a): *Qānūn-e eṣlāḡ-e mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḡadder va elḡaq-e mavāddī beh ān, 17 Ābān 1376*. (Amendment to the Anti-Narcotics Law and addenda of 8 November 1997)  
(<http://www.dchq.ir/html/index.php?module=htmlpages&func=display&pid=89>, accessed 24 September 2010)
  - Drug Control Headquarter (2010b): *Mo‘arrefī-ye setād-e mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḡadder*. (Presentation of the Drug Control Headquarter).  
(<http://dchq.ir/html/index.php?module=htmlpages&func=display&pid=35>, accessed 24 September 2010)
  - Dubler, C.E. (2010): *Afyūn*. In: Bearman, P. & Bianquis, Th. & Bosworth, C.E. & van Donzel, E. & Heinrichs, W.P. (eds.): *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Leyden: Brill. Second Edition.
  - Ebtekār (2010): *Dawlat-e mūsavī, ādarī-qommī, resālat va ...* (The government of Mūsavī, Ādarī-Qommī, *Resālat* and ...).  
(<http://www.ebtekarnews.com/ebtekar/News.aspx?NID=19030>, accessed 26 September 2010)
  - Eder, Walter (2010): *Tranquilitas*. In: Cancik, Hubert & Schneider, Helmuth (eds.): *Brill’s New Pauly*.
  - Ehteshami, Anoushirvan (1995): *After Khomeini. The Iranian Second Republic*. London: Routledge.
  - Elgood, C. (2010): *Alī b. al-‘Abbās al-Madḡsī*. In: Bearman, P. & Bianquis, Th. & Bosworth, C.E. & van Donzel, E. & Heinrichs, W.P. (eds.): *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Leyden: Brill. Second Edition.

- Eshrati, Babak & Taghizadeh Asl, Rahim & Dell, Colleen Anne & Afshar, Parviz & Kamali, Mohammad & Weekes, John (2008): Preventing HIV Transmission Among Iranian Prisoners. Initial Support Providing Education on the Benefits of Harm Reduction Practices. In: Harm Reduction Journal 5:21.  
(<http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/5/1/21>, accessed 24 September 2010)
- Esmā'īlī, Īrağ (Āḍar 1382 – 2003/04): *Naqš-e vāledayn dar be-kār-gīr-ī-ye barnāmeḥ-hā va mahārat-hā-ye eğtemā'ī dar pīš-gīr-ī az e'tiyād, baḥš-e avval*. (The Role of the Parents in the Implementation of the Social Programmes and Expertises in Drug Prevention, Part 1). In: Eşlāḥ va Tarbiyyat 21, 20-23.
- Esmā'īlī, Īrağ (Day 1382 – 2003/04): *Naqš-e vāledayn dar be-kār-gīr-ī-ye barnāmeḥ-hā va mahārat-hā-ye eğtemā'ī dar pīš-gīr-ī az e'tiyād, baḥš-e pāyān-ī*. (The Role of the Parents in the Implementation of the Social Programmes and Expertises in Drug Prevention, Part 2). In: Eşlāḥ va Tarbiyyat 22, 20-24.
- Esmā'īlī, Īrağ & Şafātīyān, Sa'īd & Motavallī-Ḥāmeneh, Mortazā & Moḥsenī, Loṭfollāh (Mordād 1383 – 2004/05): *Bar-rasī-ye važ'īyat-e e'tiyād beh mavādd-e moḥadder dar mīyān-e zandān-ī-yān-e dārā-ye taḥşīl-āt-e dāneş-gāh-ī-ye zandān-hā-ye ostān-e tehrān*. (A Study of the Situation of Drug Addiction Among Prisoners With University Education in the Prisons of the Province of Tehran). In: Eşlāḥ va Tarbiyyat 29, 52-54.
- Ettahadieh Nezam-Mafī, Mansoureh & Sadeq, Said Mir Muhammad (2001): Newspapers and Journals Reprinted from 1991 to 2001. In: Iranian Studies 34:1 (2001), 195-201.
- Fairclough, Norman (2003): *Ananlysing Discourse. Textual Analysis For Social Research*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Fairclough, Norman (2009): *Critical Discourse Analysis. The Critical Study of Language*. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition (1<sup>st</sup> Edition 1995).
- Falk, Harry (1989): Soma I & II. In: Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 52:1 (1989), 77-90.
- Fāzelī, 'Eşmat & Mawlavī, Fāṭemeh (Winter 2003): *Bar-rasī-ye maşraf-e mavādd-e moḥadder dar mīyān-e mo'tād-ān-e mard dar īrān*. (A Study of Substance Use Among Male Drug Addicts in Iran). In: E'tiyād-e Pažūheşī (Research of Addiction) 1:1, 67-85.
- Floor, Willem (2000): *The Economy of Safavid Persia*. Wiesbaden: Reichert Verlag.
- Foucault, Michel (1976): *Histoire de la Sexualité. La Volonté de Savoir*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Foucault, Michel (1981): *Archäologie des Wissens*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag.

- Fraser, James B. (1826): *Travels and Adventures in the Persian Provinces on the Southern Banks of the Caspian Sea*. London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Browne & Green.
- Gasiorowski, Mark J. & Byrne, Malcolm (eds.) (2003): *Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Ġavān-Far, ‘Abbās (Ḥordād 1382 – 2003/0): *Ġorm-angārī-ye e’tīyād va ta’tīr-e ān*. (Criminalisation of Addiction and its Effect). In: *Eṣlāḥ va Tarbiyyat* 15, 28-31.
- Gehrke, Ulrich & Mehner, Harald (1975): *Iran. Natur - Bevölkerung - Geschichte - Kultur - Staat - Wirtschaft*. Tübingen & Basel: Horst Erdmann Verlag.
- Gelpke, Rudolf (1995): *Vom Rausch in Orient und Okzident*. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. (1<sup>st</sup> edition 1966).
- Ghaffari-Farhangi, Sétoreh (1995): IRNA, Agence d’information de la République Islamique. Centre d’Études et de Recherches sur les Médias (CERM). *L’Évolution des Médias en Iran*. Repères Chronologiques. In: *CEMOTI* 20, 225-238.
- Ghahari, Keivandokht (2001): *Nationalismus und Modernismus in Iran in der Periode zwischen dem Zerfall der Qāğāren-Dynastie und der Machtfestigung Reżā Schahs*. Eine Untersuchung über die intellektuellen Kreise um die Zeitschriften *Kāweh*, *Īrānšahr* und *Āyandeh*. Berlin: Schwarz.
- Ghani, Cyrus (1998): *Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah: From Qajar Collapse to Pahlavir Power*. London & New York: I.B. Tauris.
- Gheiratmand, R. & Navipour, R. & Mohebbi, M. R. & Mallik, A. K. (2005): *Uncertainty on the Number of HIV/AIDS Patients. Our Experience in Iran*. In: *Sexually Transmitted Infections* 81:3, 279-280.
- Gignoux, Ph. (1986): *Ardā Wīrāz*. In: *Encyclopaedia of Iran*.
- Glaser, Barney G. & Strauss, Anselm L. (1974): *The Discovery of Grounded Theory. Strategies For Qualitative Research*. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company.
- Globalsecurity Online (2010): Expediency Discernment Council.  
(<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/edc.htm>, accessed 4 November 2019).
- Gonābādī, ‘Alī (1948/49): *Ketāb-e du ‘l-feqār va ḥormat-e kešīdan-e taryāk*. (Book of the piercing {sword} and the prohibition of opium smoking). Tehrān: N.P.
- Goodman, L.E. (2010): *al-Rāzī, Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Zakariyyā*. In: Bearman, P. & Bianquis, Th. & Bosworth, C.E. & van Donzel, E. & Heinrichs, W.P. (eds.): *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Leyden: Brill. Second Edition.
- Groseclose, Elgin (1947): *Introduction to Iran*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- GTZ = Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (2006): Drug Demand and Harm Reduction in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Project Sheet. Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit. Development Oriented Drug Control Programme.
- Haeri, Safa (1993): Iran: Blueprint for an Islamic Press. In: Index on Censorship 22:10, 39-40.
- Hagemeister, Jules de (1839): Essai sur les ressources territoriales et commerciales, de l'Asie Occidentale. Volume III. St.-Pétersbourg: Königliche Akademie der Wissenschaften.
- Haghpanah, M. & Mokri, Azarakhsh & Khoshnood, K. & Shottenfeld, R. (2005): A Pilot Study Comparing HIV Knowledge, Risk Behaviors and Social Stability of Opium and Heroin Users in Tehran, Iran. Unpublished Paper.
- Hansen, Bradley (2001): Learning to tax the political economy of the opium trade in Iran (1921-1941). In: Journal of Economic History 61:1, 95-133.
- Ḥaqṣenās, Ṭorāb (2010): *Communism III: In Persia after 1953*. In: Encyclopaedia Iranica.
- Hassan, Riaz (1984): Iran's Islamic Revolutionaries: before and after the revolution. In: Third World Quarterly 6:3 (July 1984), 675-686.
- Hendī, Sa'īd (1377 – 1998/99): *Afsāneh-ye afsūn. bar-rasī-ye mavādd-e moḥadder az dīd-gāh-e 'elm va dīn*. (The Legend of a Spell. An Examination of Drugs from the Viewpoint of Science and Religion). Tehrān: IRIB.
- Ḥorāsān (2010): Rūz-nāmeḥ-ye farhangī, eḡtemā'ī, siyāsī, ḥabarī-ye šobḥ-e īrān. (A Cultural, Social, Political, and Informing Morning Daily of Iran).  
(<http://www.khorasannews.com/AboutUs.aspx?type=1&year=1389&month=7&day=8>, accessed 26 September 2010)
- Hyman, Anthony (1990): Iran's Press - Freedom with Limits. In: Index on Censorship 19:2, 26.
- Jäger, Siegfried (2004): Kritische Diskursanalyse. Eine Einführung. Münster: Edition DISS. 4<sup>th</sup> Edition (1<sup>st</sup> Edition 1993).
- Jassim, Esmā'īl (2003): *Bahār* (2). In: Encyclopaedia Iranica.
- Javadi, Hasan (1989): Contemporary Persian Press in Exile. In: MELA Notes 47 (1989), 18-25.
- Kaempfer, Engelbert (1940): Am Hofe des Persischen Grosskönigs (1684-85). Das 1. Buch der Amoenitates Exoticae. Eingeleitet und in deutscher Bearbeitung hg. von Walter Hinz.

- Kalameh Online (12 Mordād 1389 – 3 August 2010): *Mo'tād-ān dīgar beh zandān nemī-ravand*. (The addicts are no longer going to prison).  
(<http://www.kaleme.com/1389/05/12/klm-27619>, accessed 26 September 2010)
- Kamrava, Mehran (2001): The Civil Society Discourse in Iran. In: British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 28:2, 165-185.
- Karimi-Hakkak, Ahmad (1999): *Farroḡī, Yazdī*. In: Encyclopaedia Iranica.
- Karimian, Ramin & Bahmanpour, Masoud (1999): Iranian Press Update. In: MiddleEast Report 29:3, 38-39.
- Katouzian, Homa (2006): State and Society in Iran. The Eclipse of the Qajars and the Emergence of the Pahlavis. London & New York: I.B. Tauris. Paperback edition. (1<sup>st</sup> edition 2000).
- Keddie, Nikki R. (2006): Modern Iran. Roots and Results of Revolution. New Haven & London: Yale University Press. Updated Edition (1<sup>st</sup> Edition 2003).
- Khiabany, Gholam (2010): Iranian Media: The Paradox of Modernity. Routledge Advances in Internaionalizing Media Studies, Volume 3. New York & Oxon: Routledge.
- Khiabany, Gholam & Sreberny, Annabelle (2001): The Iranian Press and the Continuing Struggle over Civil Society (1998-2000). In: International Communication Gazette 63:2-3, 203-233.
- Kian, Azadeh (1995): L'Invasion Culturelle Occidentale: Mythe ou Réalité?. In: CEMOTI 20 (1995), 73-90.
- Kinzer, Stephen (2003): All the Shah's Men. An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley & Sons.
- Kort, Gerard de & Vazirian, Mohsen & Nassirimanesh, Bijan & al. (2006): Young People and Drugs. Towards a Comprehensive Health Promotion Policy. Tehran Report. Tehran: Asian Harm Reduction Network & United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Field Office in Iran & Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Office, Undersecretary of Health, Ministry of Health and Medical Education.
- Kūhī-Kermānī, Ḥossayn (1324 HŠ – 1945/1946 AD): *Tārīḥ-e taryāk va taryākī dar īrān*. (A History of Opium and Opium Smokers in Iran). Tehrān: Čāḡhāne-ye 'Elmī.
- Lambton, Ann Kathrin Swynford (1969): The Persian Land Reform, 1962-1966. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Lambton, Ann Kathrin Swynford (2010): *Ḳādḡār*. In: In: Bearman, P. & Bianquis, Th. & Bosworth, C.E. & van Donzel, E. & Heinrichs, W.P. (eds.): Encyclopaedia of Islam. Leyden: Brill. Second Edition.



- Landwehr, Achim (2001): Geschichte des Sagbaren. Einführung in die Historische Diskursanalyse. Tübingen: Edition Diskurs.
- Link, Jürgen (2006): Diskursanalyse unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Interdiskurs und Kollektivsymbolik. In: Keller, Rainer & Hirsland, Andreas & Schneider, Werner & Viehöfer, Willy (eds.): Handbuch sozialwissenschaftliche Diskursanalyse. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition (1<sup>st</sup> Edition 2001), 407-430.
- Madani, Ghahfarokhi, Saeid (2006): Health: Drug Use: Iran. In: Suad Joseph & al. (eds.): Encyclopedia of Women & Islamic Cultures. Volume 2. Leiden: Brill, 138-140.
- Malcolm, John (1845): Sketches of Persia. London: John Murray.
- Malek-Moḥammadi, Mağīd (1384 HŠ – 2005/2006 AD): *E'tiyād va masā'el-e ġensī*. (Addiction and the Question of Gender). Tehrān: Enteshārāt Ferdows.
- Matthee, Rudi (2005): The Pursuit of Pleasure. Drugs and Stimulants in Iranian History, 1500-1900. Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- MacCallum, Elizabeth Pauline (1928): Twenty Years of Persian Opium (1908-1928). A Study. New York: Foreign Policy Association.
- MacCormack, D.W. & Ameri, Soltan Mohamed (1924): Memorandum on Persian Opium. Prepared for Dr. A.C. Millspaugh, Administrator General of the Finances. Tehran: Parliament Press.
- Mahrads, Ahmad (1983): Die deutsche Pénétration pacifique des iranischen Pressewesens, 1909-1936. Europäische Hochschulschriften. Reihe 3: Geschichte und ihre Hilfswissenschaften, 197. Frankfurt a.M.: Lang.
- Malek, Abbas & Mohsenian Rad, Mehdi (1994): Iran. In: Kamalipour, Yahya R. & Hamid, Mowlana (eds.): Mass Media in the Middle East. A Comprehensive Handbook. Westport: Greenwood, 74-95.
- Mansoori, Seyed-Davood & Zadsar, Maryam & Arami, Siamak & Adimi, Parisa & Alaeyi, Kamyar & Velayati, Ali-Akbar (2003): Immunological and Clinical Features of HIV in a Group of Hospitalized Iranian Patients. In: Archives of Iranian Medicine 6:1, 5-8.
- McCoy, Alfred W. (2003): The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade. Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, Colombia. 3<sup>rd</sup>, Revised Edition. Chicago: Lawrence Hill.
- McLaughlin, Gerald T. (1976): The Poppy is not an ordinary flower. A survey of drug policy in Iran. In: Fordham Law Review 44 (1976), 701-772.
- McLaughlin, Gerald T. & Quinn, Thomas M. (1974): Drug Control in Iran. A Legal and Historical Analysis. In: Iowa Law Review 59:3 (1974), 469-524.

- McMahon, Keith (2002): *The Fall of the God of Money. Opium Smoking in Nineteenth-Century China*. Lanham & Boulder & Oxford & New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Mehryar, Amir Hooshang & Moharreri, Mohammad Reza (March 1978): A study of authorized opium addiction in Shiraz city and Fars Province, Iran. In: *British Journal of Addiction* 73:1 (1978), 93-102.
- Menashri, David (1980): Shi'ite Leadership: In the Shadow of Conflicting Ideologies. In: *Iranian Studies* 13:1, Iranian Revolution in Perspective, 119-145.
- Menashri, David (2001): *Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society and Power*. London: Frank Cass.
- Merat, Zahir (Fall 1999): Pushing Back the Limits of the Possible. *The Press in Iran*. In: *Middle East Report* 212, 32-35.
- Milani, Mohsen M. (1994): *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution. From Monarchy to Islamic Republic*. Oxford: Westview Press. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition (1<sup>st</sup> Edition 1988).
- Millspaugh, Arthur Chester (1973): *The American Task in Persia*. New York: Arno Press. Reprint of the 1<sup>st</sup> edition of 1925.
- Millward, W.G. (1984): The Popular Press of Iran: 1964-1974. In: *Folia Orientalia* 22 (1984), 207-221.
- Mīr-Faḥrā'ī, 'Alī-Rezā (2004/05): *E'tiyād čīst? mo'tād kīst?* (What is Addiction? Who is an Addict?) Tehrān: Našr-e Vāḥed. 4<sup>th</sup> Edition (1<sup>st</sup> Edition 1378 – 1999/2000). [A translation of Coleman, Vernon (1946): *Addiction and Addicts*]
- Mobasser, Nilou (1998a): Tehran Spring. In: *Index on Censorship* 27:4, 134-173.
- Mobasser, Nilou (1998b): By Any Other Name. In: *Index on Censorship* 27:5, 16-18.
- Mobasser, Nilou (2000): The News Fix. In: *Index on Censorship* 29: 5, 86-87.
- Moharreri, Mohammad-Reza (1978): General View of Drug Abuse in Iran and a One-Year Report of Outpatient Treatment of Opiate Addiction in the City of Shiraz. In: Peterson, R. (ed.): *The International Challenge of Drug Abuse*. National Institute on Drug Abuse Research Monographe 19, 69-81.
- Moḥsenī, Loṭfollāh (Mordād 1383 – 2004/05): *E'tiyād bā ta'kīd bar mabānī-ye 'aṣab-šenāḡt-ī-ye ān*. (Addiction With an Emphasis on its Neurological Basics). In: *Eṣlāḡ va Tarbiyyat* 29, 21-23.
- Mokri, Azarakhsh (2002): Brief overview of the status of drug abuse in Iran. In: *Archives of Iranian Medicine* 5, 184-190.
- Motamed-Néjad, Kazèm (1995): Médias et pouvoir en Iran. In: *CEMOTI* 20 (1995), 13-43.

- Mowlana, Hamid (1974): The Politics of Opium in Iran. A Social-Psychological Interface. In: Simmons, Luiz R.S. & Said, Abdul Aziz (eds): Drugs, Politics, and Diplomacy. The International Connection. Beverly Hills & London: Sage Publications.
- Mozaʼffarī, Aḥmad (1382 – 2003/04): *Naẓar-āṭ-e qaṣṣiyyāt dar ǧarayem-e mavādd-e moḥadder*. (Judicial Opinions on Drug Crimes). Tehrān: Enteshārāt-e Qoqnūs.
- Nabavi, Negin (2005): Spreading the Word. Iran's First Constitutional Press and the Shaping of a 'New Era'. In: Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 14:3 (2005), 307-321.
- Nagl, Ludwig (1998): Pragmatismus. Frankfurt / New York: Reihe Campus.
- Nakhaee, F.H. (November 2002): Prisoners' Knowledge of HIV/AIDS and Its Prevention in Kerman, Islamic Republic of Iran. In: Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal 8:6, 725-731.
- Navai, Ramita (2005): Le Vie Della Droga (Con Una Schedi Di Mehdi Afroozmanesh – Terra minata). Translation by Bacciantini, Mario. In: limes. Rivista Italiana di Geopolitica. Volume V: l'Iran Tra Machera e Volto, 79-87.
- Neligan, Anthony Richard (1927): The Opium Question with Special Reference to Persia. London: John Bale, Sons & Danielsson.
- Nikazmerad, Nicholas M. (1980): A Chronological Suvey of the Iranian Revolution. In: Iranian Studies 13:1, Iranian Revolution in Perspective, 327-368.
- Nissaramanesh [sic!, for Nassirimanesh], Bijan & Trace, Mike & Roberts, Marcus (2005): The Rise of Harm Reduction in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In: The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme. Briefing Paper 8, 1-7.
- NLAI → *National Library & Archives of the Islamic Republic of Iran*
- Olivier, Guillaume-Antoine (1807): Voyage dans l'Empire Othoman, l'Égypte et la Perse. Volume V. Paris: Agasse.
- Opwis, F. (1999): Shariarechtliche Stellungnahmen zum Drogenverbot. In: Die Welt des Islams 39, 159-182.
- Pālāhang, Ḥasan (Ābān 1382 – 2003/04): *Bar-rasī-ye rābeṭeh-ye ǧorm va e'tīyād dar zandān-e šahr-e kord*. (A Study of the Relationship Between Crime and Addiction in the Prison of Šahr-e Kord). In: Eṣlāḥ va Tarbiyyat 20, 24-26.
- Parvin, Manuchehr & Sommer, Maurie (1997): Production and Trade of Persian Opium. Economics and Law in Retrospect. In: Orient 28, 244-260.
- Parvin, Nassereddin (1998): *Eṭṭelā'āt*. In: Encyclopaedia Iranica.
- *Payk-e Irān* online (26 Farvardīn 1389 – 15 April 2010): Ra'īs-e polīs-e mavādd-e moḥadder: dō milīyūn nafar dar kešvar mavādd-e moḥadder mašraf mī-konand.

- (According to the director of the Anti-Narcotics Police: Two million persons are consuming drugs in the country).
- Petrushevsky, Ilya Pavlovich (1968): The Socio-Economic Condition of Iran under the Īl-Khāns. In: Boyle, J.A. (ed.): The Cambridge History of Iran V. The Saljuq and Mongol Period. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 483-537.
  - Philippe, Lucien (1978): Voices That Can't Be Ignored. In: Index on Censorship 7:1, 15-24.
  - Polak, Jakob-Eduard (1865): Persien. Das Land und seine Bewohner. Volume II. Leipzig: Brockhaus.
  - Polak, Jacob Eduard (1883): Das Persische Opium. In: Österreichische Mitteilungen für den Orient 9 (1883), 124-125.
  - Qavvī-Del, Parvīn (Mehr 1382 – 2003/04): *Bar-rasī-ye eb'ād-e mohtalef-e e'tiyād va čegūnegī-ye pīš-gīrī az ān dar naw-ğavānān*. (A Study of Different Dimensions of Addiction and Kinds of Prevention of it Among Adolescents). In: Ešlāḥ va Tarbiyyat 19, 14f.
  - Rafiey, Hassan & Harenjiha, Hooman & Shirinbayan, Peymaneh & Noori, Roya & Javadipour, Morteza & Roshanpajouh, Mohsen & Samiei, Mercedeh & Assari, Shervin (2009): Needle and Syringe Sharing Among Iranian Drug Injectors. In: Harm Reduction Journal 6:21.
  - Rahmdel, Mansour (2002): International Judicial Criminal Cooperation in Combating Narcotic Drugs Crimes in Iranian Law. In: European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 10:4 (2002), 294-302.
  - Raḥmdel, Maṣṣūr (1383 – 2003/04): *Hoqūq-e kayfarī-ye mavādd-e moḥadder*. (Penal Drug Laws). Tehrān: Mīṭāq-e 'Edālat.
  - Raḥmatī, Moḥammad-Mehdī (Winter 2003): *'Avāmel-e mo'atter dar šorū'-e mašraf-e mavādd-e moḥadder. Bā ešāreh beh važ'iyyat-e mo'tād-ān-e zan*. (The Factors Affecting Drug Abuse Among Addicted Women). In: E'tiyād-e Pažūhešī (Research of Addiction) 1:1, 131-150.
  - Raisdana, Fariborz & Gharavi Nakhjavani, Ahmad (July 2002): The Drug Market in Iran. In: Annals, AAPSS 583, 149-166.
  - Ra'īs-Dānā, Farīborz (Pā'īz 1382 – Autumn 2003): *Bāzār-e mašraf-e mavādd-e moḥadder dar īrān va negāh-ī-ye vīžeh beh bāzār-e tehrān*. (Iranian Illicit Drug Market, a Glance at Tehran's Market). In: E'tiyād-e Pažūhešī (Research on Addiction) 1:4, 13-43.
  - Rasāneh (2008): *Qānūn-e maṭbū'āt-e īrān* (Iran's press law).  
(<http://www.rasaneh.org/NSite/FullStory/News/?Id=726>, accessed 26 September 2010)

- Rawan, Shir Mohammad (2000): *Moderne Massenmedien und traditionelle Kommunikation in Iran und Pakistan*. Hamburger Beiträge. Medien und Politische Kommunikation - Naher Osten und islamische Welt. Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut.
- Razzaghi, Emran Mohammad & Rahimi Movaghar, Afarin & Hosseini, M. & Chatterjee, A. (1999): *Rapid Situation Assessment (RSA) of Drug Abuse in Iran (1998-1999)*. Tehran, Iran: Prevention Department, State Welfare Organization, Ministry of Health & United Nations International Drug Control Program. Unpublished.
- Razzaghi, Emran Mohammad & Mokri, Azarakhsh & Vazirian, Mohsen (January 2005): *Effectiveness of Methadone Maintenance Program in Reducing Illicit Drug Use and HIV Related High-Risk Behavior. A Multi-Center Study*. Tehran: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Unpublished.
- Reid, Gary & Costigan, Genevieve (2002): *Revisiting "the Hidden Epidemic". A Situation Assessment of Drug Use in Asia in the Context of HIV/AIDS*. Macfarlane Burnet Institute for Medical Research and Public Health. Centre for Harm Reduction.
- Reżāpūr-Poršokūhī, Ma'sūmeh (1381 – 2002/03): *Aḥkām-e mavādd-e moḥadder dar feqh va ḥoqūq-e eslāmī*. (Drug Edicts in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence). Tehrān: Andīseh-ye Bartar.
- Russell, Gül (2002): *Greece X: Greek Medicine in Persia*. In: *Encyclopaedia of Iran*.
- Šādeqī, 'Abdollāh & Bordbār, Ġolām-Reżā (Esfant 1383 – 2004/05): *Tarḥ-e gostar-deh va kār-bord-e metādōn beh 'onvān-e negah-dārandeh-ye darmānī va qānūnī-ye darmān-ḡū-yān va madad-ḡū-yān vābesteh be mavādd*. (An Encompassing Project and Application of Methadone as a Means of a Therapeutical and Legal Protecting [Agent] for Therapy- and Assistance-Seeking [Patients] in Relation to Drugs). In: *Eṣlāḥ va Tarbiyyat* 35, 52-54.
- Sadr, Shahryar (8 July 2010): *How Hezbollah Founder Fell Foul of Iranian Regime*. In: Mianeh.  
(<http://mianeh.net/article/how-hezbollah-founder-fell-foul-iranian-regime>, accessed 26 September 2010)
- Sa'edi, Gholam Hoseyn (1984): *Iran under the Party of God*. In: *Index on Censorship* 13:1, 16-20.
- Saeed, Leila (1981): *Iran since the Shah*. In: *Index on Censorship* 10:3, 11-15.
- Šafārī, Fāṭemeh (Spring 2003): *E'tiyād va zanān. Tafāwot-hā-ye ḡensīyatī dar zamīneh-ye sū'-mašraf-e mavādd va darmān-e ān*. (Addiction and Women. Gender Differences Concerning Drug Abuse and its Treatment.) In: *E'tiyād-e Pažūhešī* (Research of Addiction) 1:2, 119-138.

- Šahīdī, Moḥammad-Ḥasan (1382 – 2003/04): *Mavādd-e moḥadder, amniyyat-e eḡetmā'ī, va rāh-e sevvom*. (Drugs, Social Security and the Third Way). Tehrān: Enteshārāt-e Eṭṭelā'āt. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition (1<sup>st</sup> Edition 1375 – 1996/97).
- Šahīdzādeh, Žāleh (Āḍar 1382 – 2003/04): *E'tiyād va zandān*. (Addiction and Prison). In: *Eṣlāḥ va Tarbiyyat* 21, 39-41.
- Šahrvand-e Emrūz (15 Tīr 1364 – 6 July 1985): *Talāš barāye raf'-e tawqīf-e rūz-nāmeḥ-ye šobḥ-e emrūz*. (Effort at removing the suspension of the newspaper Šobḥ-e Emrūz). (<http://www.shahrvandemrouz.com/content/2910/default.aspx>, accessed 25 September 2010).
- Sajjādī, Šādeq (1995): *Drugs*. In: *Encyclopaedia of Iran*.
- Šākerāmī, 'Abd ol-Ḥosayn (2007/08): *Darmān-e e'tiyād beh mavādd-e moḥadder-e ṭabī'ī va šan'atī*. (Therapy of Addiction to Natural and Synthetic Drugs). Tehrān: Enteshārāt-e Gūtenberg.
- Saleh, Jahanshah (1956): Iran Suppresses Opium Production. In: *Bulletin on Narcotics* 8 (July-September 1956), 1-2.
- Samii, A.W. (1999): The Contemporary Iranian News Media, 1998-1999. In: *Meria Journal* 3:4, 1-10.
- Samii, Abbas William (01.05.2000): Ever More Publications Closed Down. RFE/RL Iran Report 3:17. (<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2000/17-010500.html>, accessed 4 November 2019)
- Samii, A.W. (2001): Sisyphus' Newsstand. The Iranian Press Under Khatami. In: *MERIA Journal* 5:3, 1-11.
- Samii, William Abbas & Recknagel, Charles (2002): Iran's War on Drugs. In: *Transnational Organized Crime* 5:2, 153-175.
- Samii, Abbas William (2003): Drug Abuse. Iran's 'Thorniest Problem'. In: *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 9: 2, 283-299.
- Sarasin, Philipp (2003): *Geschichtswissenschaft und Diskursanalyse*. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag.
- Sarkoohi, Faraj (1998): Showdown. In: *Index on Censorship* 27:4, 134-139.
- Savage-Smith, Emilie & Ming, Zhu & Klein-Franke, F. (2010): *Tibb*. In: In: Bearman, P. & Bianquis, Th. & Bosworth, C.E. & van Donzel, E. & Heinrichs, W.P. (eds.): *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Leyden: Brill. Second Edition.

- Savage-Smith, Emilie (1998): 'Emād al-Dīn Maḥmūd (b. Serāj-al-Dīn Mas'ūd Šīrāzī). In: Encyclopaedia Iranica.
- Scarborough, John (1995): The Opium Poppy in Hellenistic and Roman Medicine. In: Porter, Roy & Teich, Mikuláš (eds.): Drugs and Narcotics in History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 4-23.
- Sciolino, Elaine (1983): Iran's Durable Revolution. In: Foreign Affairs 61:4 (Spring 1983), 893-920.
- Seefelder, Matthias (1996): Opium. Eine Kulturgeschichte: Antike, Arabien, China. Wirkungsweise, Chemie und Drogen heute. Hamburg: Nikol Verlagsgesellschaft. 3<sup>rd</sup> edition (1<sup>st</sup> edition 1987).
- Seyf, Ahmed (1984): Commercialization of Agriculture: Production and Trade of Opium in Persia, 1850-1906. In: International Journal of Middle East Studies 16:2 (May 1984), 233-250.
- Shahidi, Hossein (2007): Journalism in Iran. From Mission To Profession. New York: Routledge.
- Shahidi, Hossein (2008): Iranian Journalism and the Law in the Twentieth Century. In: Iranian Studies 41:5, 739-754.
- Shahnavaṣ, S. (1985): *Afyūn*. In: Encyclopaedia of Iran.
- Shahyād I (2010): Iranian National Police Force (*šahr-bānī-ye koll-e kešvar-e šāhanšāhī-ye īrān*). (<http://www.shahyad.net/iiaarmy/Police/police.html>, accessed 22 September 2010)
- Shahyād II (2010): *Žandarmerī-ye koll-e kešvar-e šāhanšāhī-ye īrān* (Iranian National Imperial Gendarmerie). (<http://www.shahyad.net/iiaarmy/Gendarmerie/Gandarmeri.pdf>, accessed 22 September 2010)
- Siassi, Iradj & Fozouni, Bahman (1980a): Distribution of opium coupons to addicts in Iran. Policies and Problems. In: Chemical Dependencies 4 (1980): 1-2, 127-133.
- Siassi, Iradj & Fozouni, Bahman (1980b): Dilemmas of Iran's opium maintenance program. An action research for evaluating goal conflicts and policy changes. In: The International Journal of the Addictions 15:8, 1127-1140.
- Siavoshi, Sussan (1992): Factionalism and Iranian Politics.: the Post-Khomeini Experience. In: Iranian Studies 25:3, 27-49.

- *Siyāsāt* (19 Āḍar 1379 – 9 December 2000): *Yek fāḡe‘eh! Irān bīš az afghānestān ālūdeh-ye e‘tiyād ast.* (A calamity! Iran is more contaminated by addiction than Afghanistan), p. 9, 14
- Sobhani, A.R. & Shojaii-Tehrani, H. & Nikpour, E. & Noroozi-Rad, N. (April 2000): Drug and Chemical Poisoning in Northern Iran. In: *Archives of Iranian Medicine* 3:2.
- Sreberny-Mohammadi, Annabelle (1990): Small Media For A Big Revolution - Iran. In: *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 3:3 (1990), 341-371.
- Stack, Edward (1882): *Six Months in Persia. Volume I.* London: Sampson, Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington.
- Stack, Edward (1882): *Six Months in Persia. Volume II.* London: Sampson, Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington.
- Strauss, Anselm L. (1994): *Grundlagen qualitativer Sozialforschung. Dantenanalyse und Theoriebildung in der empirischen soziologischen Forschung.* München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.
- Strohmaier, Gotthart (2010): *Ḥunayn b. Ishāq al-‘Ibādī.* In: Bearman, P. & Bianquis, Th. & Bosworth, C.E. & van Donzel, E. & Heinrichs, W.P. (eds.): *Encyclopaedia of Islam.* Leyden: Brill. Second Edition.
- Strübing, Jörg (2004): *Grounded Theory. Zur sozialtheoretischen und epistemologischen Fundierung des Verfahrens der empirisch begründeten Theoriebildung.* Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Swissinfo (30 April 2008): *Father of LSD Takes Final Trip.*  
([http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/science\\_technology/Father\\_of\\_LSD\\_takes\\_final\\_trip.html?cid=6623312](http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/science_technology/Father_of_LSD_takes_final_trip.html?cid=6623312), accessed 2 November 2019).
- Sykes, Percy Molesworth (1902): *Ten Thousand Miles in Persia or Eight Years in Irán.* London: John Murray.
- Tabrīzī, Īraḡ (1379 – 2000/01): *Teḡārat-e šayṭānī.* (Satanic Trade). Tehrān: Enteshārāt-e Tehrān.
- Taillieu, Dieter (2003): *Haoma I: Botany.* In: *Encyclopaedia of Iran.*
- Tarrock, Adam (2001): The muzzling of liberal press. In: *Third World Quarterly* 22: iv, 585-602.
- Tavernier, Jean-Baptiste (1679): *Les Six Voyages de Jean Baptiste Tavernier, Ecuyer Baron d’Aubonne, en Turquie, en Perse, et aux Indes. Volume I.* Paris: N.P.



- Tavoosi, Anahita & Zaferane, Azade & Enzevaei, Anahita & Tajik, Parvin & Ahmadinezhad, Zahra (2004): Knowledge and Attitude towards HIV/AIDS among Iranian Students. In: BMC Public Health 4:17.
- Ṭayyār, ‘Abdollāh (1380 – 2001/02): *Mavādd-e moḥadder dar feqh-e eslāmī*. (Drugs in Islamic Law). Torbat Ğām: Entešārāt-e Aḥmad Ğām.
- Tazmini, Ghoncheh (2009): Khatami’s Iran. The Islamic Republic and the Turbulent Path to Reform. International Library of Iranian Studies, Volume 12. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Tehran Times (5 July 2008): Performance of Headquarter for Fighting Against Narcotics in 2007 and Programs for 2008. Special Report, 7-10.
- Teixeira, Pedro (1902): The Travels of Pedro Teixeira: With His ‘Kings of Harmuz’ and Extractions From His ‘Kings of Persia’. Translated by Sinclair, William F. and Notes by Ferguson, Donald. London: Hakluyt Society.
- UN → *United Nations*
- UNDCP → *United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention*
- UNHCHR → *United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights*
- United Nations (2010): United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. ([http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg\\_no=XVIII-12&chapter=18&lang=en](http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12&chapter=18&lang=en), accessed 4 November 2019)
- United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (2000): Global Illicit Drug Trends 2000. UNODCCP Studies on Drugs and Crime. Statistics. Vienna: United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP).
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2009): World Drug Report 2009. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2010): Integrated Border Control in the Islamic Republic of Iran. (<http://www.unodc.org/iran/en/i50.html>, accessed 24 September 2010)
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime & Project Legal Assistance & Islamic Republic of Iran Drug Control HQS (1383 – 2004/05): *Mağmū‘eh-ye qavānīn va moqarrer-āt-e mobārezeḥ bā mavādd-e moḥadder*. (Collection of Laws and Regulations against Illicit Drugs. Tehrān: *Riṽasat-e ğomhūrī. Mo‘āvenat-e pażūheš, tadvīn va tanqīḥ-e qavānīn va moqarrer-āt. Edāreh-ye koll-e tadvīn va tanqīḥ-e qavānīn va moqarrerāt*. (The Presidency. The Directorate General for Codification and Compilation of Laws and Regulations).

- United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (2002): Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Freedom of Expression.  
(<http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/6d299cfc98c537cac1256b75002f86f3?OpenDocument>, accessed 26 September 2010)
- UNODC → *United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime*
- UNODCCP → *United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention*
- Vadet, Jean-Claude (2010): *Ibn Māsawayh, Abū Zakariyyāa'Yuhannā*. In: Bearman, P. & Bianquis, Th. & Bosworth, C.E. & van Donzel, E. & Heinrichs, W.P. (eds.): *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Leyden: Brill. Second Edition.
- Vakili-Zad, Cyrus (Spring 1990): Organization, Leadership and Revolution: Religiously-Oriented Opposition in the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979. In: *Conflict Quarterly* 10:2, 5-25.
- Vazirian, Mohsen & Nassirimanesh, Bijan & Zamani, Saman & Ono-Kihara, Masako & Kihara, Masahiro & Ravari, Shahrzad Mostazavi & Gouya, Mohammad Mehdi (2005): Brief report: Needle and Syringe Sharing Practices of Injecting Drug Users Participating in an Outreach HIV Prevention Program in Tehran, Iran. A Cross-Sectional Study. In: *Harm Reduction Journal* 2:19.
- Vezārat-e Farhang va Eršād-e Eslāmī (2010): *Vezārat-e farhang va eršād-e eslāmī* ((*Ministry for Islamic Culture and Guidance*)).  
(<http://www.ad.gov.ir/pr/bio/>, accessed 25 September 2010)
- WHO → *World Health Organization*
- Wills, Charles James (1886): *Persia as it is. Being Sketches of Modern Persian Life and Character*. London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington.
- World Health Organization (2004): *Best Practice in HIV / AIDS Prevention and Care for Injecting Drug Users. The Triangular Clinic in Kermanshah, Islamic Republic of Iran*. Cairo: World Health Organization, Regional Office for the Eastern Meditteranean.
- Yarshater, Ehsan (2006): Iran II. Iranian History 2, Islamic Period 5. The Qajar Dynasty (1799-1924). In: *Encyclopedia Iranica*.
- Yassari, Nadjma (2001): The print media in Iran. An effective weapon for civil society? In: *Orient. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Politik & Wirtschaft des Orients* 42:3, 427-447.
- Yavari d'Hellencourt, Nouchine (1995): La difficile réémergence d'une presse indépendante en Iran. Kyàn, une revue quête de modernité islamique. In: *CEMOTI* 20, 91-114.
- Yazdī, Abo 'l-Qāsem (1326 HQ – 1908/09 AD): *Ketāb-e vāfūr va vāfūrīyān*. (Book of the Opium Pipe and Opium Pipe Smokers). Tehrān: N.P.

- Yūsefī-Maḥalleh, Emrāhīm & Mazlūmī, ‘Alī-Reżā (1386 – 2007/08): *Tağdīd-e naẓar dar aḥkām-e mavādd-e moḥadder. Dīvān-e ‘ālī-ye kešvar – dad-setānī-ye koll-e kešvar*. (Revision of Drug Edicts. Supreme Court – Office of the Public Prosecutor. Tehrān: Enteshārāt-e Šāberīyūn.
- Zabih, Sepehr (1982): *The Mossadegh Era. Roots of the Iranian Revolution*. Chicago, Illinois: Lake View Press.
- Zakariyā’ī, Moḥammad-‘Alī (1385 – 2006/07): *Mavādd-e moḥadder va e’tiyād dar arā-ye feqhī*. (Drugs and Addiction in Legal Views). Tehrān: Dānešgāh-e ‘Olūm-e Entezāmī-ye NĀĞĀ. Mo‘āventat-e Pažūheš. Edāreh-ye Čāp.
- Zamani, S. & Kihara, M. & Gouya, M.M. & al. (2005): Prevalence of and Factors Associated With HIV-1 Infection Among Drug Users Visiting Treatment Centres in Tehran, Iran. In: *AIDS* 19, 709-716.
- Zamani, S. & Kihara, M. & Gouya, M.M. & Nassirimanesh, B. & Ono-Kihara, M. & Ravari, S.M. & Safaie, A. & Ichikawa, S. (April 2006): High Prevalence of HIV Infection Associated with Incarceration among community-based injecting drug users in Teheran, Iran. In: *Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome* 24, 342-346.
- Zamani, Saman & Ichikawa, Seiichi & Nassirimanesh, Bijan & Vazirian, Mohsen & Ichikawa, Kazuko & Gouya, Mohammad Mehdi & Afshar, Parvin & Ono-Kihara, Masako & Mortazavi Ravari, Shahrzad & Kihara, Masahiro (2007): Prevalence and Correlates of Hepatitis C Virus Infection Among Injecting Drug Users In Tehran. In: *International Journal of Drug Policy* 18 (2007), 359-363.
- Zerā’āt, ‘Abbās (1386 – 2007/08): *Hoqūq-e kayfarī-ye mavādd-e moḥadder*. (Penal Drug Laws). Tehrān: Enteshārāt-e Qoqnūs.
- Ziaaddini, Hasan & Ziaaddini, Mohammad Reza (2005): The Household Survey of Drug abuse in Kerman, Iran. In: *Journal of Applied Sciences* 5:2 (2005), 380-382.
- Zirinsky, Michael P. (1992): Imperial Power and Dictatorship: Britain and the Rise of Reza Shah, 1921-1926. In: *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24:4, 639-663.